Lecture 14

The Lacedaemonian constitution is defective in another point; I mean the Ephoralty. This magistracy has authority in the highest matters, but the Ephors are chosen from the whole people, and so the office is apt to fall into the hands of very poor men, who, being badly off, are open to bribes. There have been many examples at Sparta of this evil in former times; and quite recently, in the matter of the Andrians, certain of the Ephors who were bribed did their best to ruin the state.

And so great and tyrannical is their power, that even the kings have been compelled to court them, so that, in this way as well together with the royal office, the whole constitution has deteriorated, and from being an aristocracy has turned into a democracy. The Ephoralty certainly does keep the state together; for the people are contented when they have a share in the highest office, and the result, whether due to the legislator or to chance, has been advantageous. For if a constitution is to be permanent, all the parts of the state must wish that it should exist and the same arrangements be maintained. This is the case at Sparta, where the kings desire its permanence because they have due honor in their own persons; the nobles because they are represented in the council of elders (for the office of elder is a reward of virtue); and the people, because all are eligible to the Ephoralty.

The election of Ephors out of the whole people is perfectly right, but ought not to be carried on in the present fashion, which is too childish.

Again, they have the decision of great causes, although they are quite ordinary men, and therefore they should not determine them merely on their own judgment, but according to written rules, and to the laws. Their way of life, too, is not in accordance with the spirit of the constitution- they have a deal too much license; whereas, in the case of the other citizens, the excess of strictness is so intolerable that they run away from the law into the secret indulgence of sensual pleasures.

Again, the council of elders is not free from defects. It may be said that the elders are good men and well trained in manly virtue; and that, therefore, there is an advantage to the state in having them. But that judges of important causes should hold office for life is a disputable thing, for the mind grows old as well as the body. And when men have been educated in such a manner that even the legislator himself cannot trust them, there is real danger. Many of the elders are well known to have taken bribes and to have been guilty of partiality in public affairs. And therefore they ought not to be irresponsible; yet at Sparta they are so. But (it may be replied), 'All magistracies are accountable to the Ephors.' Yes, but this prerogative is too great for them, and we maintain that the control should be exercised in some other manner.

Further, the mode in which the Spartans elect their elders is childish; and it is improper that the person to be elected should canvass for the office; the worthiest should be appointed, whether he chooses or not. And here the legislator clearly indicates the same intention which appears in other parts of his constitution; he would have his citizens ambitious, and he has reckoned upon this quality in the election of the elders; for no one would ask to be elected if he were not. Yet ambition and avarice, almost more than any other passions, are the motives of crime.

Whether kings are or are not an advantage to states, I will consider at another time; they should at any rate be chosen, not as they are now, but with regard to their personal life and conduct. The legislator himself obviously did not suppose that he could make them really good men; at least he shows a great distrust of their virtue. For this reason the Spartans used to join enemies with them in the same embassy, and the quarrels between the kings were held to be conservative of the state.

Neither did the first introducer of the common meals, called 'phiditia,' regulate them well. The entertainment ought to have been provided at the public cost, as in Crete; but among the Lacedaemonians every one is expected to contribute, and some of them are too poor to afford the expense; thus the intention of the legislator is frustrated. The common meals were meant to be a popular institution, but the existing manner of regulating them is the reverse of popular. For the very poor can scarcely take part in them; and, according to ancient custom, those who cannot contribute are not allowed to retain their rights of citizenship.

The law about the Spartan admirals has often been censured, and with justice; it is a source of dissension, for the kings are perpetual generals, and this office of admiral is but the setting up of another king.

The charge which Plato brings, in the Laws, against the intention of the legislator, is likewise justified; the whole constitution has regard to one part of virtue only—the virtue of the soldier, which gives victory in war. So long as they were at war, therefore, their power was preserved, but when they had attained empire they fell for of the arts of peace they knew nothing, and had never engaged in any employment higher than war. There is another error, equally great, into which they have fallen. Although they truly think that the goods for which men contend are to be acquired by virtue rather than by vice, they err in supposing that these goods are to be preferred to the virtue which gains them.Once more: the revenues of the state are ill-managed; there is no money in the treasury, although they are obliged to carry on great wars, and they are unwilling to pay taxes. The greater part of the land being in the hands of the Spartans, they do not look closely into one another's contributions. The result which the legislator has produced is the reverse of beneficial; for he has made his city poor, and his citizens greedy. Enough respecting the Spartan constitution, of which these are the principal defects.

At vero et quae circa efforiam, etc. After the philosopher pursued the regime of the Lacedaemonians with reference to what the citizens have—namely, slaves, women, and possessions—he here pursues the same regime with reference to the citizens themselves.

And first, with reference to the governors.

Second, with reference to the people, at non bene autem neque circa convivia, [II.14.9] etc.

Third, with reference to the warriors, at eam autem quae circa navigii, [II.14.10] etc.

Now there were three governments among the Lacedaemonians, as has already been touched upon: namely, the ephors, that is, those who were providers, and he treats of these first.

And also some elders, and he treats of these second, at habent autem et quae circa seniorum, [II.14.6] etc.

There was also a king in the city, and he treats of him third, at de regno autem siquidem melius est, [II.14.8] etc.

Concerning the first, he objects to the government of the ephors with reference to five things.

First, indeed, with reference to the condition of persons that were constituted in this government. And he says that those who were concerned with this government were crookedly disposed: for this government had mastery and power over the things that were greatest in the city: for instance, over declaring war or making peace, and concerning the choices of soldiers, and other similar things. And yet, for this government, anyone from the people could be chosen, so that it sometimes happened that men who were exceedingly poor were taken up to this government—men who could be purchased because of their poverty, and were easily corrupted with gifts. They had shown this earlier many times, but they recently showed it in a certain business that they had with the Andrians: for they were corrupted by their silver, so that they exposed the whole city to danger inasmuch as it was for them to do so.

Second, at et propter principatum esse, etc., he objects to the aforementioned government with reference to the great power that it had. And he says that because this government was exceedingly great, as if equal to tyranny, it so weakened the power of the king that they compelled him to permit it that the people themselves should rule with little obedience to the law. And thus their whole regime was corrupted, because it degenerated from an aristocracy into a democracy. And yet, such government was useful with reference to something, because it contained the city in peace: for it quieted the people from sedition because it had a part in a great government. And this usefulness followed from experience in these affairs; either this came to be from the intention of the legislator, or happened by chance. For in order to preserve the regime, it must be that all parts of the city wish it to exist, and that for any part of the city, it suffices that they remain in their establishment: and this happened here. For the kings accepted it because of the honor that they had there; moreover, the calicagathoi—that is, the virtuous—accepted it because of the iherusia—that is, because of the honor given to the elders. For such government was the reward for virtue, such that nobody was assumed to it except the virtuous. The people, moreover, accepted it because of the government of the ephors, which was common to all.

Third, at sed eligibilem, etc., he objects to this government with reference to the choice [of its governors]. For it was commendable that they were assumed into government from everyone through choice, but the mode of choosing was exceedingly childish: because they were chosen perhaps through lots or through another unfitting manner, such that government sometimes fell to the powerless [inopes], as was said.

Fourth, at adhuc autem et iudiciorum, etc., he objects to the aforementioned government with reference to the decisions that it [could make]. And he says that it was inappropriate that whoever the ephors were had in their power the decision to judge about great affairs. For it was better that they not judge according to their own decision, but according to some Scriptures and laws.

Fifth, at est autem et dieta, etc., he objects to the aforementioned government with reference to their associations. And he says that their diet—that is, their discipline in food and clothing and drink, and other things of this sort--is not consonant with the will of the city; because in some things it was exceedingly remiss, for instance, with clothing or leisure; in other things, however—perhaps, for example, with food and sex—the law placed hard things upon them, perhaps so that they would not grow soft; thus it was that they were not able to uphold it, but secretly transgressed the law set up for them, enjoying bodily delights. And so their association was against the intention of the city.

Then, where he says habent autem et quae circa seniorum, etc., he objects to the aforementioned regime with reference to the government of the elders.

And first, with reference to their power.

Second, with reference to the choosing of them, at adhuc autem et electionem, [II.14.7] etc.

Therefore, he first says that among the Lacedaemonians, the things that belong to the government of the elders were not well arranged [se habent]: for they remained perpetually in government. For if elders of this sort could be found who were epyikes, that is, virtuous, and sufficiently instructed in andragathia—that is, in manly goodness, or nimbleness, someone could perhaps say that it was advantageous for the city that they remain perpetually in government. Even granting that they were perfectly virtuous, it is frightening for the city that some should always have mastery and power over the great judgments of the city, and this through the whole of their life. Because just as the virtue of the body is weakened in old age, thus also, usually, the virtue of the mind: because after men grow old, they have neither that robust soul, nor that liveliness of genius, which they had in their youth, on account of the weakened virtue of the sensitive powers that are at the service of the part that understands. Therefore, it is much more frightening for some to govern throughout life if they are, in such a manner, instructed for the good, as they were among the Lacedaemonians, and thus it was that even the legislator did not consider them completely as if they were good men, because he did not commit all things to them. Frequently, however, such men wish to seem liberal among the commoners, to seize for themselves the favor of the people, and so apart from what is useful for the city, they dispense the common goods. And so it is better that they have some correction, such that if they are found to be lacking, they can be removed: but now, however, they are without such a correction. Yet they have a certain correction, because the government of the ephors was able to correct all other governments, by hindering them, so that their sentences would not proceed if they seemed badly made, and this was the greatest dignity of the ephors. But we understand about another correction: that they can be removed—which the ephors could not do.

Then, where he says adhuc autem, etc., he objects to the aforementioned government with reference to the choosing of the governors: and he does this for two reasons.

Concerning the first, he says that the choice of the elders, which came to be among them, was exceedingly childish. For the order among them was such that those who seemed worthy for such government were to seek it—which is not correctly arranged, because according to this, nobody would be assumed into government unless they wished it. However, someone who is worthy of government should be assumed to government whether he wishes it or not, because the common utility should be preferred to his private will.

He lays out a second reason at nunc autem, etc., and he says that through this ordering about the choosing of elders, the legislator seems to make the citizens lovers of honor, as he did with the other part of the regime—that is, concerning the choosing of the ephors—or also concerning any other parts that make the citizens lovers of honor. And that they make this happen in the choosing of the elders is evident. For nobody would seek government unless he wished to be a governor—which is to love honor. If, therefore, nobody were to have government except the seeker, it would follow that only the lovers of honor would be governors, and so all would be encouraged toward loving honor: and this is exceedingly dangerous for the city, because the greater part of the injustices that happen in the city from the will of men—such as violence and robbery and the like—come to be on account of the love of honor and of money. So it is evident that such an order is dangerous to the city.

Then, where he says de regno autem, etc., he objects to the aforementioned regime with reference to the government of the kings. And he says that whether to have a king is advantageous to the city or not will be treated of later—namely, in Bk. III—but that if we suppose it is better to have a king, it still is not better as it was among the Lacedaemonians, that they did not rule throughout their whole life, but it is better that each one have the judgment of kings through the whole of their lives, because a king is useful to the city so that his power will effectively preserve the establishment of the city. And this cannot come to be unless he reigns throughout his life, because he will both fear to offend others, and others will will fear him less. It is otherwise with the elders who were chosen for some counsel or judgment. The cause, moreover, why the legislator did not institute that there should be perpetual kings among the Lacedaemonians, is this: because he deemed that he was not able to make the citizens into caluscagathoi—that is, perfectly good. And so he had no faith about the citizens, as if about those who were not perfectly good. And because of this, when they sent some legates or envoys, they chose those who were enemies or in opposition to each other, so that one would obstruct the other if he wished to do something contrary to the good of the city. And likewise, they deemed that it was healthy for the city if kings were in opposition, who succeeded each other in turn, so that one amended what the other did badly.

Then, where he says non bene autem, etc., he objects to the aforementioned regime with reference to what belongs to the people—namely, with reference to the public feasts that were in the city. And he says that the law was not well ordered about these sorts of feasts, because it would be better that gathering for feasts of this sort should come to be at the common expense of the city, as happens among the Cretans, than that they come to be such that they are produced by an individual, as happened among the Lacedaemonians, among whom even those who were exceedingly poor had to bear the expense of such things, and this was the destruction of the poor, who were not able to pay. Whence, what happened in this regard was contrary to the intention of the legislator, who instituted feasts of this sort as though they were something democratic—that is, in favor of the people—so that the people would have some recreation in feasts of this sort; but according to this law of feasts, it followed that there were some feasts of this sort at great loss to the people, because according to this, the people were not easily able to rule. For there was a law among them that those who did not contribute something to the expense [of the feasts] should not have a part in their regime; because they could neither become governors, nor have a voice in the choice of governors.

Then, where he says eam autem quae circa navigii, etc., he objects to the aforementioned regime with reference to warriors.

And first, with reference to the warriors of naval wars.

Second, more commonly, with reference to them all, at et hoc autem suppositionem, [II.14.11] etc.

Third, with reference to their pay, at prave autem habet, [II.14.12] etc.

Therefore, he first says that others have correctly criticized the law of the Lacedaemonians about the governors of ships, in that it was a cause of sedition. For although they had, as it were, everlasting kings, who were at the head of the land-based military, the navarchia—that is, the government of the ships—became as though it were another king: and so it was as though they had two kings, which was able to be the material for discord.

Then, where he says et hoc autem suppositionem, etc., he objects to the aforementioned regime more commonly with reference to all the warriors: and he says that someone could correctly criticize the supposition of the legislator, that is, the one that was supposed as an end to which the whole regime was ordered: and Plato also, in his laws, criticized that all their laws were ordered toward one part of virtue—to military virtue—because of this: it was useful for mastering others. And therefore, because they were well-arranged in those things that belong to war, but badly in those things that belong to the governing of the political establishment, it followed that they were preserved in war, but when they had acquired government, they encountered many dangers, because they did not know how to be unoccupied—that is, they did not know how to live in peace, nor were they exercised in any exercise better than war: which was no small sin. For they opined well in this regard: that they deemed the affairs of war to be better treated through the virtue of men than through wickedness, because as it says in Ethics III, virtuous men are not sparing of life where it is good to persist: but soldiers, when they have overcome dangers, are lacking, for they are not confident beyond being able to be free through the trial and industry of weapons. But they did not opine well in this regard: that they deemed the virtue through which man is well-disposed for war to be the best virtue, although the other virtues—namely, prudence and justice—are more worthy than fortitude; and even war itself is on account of peace, and not the converse.

Then, where he says prave autem habet, etc., he objects to the aforementioned regime with reference to the pay of the soldiers, or concerning public gold. And he says that among the Spartans—that is, the Lacedaemonians—things were not well-ordered about common money. For the city had nothing in common, although it was nevertheless frequently compelled to wage great wars; and therefore, the individual citizens badly administered the things necessary for such expenses, for they were not required by an individual authority of any public power, but it was left to the will of each to give what he wished—which, indeed, the legislator established because the citizens had many possessions, and were able to give much without any burden: but what happened was against the utility that the legislator had intended, because he himself left the city without any public money; and the ydiotas—that is, the private and base persons—he made into lovers of money, so long as they endeavored to gain so much that they were able to provide both for themselves and for the community. And lastly, he concludes in an epilogue that the things that have been discussed seem improper in the Lacedaemonian regime.