Lecture 5

The error of Socrates must be attributed to the false notion of unity from which he starts. Unity there should be, both of the family and of the state, but in some respects only. For there is a point at which a state may attain such a degree of unity as to be no longer a state, or at which, without actually ceasing to exist, it will become an inferior state, like harmony passing into unison, or rhythm which has been reduced to a single foot. The state, as I was saying, is a plurality which should be united and made into a community by education; and it is strange that the author of a system of education which he thinks will make the state virtuous, should expect to improve his citizens by regulations of this sort, and not by philosophy or by customs and laws, like those which prevail at Sparta and Crete respecting common meals, whereby the legislator has made property common.

Let us remember that we should not disregard the experience of ages; in the multitude of years these things, if they were good, would certainly not have been unknown; for almost everything has been found out, although sometimes they are not put together; in other cases men do not use the knowledge which they have. Great light would be thrown on this subject if we could see such a form of government in the actual process of construction; for the legislator could not form a state at all without distributing and dividing its constituents into associations for common meals, and into phratries and tribes. But all this legislation ends only in forbidding agriculture to the guardians, a prohibition which the Lacedaemonians try to enforce already.

But, indeed, Socrates has not said, nor is it easy to decide, what in such a community will be the general form of the state. The citizens who are not guardians are the majority, and about them nothing has been determined: are the husbandmen, too, to have their property in common? Or is each individual to have his own? And are the wives and children to be individual or common. If, like the guardians, they are to have all things in common, what do they differ from them, or what will they gain by submitting to their government? Or, upon what principle would they submit, unless indeed the governing class adopt the ingenious policy of the Cretans, who give their slaves the same institutions as their own, but forbid them gymnastic exercises and the possession of arms. If, on the other hand, the inferior classes are to be like other cities in respect of marriage and property, what will be the form of the community? Must it not contain two states in one, each hostile to the other? He makes the guardians into a mere occupying garrison, while the husbandmen and artisans and the rest are the real citizens.

But if so the suits and quarrels, and all the evils which Socrates affirms to exist in other states, will exist equally among them. He says indeed that, having so good an education, the citizens will not need many laws, for example laws about the city or about the markets; but then he confines his education to the guardians.

Again, he makes the husbandmen owners of the property upon condition of their paying a tribute. But in that case they are likely to be much more unmanageable and conceited than the Helots, or Penestae, or slaves in general.

And whether community of wives and property be necessary for the lower equally with the higher class or not, and the questions akin to this, what will be the education, form of government, laws of the lower class, Socrates has nowhere determined: neither is it easy to discover this, nor is their character of small importance if the common life of the guardians is to be maintained.

Again, if Socrates makes the women common, and retains private property, the men will see to the fields, but who will see to the house? And who will do so if the agricultural class have both their property and their wives in common? Once more: it is absurd to argue, from the analogy of the animals, that men and women should follow the same pursuits, for animals have not to manage a household.

The government, too, as constituted by Socrates, contains elements of danger; for he makes the same persons always rule. And if this is often a cause of disturbance among the meaner sort, how much more among high-spirited warriors? But that the persons whom he makes rulers must be the same is evident; for the gold which the God mingles in the souls of men is not at one time given to one, at another time to another, but always to the same: as he says, 'God mingles gold in some, and silver in others, from their very birth; but brass and iron in those who are meant to be artisans and husbandmen.'

Again, he deprives the guardians even of happiness, and says that the legislator ought to make the whole state happy. But the whole cannot be happy unless most, or all, or some of its parts enjoy happiness. In this respect happiness is not like the even principle in numbers, which may exist only in the whole, but in neither of the parts; not so happiness. And if the guardians are not happy, who are? Surely not the artisans, or the common people. The Republic of which Socrates discourses has all these difficulties, and others quite as great.

Causam autem deviationis, etc. After the philosopher objected to the law of Socrates by showing that it is unfitting, he here objects to it by showing that it is insufficient. Concerning this he does two things.

First, he shows that [Socrates] did not have a sufficient motive.

Second, he shows that what [Socrates] laid out was insufficient, at quinimmo sed neque modus, [II.5.5] etc.

Concerning the first he does two things.

First, he shows that the motive is insufficient because of a false supposition [II.5.2].

Second, because of a shortage of the experience that is required in crafting laws, at oportet autem non hoc ipsum ignorare, [II.5.4] etc.

Therefore, he first says that the cause why Socrates deviated from the truth concerning the law about the community of possessions, of wives, and of children, must be deemed to be because he supposed some supposition that was not correct: that the highest good of the city is that it be maximally one. But this supposition is not correct because for the city and the household, as has been said above, a sort of unity is required, but not in every way. For the unity of the city can proceed to such a degree that it will no longer be a city; for instance, if all practice one art, and dwell together in one household. Moreover, unity can proceed to such a degree that it will approach being what is not a city. So it follows that it is worse, because by how much each thing approaches its own non-being, by so much more is it inferior—as [would happen] if someone were to destroy the distinction of offices that is necessary for the well-being of the city. And he lays out an example: just as if someone were to make homophonia—that is, everyone singing in one voice—there will no longer be symphonia—that is, a harmony of voices; to this, he likens the city, constructed out of diverse things. And likewise, rismon—that is, the order of a figure, like a triangle—would be destroyed if someone wished to make only one base. And so unity can proceed to such a degree that the city would be destroyed.

But as was said above, in the city there must certainly be a multitude of diverse people, but the city becomes one and common because of some discipline of laws that are set up correctly. But if someone who was about to introduce discipline for uniting the city were to deem that through this law about the community of wives and children, a good city would come to be, it is unfitting if he were to deem that through such communities he could make the city correct, and not more through good customs and laws, and through philosophy—that is, wisdom about such things. Just as it was said above that the Lacedaemonians made private possessions common with regard to use, and in Crete also, the legislator made some things common, so that there would be public feasts for the citizens, at certain times, so that there would be greater intimacy among them.

Then, where he says oportet non hoc ipsum, etc., he shows the insufficiency of motive [power] because of a shortage of experience: and he says that for the laws to be well set up, one must not be ignorant, because someone ought to consider for much time and for many years, so that it will be clear through experience if such laws or statutes are well arranged [se habeant]. For one must deem that in the length of preceding time, almost all things have been discovered about human associations that can be thought up. But some of these have not been employed—that is, to this point, it has not proceeded for them that they should be established as law, because it was immediately apparent that they were unfitting. Some, truly, have indeed been established, but they fell out of use when men learned that they were not useful. And this becomes maximally clear if someone, through experience of the work, looks into an order of the city instituted such as Socrates discussed. For it is impossible that a city come to be except through some partition and separation; consider that with common goods, there comes to be a distribution through diverse feasts, or diverse societies, or through diverse tribes—that is, companies of the city or the region. Therefore, because it is utterly necessary that there comes to be a distribution of common goods—with reference to things—nothing other is brought forth through the establishment of such a law about the community of possessions, except that the townsmen [municipes]--that is, those who continually dwell in the city—will not have care for cultivating the farms, as though they do not have their own farms. But this can come to be even if the farms are not in common, just as the Lacedaemonians attempted to make it—so that the farms were cultivated by others as though they were their own.

Then, where he says quinimmo, etc., he shows that the Platonic law is unfitting with reference to what has been laid out. Concerning this he does two things.

First, he shows the insufficiency of the aforementioned law with reference to those things that it is about.

Second, with reference to some of its consequences, at sed sive necessaria, [II.5.10] etc.

Concerning the first, he introduces three reasons.

The first shows the insufficiency of the aforementioned law with reference to this: that it could not sufficiently distinguish the multitude of the city according to the thing [secundum id]. And he says that not only did the law of Socrates seem to accomplish nothing else than that the townsmen did not cultivate the farms—as though the fields were not their own—but Socrates did not even say what the method would be of instituting a whole political association, following his law, for communing—that is, for having all things in common; nor is it even possible for it to be explained by someone else anywhere at all, from the law having been kept.

For it is necessary that the multitude of the city be a multitude of diverse men of diverse states [of life]. Nothing was determined by Socrates about how their diversity would be able to be: for it is necessary to say that there are common possessions for farmers, just as with the other citizens, and sons and wives, or that they separately have their own sons and possessions and wives, beyond what the other citizens have. But with this second manner, he happens to indicate their diversity from the other citizens, both because of their difference in possessions, and also because of the origin of their parentage: but if, in the same manner, all the aforementioned things are common to all the others, no difference will be found according to which they can diversify the farmers from the townsmen [municipibus]—that is, from those who cultivate the city in common. Nor can it even be indicated what further consequence will follow for those who carry the weight of government in ruling the city, and so they will labor uselessly: but now they have this comfort—that they are allotted more possessions, and their sons are ennobled. Likewise, also, they will not be able to indicate what steps will permit government—that is, because of which of their preceding conditions will they be assumed to government; for now it is customary for those to assume government who are more noble in origin, or more excellent in wealth—for excellence in virtue is not always so clear that men can be found according to it alone who will be assumed to government.

But someone could say that those who keep the law of Socrates would undertake to observe in some way something like what the Cretans observe, who dismiss agriculture and other artful things of this sort for the slaves to exercise, to whom they forbid only gymnasia—that is, bodily exercise, and the use of arms, so that according to this, one does not need to distinguish between farmers and other townsmen, because those exercising agriculture and artisans, according to this, will not be citizens, but slaves. But if in the city that Socrates intended to fashion, something of this sort were set in order, as in other cities—so that some of the citizens were farmers and artisans—there will not seem to be one community, because in one city it will be necessary for it to be as if there were two cities opposed [contrarias] to each other. For in one part there will be the townsmen, who guard the city, working at nothing else; and in the other part there will be those working as farmers and artisans, and these two parts much be opposed to each other from this very thing: that while some are laboring, others do not labor, and nevertheless they receive more of the produce, as was also said above. But if possessions are not common, there will not be quarrels from this, because everyone will direct the cultivation of his own field, either through someone else, or through himself, and when the lesser serve the greater, they will receive gain from this, and there will be one union among them.

He lays out a second reason at accusationes autem, etc., and he says that in a city having all things in common, as Socrates discussed, will be found mutual accusations and disputes, and all the other evils that Socrates says are now in cities. For citizens dispute with each other about this: that they do not labor equally, nor do they equally receive the produce of their labor, and about many other things also; although Socrates had deemed that there would not be such evils in a city in which all things were in common. And because of this he said that because of this sort of discipline, the city would not require many laws, but only a few—concerning the dwelling place of the townsmen, and about a place of judgment, and a place for selling things, and other things of this sort, without the ordering of which the city is not able to be: thus, nevertheless, that this sort of discipline of the laws should be allotted only to the townsmen—that is, to the guardians of the city—but not the farmers, who dwell beyond the city of the townsmen. And so it is evident that the law of Socrates was insufficient, because it could not root out the evils that he attempted to destroy.

He lays out a third reason at adhuc autem dominos facit, etc., and says that Socrates entrusted, following his law, the whole organization of possessions to the farmers, to whom he said that it should be entrusted, so that the produce of the farms would be offered to whoever was freed up for other things: and from this he deemed that the farmers, because this power, would be effected compliant and would humbly serve the other citizens. But the complete contrary would happen: for it is more more likely that from this, since they held all things in their power, they would be a burden to the other citizens, and would discover the cunning to defraud them, rather than that they would humbly serve them. And so it is clear that the law of Socrates about the community of women and possessions was insufficient, because it could not fulfill what it attempted.

Then, where he says sed sive necessaria, etc., he shows the insufficiency of the Socratic law regarding its other consequences.

And first in general.

Second, particularly, at at vero si uxores, [II.5.11] etc.

Therefore, he first says that either such things as Socrates laid out about the community of women and possessions are necessary for the city, or they are not; however, about its habits—that is, about its consequences—he determined nothing: of what should be the order of the political associations, what should the discipline be, and which laws are proper to those who have all things in common like this? For it is not easy to discover anyone like this, and those who would be able to serve the aforementioned city must differ from others by no small amount. And so they would need to be saturated by some particular laws and a particular discipline.

Then, where he says at vero si uxores, etc., he shows the insufficiency in particular.

And first with reference to women.

Second, with reference to governors, at insecurum autem, [II.5.13] etc.

Third, with reference to the common happiness of the city, at adhuc autem et felicitatem auferens, [II.5.15] etc.

With reference to women he touches on two things.

First, that women cannot be sufficiently put in order if they are in common for both the townsmen and the farmers; either possessions are private and distinguished for both, or they are common, because if they are common, they must be managed by the farmers, and even if they belong to the townsmen, who else will manage them except the farmers? But how could the men who are in the farms manage the women who dwell in the city? For they could not, at the same time, employ the women existing in the city and also cultivate the farms.

Second, concerning women, he says that Socrates said that the women ought to deal with the same things as the men, so that they would cultivate the farms and go to war, and do other things of this sort as do the men. And he accepted a parable—that is, a likeness drawn from the beasts—in which the female was at work like the male. But Aristotle said that this is unfitting, and that there is not a likeness because the beasts participate in nothing of the oeconomic life, in which, indeed, women have their own work which they must intend, and for which they must always abstain from civil works.

Then, where he says insecurum autem, etc., he shows the insufficiency with reference to governors, and he says that it is not secure for the city that the governors of the city be instituted in this manner, as Socrates instituted them: for he had so ordered it that the governors would always remain the same, which indeed becomes a cause of sedition even among men that are not of great might, and much more among spirited and warlike men who cannot easily suffer that they should always be subjects and never govern others.

And he adds on the cause for why Socrates instituted it that there should always be the same governors: for he said that just as in some mines of the earth is found gold, and in some silver, and in some iron or bronze, so also in the souls of some men, who abound in wisdom and virtue, it is as though God had instilled gold—and for them it is just to govern; but in some, who are of the second level, there is silver; and in some who are imperfect in wisdom and virtue, it is as though there is found bronze or iron, and such men of themselves ought to become farmers and artisans. But it is clear that this is not easily changed, such that sometimes one man would be instilled with gold, and sometimes another, but it is always the same ones, and so it would follow that the same men would always govern.

Then, where he says adhuc autem et felicitatem, etc., he shows the insufficiency with reference to the common happiness of the city. For Socrates said that the legislator ought to attend to this, so that he would make the whole city happy, both regarding the works of virtue, and regarding external goods. Yet Socrates, through his law, stole happiness from the particular citizens, because he wanted them not to have anything of their own, neither possessions, nor women, nor children, which things certainly belong to happiness as though instrumentally [organice] at its service, as it says in Ethics Bk. I. But it is impossible that the whole city should be happy when neither all nor most parts of the city have happiness: for the happiness of the city is not like an even number, and other similar things, for the parts of an even number are sometimes uneven, as the parts of a group of six are two groups of three. And moreover, if the townsmen of the city are not happy, who else will be happy so that the happiness of the city can be founded upon them? For it cannot be said that the farmers and the banausi—that is, the wage-earners—are happy, who are the basest in the city, for happiness, which is the best thing in the city, cannot be preserved in its basest part.

Lastly, he concludes in an epilogue that the political association of the city that Socrates spoke about has the aforementioned difficulties, and some others not less than what has been mentioned.