Lecture 12

To honor those who discover anything which is useful to the state is a proposal which has a specious sound, but cannot safely be enacted by law, for it may encourage informers, and perhaps even lead to political commotions. This question involves another. It has been doubted whether it is or is not expedient to make any changes in the laws of a country, even if another law be better. Now, if an changes are inexpedient, we can hardly assent to the proposal of Hippodamus; for, under pretense of doing a public service, a man may introduce measures which are really destructive to the laws or to the constitution.

But, since we have touched upon this subject, perhaps we had better go a little into detail, for, as I was saying, there is a difference of opinion, and it may sometimes seem desirable to make changes. Such changes in the other arts and sciences have certainly been beneficial; medicine, for example, and gymnastic, and every other art and craft have departed from traditional usage.

And, if politics be an art, change must be necessary in this as in any other art. That improvement has occurred is shown by the fact that old customs are exceedingly simple and barbarous. For the ancient Hellenes went about armed and bought their brides of each other. The remains of ancient laws which have come down to us are quite absurd; for example, at Cumae there is a law about murder, to the effect that if the accuser produce a certain number of witnesses from among his own kinsmen, the accused shall be held guilty. Again, men in general desire the good, and not merely what their fathers had.

But the primeval inhabitants, whether they were born of the earth or were the survivors of some destruction, may be supposed to have been no better than ordinary or even foolish people among ourselves (such is certainly the tradition concerning the earth-born men); and it would be ridiculous to rest contented with their notions.

Even when laws have been written down, they ought not always to remain unaltered. As in other sciences, so in politics, it is impossible that all things should be precisely set down in writing; for enactments must be universal, but actions are concerned with particulars. Hence we infer that sometimes and in certain cases laws may be changed.

But when we look at the matter from another point of view, great caution would seem to be required. For the habit of lightly changing the laws is an evil, and, when the advantage is small, some errors both of lawgivers and rulers had better be left; the citizen will not gain so much by making the change as he will lose by the habit of disobedience.

The analogy of the arts is false; a change in a law is a very different thing from a change in an art. For the law has no power to command obedience except that of habit, which can only be given by time, so that a readiness to change from old to new laws enfeebles the power of the law.

Even if we admit that the laws are to be changed, are they all to be changed, and in every state? And are they to be changed by anybody who likes, or only by certain persons? These are very important questions; and therefore we had better reserve the discussion of them to a more suitable occasion.

De eo autem quod invenientibus, etc. After he objected to the regime of Hippodamus with reference to its division and its judgments, he here objects to it with reference to the discipline that he put in order, with reference to this: he established that honor would follow after those who discovered something useful for the city. Concerning this he does two things.

First, he objects to what was established.

Second, he raises some questions at quoniam autem fecimus, [II.12.2] etc.

Therefore, he first says that it is not secure for the city that the aforementioned law be established, but only at first glance, when it is heard, does it appear good. For if it came about that such a law was established, it will have many calumnies, where some will decide that some discovery is useful, and others that it is not. It will also have many transformations of the regime. For when one law is transformed, sometimes the whole state of the city is changed. But such an establishment brings us to another problem—that is, into another question and another consideration. For there is a doubt among some whether it is advantageous or harmful for the city to get rid of ancestral laws if something better is discovered. And therefore, regarding what has been said, it is not easy for man to quickly agree that those who discover new things be honored, or whether or not it is advantageous for cities that ancestral laws be cast off. For it may happen through this establishment that some, when provoked to invent something new to achieve honor, may introduce the destruction [dissolutio] of the whole regime under the appearance [specie] of the common good—which, indeed, is exceedingly dangerous: therefore, this establishment is not fitting.

Then, where he says quoniam autem fecimus, etc., he raises some doubts.

First, whether the laws must change.

Second, if they are to be changed, by whom, and how, at adhuc autem si mutandae, etc.

Concerning the first he does two things.

First, he introduces reasons for showing that the laws must change.

Second, he introduces [reasons] to the contrary, at alio autem modo considerantibus, [II.12.6] etc.

Concerning the first he lays out four reasons.

Concerning the first of these, he says that, because we made small mention about the change of the laws, it is better that we extend things a little more broadly about this because, as was said, there are some doubts about this. And it seems to some that it is better for ancient laws to be cast off is something better is found. For we see that it helped greatly in the other sciences that some things were changed from those that were observed by our ancestors—such as in medicine. For later doctors discovered many things, and changed what they used to observe at first. And the same thing also is in gymnastics—that is, in exercise. For some places of exercise where men exercised naked were called gymnasia, from gymnos, that is, “naked.” And we see this in all the other arts and works of power, of whose number is the political, which is the ruling of the city. Therefore also in the rule of the city, those things must change which were observed by our ancestors, so long as better things may occur.

He lays out a second reason at signum autem, etc., and he says someone can receive a sign that the laws should be changed from their works—that is, from what happens: for we see that ancient laws were exceedingly simple and barbaric—that is, irrational and foreign, just as there was an ancient law among the Greeks that they could purchase wives in turn, bearing iron for this purchase, perhaps because other metals were not in use. And likewise, we see that if any laws still remain from ancient times, they are all foolish, as was a law of this sort in some land concerning homicide, that if anyone was prosecuted as a murderer on account of kin-slaying, and he fled when presented with a multitude of witnesses, that he would be deemed guilty of homicide (and this seems to have introduced the custom of dueling). And this is utterly unreasonable. Men, therefore, in setting up laws, should not seek what would have been observed by their ancestors, but what would be good to be observed; and so it is fitting for old laws to change if better ones may occur.

He lays out a third reason at verisimileque, etc. In order to understand it, it must be considered that Aristotle was of the opinion that the world existed from eternity, as is evident in Physics VIII, and in On the Heavens I. And yet it is clear through ancient histories that from some certain time, regions started to be inhabited, which seems contrary to the eternity of the world. But to untangle this, Aristotle deduced that frequently, general desolation of the lands was made by some flood or through whatever other corruptions happened. When these had ceased, the regions started to be inhabited anew. Which, indeed, could happen in two ways. In one manner, such that men were generated from the land. For some posited that, just as a certain rodent is generated from the land, so also man was naturally generated from the land in some proportionate manner. But this does not seem fitting, because nature proceeds to its effects from determinate beginnings and through determinate means; and so a perfected animal can never be generated except from semen: whence we do not believe that man could naturally come to be from the land, but only by divine force. In another manner, it could have happened that in a general corruption, some men were preserved either in the mountains or in some other manner, just as we posit that Noah was preserved in the arc at the time of the general flood, and Deucalion was preserved in the mountains in a flood that happened in the time of King Ogygus, in the land of the Greeks. But in whichever of these ways it may have happened, it seems that the first men were “contingents”—that is, that they were not men excellent in any way—and nonsensical, as is told in the story about those who were said to have been produced from the earth in the time of Deucalion; and so it seems unfitting that anyone should persevere in their laws and statutes.

He lays out a fourth reason at ad haec autem, etc. For someone could say that it was opportune to change the customs of the nonsensical ancients, but that the laws that were written by wise men should not be changed. But in order to exclude this, he himself objects by saying that it is not better if even the written laws persevere unmovable. For we see that it is impossible for all things to be diligently and perfectly written out about the ordering of the city, even by any number of wise men; just as this is also impossible concerning the other arts: because wise men write laws universally, and every particular cannot be considered; but acts concern particulars, and so they were not able to perfectly write out all things that belong to the directing of acts; and thus it is better that they be altered when something better is discovered. Thus, therefore, through reasons of this sort, it seems that sometimes, some laws should be changed.

Then, where he says alio modo, etc., he proceeds toward the contrary position.

And first he shows the truth of the question.

Second, he untangles some reasons that have been introduced at mendax quoque, [II.12.17] etc.

Therefore, he first says that if anyone were to consider it in another way, it will seem that it is extremely dreadful to change ancient laws, even for truer ones: for it can happen that what is discovered is a little better; but accustoming oneself to destroying laws is exceedingly crooked. And so it is clear that small defects and errors that happen to the governors and wise men in carrying out the laws ought to be upheld, because he who wishes to change to something better will not so much make progress through changing as he will do harm, so long as the citizens become accustomed to not observing the statutes and prescriptions of the governors.

Then, where he says mendax quoque, etc., he resolves one of the reasons introduced to the contrary. And he says that this example that was taken up concerning art, in which it greatly helped to make a change, introduced us to something deceitful, since a change in art is not like a change in law: because the things that are of art have their efficacy from reason, but law has nothing firm to persuade subordinates that it is good except custom—which, indeed, does not come to be except after a great time. And so, whoever easily changes the laws as such cripples the virtue of the law. The solution to the other reasons is evident, because they did not conclude that laws are to be changed with ease, but that some laws, namely, bad ones, should sometimes be changed—which is true.

Then, where he says adhuc autem si mutandae, etc., he raises another question, and he says that if the laws should sometimes be changed, one should seek out whether all laws may be changed, and in any regime, or not; and whether they may be changed by anyone, or by some determinate people. For what is more true about this differs greatly. And therefore, this consideration is dismissed for the present and saved for later.