Lecture 9

And so with respect to property: there should not only be enough to supply the internal wants of the state, but also to meet dangers coming from without. The property of the state should not be so large that more powerful neighbors may be tempted by it, while the owners are unable to repel the invaders; nor yet so small that the state is unable to maintain a war even against states of equal power, and of the same character. Phaleas has not laid down any rule; but we should bear in mind that abundance of wealth is an advantage. The best limit will probably be, that a more powerful neighbor must have no inducement to go to war with you by reason of the excess of your wealth, but only such as he would have had if you had possessed less. There is a story that Eubulus, when Autophradates was going to besiege Atarneus, told him to consider how long the operation would take, and then reckon up the cost which would be incurred in the time. 'For,' said he, 'I am willing for a smaller sum than that to leave Atarneus at once.' These words of Eubulus made an impression on Autophradates, and he desisted from the siege.

The equalization of property is one of the things that tend to prevent the citizens from quarrelling. Not that the gain in this direction is very great. For the nobles will be dissatisfied because they think themselves worthy of more than an equal share of honors; and this is often found to be a cause of sedition and revolution.

And the avarice of mankind is insatiable; at one time two obols was pay enough; but now, when this sum has become customary, men always want more and more without end; for it is of the nature of desire not to be satisfied, and most men live only for the gratification of it. The beginning of reform is not so much to equalize property as to train the nobler sort of natures not to desire more, and to prevent the lower from getting more; that is to say, they must be kept down, but not ill-treated.

Besides, the equalization proposed by Phaleas is imperfect; for he only equalizes land, whereas a man may be rich also in slaves, and cattle, and money, and in the abundance of what are called his movables. Now either all these things must be equalized, or some limit must be imposed on them, or they must be let alone.

It would appear that Phaleas is legislating for a small city only, if, as he supposes, all the artisans are to be public slaves and not to form a supplementary part of the body of citizens. But if there is a law that artisans are to be public slaves, it should only apply to those engaged on public works, as at Epidamnus, or at Athens on the plan which Diophantus once introduced. From these observations any one may judge how far Phaleas was wrong or right in his ideas.

Similiter autem et de possessione, etc. After the philosopher objected to the regime of Phaleas because of the things he neglected—namely, the discipline of citizens, the peace of the city, and common association—he here objects to it in this regard: that he insufficiently ordered it concerning substance. Concerning this he lays out four reasons.

About the first, he says that Phaleas also did not sufficiently determine about possessions. For although he laid out some rules for possessions among the citizens, toward each other—namely, that the possessions of all should be equal—he did not, however, determine how much ought to be possessed by the whole city. The measure [of the city’s possessions] must be taken up, not only in relation to what is sufficient for the use of the citizens—which pertains to the food and clothing of the citizens, and other things of this sort—but also in relation to the dangers that can threaten from outside. And so two things should be considered concerning the quantity of the possession of the city: the first is that it should not be so great that neighboring powers are lured into desiring it, such that the citizens cannot endure their disturbances; the other is that it not be so small that it does not suffice to prepare for a war through which the citizens resist those equal to them, and similar. Therefore, one must be certain [scire] that the multitude of possessions profits the city, because through this, the citizens will be sufficient not only for the expenses of civic life, but also for warlike exercises. However, the best limit for the multitude of substance seems to be that it not be so much that, on account of abundance, citizens lightly presume to wage war against their more powerful [neighbors]; but such that they are able to securely wage war against those who do not have as great a substance, through which they would be able to resist them. Or it can be understood otherwise: that such a limit of the possessions of the citizens should be established that the more powerful will not easily be raised to wage war against the city, allured by their abundant possessions; but they should be disposed toward them as toward those who do not have much wealth on account of which the more powerful would have to undergo the hazards of war in order to loot it.

And this fits with the example that follows. For when some prince named Autophradates wished to besiege a city called Atarneus, a wise man named Eubolus—or “Eubulus,” that is, “someone of good counsel”—led him to consider how long it would take to capture the city, and along with this, also, to calculate the expenses of so great a time: and if he found that there was less to be gained in capturing the city than would be spent in the siege, to abandon it. The prince, agreeing with this counsel, stopped the siege. But he would not have stopped if they had had greater wealth. And so the aforementioned limit of possessions seems to be what is useful for the city. And since Phaleas neglected this, he seems to have insufficiently ordered the possessions of the city.

He lays out a second reason at est quidem igitur aliquid, etc., and he says that in some places, it is expedient for the city that the substance of the citizens be equal so that sedition will not come to be among the citizens. But, if one may speak thus, it is nothing great: for through this, sedition may cease among the small citizens, but the material for sedition among the greater of the city remains. For those who are favored in the city—namely, the nobles, and those existing virtuously—will be indignant if they receive equally, since they are greater in worth. For just as it seems to be against justice that for equals to have unequal things, so also is it unjust for unequals to have equal things. And from this cause, frequently the greater citizens are disturbed by the others and raise sedition. For it is through justice that the peace of the city is preserved, but the transgression of justice is the cause of sedition. So Phaleas insufficiently established things about possessions.

He lays out a third reason at adhuc autem malitia hominum, etc., and he says that even if the will of men were able to be satisfied regarding necessities, yet it is not able to be satisfied regarding wickedness. For at first, for men who have nothing, it seems sufficient that they have two obols; but when they will have acquired this, or have received it from paternal inheritance, it always seems that they need more, and those goes on without an end [in infinitum]. And this is because the nature of desire is without an end, for it does not seek only the necessities of life, but all things that are able to be delightful to man—which are without end. And so, since most men intend to satisfy their desire, it follows that their desire to be satisfied cannot go on without an end. From this—that some desire the things of others—arises sedition in cities. Therefore, a legislator must regulate the beginning of these things—that is, desire—even more than possessions.

But this comes to be in one way with reference to the good, and in another way with reference to the wicked. For the legislator must institute those who are natural epyikes—that is, the naturally virtuous—in such a way that they do not wish to act covetously [avare]—that is, to take the things of others: which, indeed, is able to be done by making them accustomed to the love of justice. But crooked men ought to be handled in such a way that they are not able to take the things of others even if they wish to. And for this, two things are necessary: the first is that the crooked in the city should be lesser—that is, that they should be dismissed into the lowest state, so that they will not be able to harm others. The other, however, is that wrongs not be inflicted upon them, by which men are provoked to harm others. Therefore, since Phaleas neglected discipline of this sort, he seems to have been insufficient in his legislation.

He lays out a fourth reason at non bene autem, etc., and says that Phaleas did not speak sufficiently about equality of substance, because he equalized the substance of citizens only with reference to unmovable goods, namely, with reference to the possession of the land. But there are other sorts of wealth, such as slaves, animals, currency, and other things that are prepared for the use of life, which are called equipment—and about the equality of these he said nothing. For the equality of everything—both the movable and immovable things—must be established; either these things should be ordered after some other manner, or everything should be neglected: for there is the same rationale for the movable and the immovable wealth, because sedition can arise from both of them.

Then, where he says videtur autem ex legislatione, etc., he objects to the order of Phaleas with reference to artisans, and he says that on account of the law that Phaleas held up about artisans, it followed that a little city would have been constructed. For he wanted all the artisans to be at work in common, and their works to be distributed to the citizens according to their necessities; and following this, the artisans would be like the slaves of the community, and would not have filled up the multitude of the city. Therefore, the city must have remained small, since we see now that the artisans make up no small part of the city. Yet in the city, there must be some public workers who work upon the common works of the city, as it served for the city of Epidamnus, and as some legislator named Diophantus established at one time in Athens. And lastly, in an epilogue, he conludes that from what has been advanced, one is able to consider what about the regime of Phaleas was said well, and what was not said well.