Lecture 8

Other constitutions have been proposed; some by private persons, others by philosophers and statesmen, which all come nearer to established or existing ones than either of Plato's. No one else has introduced such novelties as the community of women and children, or public tables for women: other legislators begin with what is necessary.

In the opinion of some, the regulation of property is the chief point of all, that being the question upon which all revolutions turn. This danger was recognized by Phaleas of Chalcedon, who was the first to affirm that the citizens of a state ought to have equal possessions. He thought that in a new colony the equalization might be accomplished without difficulty, not so easily when a state was already established; and that then the shortest way of compassing the desired end would be for the rich to give and not to receive marriage portions, and for the poor not to give but to receive them.

Plato in the Laws was of opinion that, to a certain extent, accumulation should be allowed, forbidding, as I have already observed, any citizen to possess more than five times the minimum qualification But those who make such laws should remember what they are apt to forget- that the legislator who fixes the amount of property should also fix the number of children; for, if the children are too many for the property, the law must be broken. And, besides the violation of the law, it is a bad thing that many from being rich should become poor; for men of ruined fortunes are sure to stir up revolutions.

That the equalization of property exercises an influence on political society was clearly understood even by some of the old legislators. Laws were made by Solon and others prohibiting an individual from possessing as much land as he pleased; and there are other laws in states which forbid the sale of property: among the Locrians, for example, there is a law that a man is not to sell his property unless he can prove unmistakably that some misfortune has befallen him. Again, there have been laws which enjoin the preservation of the original lots. Such a law existed in the island of Leucas, and the abrogation of it made the constitution too democratic, for the rulers no longer had the prescribed qualification.

Again, where there is equality of property, the amount may be either too large or too small, and the possessor may be living either in luxury or penury. Clearly, then, the legislator ought not only to aim at the equalization of properties, but at moderation in their amount.

Further, if he prescribe this moderate amount equally to all, he will be no nearer the mark; for it is not the possessions but the desires of mankind which require to be equalized, and this is impossible, unless a sufficient education is provided by the laws.

But Phaleas will probably reply that this is precisely what he means; and that, in his opinion, there ought to be in states, not only equal property, but equal education. Still he should tell precisely what he means; and that, in his opinion, there ought to be in be in having one and the same for all, if it is of a sort that predisposes men to avarice, or ambition, or both.

Moreover, civil troubles arise, not only out of the inequality of property, but out of the inequality of honor, though in opposite ways. For the common people quarrel about the inequality of property, the higher class about the equality of honor; as the poet says, the bad and good alike in honor share. (Homer, Iliad, bk. 9, ln. 319.)

There are crimes of which the motive is want; and for these Phaleas expects to find a cure in the equalization of property, which will take away from a man the temptation to be a highwayman, because he is hungry or cold. But want is not the sole incentive to crime; men also wish to enjoy themselves and not to be in a state of desire- they wish to cure some desire, going beyond the necessities of life, which preys upon them; nay, this is not the only reason- they may desire superfluities in order to enjoy pleasures unaccompanied with pain, and therefore they commit crimes. Now what is the cure of these three disorders? Of the first, moderate possessions and occupation; of the second, habits of temperance; as to the third, if any desire pleasures which depend on themselves, they will find the satisfaction of their desires nowhere but in philosophy; for all other pleasures we are dependent on others.

The fact is that the greatest crimes are caused by excess and not by necessity. Men do not become tyrants in order that they may not suffer cold; and hence great is the honor bestowed, not on him who kills a thief, but on him who kills a tyrant. Thus we see that the institutions of Phaleas avail only against petty crimes.

There is another objection to them. They are chiefly designed to promote the internal welfare of the state. But the legislator should consider also its relation to neighboring nations, and to all who are outside of it. The government must be organized with a view to military strength; and of this he has said not a word.

Sunt autem quaedam, etc. After the philosopher argued about the regime of Socrates (or Plato), he here discusses the regime of someone who was called Phaleas. Concerning this he does three things.

First, he describes its order.

Second, he approves of it with reference to what Phaleas said well, at quia quidem igitur habet, [II.8.6] etc.

Third, he objects to it with reference to what it lacked, at sed est aequalitatem, [II.8.8] etc.

Concerning the first he does two things.

First, he compares this regime and the following to the preceding order of Socrates/Plato.

Second, he describes the order of this regime, at videtur enim quibusdam, [II.8.2] etc.

Therefore, he first says that beyond the aforementioned regimes of Socrates/Plato, there are also some other regimes—that is, orders of cities—some of which were found by the ignorant and illiterate, but some of which were discovered by philosophers and by the sort of men who were prudent and experienced in citizenly association. And some of these were constituted only by their authors, such that they were not observed in any city; but there are some that some people follow in civil association. All, however, of these sorts of regimes have a greater relation to each other and to what is fitting for the city than both of the aforementioned regimes of Socrates/Plato, the first of which was posited above, regarding the community of women and sons and possessions; the second, afterward, about the laws written by him. For no other legislator discovered either the community of sons and wives, that belonged to the first regime of Socrates, or ordered the feasts for the women that belonged to the second, as has been obviously stated; but they [i.e. other lawmakers] start to order the city from things that are more necessary.

Then, where he says videtur enim quibusdam, etc., he describes the regime that Phaleas ordered. Concerning this he does four things.

First, he shows what most legislators intend. And he says that to some legislators, it seemed most necessary that things be well ordered regarding the substance, that is, the possessions of the citizens, because from this chiefly arises all the sedition of the city—which it is the leading intention of legislators to remove.

Then, where he says propter quod Felleas, etc., he shows what this Phaleas ordered. And he says that he first established something about this: he desired that all the possessions of the citizens should be equal. And he said that it is not difficult for this to come to be in a city at the beginning, when it started to be inhabited, because possessions could be equally divided among the citizens. But in an inhabited city, the citizens of which have unequal possessions, this was more difficult: yet it could swiftly be led back to this rule through dowries, such that when the wealthy contracted with the poor, they would give dowries but not receive them, but the poor would receive them and not give them, until the possessions of all were equalized.

Third, at Plato autem leges, etc., he shows how Plato ordered things differently about this. For he said that none of the citizens should have been given power so that he would have more than quintuple the wealth then was possessed by whoever had the least. But this should be understood with reference to the wealth of movable things [rerum mobilium], because he made immovable things common.

Fourth, at oportet autem neque hoc latere, etc., he shows what all things of this sort lack. For it escaped them that since they established something about the multitude of wealth, they must also put something in order about the multitude of sons: for example, that someone should not supply the work of generation after a certain number [of children], or that after some number of children were born, that the overgrowth of men should be sent to construct other cities, or in whatever other manner. Because if the number of the sons who are born exceeds the multitude of wealth allotted to each man, it is necessary that the law about the equality of possessions will be dismantled. For example, if one of two citizens who have equal possessions generates four sons, but the other only one, from necessity it would follow that their sons would not have equal possessions. And because of this—that the law would be undone—another evil would also follow: that many who were born of the wealthy would become poor when the substance of one wealthy man was divided among many sons. And this is evil because the task [opus], for the peace of the city, is that the sons of the wealthy—who can be extravagant—do not become poor, because it could make them into thieves. But if the quantity of possessions were not allotted to anyone, this would not follow, because insofar as the number of someone's sons expanded, he would be zealous to increase his wealth. So therefore, either nothing should be established about a measure for possessions, or at the same time as this, something should be put in order about a number of sons.

Then, where he says quia quidem igitur, etc., he approves of the aforementioned order of things in this regard: that Phaleas put something in order about the measure of substance—lest it should seem that he condemned him because of the aforementioned unfitting things. Moreover, he approves him for two reasons.

First, indeed, because of the authority of ancient legislators; and he says that some of the ancient legislators seem to have known that regulating the substance of the citizens has a great virtue for preserving well the civic community. And so Solon, who was one of the seven wise men, and established the laws of the Athenians, set it up as a law (that is observed even among others) that someone could not acquire land to possess as much as he might wish, but only up to a certain limit: likewise also, there are laws in other cities that prohibit men from selling their possessions, as in the city of the Locrians—which is in Calabria—there was an ancient law that nobody could sell their possessions unless they could demonstrate that some heavy misfortune had happened to them—for instance, that they had been captured by enemies, or had suffered something else of this sort. Likewise, also, some places have ordered laws that the ancient lots of citizens be preserved inviolate. And these all belong to regulating the substance of citizens.

Second, at hoc autem solutum, etc., he shows the same thing through the unfitting things that would follow [if substance remained unregulated]. And he says that because this was permitted in a specific city, it followed that their regime was greatly democratic—that is, of the people—because when it was permitted to anyone to purchase possessions indifferently, it made it that many of the people were elevated, and the greater ones were pressed down: and so it followed that the men chosen for government were not from any of the citizens of determined worth, because of the overwhelming confusion in the conditions of the citizens.

Then, where he says sed est aequalitatem quidem, etc., he objects to the aforementioned order.

And first, because it neglected some things.

Second, because substance was not fittingly regulated, at similiter autem et de possessione, [II.9.1] etc.

Third, because things were unfittingly indicated concerning artisans, at videtur autem ex legislatione, [II.9.7] etc.

Concerning the first he does three things.

First, he shows that Phaleas neglected the things that belong to the discipline of the citizens [II.8.9].

Second, that he overlooked the things that belong to the peace of the city, at adhuc dissident, [II.8.12] etc.

Third, because he neglected things that belong to the civic association, at adhuc multa opus est, [II.8.15] etc.

Concerning the first, he lays out two reasons.

The first is that it can happen that there is equality of substance among the citizens, and yet that there is either too much, so that citizens live luxuriously from it, and thus the morals [mores] of the citizens are corrupted; or that it is too little [modicum], so that the citizens live too strictly, such that one is not able to support another; and both of these are harmful for the good discipline of the citizens. So it is clear that Phaleas was not a sufficient legislator, because he only made the substance of the citizens to be equal, but he needed to determine some mean, so that there would be so great a quantity of possessions that they could neither intend superfluous luxury, nor also be compelled to live too frugally.

He lays out a second reason at adhuc autem si quis, etc.

Concerning this he does two things.

First, he lays out the reason, and he says that even if someone ordered moderate possessions for all citizens, this still would not suffice for the good life of the citizens. For one must more rule the interior desires of the soul—so that they do not desire immoderately—than the exterior substance—so that they do not have things immoderately. But it does not happen that the desires of man are ruled except when men are sufficiently instructed through the due laws—which Phaleas did not set up. And so he insufficiently handed down what belongs to the discipline of the citizens.

Second, at sed forte utique dicet, etc., he rules out the response of Phaleas, who would perhaps have responded to this that both must be in the city—that is, both equality of possessions and equality of discipline, such that all the citizens are given equal formation by discipline. But Aristotle speaks against this that one would have needed to say what such a discipline is that must give formation to all the citizens. For it does not suffice to say that it should be one and the same for all, but it must be the sort of thing through which the citizens may be given a formation such that some of them do not wish to exceed the others either in wealth or in honors, or in both at once. And so, since Phaleas neglected this sort of discipline, he was insufficient as a legislator.

Then, where he says adhuc dissident, etc., he shows that Phaleas neglected the things that belong to the peace of the city. Concerning this, he lays out three reasons.

The first is that citizens are factious not only because of inequality of possessions, but also because of inequality of honors—but in different ways. Now the multitude of the people do not care about honors, but only about wealth, and so they are factious because of inequality of wealth. But favored [gratiosi] men, who excel others in the works of virtue, are factious because of honors if equal honors are rendered to them, and their honor is not greater than others. And therefore, the legislator needs to put something in order about honors: for instance, that some honor be determined that is not given to any except the good, and another honor that even someone wicked—that is, lacking in virtue—could use. And thus will peace be preserved in the city. However, since Phaleas neglected this, he insufficiently handed down what belongs to the peace of the city.

He lays out a second reason at non solum autem homines, etc., which is like this. Men certainly not only do wrong to others because they are seeking out necessities—which is first, and the remedy for which Phaleas thought was that the substance of the citizens should be equal, and so all would have the necessities, and thus one man would not despoil another in order to avoid hunger or cold—but also, some men do wrong to those nearest them so that they may enjoy what delights them, and so that they will not desire anything that they do not immediately have. Because if there are some who have too great a desire of temporal necessities (for necessities in Greek), that is, who desire more than would be necessary for them, then as a medicine for this—so that they can make their desires content—they will do injury, stealing away the goods of others by force or deception. Nor is this the only cause of men doing wrong, but also because some want to so rejoice in delights that they do not suffer any sorrow; and therefore, they do wrong to men by whom they fear they could have sorrow inflicted upon them, by oppressing them. Therefore, for the peace of the city, the legislator must think up some remedies for these three causes of wrong-doing. For those who would do wrong because of seeking out necessities, it suffices as a remedy to have modest [modica] possessions, and their own work, through which they can acquire some food for themselves. For with a few things, nature is contented. But for those who do wrong because of a desire for delights, the remedy is temperance, which moderates in men the desire for delights. But against the third—namely, against those who do wrong so that they may not have sorrow, the remedy is to apply philosophy, so that they can enjoy its delights, which are without sorrow—which even make men not to sorrow in misfortune. But in the other two, help can be given to a man through other men; and so, since Phaleas neglected the second of these two remedies, only giving a remedy for the first, he seems to have ordered things insufficiently.

He lays out a third reason at iniuriantur, etc., and says that men do wrong most of all in order to acquire excellence in wealth and honors, but not in order to seek out necessities—as it is evident about those who exercise tyranny: not, indeed, so they will not suffer from hunger or cold, but on account of the aforementioned excellences. And therefore, because such men most of all do wrong in the city, a reward of great honor is given in cities to those who kill tyrants, but not to those who kill thieves. And yet, Phaleas did not set up any remedy against the wrong-doing of tyrants: and so it is evident that his manner of ordering things offered help only against the little wrongs, but not against the great ones.

Then, where he says adhuc multa opus est, etc., he shows that the order of Phaleas was insufficient with reference to the association of citizens; because many things must be constituted in the city, from which the citizens may associate well with each other. Something must also be constituted through which they will associate well with their neighbors, and with any foreigners. And because among neighbors and foreigners there are also some who are enemies, with whom there will be warring, it is therefore necessary to set up in the city some order in relation to warlike fortitude. All of these things the aforementioned legislator neglected: so it is clear that he insufficiently ordered the city.