Lecture 9 — Friendships and Civic Association

As we noted at the outset, friendship and justice evidently deal with the same topics and persons, for in every association, there seem to be some kind of justice and also friendship. [1657]

Consequently, fellow voyagers and fellow soldiers are greeted as friends. So too are those who engage in other common ventures; for to the extent that people share with one another, friendship—and justice too—exists among them. [1659]

Correctly, then, the proverb says that “friends’ goods are common goods.” Indeed, friendship consists in mutual sharing. [1660]

Brothers and comrades have all things in common. But other associates have certain definite things in common; some have more in common, others less. In accordance with this, some friendships likewise differ in degree. [1661]

Similarly, the notions of justice differ. The same kind of right does not exist between parents and children as between brother and brother; nor are relations between companions the same as those between fellow citizens. This is likewise the case in other types of friendship. Therefore, different acts of injustice are found among the persons just mentioned. [1662]

Moreover, acts of injustice are aggravated by being done to close friends. For example, it is more shameful to steal money from a comrade than from a fellow citizen, or to refuse help to a brother than to refuse a stranger, or to strike one’s father than to strike someone else. Friendship and justice naturally increase at the same time as they exist between the same persons and are equally extensive. [1663]

All associations are like parts of civic association, for men come together for some advantage and acquire something necessary for life. But civic association seems to be formed and to endure for the sake of advantage, so that the citizens might seek and obtain some benefit accruing. Indeed, legislators aim at this, and men call that just that contributes to the common good. [1665]

Other associations, then, seek some private gain. Thus, sailors aim at a successful voyage in the hope of making money or something of the sort; fellow soldiers agree on the objective of war, whether it be wealth, or victory, or the capture of a city; members of tribes and townships act in a similar way. [1667]

Still other associations seem to be formed for the sake of pleasure, such as religious choirs or minstrels, for they were established respectively to perform at the sacrifices and feasts. [1668]

But all these were usually placed under civic association that aims not at present gain, but at what is profitable all during life. And the people offer sacrifice and arrange gatherings to render honor to the gods and to acquire rest and pleasure for themselves. For the ancient sacrifices and gatherings took place after the harvest as an offering of first fruits, for at this period men had most leisure. [1669]

All these associations seem to be divisions of civic association. Consequently, the various kinds of friendships that we discussed will correspond to these associations. [1671]

1657. As we noted at the outset, friendship and justice. After the Philosopher has treated the different kinds of friendships existing between unequal persons, he now distinguishes them according to their proper formalities.

He handles this in two ways.

First, he shows that these kinds of friendships are distinguished in much the same way as civic associations.

Second, at there are three kinds (1160a31; [1672]), he distinguishes the kinds of friendships according to the distinctions of civic units.

Concerning the first point, he gives this argument. Every friendship consists in association. Every association is reduced to civic association. Therefore, all friendships must be understood according to civic associations.

He treats this argument under three aspects.

First, he proves the first statement;

second, at all associations are (1160a8; [1665]), he proves the second statement;

third, at all these associations (1160a28; [1671]), he draws a conclusion.

He does two things in regard to the first point.

First, he shows that every friendship consists in association.

Second, at brothers and comrades (1159b32; [1661]), he shows that friendship is differentiated according to the diversity of association.

He shows the first in three ways.

1658. First, by the following argument. As was previously explained [1632] justice and friendship deal with the same things. But justice consists in association, for every kind of justice has a relation to another, as we stated in book 5 [885–86, 906, 909, 934]. Therefore, friendship, too, consists in association.

1659. Second, at consequently, fellow voyagers (1159b27), he shows the same thing by customary speech. Men are accustomed to call friends those who share in any common undertaking—for example, fellow voyagers who take part in seafaring and fellow soldiers who share in military service. The same is true in other kinds of association, because friendship seems to exist among people to the extent that they share with one another, and because, in accordance with this, justice also exists among them.

1660. Third, at correctly, then (1159b31), he proves his contention by a current proverb. It is generally said that friends’ goods are common goods. Therefore, friendship consists in sharing in common.

1661. At brothers and comrades (1159b32), he shows that friendships differ according to different modes of association.

He discusses this point under three aspects.

First, he explains the diversity of friendships according to the diversity of association. We see that brothers and similar relatives have all things in common, like home, table, and so on. But other friends have particular things as their own; some have more, some less. In accordance with this, some friendships are greater, such as among those who have many things in common; and others are less, as among those who have few things in common. From this it is very evident that, if there were no communication, there could be no friendship.

1662. Second, at similarly, the notions (1159b35), he shows that justice is differentiated according to different types of association. The same kind of right is not found in every association, but a different kind. Thus, it is obvious that the same right does not exist between father and sons as does between brother and brother. Likewise, there is a different justice between etairos—that is, people of the same age and rearing—than there is between citizens, because they bestow different things on one another as mutually due. The same pattern holds in other kinds of friendship. So it is clear that different types of justice exist between the individuals just mentioned.

1663. Third, at moreover, acts of injustice (1160a3), he shows how justice is differentiated according to the diversity of friendship. He says justice and injustice increase in proportion as they are done to closer friends. The reason is that it is just in a greater degree to do good to a closer friend, and unjust in a greater degree to injure him. So it is more offensive and unjust to rob or steal money from a familiar acquaintance or a comrade than it is to do so from a fellow citizen, or to withhold help from a brother rather than from a stranger, or to strike one’s father rather than to strike someone else.

1664. That justice and friendship are extended at the same time arises from this, that they exist in the same persons and both pertain equally to some communication. This is confirmation of what was stated previously [1661].

1665. Then, at all associations (1160a8), he shows that all associations are reduced to civic association.

He treats this point in a twofold manner.

First, he shows that all association has a likeness to civic association.

Second, at other associations, then (1160a14; [1667]), he shows that all other associations are contained under civic association.

He says first that every association has some likeness to the parts of civic association. We see that all associations agree in something useful, in that they acquire something necessary for living. And civic association also appears to have this, because fellow citizens seem both to have come together in the beginning and to have remained together for their common interest.

This is evident for two reasons.

1666. First, legislators seem to aim most of all to obtain the general welfare.

Second, men call that just in a state that benefits the citizens generally.

1667. Next, at other associations(1160a14), he shows that other associations are contained under civic association.

On this point, he does three things.

First, he shows how some of the other associations are directed to a particular interest. He says that associations other than the civic intend some private gain. For example, fellow voyagers intend to acquire money if they are merchants, or something else of the sort, like a city, if they are warriors. If they are fellow soldiers, they agree in the objective of the war, whether this be riches, victory alone, or capture of a city. In this way, too, those who belong to one tribe or one people agree on some private gain.

1668. Second, at still other associations (1160a19), he shows that even associations that are apparently formed for pleasure are really for some utility. He says still other associations seemingly exist for pleasure, such as choruses or those who sing together in a choir or a dance, and bands or those who play brass instruments like trumpets and cymbals. Associations of this kind were accustomed to be established for the sake of the religious cult, so that men may be more pleasantly detained there, or on account of a wedding or nuptials, that the groom and bride may have greater pleasure because they share in such great rejoicing.

1669. Third, at but all these (1160a21), he shows from the premises that all the other previous associations are contained under civic association. He says that all were usually placed under civic association, inasmuch as all are customarily directed by it. He gives the explanation because, as previously observed [1667], other associations are ordered to some private advantage. Civic association, however, does not aim at a private and present gain, but at what is useful all during life. He shows this especially in regard to associations of persons providing entertainment, and most of all in sacrifices where it seems less evident.

1670. Aristotle says that people who offer sacrifice in gatherings of this kind intend to render honor to God and to acquire for themselves repose and a little pleasure, which is ordered to the good of living. Therefore the ancients also gathered together after the harvest in the autumn to offer sacrifices, that is, to pay first-fruits. This was a suitable time for men to have leisure both that they might rest from their recent labors and because abundant food was available. So, obviously, all these things are subjected to the ordering of the state, as they pertain to the benefit of living.

1671. At all these associations (1160a28), he leads up to the conclusion intended: all associations are contained under civic association as parts of it. To this extent, others are directed to particular interests. but civic association to the common welfare. Now since friendships are formed in relation to associations of this kind, it follows that the distinction of friendships should be observed according to the distinction of civic association.