Lecture 6

The same, or nearly the same, objections apply to Plato's later work, the Laws, and therefore we had better examine briefly the constitution which is therein described. In the Republic, Socrates has definitely settled in all a few questions only; such as the community of women and children, the community of property, and the constitution of the state.

The population is divided into two classes—one of husbandmen, and the other of warriors; from this latter is taken a third class of counselors and rulers of the state. But Socrates has not determined whether the husbandmen and artisans are to have a share in the government, and whether they, too, are to carry arms and share in military service, or not. He certainly thinks that the women ought to share in the education of the guardians, and to fight by their side. The remainder of the work is filled up with digressions foreign to the main subject.

And with discussions about the education of the guardians.

In the Laws there is hardly anything but laws; not much is said about the constitution. This, which he had intended to make more of the ordinary type, he gradually brings round to the other or ideal form. For with the exception of the community of women and property, he supposes everything to be the same in both states; there is to be the same education; the citizens of both are to live free from servile occupations, and there are to be common meals in both.

The only difference is that in the Laws, the common meals are extended to women, and the warriors number 5,000, but in the Republic only 1,000.

The discourses of Socrates are never commonplace; they always exhibit grace and originality and thought; but perfection in everything can hardly be expected.

We must not overlook the fact that the number of 5,000 citizens, just now mentioned, will require a territory as large as Babylon, or some other huge site, if so many persons are to be supported in idleness, together with their women and attendants, who will be a multitude many times as great. In framing an ideal we may assume what we wish, but should avoid impossibilities. It is said that the legislator ought to have his eye directed to two points- the people and the country. But neighboring countries also must not be forgotten by him, firstly because the state for which he legislates is to have a political and not an isolated life. For a state must have such a military force as will be serviceable against her neighbors, and not merely useful at home. Even if the life of action is not admitted to be the best, either for individuals or states, still a city should be formidable to enemies, whether invading or retreating.

There is another point: should not the amount of property be defined in some way which differs from this by being clearer? For Socrates says that a man should have so much property as will enable him to live temperately, which is only a way of saying 'to live well'; this is too general a conception.

Further, a man may live temperately and yet miserably. A better definition would be that a man must have so much property as will enable him to live not only temperately but liberally; if the two are parted, liberally will combine with luxury; temperance will be associated with toil. For liberality and temperance are the only eligible qualities which have to do with the use of property. A man cannot use property with mildness or courage, but temperately and liberally he may; and therefore the practice of these virtues is inseparable from property.

There is an inconsistency, too, in too, in equalizing the property and not regulating the number of the citizens; the population is to remain unlimited, and he thinks that it will be sufficiently equalized by a certain number of marriages being unfruitful, however many are born to others, because he finds this to be the case in existing states. But greater care will be required than now.

For among ourselves, whatever may be the number of citizens, the property is always distributed among them, and therefore no one is in want; but, if the property were incapable of division as in the Laws, the supernumeraries, whether few or many, would get nothing.

One would have thought that it was even more necessary to limit population than property; and that the limit should be fixed by calculating the chances of mortality in the children, and of sterility in married persons. The neglect of this subject, which in existing states is so common, is a never-failing cause of poverty among the citizens; and poverty is the parent of revolution and crime.

Pheidon the Corinthian, who was one of the most ardent legislators, thought that the families and the number of citizens ought to remain the same, although originally all the lots may have been of different sizes: but in the Laws the opposite principle is maintained. What in our opinion is the right arrangement will have to be explained hereafter.

There is another omission in the Laws: Socrates does not tell us how the rulers differ from their subjects; he only says that they should be related as the warp and the woof, which are made out of different wools.

He allows that a man's whole property may be increased fivefold, but why should not his land also increase to a certain extent? Again, will the good management of a household be promoted by his arrangement of homesteads? For he assigns to each individual two homesteads in separate places, and it is difficult to live in two houses.

Fere autem similiter et quae circa leges, etc. After the philosopher objected to the position of Socrates about the community of women and children and possessions, which he had laid out as if it were the governing thing in his regime, he here inquires about the other subsequent Laws.

And first he explains them.

Second, he argues against them, at superfluum quidem igitur, [II.6.6] etc.

Concerning the first he does two things.

First, he says what he intends.

Second, he carries out his intention, at dividitur autem in duas partes, [II.6.2] etc.

Therefore, he first says that just as the law about the community of women and possessions has many difficulties, so also do his other subsequent Laws. And therefore it is better to say a few words here about his whole regime, because Socrates determined few things in his regime: about the community of wives and sons and possessions, and how they ought to be arranged; and over this he determined the order of political association.

Then, where he says dividitur autem in duas, etc., he relates what Socrates had said about the order of the regime—for enough has been said above about the community.

And first, with reference to the parts of the city.

Second, with reference to the discipline of the citizens, at et de disciplina qualem quamdam, [II.6.3] etc.

Concerning the first he says four things.

The first is that Socrates divided the whole multitude inhabiting the city into two parts: the first was of the farmers and the other artisans; the second was of those living for war; and he added a third part: the council and the governors of the city.

Second, he says that Socrates omitted to speak about whether the farmers and artisans ought to have some government, and whether they also ought to fight in some manner, or not.

Third, he says that Socrates deemed that the women must go to war, and do other things like the men.

Fourth, he says that Socrates filled up other parts of his political [community] with many foreign discourses that did not belong to the material of the political community, interspersing many things about the natural sciences and the other sciences.

Then, where he says et de disciplina, etc., he describes what Socrates said about the discipline of the city, and he does three things in this regard.

First, he says that in general, Socrates said about the discipline of the city that the townsmen—that is, the inhabitants of the city—must have some discipline.

Second, at legum autem, etc., he lays out those things in which [the Laws of Socrates] fit with other regimes, and he says that a great part of the Laws that Socrates laid out are laws that are observed in some manner in cities. For since he was going to speak about a regime—that is, about the association of the city—and he was going to introduce a greater community into the city than is customary, by gradually instituting laws he arrived at another regime that is now observed. Because beyond the communion of women and possessions that was proper to his regime, he handed down all other things that are able to be common to both regimes—namely, both to the one that observes this community, and to the one that does not observe it. For he said that the same discipline was for both of them: consider that men were to live from necessary works with moderation and abstinence, and that they were to make feasts in the city for greater intimacy among the citizens, which things are also observed among other cities—although they would need to have instituted a very different discipline [in Socrates's city], as was said above.

Third, where he says verum tamen in hac inquit, etc., he describes some things proper to what Socrates laid out. The first was that there would also come to be feasts for women and not only for men. Another was that he determined the number of warriors—so that in the city there would be at least a thousand bearing arms, and at most five thousand.

Then, where he says superfluum quidem igitur, etc., he objects to the other things mentioned that Socrates introduced.

And first he objects to the discipline of the laws.

Second, to the order of a part of the city, at coordinatio autem tota vult, [II.7.1] etc.

Concerning the first he does two things.

First, he proposes his intention.

Second, he clarifies what was proposed, at quoniam et nunc dictam, [II.6.7] etc.

Therefore, he first says that the discourses of Socrates have something superfluous, inasmuch as he fills up his Republic with extraneous discourses; and trivial, inasmuch as there were insufficient reasons, and they were put forward without experience; and new, inasmuch as it was going against common custom. And it is filled with questions because of the many consequent difficulties. And that it is difficult to assert that Socrates spoke well in all things.

Then, where he says quoniam et nunc dictam he clarifies what he had said.

And first, he objects to the words of Socrates with reference to the measure he placed upon the city.

Second, with reference to its distinction, at Fidon quidem igitur, [II.6.16] etc.

Concerning the first he does two things.

First, he objects to his words with reference to the number of warriors.

Second, with reference to the quantity of possessions that he assessed, at et multitudinem autem possessionis, [II.6.8] etc.

Therefore, he first says that if someone were to consider the aforementioned multitude of warriors that Socrates instituted in the city, it clearly appears that a city of this sort will require the greatest breadth of fields, as around Babylon, for feeding five thousand warriors from them who work at nothing else, and further, the other far greater host of women and servants [famulorum].

And according to this, he who would institute such a city must have a multitude of fields at his whim—which, indeed, is not impossible, but nevertheless, it ought to be considered that he who wants to establish [statuere] a law in a city ought not to establish the law according to what he thinks to be possible, but by looking to those things that are in existence for it; and chiefly to two things: to the region, so that he will not constitute a greater city than that region can feed; and also to the men, so that the laws may be fitting for the human beings according to their conditions.

The third thing for one who would put things in place is that he put forward laws by looking toward the neighboring places. This is necessary, first of all, if the city would have a life that is not solitary but political—that is, in common with many other cities, with whom it has society not only in peace, but also in war. Because it is not only necessary that such a city have the use of such weapons for war and in so great a number insofar as it is useful for its own region, but also in foreign places, in which are associated both enemies and friends. Second, however, if someone does not approve of a warlike life, either as what is proper to some men, or as something common to the whole city, nevertheless, citizens must still be armed and warlike in this regard, as there are terrible foes—not only when they come into the region, but also when they depart.

Then, where he says multitudinem autem, etc., he objects to the position of Socrates with reference to the measure of possessions that he established in the city. Concerning this he does two things.

First, he objects to the measure of possessions posited by Socrates in and of itself.

Second, because he neglected a measure for generation, at inconveniens autem et possessiones, etc.

Concerning the first, he lays out two reasons.

Therefore, he first says that one must consider whether we could more strongly, in another manner, determine a more even quantity of possessions which the city ought to have in common than what Socrates had determined. For Socrates says that the possessions of the city ought to be enough that the citizens are able to live temperately from them: but it would be more evenly spoken if someone were to say that the possessions of the city ought to be enough that it may live well from them. For this determination is more useful, for “to live well” comprehends more things within itself than “to live temperately.”

He lays out a second reason at adhuc autem est temperate quidem, etc., and he says that it can happen for someone to live temperately who nevertheless lives in poverty—that is, in great need. And thus it is evident that the aforementioned determination of Socrates is not sufficient, but a better determination is to say that possessions ought to be so great that one may live temperately and generously. For if either of these is spoken of separately, something unfitting would follow. On the one hand, if it is said that one ought to live generously, it would follow that man would live in superfluous luxury. On the other hand, if it is said that he ought to live temperately, it would follow that man could live with neediness and labor. Therefore, to exclude both of these unfitting things, one must say “temperately and generously.” And such a determination is sufficient, because these two virtues alone make man well disposed for the use of his substance—that is, his possessions. And this is evident in the other virtues, for it could not be said that someone uses his possessions meekly or bravely. For meekness concerns anger, and bravery concerns fear and daring; and thus in no way do they look toward the use of possessions; but temperance, which is about the concupiscence for food and sex—on account of which many devour their substance—and generosity, which is about giving and receiving, clearly look toward the use of possessions. And so it can be said that someone uses his possessions temperately and generously: and so, since through both of these things there seems to be something unfitting concerning the use of possessions, the latter things—temperance and generosity—are necessary for the use of possessions.

Then, where he says inconveniens autem, etc., he objects to the position of Socrates because of this: that while he determined the amount of possessions, he did not determine the amount of generation. Concerning this he does six things.

First, he proposes that what Socrates said is unfitting: and he says that it is unfitting that someone should wish for the possessions of a city to be equalized—that is, to be brought down to a certain quantity—and along with this should not institute something for determining the multitude of the citizens, but permit the generation of citizens to come to be without a limit, as Socrates did.

Second, at tamquam sufficienter, etc., he lays out the reason that moved Socrates. For it happens in the city that many women are infertile, and so it is permitted to other women to generate many sons, and yet to always preserve the same multitude of the city, as we now see come to pass in cities. And because of this, it did not seem necessary to Socrates that anything should be assessed about the generation of sons.

Third, indeed, at nunc quidem enim, etc., Aristotle shows that this reasoning is insufficient because now in cities, because possessions are divided, and each one has his own possessions, no difficulty can come forth regarding the generation of sons bringing forth any multitude whatsoever, because each person, having zeal for his own sons, provides for them in some manner. But then, since possessions were not divided among citizens in the ordering of Socrates, it would have followed that those who were abject would partake in none of the fruit of possessions, whether they were multiplied or diminished, so long as those who were powerful were multiplied; and so long as the powerful of the city take up the necessary things first for themselves and their own, their multitude will increase.

Fourth, at magis autem suspicabitur, etc., he proposes that one must determine multitude concerning the generation of sons. And he says that someone could estimate that one must further determine the generation of sons than even the multitude of [their] substance—so that more citizens are not generated than some determinate number for which the possessions of the city are sufficient.

Fifth, at hanc autem multitudinem, etc., he shows what ought to be observed in such a determination, and he says that one must determine the multitude of sons that should be generated by looking toward chance occurrences: for instance, toward the deaths of those who are born, and toward the sterility of the women who do not conceive, so that only so much of the rest would be permitted to exceed the number of the generated as would fill up what is lacking by some sort of chance.

Sixth, at sinere autem, etc., he shows how one must determine the multitude of the generated; and he says that this is necessary because if it were permitted that men should generate without an end, apart from some determinate number, as commonly comes to be in cities, it would follow, of necessity, that from this comes forth a cause of poverty for the citizens. For many sons will be poor when they have only what their wealthy father had. But from the poverty of the citizens, it follows that there will be sedition and wickedness; because so long as they do not have the necessities of life, they will be zealous to seek them out with robbery and fraud.

Then, where he says Phaedon quidem igitur, etc., he objects to Socrates's discipline in the Laws with reference to the distinction that he made in the city. And concerning this he does four things.

First, he shows how Socrates disagreed with other legislators about this distinction. And he says that some legislator of Corinth named Phaedon said two things need to be observed in the city. The first is that the households of the ancient citizens remain equal to each other in wealth and worthiness, even if from the beginning they were to have had unequal lots. (How they can be brought back to equality he will say later.) The other is that the multitude of the citizens should remain always equal. In the laws of Socrates, the contrary is found, because he neither puts in order how the equality of the multitude of the citizens would be preserved, nor also does he establish that the wealth of the citizens be equal; but he permits that some should have greater wealth than others, as will be said afterward. But about what is better—whether that all the citizens should have equal wealth or not—will be determined afterward.

Second, at derelictum autem est, etc., he objects to the law of Socrates with reference to the distinction of the governors. And he says that through the laws of Socrates, it was not determined how the governors ought to be distinguished from the subordinates—although, indeed, he had himself said that there would have to be some distinction between them, since just as a thread of fleece and a thread of flax come to be from different materials, so those who are to be assumed into government and those who are to remain in subjection must come from different conditions, for he could not distinguish them through the origin of their family [genus], since he had set up wives and children in common.

Third, at quoniam autem omnem substantiam, etc., he objects to the position of Socrates with reference to the distinction of possessions. And he says that Socrates permitted that with moveable things [res mobilis], the wealth of one could be multiplied beyond the wealth of another by five times; and by equal reasoning, he was able to permit the same thing for possessing the land, so that he would not make all farms communal.

Fourth, at et domiciliorum autem, etc., he objects to the distinction of Socrates with reference to households. And he says that one must consider whether perhaps distinction of households that Socrates introduced is not useful for the economic [governor]. For he said that any citizen ought to have two homes, perhaps because of the separation of sons. But it is difficult for someone to have so great a family that he could inhabit two households; and it is ruinous for an economic governor that one man should pay the expenses for two families.