Lecture 4 — Useful and Pleasurable Friendships Compared

But the friendship for pleasure has a likeness to this friendship, for virtuous men are pleasing to one another. The same can be said about utilitarian friendship, since virtuous men are also useful to one another. [1585]

But, here again, friendships are to a great extent lasting when an equal return (of pleasure, for instance) is made by each friend; and not only by a return of pleasure, but also by a return of the same pleasurable object, as happens among the witty. This does not occur between a lover and his beloved, however, for they do not take pleasure in the same things: one in seeing the beloved, the other in receiving the attention of the lover. But when beauty fades, the friendship sometimes breaks up, because the lover is no longer attracted by the beloved and the other no longer receives the adulation of the lover. [1586]

Again, many persons remain friends when they become accustomed to each other’s natural dispositions, these being similar. [1588]

Where people do not exchange pleasure but rather profit in matters of love, their friendship is less intense and also less enduring. [1589]

Likewise, people who are friends by reason of utility break up their friendship when utility ends because they were not lovers of one another, but only of profit. [1590]

Therefore, for the sake of pleasure and utility, bad people may be friends with one another or good men may be friends with bad men, and those who are neither good nor bad may be friends with any sort of person. But it is plain that only virtuous men love each other because of themselves, for vicious men do not find pleasure in one another unless some advantage is forthcoming. [1591]

Only the friendship between virtuous men is unchangeable. For it is not easy to believe some evil about a person who has been proved often and never found acting unjustly, and in whom we have discovered whatever is considered worthy of true friendship. But, in other types of friendship, there is nothing to prevent all such kinds of suspicions from occurring. Indeed, men designate as friends both those who love for utility, like alliances between states that seem to be contracted with a view to advantage, and those who love for pleasure, like children. Consequently, we too should call men of this sort friends. [1592]

There are, then, many kinds of friendship. First and principally is the friendship between good men qua good. The remaining types are called friendship by analogy, for some men are friends in virtue of something good or something akin to good; even what is pleasurable seems to be good to those who are fond of pleasures. But these friendships do not combine very well, nor do the same persons become friends from motives of utility. Things that are incidental are not bound together in all respects. But friendship is divided into these species: evil men can be friends for pleasure or utility, this being their point of resemblance. On the other hand, good men are friends for one another’s sake, namely, in virtue of their goodness. The good, then, are friends in an absolute sense, but the others only incidentally and because of their resemblance to the good. [1594]

1585. But the friendship for pleasure. After the Philosopher has treated the three kinds of friendship, he now compares them.

On this point, he does three things.

First, he shows in what respect the other kinds of friendship are like perfect friendship.

Second, at therefore, for the sake (1157a16; [1591]), he shows how they differ.

Third, at there are, then (1157a30; [1594]), he summarizes what has been discussed.

He treats the first point in a twofold manner.

First, he shows the likeness of the other kinds of friendship to perfect friendship in regard to the reason for loving. He explains that friendship for pleasure has a likeness to perfect friendship to the extent that virtuous men are pleasing to one another. Similarly, utilitarian friendship is like perfect friendship in that virtuous men are useful to one another.

1586. Second, at but, here again (1157a3), he shows the likeness in regard to the duration of friendship.

On this point, he does two things.

First, he shows how useful and pleasurable friendships endure.

Second, at likewise, people who (1157a14; [1590]), he shows which of these is more enduring.

He discusses the first point from a double aspect.

First, he proposes two reasons why these two kinds of friendship are lasting; in this, they resemble perfect friendship.

Second, at where people (1157a12; [1589]), he states the reasons why they lack permanency.

First, he says that friendships even among those who are friends for utility and pleasure endure for the most part, since such persons make the same and an equal return to one another, such as pleasure for pleasure. Because there is a variety of pleasures differing in kind and number according to the variety of pleasurable objects, the durability of friendship requires not only a return of pleasure, but a return by the same kind of pleasurable object. This occurs among the witty, when one delights in the banter of the other. But this does not necessarily happen among persons who love one another sexually, since sometimes they do not take pleasure in the same things.

1587. But the lover takes pleasure in seeing the beauty of the beloved, and the beloved in receiving favors from the lover. On the termination of these circumstances, pleasurable friendship sometimes breaks up when the attractiveness of the one and the favor of the other cease.

1588. At again, many persons (1157a10), he gives the second reason for durability. He explains that, even in friendship based on utility and pleasure, many remain friends when one loves the ways of the other, as wehn one lustful person loves the ways of another or one miser loves the ways of another; not that such ways are attractive of themselves, but by reason of habit, inasmuch as both persons have like habits. But likeness is essentially a cause of friendship unless it incidentally hinders the good of the individual, as we stated previously [1566]. Since evil habits acquired from custom are enduring, such a friendship is lasting.

1589. Then, at where people (1157a12), he states the reason why friendship is deficient in durability. He says that people who do not make a return of one pleasurable object for another, but rather of a useful object for a pleasurable one, are less friends because of slighter likeness to one another. Hence, their friendship is less enduring.

1590. Next, at likewise, people who (1157a14), he compares the durability of the two kinds of friendship. He says that men who are friends by reason of utility break up their friendship when utility ceases, because they were friends not of one another, but of the utility they seek. But pleasure comes more from the beloved in himself than does utility, which sometimes is in an external object.

1591. At therefore, for the sake (1157a16), he states two differences by which the two kinds of friendship deviate from perfect friendship.

First, he infers from the discussions that, for the sake of pleasure and utility, any type of men can become friends with one another, such as the good with the good, the bad with the bad, and even those who are neither virtuous nor vicious with both (namely, the good and the bad), and with each other. But only good men make friends in that perfect friendship by which men are loved for their own sakes; evil men do not provide anything except utility by reason of which they can love one another or find mutual pleasure.

1592. He gives the second difference at only the friendship (1157a20), saying that only friendship between virtuous men, which is the perfect kind, is of itself unchangeable. Friendship is destroyed especially when one friend finds in the other something opposed to their friendship. But this is impossible in friendship between the virtuous. A man does not readily believe some evil about one whom he has often proved and never found doing any wrong and in whom he has discovered whatever is considered worthy of true friendship. Consequently, such a friendship does not break up, because it is friendship essentially and not incidentally, and because it is perfect, containing in itself everything requisite for friendship (the reasons have been given before [1578–82]), and also because it does not admit as an obstacle to friendship what is now offered as a reason.

1593. But in other kinds of friendship, nothing hinders one from believing evil of another and acting unjustly to another. Therefore, some would not be termed friends according to these types of friendship. But people have usually designated as friends of this kind both those who love for the sake of utility (friendship is said to exist among states because of the advantage of mutually fighting against their common enemies) and those who love one another for the sake of pleasure, as is evident among children. So we should follow the customary way of speaking and call such men friends.

1594. Last, at there are, then (1157a30), he summarizes what has been said about the kinds of friendship, stating that there are many kinds of friendship. There is that between good men as good, being friendship in the primary and proper sense, while the remaining kinds are called friendship from a likeness to this. Some men are called friends according to these types of friendship to the extent that there is present a likeness to true friendship. It is clear that what is pleasurable seems to be a kind of good to those who love pleasures. So, this friendship has a likeness to that which is an unqualified good. The same argument prevails in the case of useful friendship.

1595. However, these two kinds of friendship are not so combined that friends for utility and friends for pleasure are identical, for things that are incidental are not united in all cases, such as what is musical and white. The kinds of friendship just treated are friendships incidentally, as we have pointed out [1566]; hence, they are not always combined. If, then, according to the division of friendship into the foregoing species, the evil can be friends among themselves for pleasure or utility, then to that extent, they are like one another in one or other of these aspects. But the good are friends for each others’ sake; that is, they are friends according to their goodness. Thus only the good are friends essentially; others are friends by way of resemblance, to the extent that they resemble the good.