Lecture 11

The first of these proposals to which objection may be taken is the threefold division of the citizens. The artisans, and the husbandmen, and the warriors, all have a share in the government. But the husbandmen have no arms, and the artisans neither arms nor land, and therefore they become all but slaves of the warrior class. That they should share in all the offices is an impossibility; for generals and guardians of the citizens, and nearly all the governing magistrates, must be taken from the class of those who carry arms. Yet, if the two other classes have no share in the government, how can they be loyal citizens?

It may be said that those who have arms must necessarily be masters of both the other classes, but this is not so easily accomplished unless they are numerous; and if they are, why should the other classes share in the government at all, or have power to appoint magistrates?

Further, what use are farmers to the city? Artisans there must be, for these are wanted in every city, and they can live by their craft, as elsewhere; and the husbandmen too, if they really provided the warriors with food, might fairly have a share in the government. But in the republic of Hippodamus they are supposed to have land of their own, which they cultivate for their private benefit.

Again, as to this common land out of which the soldiers are maintained, if they are themselves to be the cultivators of it, the warrior class will be identical with the husbandmen, although the legislator intended to make a distinction between them. If, again, there are to be other cultivators distinct both from the husbandmen, who have land of their own, and from the warriors, they will make a fourth class, which has no place in the state and no share in anything. Or, if the same persons are to cultivate their own lands, and those of the public as well, they will have difficulty in supplying the quantity of produce which will maintain two households: and why, in this case, should there be any division, for they might find food themselves and give to the warriors from the same land and the same lots? There is surely a great confusion in all this.

Neither is the law to be commended which says that the judges, when a simple issue is laid before them, should distinguish in their judgement; for the judge is thus converted into an arbitrator. Now, in an arbitration, although the arbitrators are many, they confer with one another about the decision, and therefore they can distinguish; but in courts of law this is impossible, and, indeed, most legislators take pains to prevent the judges from holding any communication with one another.

Again, will there not be confusion if the judge thinks that damages should be given, but not so much as the suitor demands? He asks, say, for twenty minae, and the judge allows him ten minae (or in general the suitor asks for more and the judge allows less), while another judge allows five, another four minae. In this way they will go on splitting up the damages, and some will grant the whole and others nothing: how is the final reckoning to be taken?

Again, no one contends that he who votes for a simple acquittal or condemnation perjures himself, if the indictment has been laid in an unqualified form; and this is just, for the judge who acquits does not decide that the defendant owes nothing, but that he does not owe the twenty minae. He only is guilty of perjury who thinks that the defendant ought not to pay twenty minae, and yet condemns him.

Dubitabit autem utique aliquis, etc. Having put forward the regime of Hippodamus, Aristotle here objects to it.

And first, with reference to the division that he instituted.

Second, with reference to what he said about judgment, at non bene autem neque de iudicio, [II.11.6] etc.

Third, with reference to what he instituted about the discipline of citizens, at de eo autem quod invenientibus, [II.12.1] etc.

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he objects to the division instituted by Hippodamus with reference to the parts of the city.

Second, with reference to possessions, at adhuc autem communem, [II.11.5] etc.

Concerning the first he does three things.

First, he objects to the division of the parts of the city with reference to artisans.

Second, with reference to warriors, at sed oportet, [II.11.3] etc.

Third, with reference to farmers, at adhuc agricolae, [II.11.4] etc.

Therefore, he first says that the first doubt about the regime of Hippodamus comes from the division of the multitude of the citizens. For Hippodamus wanted the artisans, the farmers, and the armed men to all commune in the order of the city; yet so that the farmers would not have arms, but would have land; the artisans, moreover, would have neither land nor arms. From this order, it would follow that the artisans were almost the slaves of those who possessed arms, because they have none of their own possessions—which seems to belong to their usefulness. For they are devoted to [insistunt] works in the service of the city, and chiefly of the warriors, who must obtain the greater part of the honors of the city. For it is not possible that the artisans should have a part in all honors, because it will not be appropriate for artisans to be instituted as the commanders of the army and the rulers of the citizens, or put into other great governments; but these will only come from warlike men, who are more apt for this. For it is not possible, since they do not have a part in the regime of the city, that they should love such an ordering of the city: whence, the material for sedition remains, and therefore, he did not sufficiently give order to the artisans.

Then, where he says sed oportet, etc., he objects to the aforementioned ordering with reference to men of war. For they must be better—that is, more powerful than both the other parts, namely, the farmers and the artisans. And this is because it belongs to the men of war to defend the power of the city not only against the attacks of enemies, but also against the sedition of the citizens, whom they are not able to repress unless they are more powerful than them—which, indeed, is not easy unless there are many of them. But if the men of war exceeded the others in multitude, and in virtue, and in worth, there was no necessity that the artisans and the farmers should have had any part in the rule of the city, and that the institution of the governors should belong to them, because this would happen at the decision of the men of war. Therefore, it is superfluously committed to others, and so it is evident that he did not fittingly divide the men of war from the others.

Then, where he says adhuc agricolae, etc., he objects to the aforementioned distinction with reference to the farmers. For it is not clear, concerning them, how they would be useful to the city. Concerning artisans, it is clear that they are necessary in the city so that they can prepare various equipment, and the life of the citizens will be able to proceed well through the things that are prepared by their art—as also occurs in other cities. For it can be understood that the artisans can proceed—that is, be nourished by their art—so that they do not require the farmers to support them. But the men of war, as though distinct from the others, are not able to be supported by their office, and so they require that they be supported by others. Therefore, if the farmers were instituted for acquiring food for the men of war, they would reasonably be placed as a part of the city. For the part of the whole must assist the good of the other parts. But following the aforementioned workings, they will have their own possessions and cultivate them, and so they will not be useful to others, but only to themselves. Therefore, he did not fittingly set up the farmers as a part of the city.

Then, where he says adhuc autem communem, etc., he objects to the division of possessions. For Hippodamus set up one part of the possessions of the city in common, from which the men of war were fed. Therefore, it should be considered who will cultivate this common land. Now it must be cultivated in one of three manners. The first is that the warriors themselves cultivate the common land, and so they will be fighters and farmers. But the legislator wished to distinguish these things, therefore it was a useless distinction. The second manner is that some others between the fighters and the farmers—who cultivate their own possessions—cultivate the common land. From this it follows that there will be some fourth part of the city that in no way participates in the rule of the city, but is utterly alien to it. For no one is allowed to choose the governors except the three aforementioned parts. The third manner can be that the farmers themselves who cultivate their own possessions also cultivate the common ones. But then it would follow that there would not be an abundance of the produce of the land in the city, for it will not be easy for one farmer to sufficiently cultivate so many lands as would administer the produce necessary for two families. Even if such a third manner were set up, it seems that it would have been superfluous to divide possessions into three parts. For it could have happened that from the beginning the whole land was given to the farmers, so that each farmer, from the land that came to him by lot, would acquire food for his family and for some other men of war. Therefore, what Hippodamus said about these sorts of divisions introduces great disturbance.

Then, where he says non bene autem neque de iudicio, etc., he objects to the aforementioned regime with reference to judgment—namely, insofar as he established that judgments in court do not occur by collecting the sentences [of the judges]. Concerning this he does two things.

First, he objects to this establishment.

Second, the reason for the establishment, at adhuc nullus degerare cogit, [II.11.8] etc.

Concerning the first, he lays out two reasons.

About the first, he first says that the law which he set up about judgment is not well arranged [se habet]. Through the law, Hippodamus deemed it worthy that people should make judgments when divided from each other, so that any of them, by himself, could write out what seemed to him to be the cause [of the problem]. And according to this, Hippodamus wanted a judge to investigate by himself what his sentence should be. But in such an individual investigation also happened to be investigated by many at once, because the judges could speak together in their own households about the judgment they were carrying on, even though they did not speak together in court—that is, in a public place of judgment—to confer about their judgments. And this was most dangerous, because by conferring privately, rather than in a public court with everyone listening, it could more easily happen that one judge could have twisted another into bearing a sentence other than it seemed to him. This is why many legislators have established the contrary of this, so that judges cannot speak together—that is to say, in private—but they only confer with each other in court. Therefore, it seems that the aforementioned law would have been dangers, and contrary to the laws of others.

He lays out a second reason at deinde quomodo non erit plenum turbatione, etc., and he says that judgment will not be able to happen in the aforementioned manner without disturbance. For it can happen that it will not seem to a judge, considering things himself, that the defendant is so much to be condemned as the plaintiff deems who is suing, but perhaps the plaintiff deems that the defendant should be prosecuted for twenty minas, but the judge judges that he should be prosecuted for ten minas; or perhaps one judge condemns him to more, but another to less—for instance, one to five minas, and the other to four. And in this manner, the judges must suffer the same thing to happen—that is, that they confer with each other after the sentences have been written, just as if the sentences had not been written individually, because perhaps one judge will condemn the defendant to all that the plaintiff petitions, but another one will not. So in what manner will the diverse sentences of the judges be debated, except by conferring? So the aforementioned law will not be able to avoid what it intended to avoid—the conference of the judges. So it is evident that it was superfluous.

Then, where he says adhuc nullus, etc., he objects to the cause of the established law, which was the avoidance of perjury, and he says that if a conference of the judges about the condemnation of someone were to happen, no one would be coerced because of this, so that perjury would be committed by the one who ought to judge, even if the accusation of the plaintiff is justly written and the judge does not accept it. For the judge will not judge that the defendant owes nothing, but perhaps he will judge that he owes twenty minas, although the plaintiff is petitioning for more. But the defendant who is condemned seems to swear that he does not deem that he even owes twenty minas. And so, for this reason [causam], this law need not have been set up.