Lecture 16

The Carthaginians are also considered to have an excellent form of government, which differs from that of any other state in several respects, though it is in some very like the Lacedaemonian. Indeed, all three states- the Lacedaemonian, the Cretan, and the Carthaginian- nearly resemble one another, and are very different from any others. Many of the Carthaginian institutions are excellent. The superiority of their constitution is proved by the fact that the common people remain loyal to the constitution the Carthaginians have never had any rebellion worth speaking of, and have never been under the rule of a tyrant.

Among the points in which the Carthaginian constitution resembles the Lacedaemonian are the following: the common tables of the clubs answer to the Spartan phiditia, and their magistracy of the 104 to the Ephors; but, whereas the Ephors are any chance persons, the magistrates of the Carthaginians are elected according to merit—this is an improvement. They have also their kings and their gerusia, or council of elders, who correspond to the kings and elders of Sparta.

Their kings, unlike the Spartan, are not always of the same family, nor that an ordinary one, but if there is some distinguished family they are selected out of it and not appointed by senority—this is far better. Such officers have great power, and therefore, if they are persons of little worth, do a great deal of harm, and they have already done harm at Lacedaemon.

Most of the defects or deviations from the perfect state, for which the Carthaginian constitution would be censured, apply equally to all the forms of government which we have mentioned. But of the deflections from aristocracy and constitutional government, some incline more to democracy and some to oligarchy. The kings and elders, if unanimous, may determine whether they will or will not bring a matter before the people, but when they are not unanimous, the people decide on such matters as well. And whatever the kings and elders bring before the people is not only heard but also determined by them, and any one who likes may oppose it; now this is not permitted in Sparta and Crete. That the magistrates of five who have under them many important matters should be co-opted, that they should choose the supreme council of 100, and should hold office longer than other magistrates (for they are virtually rulers both before and after they hold office)—these are oligarchical features; their being without salary and not elected by lot, and any similar points, such as the practice of having all suits tried by the magistrates, and not some by one class of judges or jurors and some by another, as at Lacedaemon, are characteristic of aristocracy.

The Carthaginian constitution deviates from aristocracy and inclines to oligarchy, chiefly on a point where popular opinion is on their side. For men in general think that magistrates should be chosen not only for their merit, but for their wealth: a man, they say, who is poor cannot rule well- he has not the leisure. If, then, election of magistrates for their wealth be characteristic of oligarchy, and election for merit of aristocracy, there will be a third form under which the constitution of Carthage is comprehended; for the Carthaginians choose their magistrates, and particularly the highest of them—their kings and generals—with an eye both to merit and to wealth.

But we must acknowledge that, in thus deviating from aristocracy, the legislator has committed an error. Nothing is more absolutely necessary than to provide that the highest class, not only when in office, but when out of office, should have leisure and not disgrace themselves in any way; and to this his attention should be first directed.

Even if you must have regard to wealth, in order to secure leisure, yet it is surely a bad thing that the greatest offices, such as those of kings and generals, should be bought. The law which allows this abuse makes wealth of more account than virtue, and the whole state becomes avaricious. For, whenever the chiefs of the state deem anything honorable, the other citizens are sure to follow their example; and, where virtue has not the first place, their aristocracy cannot be firmly established. Those who have been at the expense of purchasing their places will be in the habit of repaying themselves; and it is absurd to suppose that a poor and honest man will be wanting to make gains, and that a lower stamp of man who has incurred a great expense will not. Wherefore they should rule who are able to rule best.

And even if the legislator does not care to protect the good from poverty, he should at any rate secure leisure for them when in office.

It would seem also to be a bad principle that the same person should hold many offices, which is a favorite practice among the Carthaginians, for one business is better done by one man. The legislator should see to this and should not appoint the same person to be a flute-player and a shoemaker. Hence, where the state is large, it is more in accordance both with constitutional and with democratic principles that the offices of state should be distributed among many persons. For, as I said, this arrangement is fairer to all, and any action familiarized by repetition is better and sooner performed. We have a proof in military and naval matters; the duties of command and of obedience in both these services extend to all.

The government of the Carthaginians is oligarchical, but they successfully escape the evils of oligarchy by enriching one portion of the people after another by sending them to their colonies. This is their panacea and the means by which they give stability to the state. Accident favors them, but the legislator should be able to provide against revolution without trusting to accidents. As things are, if any misfortune occurred, and the bulk of the subjects revolted, there would be no way of restoring peace by legal methods. Such is the character of the Lacedaemonian, Cretan, and Carthaginian constitutions, which are justly celebrated.

Politizare autem videntur, etc. After the philosopher has pursued the regime of the Lacedaemonians and the Cretans, and pursues the regime of the Carthaginians. And concerning this he does three things.

First, he he commends a regime of this sort, along with the others.

Second, he shows the agreement of this regime with the aforementioned, at habet autem similia, [II.16.2] etc.

Third, he objects to some things about it, at melius autem reges, [II.16.3] etc.

Therefore, he first says that the Carthaginians seemed to live well politically, and better than the others with reference to many things, and most of all in those in which it approaches the Lacedaemonian regime. For these three regimes—namely, that of the Cretans, the Lacedaemonian, and that of the Carthaginians—were related to each other, and greatly different from the others; and they had many good establishments among them. Moreoever, a sign that their regimes were well-ordered is that the people remained quieted in such an order, and no sedition of the people of any weight came to be there, nor did their regime even degenerate into tyranny.

Then, where he says habet autem similia, etc., he shows the agreement of this regime with the Lacedaemonian.

And first, with reference to this: that among them there were the feasts of society that the Lacedaemonians called Philitia.

Second, with reference to the rule of the city; because among the Carthaginians there was the government of the hundred and four men, like the government of the ephors who were among the Lacedaemonians: yet, with reference to this, they were not worse, but the Carthaginians were better-arranged; because the Lacedaemonians instituted the ephors from an undetermined group—that is, from any persons whatsoever—who also were not proven in virtue. But the Carthaginians chose for this government only virtuous men. Likewise, also, the Carthaginians had kings like the Lacedaemonians, and had iherusia—that is, a certain place of worth or honor that corresponded with the elders who were among the Lacedaemonians.

Then, where he says melius autem, etc., he objects to the aforementioned regime according to the two modes posited above.

And first, with reference to this: that it was not well-established.

Second, with reference to this: that it did not accord [concordia] with the intention of the legislator, at eorum autem quae ad suppositionem, [II.16.4] etc.

Therefore, he first says that it would be better that the kings were not received from only one family, but from any of the virtuous: and if they ought to have been received from one family, the family ought not to be of just any kind, but of the sort from which the good usually come forth. And again, if some family were chosen that differed in goodness from the others, from which the kings were assumed, it would be better that from that family, those be chosen as king through choice rather than by age—when, for example, the first-born has mastery: in which, when it occurs otherwise, it frequently happens that worthless men come into rule: and it is exceedingly dangerous if worthless men are constituted as having power over great affairs. For this greatly wounds cities: and such worthless kings wounded the city of the Carthaginians in many things. He also concludes from what has been said that since these three regimes are similar, there are things common to all of them that are worthy of rebuke. And therefore, what has been said regarding the others should also be understood here.

Then, where he says eorum autem quae, etc., he objects to this regime with reference to this: that it fell away from its proposed intention. Concerning this he does three things.

First, he shows that in some things, it veered toward democracy, and in others, toward oligarchy.

Second, he shows that it veered more toward oligarchy, at transgreditur autem aristocratiae, [II.16.5] etc.

Third, he objects to the remedy that they applied to this, at oligarchia autem, [II.16.9] etc.

Therefore, he first says that, although it was the presupposed intention of the legislator among the Carthaginians to institute a polity or aristocracy, some of his establishments bent down toward the demos—that is, toward the people—and some toward oligarchy. For it was established among them that the kings, along with the elders, would have it in their power to defer something to the people, or not to defer when all were in accord: but if not all were in accord, the people had the judgment of what ought to occur in this matter. Likewise, moreover, when from common accord, they referred something to the people, the people not only had the power to hear what was said, and to approve it, but it had the power to make the judgment of whether it was good or not: and if the people wished, they could contradict it—which did not occur in the other previous regimes: and so the people established for the governors what should be done: and this was democratic. On the other hand, there was among them a sort of pentharchia—that is, a government of five men—who had the power to interject themselves into many and great occupations of the city: and these men were chosen only by the governors. Likewise, also, by them alone were chosen the one hundred and four, about whom it was spoken above. Likewise, also, the greater men of the city were governors for a greater time than the others, because those who preceded in government were companions in government of those who succeeded them, and so the time of government was doubled for them, which did not occur for the others who were lesser: and this was oligarchic. There was also something aristocratic among them: that the governors were chosen giving bribes. And again, they were not chosen by lot, but on account of virtue, and some other things of this sort. And so they did not fall away from aristocracy in all things. They also had something else that was oligarchic: that the greatest governors judged all sentences. However, there were not diverse [governors] who judged diverse affairs, as happened in Lacedaemon.

Then, where he says transgreditur autem, etc., he shows that this regime bent down more toward oligarchy.

And this is with reference to two things: he lays out the second at pravum autem utique, [II.16.8] etc.

Concerning the first he does two things.

First, he shows where it bent down toward oligarchy.

Second, he objects to it, at oportet autem putare, [II.16.6] etc.

Therefore, he first says that the institution of the regime of the Carthaginians, which they wished to be aristocratic, bent down most of all toward oligarchy, as it seems to in many [regimes]. For they deemed that not only virtuous governors must be chosen, but also wealthy ones: and they were moved by this reason: because it was impossible that someone poor could rule well and also be freed up for the occupations of the city. For their governors did not have a salary from the common treasury. Hence, if those virtuous and poor were chosen as governors, they would need to intend acquiring provisions for themselves, while neglecting the occupations of the city. However, because it is oligarchic to choose the wealthy as leaders, but aristocratic to choose the virtuous, it is clear that to choose those wealthy and virtuous will be some third order, which was observed among the Carthaginians. For above all, they chose as governors kings and military generals, respecting at the same time wealth and the virtues.

Then, where he says oportet autem putare, etc., he objects to the aforementioned ordering.

And first, he objects to the reason by which they were moved.

Second, the ordering itself, at si autem oportet, etc.

Therefore, he first says that such a falling away from aristocracy should be credited to the legislator: for it was of the greatest necessity to see from the beginning in what way the best men in virtue would be able to be freed-up for the works of virtue, without being dishonored, by being freed-up from course work: and this is not only when they are governors, but even when they were acting in private life—namely, by instituting some reward for virtue, by which the virtuous would be supported.

Then, where he says si autem oportet, etc., he objects to this ordering in two ways.

First, he shows that it is dangerous. For if one must look toward wealth when choosing governors, so that they can be freed-up, without the works through which they make gain for their own provision, it will be exceedingly evil that the greatest governments—the king, and the commanders of the army—will be for sale, so that they will be for whomever may be given an abundance of money. Thus, he says that it is crooked, because from this law it would follow that the whole city would be lovers of money—even more than of virtue. Because whatever citizens see to be valuable for government, they consequently opine to be valuable. And in whatever city virtue does not receive the greatest honor—so that the honor of government is deferred only to virtue—it is impossible that in such a city men will infallibly govern according to virtue. And because government is given on account of wealth, in a sense, purchased by wealth, it is probable that the citizens will become accustomed to gape after the gain of money, when [it is the case that] they would be able to govern by spending it. For it is exceedingly unfitting, if it should be said that he who is poor and virtuous will wish for gain when constituted in an office, but that he who is worse will not wish for gain after he has spent much money to acquire government. For this is utterly improbable. And therefore, one should not seek whether they are wealthy who are to be instituted to government, but [rather], whether they are wealthy or poor, those ought to be instituted who are able to aristarchizare—that is, to govern according to virtue. Second, at dignius, etc., he objects to the aforementioned law for this: that it neglected a more fitting remedy that could have been applied. For it would be more worthy if a legislator gave preference to the choice of those poor and virtuous for government, not looking to wealth; and along with this, that he set up some cure, so that at any event, they could exist unoccupied while in government.

Then, where he says pravum autem utique, etc., he lays out his second way in which this regime bends down toward oligarchy, and he says that what was observed among the Carthaginians is crooked—that the same person would obtain several seats of government or several offices: because one work is perfected best by one man. However, if one man should have to exercise several works, it is necessary that he should be hindered in the other, or in both. Hence, the legislator must attend, lest he impose several works on one man: for example, that he not require the same man to pipe and to cut leather. And therefore, lest the smallness of the city should be a hindrance, it seems to be more political and demotic—that is, popular—that several people should participate in diverse seats of government, but not that one should have several seats of government: because this is oligarchic. And therefore, this is better, because each thing, as was said, is more beautifully and swiftly perfected by one [person], so that one person should not be compelled to do many things. And we see this in the army and on ships. For with both, because of the distinction of officers, to govern and to be subject is in some way extended to all—where some subjects are preferred to others, all the way to the lowest ranks.

Then, where he says oligarchia autem existente, etc., he objects to the remedy that they had against the aforementioned bending down. And he says that, although their regime was oligarchic, they discovered the best manner of escaping the sedition of the people, because they always sent some of the people for the rule of the cities that were subject to them, so that they were thus made wealthy, and through this, in some way they healed their regime, and made it endure; but this was by fortune, because the cities subject to them did not rebel. However, it must not be by fortune that citizens are without sedition, but by the providence of the legislator. Now, however, if some misfortune were to happen to the Carthaginians, such that a great part of their subjects left their mastery, there will be no remedy against sedition because of the laws they upheld. Lastly, in an epilogue, he concludes that what has been said about the regimes of the Lacedaemonians, the Cretans, and the Carthaginians, merits acceptance.