Lecture 15

The Cretan constitution nearly resembles the Spartan, and in some few points is quite as good; but for the most part less perfect in form.

The older constitutions are generally less elaborate than the later, and the Lacedaemonian is said to be, and probably is, in a very great measure, a copy of the Cretan. According to tradition, Lycurgus, when he ceased to be the guardian of King Charillus, went abroad and spent most of his time in Crete. For the two countries are nearly connected; the Lyctians are a colony of the Lacedaemonians, and the colonists, when they came to Crete, adopted the constitution which they found existing among the inhabitants. Even to this day the Perioeci, or subject population of Crete, are governed by the original laws which Minos is supposed to have enacted.

The island seems to be intended by nature for dominion in Hellas, and to be well situated; it extends right across the sea, around which nearly all the Hellenes are settled; and while one end is not far from the Peloponnese, the other almost reaches to the region of Asia about Triopium and Rhodes. Hence Minos acquired the empire of the sea, subduing some of the islands and colonizing others; at last he invaded Sicily, where he died near Camicus.

The Cretan institutions resemble the Lacedaemonian. The Helots are the husbandmen of the one, the Perioeci of the other, and both Cretans and Lacedaemonians have common meals, which were anciently called by the Lacedaemonians not 'phiditia' but 'andria'; and the Cretans have the same word, the use of which proves that the common meals originally came from Crete. Further, the two constitutions are similar; for the office of the Ephors is the same as that of the Cretan Cosmi, the only difference being that whereas the Ephors are five, the Cosmi are ten in number. The elders, too, answer to the elders in Crete, who are termed by the Cretans the council. And the kingly office once existed in Crete, but was abolished, and the Cosmi have now the duty of leading them in war. All classes share in the ecclesia, but it can only ratify the decrees of the elders and the Cosmi.

The common meals of Crete are certainly better managed than the Lacedaemonian; for in Lacedaemon every one pays so much per head, or, if he fails, the law, as I have already explained, forbids him to exercise the rights of citizenship. But in Crete they are of a more popular character. There, of all the fruits of the earth and cattle raised on the public lands, and of the tribute which is paid by the Perioeci, one portion is assigned to the Gods and to the service of the state, and another to the common meals, so that men, women, and children are all supported out of a common stock. The legislator has many ingenious ways of securing moderation in eating, which he conceives to be a gain; he likewise encourages the separation of men from women, lest they should have too many children, and the companionship of men with one another—whether this is a good or bad thing I shall have an opportunity of considering at another time. But that the Cretan common meals are better ordered than the Lacedaemonian there can be no doubt.

On the other hand, the Cosmi are even a worse institution than the Ephors, of which they have all the evils without the good. Like the Ephors, they are any chance persons, but in Crete this is not counterbalanced by a corresponding political advantage. At Sparta every one is eligible, and the body of the people, having a share in the highest office, want the constitution to be permanent. But in Crete the Cosmi are elected out of certain families, and not out of the whole people, and the elders out of those who have been Cosmi.

The same criticism may be made about the Cretan, which has been already made about the Lacedaemonian elders. Their irresponsibility and life tenure is too great a privilege, and their arbitrary power of acting upon their own judgment, and dispensing with written law, is dangerous.

It is no proof of the goodness of the institution that the people are not discontented at being excluded from it. For there is no profit to be made out of the office as out of the Ephoralty, since, unlike the Ephors, the Cosmi, being in an island, are removed from temptation.

The remedy by which they correct the evil of this institution is an extraordinary one, suited rather to a close oligarchy than to a constitutional state. For the Cosmi are often expelled by a conspiracy of their own colleagues, or of private individuals; and they are allowed also to resign before their term of office has expired. Surely all matters of this kind are better regulated by law than by the will of man, which is a very unsafe rule.

Worst of all is the suspension of the office of Cosmi, a device to which the nobles often have recourse when they will not submit to justice.

This shows that the Cretan government, although possessing some of the characteristics of a constitutional state, is really a close oligarchy. The nobles have a habit, too, of setting up a chief; they get together a party among the common people and their own friends and then quarrel and fight with one another. What is this but the temporary destruction of the state and dissolution of society? A city is in a dangerous condition when those who are willing are also able to attack her. But, as I have already said, the island of Crete is saved by her situation; distance has the same effect as the Lacedaemonian prohibition of strangers; and the Cretans have no foreign dominions. This is the reason why the Perioeci are contented in Crete, whereas the Helots are perpetually revolting. But when lately foreign invaders found their way into the island, the weakness of the Cretan constitution was revealed. Enough of the government of Crete.

Cretensium autem politia, etc. After the author pursued the Lacedaemonian regime above, he here pursues the regime of the Cretans.

And first, he relates this regime to the preceding.

Second, he objects to it, at de quibus eosdem utique dicet, [II.15.7] etc.

Concerning the first, he does two things.

First, he lays out the relation of these regimes in common.

Second, he indicates the reason for the relation he laid out, at et enim videtur, [II.15.2] etc.

Third, he explicates the aforementioned relation specifically, at habet autem proportionaliter, [II.15.4] etc.

Therefore, he first says that the regime of the Cretans is a relative of the Lacedaemonian regime in some things, yet it differs in others, in a few of which it is not more poorly arranged than the Lacedaemonian regime, but better; but in most things, it is arranged less smoothly, that is, less advantageously and fittingly for the good establishment of the city.

Then, where he says et enim videtur, he indicates the cause of the previously noted relation.

And first he shows that the cause of this is because the Lacedaemonian is taken up from the Cretan.

Second, he indicates the cause why the Cretan was prior, at videtur autem insula, [II.15.3] etc.

Therefore, he first says that the cause of the aforementioned things is because the Lacedaemonian regime imitates the regime of the Cretans in many things, insofar as it is older; and therefore, the regime of the Cretans is more poorly arranged in many things: because we see that most of those things that were discovered by the ancients are less articulated—that is, carefully distinguished—than what are discovered by the younger ones. For they say that Lycurgus, who instituted the Lacedaemonian regime, when he left the kingdom of Charillus, king of the Lacedaemonians, for a long time he was associated with Crete because of the friendship and affinity which the Lacedaemonians had for the Cretans. And therefore, the Lacedaemonians, who had come to Crete for the sake of familiarity, took up the institutions of the laws that then were among those dwelling in Crete. Whence we see that the Cretan residents employed laws in the same manner as did the Lacedaemonians; and this is following the institution of Minos, king of the Cretans.

Then, where he says videtur autem insula, etc., he indicates the cause why the laws among the Greeks were first discovered at Crete. For he says that the island of the Cretans seems, according to the setting of the land, to be the best-organized for being the governor of the Greeks, who almost all dwelt around the sea. It is as if that island is adjacent to the whole Greek shore, and slightly set apart from the island called the Peloponnese, which is now called Achaeia: and likewise, turning toward Asia, it is close to the place that is called Tropium, and the island that is called Rhodes; and therefore Minos, who was the king of the Cretans, obtained the government of the whole Greek sea, and he overcame some islands through violence that were previously inhabited; but some he made to be newly inhabited; into both, he pressed his laws. Lastly, however, he went over to the island of Sicily, and there he died near the Forge—that is, near the mountain of Vulcano, or near Etna, from both of which erupts fire.

Then, where he says habet autem proportionaliter, etc., he explicates the relation laid out above specifically.

And first, he shows what things both regimes agree.

Second, in which things the regime of the Cretans has something better, at quod quidem igitur conviviorum, etc.

Third, in which things it has something worse, at quae autem circa cosmos, etc.

Therefore, he first hows that these two regimes are proportionally related to each other, agreeing in three regards.

First, indeed, in agriculture, which the slaves exercised among the Lacedaemonians, but among the Cretans, the residents—that is, the rural inhabitants in the island.

Second, with reference to public feasts, which occur among both: which, indeed, are now called Philitia among the Lacedaemonians, from philos, which is “love,” because the were instituted for preserving mutual love among the citizens; but in antiquity, they were called Andria among them, from anir, which is “man,” because only the men came together there, apart from the women; and so are they now called among the Cretans. Whence it is clear that the Lacedaemonians took up [the practice] from the Cretans.

Third, with reference to the order of the regime, because the ephors, among the Lacedaemonians, have the same power as do those among the Cretans who are called cosmoi—that is, “adorners,” who were different only in number: for there were five ephors among the Lacedaemonians, but there were ten cosmoi of the Cretans. Likewise, also, the elders among the Lacedaemonians were equal both in number and in power to the elders of the Cretans, who they called the boulin—that is, the counsel. The king, however, among the Cretans, was at first just as he was among the Lacedaemonians: but afterward, they dismantled the kingship, and committed to the cosmoi the command of wars: both also have an Ecclesia—that is, a meeting of the people—which has power over nothing except confirming the sentences of the elders and the cosmoi.

Then, where he says quae quidem igitur conviviorum, etc., he shows in what things the regime of the Cretans was better. And he says that the ordering of feasts was better among the Cretans than even among the Lacedaemonians, because in Lacedaemon, each one who approached the feast needed to supply something per capita, otherwise he would not be able to participate in the regime, as was said previously: but among the Cretans there was an observance that belonged more to the common things, because in public affairs, both regarding the produce of the land and the cattle and the yields that the residents who cultivated the lands yielded up, it was the institution that there be some part that was spent on sacrifices, and some part that was spent on feasts, so that in such feasts, the men—the husbands and wives and children—should receive sustenance from the common things. Moreover, their legislator also very philosophically introduced another thing proper to the regime of the Cretans: that they should eat moderately; as if this were exceedingly beneficial both for the individual and the community. Wishing also that they not procreate many children, lest the multitude of men should exceed the quantity of possessions, he wished that the men not mingle much with the women, and to this end, he permitted the foul intercourse of males: but whether in this he crafted things well or badly will be considered later—yet this is clear: that the ordering of feasts was better among the Cretans than among the Lacedaemonians.

Then, where he says quae autem circa cosmos, etc., he shows in what regard the Cretan regime was worse. And he says that the ordering among the Cretans about the cosmoi was worse than among the Lacedaemonians about the ephors. For there is one evil common to both, because in both, anyone could be taken up into this government—that is, men who were neither proven nor virtuous. But yet, among the Lacedaemonians there was one good, because they could be chosen from any condition of man: and therefore the people, as though they had a part in the greatest government, beneficially wished that the regime be preserved. But among the Cretans, the cosmoi were not chosen from men of any condition, but only from those who were or had been among the number of the elders; and likewise, the elders the chosen from those who had been cosmoi—to whom it was permitted to leave their government, as will be said below. And thus, the people did not have a part of the government of the cosmoi.

Then, where he says de quibus eosdem, etc., he objects to the aforementioned regime.

And first, with reference to the establishments they set up.

Second, with reference to the remedies they applied, at quam autem faciunt, [II.15.9] etc.

Concerning the first he does two things.

First, he objects to their establishments.

Second, he excludes some responses, at quiescere, [II.15.8] etc.

Moreover, he objects to such a regime with reference to two things that he also objected to in the Lacedaemonian regime. One of these is that the cosmoi and the elders have government for the whole of their lives, without correction—that is, without being able to be removed because of a fault; and so their government was greater than was worthy. The second, however, is that, because they did not govern according to writing—that is, according to any written laws—but according to auctognomonas—that is, through decisions and opinions; and this was not safe for the city, because their judgment was able to be twisted by love or hatred.

Then, where he says quiescere autem, etc., he excludes a certain response through which they could defend themselves, invoking as a sign of the good ordering that they always lived without sedition. But he himself says that among them, the people's restraint from sedition, not participating in government, is not a sign demonstrating that their regime is well-ordered: for this happened because the Cretans traveled far from other men, dwelling in an island, and distant from others; and so they did not have war with bordering peoples, as was said above, and thus the cosmoi, among the Cretans, did not have to take or spend anything on account of the wars, as did the ephors among the Lacedaemonians. Hence, the people did not greatly care to participate in this sort of government.

Then, where he says quam autem faciunt, etc., he objects to the remedies that were among the Cretans against the dangers.

And first he lays them out.

Second, he objects to them, at aut palam, etc.

Concerning the first he does two things.

First, he lays out the remedies that were against persons that held government badly.

Second, the remedy that was against the government itself, at omnium autem pessimum, [II.15.10] etc.

Therefore, he first says that the medicine that the Cretans made against the aforementioned sins concerning uncorrectable governors is not fitting, nor is it political—as if the wise were the common order of the city—but rather is oppressive and tyrannical, which is not according to reason, but through violence. For many times, some among them assembled, either from the governors or from private persons, and cast out the cosmoi through violence. There was also another remedy, because the cosmoi were able to renounce their government within their own lifetime. But it was better that these two things should be put in order through law—so that there would be some certain [certa] law, according to which the cosmoi ought to be expelled, or to depart from their government—than that this should come to be following the will of men, which is not a safe canon—that is, a safe rule—since frequently, the human will is irrational and unjust.

Then, where he says omnium autem pessimum, etc., he lays out the remedy that they had for the office itself; and he says that it was the worse among all the remedies that when the cosmoi wished to give sentence against some of the powerful, they frequently instituted among them an acosmoi—that is, a break from the government of the cosmoi: for they utterly forbid, for a time, such government. And he says that this is the worst thing, because it was not only against the persons, but was against the whole office, or government, from which came forth many useful things for the city.

Then, where he says aut et palam, etc., he objects to the aforementioned remedy. And he says that this last institution, about the emptying of the cosmoi, has something of regime inasmuch as it comes to be from the common consent of the people—but yet it is not a true regime, but it is rather an oppression through the power of the people, and a path to tyranny. For some who had hatred for the cosmoi were accustomed to gather to themselves the people and their other friends to make a monarchy, so that one of them could have mastery in the city in the place of all; and when they could not do this immediately, they raised sedition and the citizens fought with each other. But this is not at all different from a situation where, after some time, there will no longer be a city, but the whole political communion will be unbound.

For there cannot be a city when the concord of the citizens is unbound; and thus [the city] as such is dismantled. But even before it would be dismantled as such, danger will threaten it, from enemies who wish and are strong enough to invade the city; because so long as the citizens fight each other, they are not able to resist their enemies with one spirit; and sometimes, one part introduces enemies in aid of themselves. But, as it has been said, the regime of the Cretans was freed from the dangers of enemies because of its place, because they dwelt in an island far from other cities; and the distance itself made them safe from being driven out—that is, that they would not be driven out from their own place by enemies. And he lays out two signs of this: one is that the establishment [status] of the residents endured among the Cretans because of their custom of association. But those who immigrated from elsewhere for serving were not able to linger with them for long, because they were not able to have any government among them. For the Cretans did not wish to have government who were foreigners. The second sign is that war had recently come over to the island of the Cretans from foreign invaders of the island: from this it is clear that their laws were not sufficiently virtuous to preserve their regime; but they were preserved because they did not have any enemies warring against them. Lastly, in an epilogue, he concludes that enough has been said about the regime of the Cretans.