Lecture 4

Next let us consider what should be our arrangements about property: should the citizens of the perfect state have their possessions in common or not? This question may be discussed separately from the enactments about women and children. Even supposing that the women and children belong to individuals, according to the custom which is at present universal, may there not be an advantage in having and using possessions in common? Three cases are possible: the soil may be appropriated, but the produce may be thrown for consumption into the common stock; and this is the practice of some nations. Or, the soil may be common, and may be cultivated in common, but the produce divided among individuals for their private use; this is a form of common property which is said to exist among certain barbarians. Or, the soil and the produce may be alike common.

When the husbandmen are not the owners, the case will be different and easier to deal with; but when they till the ground for themselves the question of ownership will give a world of trouble. If they do not share equally enjoyments and toils, those who labor much and get little will necessarily complain of those who labor little and receive or consume much.

But indeed there is always a difficulty in men living together and having all human relations in common, but especially in their having common property. The partnerships of fellow-travelers are an example to the point; for they generally fall out over everyday matters and quarrel about any trifle which turns up.

So with servants: we are most able to take offense at those with whom we most we most frequently come into contact in daily life. These are only some of the disadvantages which attend the community of property.

The present arrangement, if improved as it might be by good customs and laws, would be far better, and would have the advantages of both systems. Property should be in a certain sense common, but, as a general rule, private; for, when everyone has a distinct interest, men will not complain of one another, and they will make more progress, because every one will be attending to his own business. And yet by reason of goodness, and in respect of use, 'Friends,' as the proverb says, 'will have all things common.' Even now there are traces of such a principle, showing that it is not impracticable, but, in well-ordered states, exists already to a certain extent and may be carried further. For, although every man has his own property, some things he will place at the disposal of his friends, while of others he shares the use with them. The Lacedaemonians, for example, use one another's slaves, and horses, and dogs, as if they were their own; and when they lack provisions on a journey, they appropriate what they find in the fields throughout the country. It is clearly better that property should be private, but the use of it common; and the special business of the legislator is to create in men this benevolent disposition.

Again, how immeasurably greater is the pleasure, when a man feels a thing to be his own; for surely the love of self is a feeling implanted by nature and not given in vain, although selfishness is rightly censured; this, however, is not the mere love of self, but the love of self in excess, like the miser's love of money; for all, or almost all, men love money and other such objects in a measure.

And further, there is the greatest pleasure in doing a kindness or service to friends or guests or companions, which can only be rendered when a man has private property. These advantages are lost by excessive unification of the state.

The exhibition of two virtues, besides, is visibly annihilated in such a state: first, temperance towards women (for it is an honorable action to abstain from another's wife for temperance' sake); secondly, liberality in the matter of property. No one, when men have all things in common, will any longer set an example of liberality or do any liberal action; for liberality consists in the use which is made of property.

Such legislation may have a specious appearance of benevolence; men readily listen to it, and are easily induced to believe that in some wonderful manner everybody will become everybody's friend, especially when some one is heard denouncing the evils now existing in states, suits about contracts, convictions for perjury, flatteries of rich men and the like, which are said to arise out of the possession of private property. These evils, however, are due to a very different cause- the wickedness of human nature. Indeed, we see that there is much more quarrelling among those who have all things in common, though there are not many of them when compared with the vast numbers who have private property.

Again, we ought to reckon, not only the evils from which the citizens will be saved, but also the advantages which they will lose. The life which they are to lead appears to be quite impracticable.

Habitum autem hiis est, etc. After the philosopher objected to the law of Socrates with regard to the community of women and children, he here objects to it with reference to the community of possessions. And concerning this, he does two things.

First, he proposes his intention.

Second, he shows what was proposed, at alteris quidem igitur, [II.4.2] etc.

Concerning the first he does three things.

First, he links it with the preceding, saying that one has to consider about possessions—as a consequence of the preceding—whether it is necessary to order them such that those who ought to be associated after the best civil association should have possessions in common or not in common.

Second, at hoc autem utique, etc., he shows that this question should be considered separately from the previous, which was about the community of women; and he says that it would be considered separately even if there were no statute about the community of children and wives. Namely, if it were a given that children and wives were not common, but that each one separately had is own wife and children after the mode that is now observed, we should still consider whether it is better that possessions and their use should be common to all than that each one have his own possessions, as it is now.

Third, at puta campos seorsum, etc., he distinguishes the modes in which it is possible for citizens to hold their possessed goods in common. And he lays out three modes:

the first of which is that each person separately has fields of his own, but that all the produce of the fields are carried away to a common place and distributed to everyone—which is observed among some nations.

The second mode is that, conversely, the land is in common, and cultivated in common, but the produce of the farms is divided among the citizens for the private use of each. And this mode is observed among some barbarians.

The third mode is that both the fields and their produce are common, which Socrates said should be established by law.

Then, where he says alteris quidem igitur, etc., he shows what is true about the proposed question.

And first he objects to the law of Socrates about the community of possessions, showing what evils would follow from it.

Second, he shows what goods would be taken away through it, at eo autem modo, [II.4.5] etc.

Concerning the first, he lays out three rationales.

The first is: if possessions were common to all citizens, one of two things must happen [esse]: either the farms are cultivated by some who are foreigners, or by some of the citizens. And if, indeed, they are cultivated by others, there will be some difficulty, because it is difficult to summon so many foreign farmers: however, this mode would be easier than if some of the citizens were to labor, for this displays many difficulties. For it would not be possible for all the citizens to cultivate the farms, since it must be that the greater [citizens] would intend greater occupations, but the lesser ones at farming; nevertheless, it must also be that the greater citizens, who would labor less at farming, would also receive more of its produce, and so the partaking of the produce [of the farms] would not correspond to the work equally, according to proportion. And because of this, of necessity there would arise accusations and quarrels when the lesser citizens, who labor more, would complain about the greater that those laboring less received much, but conversely, those laboring more received less. And so it is evident that from this law, the unity of the city—which Socrates had wished—would not follow, but rather, discord.

He lays out a second rationale, at omnino autem convivere, etc., and he says that it is extremely difficult for many men to live life together and that they commune in any human goods, and chiefly in wealth. For we see that those who commune in some wealth have many disagreements with each other, as is evident among those who travel together: for they frequently disagree with each other about what is advantageous when determining what is to be done about food and drink, and at times, for a trifle, they repel and offend each other in word and deed. So it is evident that if all citizens held all possessions in common, more quarrels would exist among them.

He lays out a third reason, at adhuc autem famulantium, etc., and he says that men are most offended by those maids which they most [frequently] require for some servile service. And this is because of a community of associated life: for those who do not frequently associate do not frequently have disturbances with each other. From this it is evident that a union existing among men is frequently the cause of strife. And lastly, he concludes that the previous difficulties and other similar ones would follow from a community of possessions in the city.

Then, where he says eo autem modo, etc., he shows what goods would be taken away through the aforementioned law. And he lays out three rationales.

Concerning the first, he says that if it were so ordered in the city—as now occurs—that possessions were divided among the citizens, and this were put in order through beautiful customs and just laws, there would be a great difference in the abundance of goodness and usefulness regarding those things that Socrates discussed. For on both sides there is found some good, both in the one that proposes private possessions and in the one that proposes common possessions. But if possessions were private, and it were put in order by correct laws and customs that citizens commune with each other in their goods, there will occur that sort of manner of living well that comes from both—both from the community of possessions and from their distinction. For indeed, simply speaking, possessions must be private to the degree that they are the property of a master, but they must be common in some manner. For from this—that there are private possessions—it follows that the managers of possessions are divided, while each one has care for his own possessions. From this two goods follow: the first is that, so long as each one limits [intermittit] himself at his own property, and not at what is another's, the quarrels among men will not happen that tend to happen when many have to manage one thing—where it seems to one that it should be done in this way, and to another in another way; the second good is that each one will multiply more his own possessions, since he is more devoted and studious for those things that are as though his own. And in this manner possessions will be divided, but because of the virtue of the citizens, who will be generous and beneficent to each other, they will be common in usage, as it says in the proverb that the things of friends are common.

And in case this seems impossible to someone, he adds on that in some well-organized cities there is a statute that some things are common regarding use in and of themselves [ipso facto], but some become common through the will of their masters: while each one still has private possession, he makes some of his goods come forth for the usefulness of his friends, and his friends use some of his goods as their own, as though they were things in common. So it was in Lacedaemon, in which one could use the slave of another for his own service, as if he were his own slave. Likewise, they were able to use the horses and dogs of others as though their own, if they needed to go to the fields—when in the same district. And so it is clear that it is much better that there be private possessions regarding mastery, but that they become common in some manner with reference to their use. But how the use of private things can become common—this belongs to the providence of a good legislator.

He lays out a second rationale at adhuc, etc. And he says that one cannot easily describe the degree to which it is more delightful to repute something as your own. For the delight comes from this: that man loves himself, and because of this he wants goods for himself. Nor is it vain that someone has friendship for himself, but it is natural. Certainly, sometimes someone is justly blamed for being a philauton—that is, a self-lover—but when this is said in blame, this is not for loving himself simply speaking, but more than he should; just as they are blamed who love money—which, indeed, everyone loves in some manner—because lovers of money are blamed inasmuch as they love it more than they should. This delight, however, which concerns having one's own things, the law of Socrates removes.

He lays out a third reason at vero et largiri etc., and he says that it is very delightful for a man to give help, or to bear it either to friends or to foreigners, or to any others—which happens, moreover, through man having private possessions. And so also the law of Socrates takes away this good when it removes private possessions. Lastly, he concludes that such unfitting things happen to those who excessively wish to unite the city by introducing a community of possessions, and of wives and children.

Then, where he says et ad haec interimunt etc., he objects at once to each position—to the community of wives and to the community of possessions. And he also introduces three reasons for this.

The first is that those who excessively wish to unite the city like this clearly abolish [interimunt] the works of two virtues: temperance, inasmuch as it is about women—for the work of temperance is to abstain from other women—which will not have a place if all women are in common; likewise, introducing a community of possessions removes the act of generosity [liberalitas], for nobody will be able to exercise the act of generosity since he does not have private possessions—from the use of which is the work of generosity constructed. The provident man spends and gives the things that are his own; but that someone should give away things held in common is not very generous.

He lays out the second reason at bonae faciei quidem igitur, etc., and he says that the aforementioned law of Socrates seems superficially good, and it seems that it is either philantropos, meaning “introducing friendship among men,” or that it is philantropos meaning “lovable by men.” And this is because of two things. First, because of the good that someone looks for as coming from such a law. For when someone hears that among citizens there are all things in common, he looks up to this with joy, reputing that a wondrous friendship of all with all will come from this. Second, because of the evils that he thinks will be taken away through this law. For some condemn the evils that now happen in cities, such as disputes of men over contracts, and judgments about false testimony, and that the poor flatter the wealthy, as though all such things came to be because possessions are not in common. But if someone would consider correctly, none of these come to be because possessions are not in common, but because of the wickedness of men. For we see that those who possess something in common are often more greatly divided among themselves than those who have separated possessions. But because those who have possessions in common are few with respect to those who have them divided, because of this, fewer quarrels come from a community of possessions: but if all held possessions in common, there would be many more quarrels.

He lays out a third reason at adhuc autem iustum, etc., and he says that man ought to consider not only how much evil those who have possessions and wives in common are deprived of, but also how many goods they are deprived of. For the legislator ought to allow some evils lest he deprive people of greater goods. But people are deprived of so much good through this law of Socrates that such an association of life seems impossible, as is clear from the unfitting things laid out above.