Lecture 11 — Friendships Conform to Kinds of States

Each form of government seems to involve a kind of friendship, inasmuch as justice is present. [1688]

The friendship of a king to his subjects is one of superiority in beneficence, for he confers benefactions on them if he is a good ruler, taking care that his subjects act virtuously; he is regarded as a shepherd of his flock. Hence, Homer called Agamemnon the shepherd of his people. [1689]

Such, too, is the friendship of a father. [1690]

These friendships, though, differ in the greatness of benefits. A father is the cause of his son’s existence (considered the greatest good in this life), rearing, and instruction—benefits that are attributed also to a man’s ancestors. [1691]

Likewise, by nature, a father rules his sons, an ancestor his descendants, and a king his subjects. [1692]

Friendships of this type imply a kind of excellence in the ruler. For this reason, parents are honored. Thus justice is not the same for both parties, but must be proportioned to their worth. This is true also of friendship. [1693]

But the friendship between husband and wife resembles that found in an aristocracy. For, it is in accordance with virtue, and more good is attributed to those better qualified, although what is due each one is assigned to him. In this way, justice is preserved. [1694]

Friendship between brothers is similar to that among comrades, for they are equal and around the same age; and persons like this have much the same training and habits. There is a likeness to this in the friendship found in a timocracy, for the citizens aim at equality and virtue; they share power equally and in turn. So their friendship too will be one of equality. [1695]

On the other hand, just as there is little justice in corrupt forms of rule, so there is little friendship. [1696]

It is minimal in the worst system, for in a tyranny, no friendship, or very little, is found. [1697]

In those regimes where nothing is shared by the ruler and the subjects, no friendship exists, nor is there any justice, for the subject is like a tool to an artisan, the body to the soul, a slave to a master. These objects are benefitted by the things that use them. But lifeless instruments are not subjects for friendship or justice; nor are horses or cattle; neither is a master a friend to a slave as a slave, for they have nothing in common. In fact, a slave is a living tool, and a tool a lifeless slave. [1698]

Consequently, there can be no friendship with a slave as slave, but only as man. Indeed, a man can have a kind of justice toward anyone who can share something according to law or agreement. The same too holds for friendship with a man inasmuch as he is a man. There is, then, little room for friendship or justice under tyrannies. [1700]

In democracies, however, friendship is most fully realized, for where all are equal, there is much sharing. [1701]

1688. Each form of government seems to involve. After the Philosopher has distinguished the kinds of political and domestic association, he now distinguishes the corresponding kinds of friendships.

He discusses this point in a twofold manner.

First, he states his intent. He says each form of government and political order apparently involves a kind of friendship, from the fact that, in every polity, a kind of justice is found. But friendship and justice are in some way concerned with the same matters, as we have indicated [1658, 1664].

1689. Second, at the friendship (1161a11), he explains his statement:

first, in regard to good forms of government;

second, at on the other hand (1161a30; [1696]), in regard to evil systems.

He treats the first point under three headings.

First, he shows how friendship can exist on the basis of kingdom;

second, at but the friendship (1161a22; [1694]), on the basis of aristocracy;

third, at friendship between brothers (1161a25; [1695]), on the basis of timocracy.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he shows how friendship may exist between a king and his subjects.

Second, at such, too, is (1161a15; [1690]), he compares a father’s friendship with a king’s.

He says first that, by reason of benefit, a superabundant friendship exists between a king and his subjects, as between a benefactor and a beneficiary. It is proper to a king to confer benefits on his subjects, for if he is a good ruler, he takes care that they perform good deeds, and he strives to make his subjects virtuous. Hence, inasmuch as he leads his subjects as a shepherd his flock, he is even given that title. Thus, Homer called King Agamemnon “shepherd of his people.”

1690. Then, at such, too, is (1161a15), he compares paternal with regal friendship.

He considers four aspects of this point.

First, he compares a father’s friendship with a king’s, saying that the friendship of a father is like that of a king.

1691. Second, at these friendships, though (1161a16), he shows the difference between the two friendships, noting that they differ in greatness of benefits. Although the benefaction of a king absolutely speaking is greatest, insofar as it extends to all the people, nevertheless the benefaction of a father is greater in relation to one person. A father is the cause of the son’s three greatest goods.

First, by generation, he is the cause of the son’s existence (considered the greatest good);

second, of upbringing, through his rearing;

third, of his instruction.

These three goods are attributed not only to fathers in regard to their sons but also to the ancestors, namely, the grandfathers and the great-grandfathers, in regard to their grandsons and great-grandsons.

1692. Third, at likewise, by nature (1161a18), he proves his statement that the friendship of a father is like a king’s. By nature, a father is the ruler of his son, as an ancestor is of his descendants, just as a king is a ruler of his subjects. Consequently, sons are under the dominion of their father, and grandsons of their grandfather, just as subjects are under the dominion of their king.

1693. Fourth, at friendships of this type (1161a20), he shows the basis of agreement for all such friendships. He states two common features.

One is that they all consist in a kind of excellence of one person over the other. Since this is obvious in the case of a king and his subjects, he makes it clear concerning fathers and sons. Because the father greatly excels, parents are honored by their sons, for honor is due to one who excels—as we pointed out in book 1 [214], and the same must be said of ancestors.

The other feature is that, in friendships of this nature, the same thing is not just on the part of each. The king, therefore, must not do the same for his subject as the subject must do for his king, nor the father the same for his son as the son for his father. But what is just must be judged for both parties according to worth, such that each does for the other what is proper, for in this way. friendship between them entails one loving the other in a fitting manner.

1694. Next, at but the friendship (1161a22), he shows that there is a friendship corresponding to aristocracy. He says that friendship between husband and wife is similar to that found in an aristocracy, in which a few are entrusted with authority by reason of excellence, on account of which they are loved. Since those in authority are better qualified, more good is attributed to them, inasmuch as they are esteemed above others; nevertheless, what is proper to each is assigned to him. Indeed, virtuous men constituted in power do not take from their subjects the good that belongs to them. By this procedure, justice is preserved in accordance with aristocracy, and the same is true in a friendship between a husband and wife. The husband, being more worthy, is placed over the wife; however, the husband does not direct the affairs belonging to the wife.

1695. At friendship between brothers (1161a25), he shows how friendship is understood in accordance with timocracy. He states that friendship between brothers is similar to etairiciae—namely, friendship between persons of the same age—for brothers are equal and alike in age. Persons of this kind have the same training and habits for the most part, because habits follow the way of living, as was indicated in book 2 [248, 315]. From this, there appears an obvious likeness between such a friendship and friendship corresponding to timocracy, in which citizens, who are in control, are equal and fair or virtuous. Hence, it is just that they rule in turn so that one does not have all the power, but a part of it, which makes them equal in power. So too is the friendship among them. This is also clearly observed in friendship among those who are brothers and of a like age or upbringing.

1696. Then, at on the other hand (1161a30), he shows how there is friendship corresponding to corrupt forms of government.

He discusses this point under three aspects.

First, he shows that, in such systems, there is very little friendship;

second, at it is minimal (1161a31; [1697]), he shows in which of these the least friendship exists;

third, at in democracies, however (1161b9; [1701]), he shows in which of these most friendship exists.

He says first that, as there is little justice in perversions—that is, corrupt forms of rule—so also there is little friendship, for this in some way concerns the same thing as justice.

1697. Next, at it is minimal (1161a31), he shows in which corrupt political system friendship is minimal.

On this point, he does three things.

First, he states his proposition;

second, at in those regimes (1161a32; [1698]), he proves it;

third, at consequently, there can be (1161b5; [1700]), he shows how the statement should be understood.

He says first that, since there is little friendship in corrupt regimes, it follows that there is the least friendship in the worst regimes, namely, in tyrannies, in which no friendship or very little exists.

1698. Second, at in those regimes (1161a32), he proves his proposition. Friendship consists in sharing in common, as we have explained [1655–61]. Obviously, then, if nothing is shared between ruler and ruled—as when the ruler aims at his own good—no friendship can exist between them; nor can there be any justice between them, inasmuch as the ruler usurps for himself all the good due to the subject. But this happens under tyranny, because the tyrant does not strive for the common good, but for his own. Thus, he acts with his subjects like a workman with a tool, a soul with the body, or a master with a slave, for the tyrant uses his subjects as slaves.

1699. These three objects just mentioned are benefited by the persons who use them, to the extent that the objects are moved—that is, the slave by the master, the body by the soul, and the tool by the workman. However, those who use things do not have friendship toward them. Even if they somehow benefit the things, they intend by this the good of the things only as it is related to their own good. This is particularly obvious of an artisan in relation to lifeless instruments, which are not objects of friendship or justice because they do not share in the activity of human life. Indeed, horses and cattle are not objects of friendship, though they do have life. So, too, a master does not have friendship with a slave, because they share nothing, but all the good of the slave is the master’s, as all the good of a tool is the artisan’s. In fact, a slave is, as it were, a living tool, and conversely a tool is, as it were, a lifeless slave.

1700. Third, at consequently, there can be (1161b5), he shows how his statement [1699] is to be taken. He says that, according to the premises, there is no friendship of a master for a slave as a slave, although there is friendship for him precisely as a man. A friendship can exist between any two men inasmuch as they can share some thing according to law or arrangement, that is, agreement or promise. In this way, a master can have friendship with a slave as a human being. Thus, it is obvious that, under tyranny, in which rulers use subjects as slaves, there is little friendship or justice.

1701. Then, at in democracies, however (1161b9), he shows in which corrupt political system friendship is most fully realized. He says that this occurs in democracy. In this system, the rulers strive in many ways for the general welfare, inasmuch as they want the common man to be equal to the talented man, and they aim principally at the good of the people. On the other hand, an oligarchy takes a middle course, since it works neither for the good of the many, like a democracy, nor for the benefit of one, like a tyranny, but for the good of a few.