Lecture 12 — Subdivisions of Friendship

All friendship, then, involves common participation, as has been pointed out. [1702]

One may, however, set apart from other friendships those between blood relatives and comrades. [1703]

But civic friendships—existing between fellow tribesmen and fellow voyagers—and others of this kind have more evident signs of association; this seems an acknowledged fact. Among these also will be placed friendship between fellow travelers. [1704]

Friendships between relatives, however, seem to be of various kinds and to depend on paternal friendship. [1705]

Parents indeed love their children as part of themselves. But children love their parents as the authors of their existence. [1706]

Now, parents know the identity of their children better than children know the identity of their parents. [1707]

Moreover, the procreator is nearer to the offspring than the offspring to the procreator, for the product belongs to the producer, that is, a tooth or a hair or the like to its owner; but the producer does not belong to the product at all, or belongs to it only in a minor way. [1708]

But length of time produces the same result. Parents love their children from birth, but children love their parents only after a lapse of time and the acquisition of reason or understanding. [1709]

From these observations, it is obvious that mothers love their children more. [1710]

Undoubtedly, parents love their children as themselves, for their offspring are, as it were, the parents themselves existing separately. But children love their parents because begotten by them. [1711]

Brothers, though, love one another—being generated by the same parents, for identity of origin with them makes the brothers identical with one another. For this reason, brothers are said to be of the same blood, of the same stock, and so on. They are then the same, existing as different individuals. [1712]

Similarity in upbringing and age is a great aid to friendship, for “men of a year like to draw near,” and people living the same way are comrades. Hence, fraternal friendship resembles that of comrades. [1713]

Nephews, however, and other kindred are linked together by derivation from brothers, who are the sons of the same parents. They are more closely or distantly related as they are nearer or farther removed from their common ancestor. [1714]

Children have friendship for their parents—and men for their gods—as for something transcendently good. The reason is that parents are in a special way the causes of their children’s existence, upbringing, and training. [1715]

Such friendship contains more pleasure and utility than an outsider’s friendship, inasmuch as parents and children live more in common. [1716]

Friendship among brothers has all the features of friendship among comrades; and it has them more perfectly when the brothers are virtuous and alike in general, inasmuch as they are closer to one another. For they love each other from birth; they have the same parents, rearing, and education, and so are alike in character; their friendship has been fully and convincingly tested by time. [1717]

In the case of other relatives, a proportionate communication of friendship is found. [1718]

Between man and wife, a natural friendship seems to exist, for they are more inclined by nature to a conjugal society than to a political one. This is so because the home is older and more necessary than the state, and because generation is common to all animals. [1719]

Only to this extent do other animals come together. Men, however, cohabit not only to procreate children, but also to have whatever is needed for life. Indeed, from the beginning, family duties are distinct; some are proper to the husband, others to the wife. Thus mutual needs are provided for when each contributes his own services to the common good. [1721]

Therefore, this friendship seems to possess both utility and pleasure. But it can exist for the sake of virtue if the husband and wife are virtuous, for each has his proper virtue and they can delight in it. [1723]

Children seem to be a bond of union. Hence, sterile couples separate more readily, for children are a common good of both parties; and what is common maintains friendship. [1724]

To ask how man and wife—and friends in general—ought to live together is the same as to ask how they ought to be just. And justice does not seem to be observed in the same [way] towards a friend, a stranger, a comrade, and a fellow student. [1725]

1702. All friendship, then, involves common participation. After the Philosopher has distinguished the kinds of friendship according to the species of political and domestic association, he now subdivides the kinds of friendships.

On this point, he does two things.

First, he states a general principle for dividing and subdividing friendships.

Second, at friendships between relatives (1161b16; [1705]), he gives special treatment to some particular kinds of friendship.

He discusses the first point under three aspects.

First, he proposes a general principle for distinguishing the kinds of friendship, concluding from the premises that all friendship consists in common participation, as has been pointed out [1698].

1703. Second, at one may (1161b12), he distinguishes, by reason of common participation, the kinds of friendship that seem to have less in common. He says that, according to the diversity of common participation, friendship can be distinguished in itself and from others into consanguineous (or that between blood relatives) and companionate (or that between comrades). Blood relatives have a common origin, and comrades a common upbringing.

1704. Third, at but civic friendships (1161b13), according to this, he distinguishes friendships that seem to have more in common. He states that civic friendships (namely, those among fellow tribesmen, fellow voyagers, or men sailing together) and all others of this kind (for example, between fellow soldiers or fellow students) have more evident signs of association than the friendships of blood relatives or comrades. For, in the former, we must clearly acknowledge that association is the cause of friendship. (Friendship between fellow travelers can be placed in this category.) But the friendship of blood relatives or comrades does not have any present and permanent mode of communicating, and so is less obvious.

1705. Then, at friendships between relatives (1161b16), he treats in particular some kinds of friendship:

first, friendship between relatives;

second, at between man and wife (1162a16; [1719]), friendship existing between husband and wife.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he distinguishes the kinds of friendship between blood relatives.

Second, at children have friendship (1162a4), he points out the characteristics of each division.

He discusses the first point under three headings.

First, he treats a father’s friendship for his son;

second, at brothers, though (1161b30; [1712]), the friendship of brothers for one another;

third, at nephews, however (1162a1; [1714]), the friendship of other blood relations.

He handles the first point in a threefold manner.

First, he proposes in what way paternal friendship is related to other friendships between blood relatives.

He says that friendship between blood relatives seems to have great variety, that is, to be divided into many species by reason of the different grades of consanguinity. Nevertheless, all such friendships depend on paternal friendship as a starting point, as will be clear from what follows.

1706. Second, at parents indeed (1161b18), he gives the reason for this friendship. He says that parents love their children as part of themselves; they are generated from the seed of their parents. Hence, the son is a separated part of the father, so to speak. Consequently, this friendship is nearest to the love of a man for himself, from which all friendship is derived, as will be indicated in book 9 [1797]. With reason, then, paternal friendship is considered to be the starting point. But children love their parents as the source of their existence, much like a separated part would love the whole from which it is separated.

1707. Third, at now, parents know (1161b19), he compares a father’s friendship with that of a son.

He discusses this point in a threefold fashion.

First, he ranks paternal friendship above filial;

second, at from these observations (1161b26; [1710]), maternal above paternal;

third, at undoubtedly parents (1161b27; [1711]), he clarifies his statement.

He gives three reasons for the initial assertion.

The first is this. The more a man knows the causes for love, the more reasonable it is that he love more. It has been noted [1076] that parents love their children as part of themselves. But children love their parents as the authors of their existence. Now, fathers can know their offspring better than their children can know that they are their children, for the parents know the generative action, but the children do not, since they were not yet born. Hence, it is reasonable for parents to love their children more than children their parents.

1708. He assigns the second reason at moreover, the procreator (1161b21). It is this. The basis for love in every friendship of blood relatives is the relationship of one person to another. But the procreator or begetter is nearer to the begotten than the thing made to the maker or the begotten to the begetter. The offspring is, as it were, a separated part of the procreator, as we have indicated [1706–7]. Hence, it seems to be compared to the procreator as a separable part to the whole, for example, a tooth or a hair or the like. But such parts, which are separated from the whole, have an affinity to the whole because the whole includes them in itself, and not the opposite. For that reason, the whole seems not to belong to the parts at all or to belong to them less than if the converse were the case, for even if a part pertains to the whole, nevertheless it is not identical with the whole itself, as all the parts are included in it. Consequently, it is reasonable that parents love their children more than children their parents.

1709. He gives the third reason at but length of time (1161b24). Obviously, friendship is strengthened with the passage of time. But it is evident that parents love their children for a greater length of time than do children their parents. Indeed, parents love their children as soon as they are born. But children love their parents only after some time has elapsed and they attain intelligence or the use of reason, or at least the capacity to distinguish their parents from others. For, in the beginning, children call all men fathers and all women mothers, as mentioned in Physics 1. (Physics 1.1.184b12; see Aquinas, In I phys., lec. 1, no. 2.) It is reasonable, then, for parents to love their children more than children love their parents.

1710. Then, at from these observations (1161b26), he compares a mother’s love with a father’s. He says that it can be clearly shown from the previous considerations why mothers love their children more than fathers do.

The first reason he gives does not need proof. For mothers can know better than fathers who their children are. Likewise, in regard to time, mothers conceive the affection of love for their children before fathers, because they are more constantly in their company.

The second reason is applicable in one part but not in the other. For the father disposes the son’s principal part, the form; and the mother disposes the matter, as is noted in the treatise De generatione animalium. (De generatione animalium 2.1.731b13.)

1711. Next, at undoubtedly, parents love (1161b27), he clarifies what he stated in the second reason, that children are closer to their parents than the converse. This is so because parents love their children as themselves. Children generated by their parents are, as it were, the parents themselves, differing from them only in the fact of their distinct existence. On the other hand, children love their parents not as though they were part of their parents, but as begotten by them.

1712. At brothers, though (1161b30), he explains fraternal friendship.

First, he gives the basis of this friendship.

Second, at similarity in upbringing (1161b33; [1713]), he shows the means of strengthening this friendship.

He remarks first that brothers love one another because they are begotten by the same parents. Things that are identical with one and the same thing are identical in some fashion with one another. Since, then, children are identical in some way with their parents, as has been observed [1711], the children’s identity with them—that is, with the parents—makes the children identical in some way. Consequently, we say that brothers are the same by blood, by stock, and so on. Although the parents’ blood (which is the common origin) is entirely the same, this identity also endures in some measure even in the children, who are separated from their parents and from one another.

1713. Then, at similarity in upbringing (1161b33), he explains how this friendship is strengthened. He observes that fraternal friendship is fostered greatly by the fact that brothers are reared together and are nearly the same age, since it is natural for people alike in years to love one another. Likewise, companions or persons of common upbringing usually have an identical manner of life, which is a cause of mutual love. Consequently, fraternal friendship resembles friendship between comrades or persons brought up together.

1714. At nephews, however (1162a1), he defines the friendship of other blood relatives. He states that nephews and other kindred are connected with one another by relationship of generation and friendship to the extent that they derive their origin from brothers, sons of the same parents. In fact, they are called blood relatives because they are descended from these very persons. Such people are said to be more or less related inasmuch as they are nearer to or farther removed from their procreator, that is, their original ancestor, for the first must be the measure of all.

1715. Next, at children have friendship (1162a4), he indicates the characteristics of these friendships:

first, of paternal friendship;

second, at friendship among brothers (1162a9; [1717), of fraternal friendship;

third, at in the case (1162a15; [1718]), of friendship between other blood relatives.

To the first friendship, he assigns two characteristics.

The first is that children have friendship for their parents as to a kind of superior good. The reason is that parents are special benefactors—the cause of their children’s existence, upbringing, and training. Man’s friendship for God is also of this nature.

1716. Then, at such friendships (1162a7), he states the second characteristic. Friendship between children and parents has pleasure and utility in a greater degree than outside friendship in proportion as they live a life more in common. Because of this, they become especially useful and pleasant to one another.

1717. At friendship among brothers (1162a9), he gives the characteristic of fraternal friendship. He observes that the same features are found in friendship of brothers as in the friendship of comrades or persons living together. And if brothers are just or virtuous and entirely alike in their habits, then friendship is greater from this common upbringing, inasmuch as they are closer to one another.

This is due to three considerations.

First, to length of time, since they love each other almost as soon as they are born.

Second, to a more perfect likeness. Brothers born of the same parents seem more alike in their ways and hence appear to have the same natural disposition; they have been reared together and trained in a similar fashion by their parents.

Third, this is due to the proof of friendship since they have put each other to the test, and for that reason, their friendship is highest and firmest.

1718. Next, at in the case (1162a15), he assigns the third characteristic of friendship between other kinsmen. He says that matters pertaining to friendship between other kindred should be understood in proportion to fraternal friendship, since other blood relatives are descended from brothers, as indicated above [1714].

1719. Then, at between man and wife (1162a16), he treats friendship between husband and wife.

He discusses this point under three headings.

First, he assigns the reason for this friendship.

Second, at children seem to be (1162a27; [1724]), he points out the means that can strengthen this friendship.

Third, at to ask how man and wife (1162a29; [1725]), he answers a question.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he offers the proper reason for this friendship.

Second, at therefore, this (1162a24; [1723]), he shows how this friendship shares the general reasons for friendship.

He treats the first point from two aspects.

First, he assigns the particular reason for the friendship that is common to both man and other animals.

Second, at only to this extent (1162a19; [1721]), he gives another reason restricted to men.

He remarks first that a natural friendship seems to exist between man and wife. He proves this by recourse to a higher principle: man is by nature a political animal, and it is more natural for him to be a conjugal animal.

Aristotle presents two arguments.

1720. The first is that antecedent and necessary things seem to belong to nature more completely. And domestic society, to which the union of man and wife pertains, is antecedent to civil society, for the part is antecedent to the whole. Domestic society is also more necessary because it is ordered to acts necessary for life, namely, generation and nourishment. Obviously, then, man is inclined by nature more to conjugal than political society.

The second reason is that generation of offspring, to which the union of man and wife is ordered, is common to other animals, and therefore follows the nature of the genus. So it is clear that man is by nature more a conjugal than a political animal.

1721. Then, at only to this extent (1162a19), he indicates the proper reason for conjugal friendship, which belongs to man alone. He concludes from the premises that pairing of male and female among other animals exists exclusively for generation of offspring, as has been noted [1720]. But union of male and female among men occurs not only for the procreation of children but also for the functions needed in human living. It is immediately apparent that these functions are so divided between man and woman that some are proper to the husband, like external works, and others to the wife, like sewing and other domestic occupations. Thus, mutual needs are provided for when each contributes his own services for the common good.

1722. Obviously, then, conjugal friendship among men is not only natural as among other animals—where it is directed to the work of nature, namely, generation—but also domestic as directed to a sufficiency for family life.

1723. At therefore, this (1162a24), he shows how this friendship shares the common reasons for friendship. He observes from previous statements that conjugal friendship obviously has utility inasmuch as it furnishes a sufficiency for family life. Likewise, it provides pleasure in the generative act, as is the case with other animals. But when the husband and wife are virtuous, their friendship can be based on virtue. In fact, there is a virtue proper to both husband and wife that renders their friendship delightful to each other. Clearly, then, friendship of this kind can be based on virtue, utility, and pleasure.

1724. Next, at children seem (1162a27), he indicates a means of making this friendship strong. He remarks that children seem to be a cause of a stable and lasting union. Hence, sterile couples who fail to have children are separated more readily. In fact, divorce was granted in former times because of sterility. And the reason for this is that children are a common good of both husband and wife, whose union exists for the sake of children. But what is common continues and preserves friendship, which also consists in sharing, as has been pointed out [1702].

1725. At to ask how man and wife (1162a29), he answers an inquiry, namely, how a man and wife ought to live together. He himself replies that to ask this is the same as to inquire how justice exists between man and wife, for they ought to live together in such a way that each fulfills what is just to the other. This will be different for different persons, for the same justice must not be observed toward friend, stranger, comrade, and student. Therefore, a study of this kind belongs to domestic ethics or political science.