Lecture 2

But, even supposing that it were best for the community to have the greatest degree of unity, this unity is by no means proved to follow from the fact 'of all men saying "mine" and "not mine" at the same instant of time,' which, according to Socrates, is the sign of perfect unity in a state. For the word 'all' is ambiguous. If the meaning be that every individual says 'mine' and 'not mine' at the same time, then perhaps the result at which Socrates aims may be in some degree accomplished; each man will call the same person his own son and the same person his wife, and so of his property and of all that falls to his lot. This, however, is not the way in which people would speak who had their had their wives and children in common; they would say 'all' but not 'each.' In like manner their property would be described as belonging to them, not severally but collectively. There is an obvious fallacy in the term 'all': like some other words, 'both,' 'odd,' 'even,' it is ambiguous, and even in abstract argument becomes a source of logical puzzles. That all persons call the same thing mine in the sense in which each does so may be a fine thing, but it is impracticable; or if the words are taken in the other sense, such a unity in no way conduces to harmony.

And there is another objection to the proposal. For that which is common to the greatest number has the least care bestowed upon it. Every one thinks chiefly of his own, hardly at all of the common interest; and only when he is himself concerned as an individual. For besides other considerations, everybody is more inclined to neglect the duty which he expects another to fulfill; as in families many attendants are often less useful than a few. Each citizen will have a thousand sons who will not be his sons individually but anybody will be equally the son of anybody, and will therefore be neglected by all alike.

Further, upon this principle, every one will use the word 'mine' of one who is prospering or the reverse, however small a fraction he may himself be of the whole number; the same boy will be 'so and so's son,' the son of each of the thousand, or whatever be the number of the citizens; and even about this he will not be positive; for it is impossible to know who chanced to have a child, or whether, if one came into existence, it has survived. But which is better- for each to say 'mine' in this way, making a man the same relation to two thousand or ten thousand citizens, or to use the word 'mine' in the ordinary and more restricted sense? For usually the same person is called by one man his own son whom another calls his own brother or cousin or kinsman—blood relation or connection by marriage either of himself or of some relation of his, and yet another his clansman or tribesman; and how much better is it to be the real cousin of somebody than to be a son after Plato's fashion!

Nor is there any way of preventing brothers and children and fathers and mothers from sometimes recognizing one another; for children are born like their parents, and they will necessarily be finding indications of their relationship to one another. Geographers declare such to be the fact; they say that in part of Upper Libya, where the women are common, nevertheless the children who are born are assigned to their respective fathers on the ground of their likeness. And some women, like the females of other animals- for example, mares and cows- have a strong tendency to produce offspring resembling their parents, as was the case with the Pharsalian mare called Honest.

At vero neque si hoc optimum, etc. After he objected to the cause which Socrates assigned for passing a law about the community of women and children, showing that it is not the best thing for the city that it be maximally one, he here begins to show that the city does not attain maximal unity through the previously advanced law. And he posits this for four reasons.

About the first of these, he says that, even if we grant that it would be the best for the city that it be maximally one, it still does not seem to be shown that the city would be maximally one by everyone saying at the same time, “this is mine,” and “this is not mine.” For if all things were common, nobody would be able to say “this is mine” except about that of which another could also say “this is mine.” And Socrates thought that this would be a sign that the city is perfectly one. For he saw that factions arise in the city from this, that one has care for his own good, and another for his own good, and thus the zeal of men is carried toward diverse things because it is not the same thing about which each one says, “this is mine.” But if all men were to say about one and the same object, “this is mine,” the zeal of all men would be born into one; and thus, as Socrates supposed, the city would be maximally one. But this is not a cause [of unity]: because when you say “All say: ‘This is mine,’” this proposition has a twofold meaning: for the word “all” can be taken distributively or collectively. If distributively, its sense would be that each one, through himself, would be able to say of such a thing “this is mine;” and then what Socrates said would definitely be true, because each one would delight in one and the same [child] as though in his own son, and likewise, in the same woman as though his own wife. And thus also for substance, that is, possessions. But those who use wives and children in common do not all say in this sense, “this is mine,” but rather, all speak collectively, as though possessing one common thing: thus it is that nobody says through himself, “this is mine.” And the same thing is also true if a possession is common: for it will be the property of nobody in and of himself. Thus, therefore, it is clear that it was a certain sophistic syllogism along which Socrates was proceeding when he said that all saying “this is mine” is a sign of perfect unity: because such sayings as “all” and “each,” because of their twofold meaning, even in speeches, that is, in disputations, they make litigatious syllogisms, that is, sophistic ones: as if someone were to say, “since it is proposed ‘three from one party, and three from the other party,’ each of them is equal [par];” for this is true if it is taken collectively, because they are equal when joined together at the same time: but if taken distributively, they are unequal. Hence, it ought to be said that in one sense, it is good for all men to say of the same thing that it is theirs, namely, insofar as “all” is taken distributively. But this is not possible, because it implies a contradiction. For from this very thing, that it is the property of this one, it is not of another one. But if it is not taken like this, but collectively, it will not be consensual, that is, not agreeable for the city.

He sets out a second argument, at ad haec autem, etc., through which he shows that what was said by Socrates is not only not useful for the city, but even inflicts the greatest injury [upon the city]. For we see that exceedingly little care is taken of those things that are common to many: because all have the greatest care for what is their own; but about what is common, men care even less than for what belongs to each one; thus it is that something is cared for less by many at the same time than it would be cared for if it belonged to only one. For as long as one believes that another will do something, all neglect it: just as it happens in the services of assistants, that many servants often serve worse, so long as one expects that another will do something. Therefore, following the law of Socrates, it follows that each citizen would have a thousand sons, or many; and thus would care less for each than if he were to have only one. And if we add that these thousand sons are not property of each of the citizens, but is the uncertain son of an uncertain father, much less would they care. Whence, it follows that all citizens will likewise neglect the care of the sons, and this will be the greatest punishment [damnum] for the city.

He posits a third rationale, at adhuc sic unusquisque, etc. saying that thus, that is, according to the position the position of Socrates, each of the citizens would say about each of the citizens who worked well, or badly, however many they happened to be: “this is mine”—something that exists by nature, such as “this is my son,” or “this is his son.” And they would speak in this manner about each thousand—or however many there happened to be in the city. And they would say this, not as if they knew for certain that this was their son, or his son, but with doubt; since if the women were common, and many would join up with the same woman, it could not be clear from which father he happened to be the generated son, since there are many who did not generate him. And it would be even less clear whose son happened to be preserved in life, since many die. Therefore, it ought to be considered whether it is better that, in this manner, anyone should call anyone the same thing, that is, his son or his nephew, from any number of two thousand or ten thousand, or great, that anyone should call some youth his own, as in the manner they do in cities. For we see that a certain of the citizens calls one and the same youth his son, and another calls him his nephew, or following some other relationship; either considering a relationship because of consanguinity, or because of some familiarity, or because someone from the beginning had care of him—was his tutor, for instance, or instructor. This also is for those who belong to him: and although he would call one a son or nephew, he would call another a brother's son, or a tribesman. For they are called “brother's sons” who are born of two brothers, but they are called tribesmen who are from one tribe, such as those from one company [societas] in the city. It is clear, therefore, that it is not only following the law of Socrates that many citizens say of one and the same, “he is mine,” but also following the custom which is now observed in cities. But in this, it seems to be preeminent following the law of Socrates that many should say “this is my son.” From [custom], however, it is preeminent that diverse [citizens] should say that one and the same [youth] is theirs—not as if he were common, but as if he were their own nephew, or son, or brother, or other things of this manner. And it is much better and more effective for provoking [impendendam] friendship and care that someone should deem that someone is their own nephew than that he should evaluate him to be a common son in the manner that Socrates posited. Because as was said, men love and care for their own things more greatly than common things. Whence it is clear that the law of Socrates brings forth more damage than utility for the city.

He posits a fourth rationale, at quinimo, sed neque diffugere, etc, and says that although Socrates had thought, through the community of women and sons, to avoid this—so that nobody would say that someone was their own son or brother, but would hold this opinion commonly, nevertheless, he could not escape that it should be expected about some by others that they are their brothers, or sons, or fathers, or mothers: and this is because of the likeness that is frequently found between sons and fathers or mothers. Whence, certain of them, who describe the peryodos of the earth, that is, how the circle of the world is inhabited, narrate that in upper Libya there are some who have common wives, but divide their sons following their likenesses: thus, that each of the men takes to himself as son he who is like to himself. And we also see that this happens among the females of other animals, such as mares and cows, which naturally have it that they make sons like to their fathers; just as was said about a certain mare, which in the land of Pharsalus was called “the just” on account of this, because she gave back sons that were like their fathers. Whence it is clear that Socrates, through the law that he says ought to be held about the community of wives and sons, cannot bring it about that there would not be private affections between men.