Lecture 7

The whole system of government tends to be neither democracy nor oligarchy, but something in a mean between them, which is usually called a polity, and is composed of the heavy-armed soldiers.

Now, if he intended to frame a constitution which would suit the greatest number of states, he was very likely right, but not if he meant to say that this constitutional form came nearest to his first or ideal state; for many would prefer the Lacedaemonian, or, possibly, some other more aristocratic government.

Some, indeed, say that the best constitution is a combination of all existing forms, and they praise the Lacedaemonian because it is made up of oligarchy, monarchy, and democracy, the king forming the monarchy, and the council of elders the oligarchy while the democratic element is represented by the Ephors; for the Ephors are selected from the people. Others, however, declare the Ephoralty to be a tyranny, and find the element of democracy in the common meals and in the habits of daily life.

In the Laws it is maintained that the best constitution is made up of democracy and tyranny, which are either not constitutions at all, or are the worst of all.

But they are nearer the truth who combine many forms; for the constitution is better which is made up of more numerous elements.

The constitution proposed in the Laws has no element of monarchy at all; it is nothing but oligarchy and democracy, leaning rather to oligarchy.

This is seen in the mode of appointing magistrates; for although the appointment of them by lot from among those who have been already selected combines both elements, the way in which the rich are compelled by law to attend the assembly and vote for magistrates or discharge other political duties, while the rest may do as they like, and the endeavor to have the greater number of the magistrates appointed out of the richer classes and the highest officers selected from those who have the greatest incomes, both these are oligarchical features.

The oligarchical principle prevails also in the choice of the council, for all are compelled to choose, but the compulsion extends only to the choice out of the first class, and of an equal number out of the second class and out of the third class, but not in this latter case to all the voters but to those of the first three classes; and the selection of candidates out of the fourth class is only compulsory on the first and second. Then, from the persons so chosen, he says that there ought to be an equal number of each class selected. Thus a preponderance will be given to the better sort of people, who have the larger incomes, because many of the lower classes, not being compelled will not vote.

These considerations, and others which will be adduced when the time comes for examining similar polities, tend to show that states like Plato's should not be composed of democracy and monarchy.

There is also a danger in electing the magistrates out of a body who are themselves elected; for, if but a small number choose to combine, the elections will always go as they desire. Such is the constitution which is described in the Laws.

Coordinatio autem tota, etc. After Aristotle objected to the position of Socrates with reference to the discipline of the Laws, he here objects to it with reference to the order of the city.

And first, with reference to the people.

Second, with reference to the governors, at quidam quidem igitur dicunt, [II.7.4] etc.

For evidence of what he says here, it should be considered that there are six kinds of orders for the city, as will be said in Bk. III. For every city is either ruled by one, or by the few, or by the many. If by one, either the one is a king or a tyrant. He is a king if he is virtuous, and upholds what is useful in common for his subordinates; but he is a tyrant if he is evil, and twists all things back toward his own ease, despising what is useful for his subordinates. However, if the city is ruled by the few, either those are chosen because of virtue who administer the good of the multitude—and such a rule is called aristocracy—that is, the power of the virtuous or the best, or some few are chosen because of their power, or their wealth, and not because of virtue—who will twist all the things of the multitude back to what is useful for themselves. And such a rule is called an oligarchy—that is, the government of the few. But if a city is ruled by the many, likewise if it is ruled by many who are virtuous, such a rule will be called by the common name of polity. However, it does not happen that the many are found virtuous in a city, except by chance, with regard to warlike virtue: and therefore this rule is when warlike men have mastery in the city. But if the whole multitude of the people wish to have mastery, it is called democracy—that is, the power of the people.

Therefore, he first says that according to the law of Socrates, that the whole established order of the multitude—namely, of the city—is neither a democracy, nor an oligarchy, but is a mean between these, which some name by the common name polity: and it is constructed from those who use arms. For when Socrates divided the multitude of the city into two parts, the first of which was the warriors, he abandons the other—the artisans and the farmers (though the farmers must remain in the farms)—as if the multitude dwelling in the city were a multitude of warlike men.

Then, where he says siquidem igitur ut communissimam, etc., he shows the degree to which Socrates spoke well, and the degree to which he spoke badly. And he says that if he instituted such an order as the most common among the other regimes, perhaps he spoke well. For oligarchy is only of the great; democracy is only of the weak; but this regime is one of those that are the mean between both, and whence it is more common, namely, since those of both parts participate in it. But if he instituted such an order as if it were the best after the first one, he did not speak well. For he calls the first order a kingdom, either because it is the first in time (for at the beginning, all cities were ruled by kings), or because it is the best—so long as the king is good. But after this first regime, it cannot be said that the regime of warlike men is the best; for aristocracy—the government of the virtuous—is much better, in which manner the Laconians were ruled, even if those who are citizens of other [cities] are still ruled more aristocratically.

Then, where he says quidam quidem igitur dicunt, etc., he objects to the order that Socrates established in the city with reference to governors. Concerning this he does two things.

First, he lays out Socrates's position.

Second, he objects to it, at quas aut omnino, [II.7.6] etc.

Concerning the first he does two things.

First, he proposes that it is advantageous in cities that the aforementioned regimes be mixed.

Second, he shows how Socrates mixed them, at in legibus autem iis dictum est, [II.7.5] etc.

Therefore, he first says that some say that the best regime of the city is that it is as though it were a mixture of all the aforementioned regimes. And the reason for this is because one regime is restrained by the admixture of another, and it is given less material for sedition if all have a share in the government of the city—as though in some part, the people have mastery, in another the powerful, and in another the king. And following this, the ordering of the city of the Lacedaemonians will be most praised. There are two opinions about this. For some say that it is put together from three cities: from oligarchy—the government of the wealthy—and monarchy—the power of one—and democracy—the power of the people. For they had a king in the city, which belongs to monarchy; they also had some elders, assumed from the greater men of the city, which belongs to oligarchy; they also had some leaders who were chosen from the people, and were called ephors—that is, providers—which belongs to democracy. But the opinion of others was that the government of the ephors belonged to tyranny, because they exercised mastery at will; but there were other governments in the city that organized common feasts, and other things that belonged to the daily life of the city—to nutrition and to sexual matters—and they said that this belonged to democracy.

Then, where he says in legibus autem, etc., he shows how Socrates mixed his regime. And he says that in the laws of Socrates it was said that the best regime ought to be put together from tyranny and democracy; perhaps so that the power of the people might be bridled by the power of a tyrant, and moreover that the power of a tyrant might be bridled by the power of the people.

Then, where he says quas aut omnino, etc., he objects to what Socrates said.

And first, he shows that this ordering, in itself, is unfitting.

Second, he shows that the things Socrates established were not fitting for this mixture, at deinde neque habens videtur, [II.7.7] etc.

Therefore, he first says that the two aforementioned regimes—tyranny and democracy—either should not be called regimes, because they do not follow the order of reason, but the impulse of the will, or they should be called the worst of all. And so it is unfitting that from the worst regimes the best regime should be put together. He does much better, therefore, who mixes the ordering of the city from many regimes: for by however much it is mixed from many, by so much is it better, because many have a share in the mastery of the city.

Then, where he says deinde, neque habens, etc., he objects to what Socrates had said with reference to the things that he instituted, which are not fitting for the aforementioned mixture. Concerning this he does two things.

First, he shows that those things that Socrates established are not fitting for the aforementioned mixture.

Second, that in themselves, they were dangerous, at habet autem, et circa electionem, [II.7.11] etc.

Concerning the first he does three things.

First, he proposes his intention.

Second, he clarifies what was proposed, at palam autem ex principantium, [II.7.8] etc.

Third, he shows how the aforementioned mixture could come to be, at quomodo quidem igitur, [II.7.10] etc.

Therefore, he first says that although Socrates wished to mix the regime from democracy and tyranny, which is a sort of monarchy, if anyone were to consider the things that he established, nothing here is monarchic—that is, belonging to the government of one; but all things are oligarchic and democratic, that is, belonging to the powerful or to the people. And his ordering leans more toward oligarchy.

Then, where he says palam autem, etc., he shows what was proposed.

And first, concerning the choice of governors;

second, concerning the choice of counselors, at oligarchicam autem, [II.7.9] etc.

Therefore, he first says that what was said is clear from the institution of governors that Socrates determined. For he says that they should have been chosen from those who were taken up as governors by lot: and this was common both to democracy and to oligarchy, because such men were chosen both from the people and from the greater men. But some other things he instituted belong to oligarchy: that it belongs to the wealthy of the city to call together the multitude, and that they announce the chosen governors to the people; and all things of this sort that belonged to the community of the city he wished to happen through the wealthy, and he dismissed the others from these affairs; likewise, also, it was oligarchic that he wanted more governors to be from the wealthy, and for them to be constituted in the greater offices.

Then, where he says oligarchicam autem, etc., he says how it leans toward oligarchy in the choice of the counselors. And he says that, following Socrates, citizens were distinguished into four ranks, and from all the ranks there were some who chose counselors. But all who were of the first honorability of necessity were forced to choose; but those who were in the second honorability did not all choose, but some equal in number to the first ones; and yet these also of necessity were forced to choose. Then, from the third rank there were chosen some equal in number, and likewise from the fourth: however, there was not necessity that all those who were chosen from the third or the fourth ranks should choose; and nobody was able to choose counselors from the fourth for its counselors except those who were of the first or second rank: and thus Socrates said that an equal number of counselors would come from each rank of the city; but this is not necessary: in fact, there always will be more and better men from the greatest honorability, because the people will not all choose, since they are not under the necessity of choosing.

Then, where he says quomodo quidem igitur, etc., he says that from what has been said, it can be clarified how a regime must be instituted from democracy and monarchy: and again, from those things that will be said afterward, when he will delve into a consideration about regimes thus mixed.

Then, where he says habet autem et circa electionem, etc., he shows that the choice of governors that Socrates instituted is dangerous. And he says that it is dangerous for the city that Socrates instituted--concerning the choice of governors--that those chosen to choose would be taken from others who had [already] been chosen. For those chosen first—from whom the governors were chosen—are few with respect to the whole multitude of the city, and therefore it will be easier to corrupt them than the whole multitude. And so if there were some who wished to always be instituted in government, even if they should be few in multitude, they would always be chosen as governors according to their will, because they would choose each other, and in exchange, succeed each other in government.

Lastly, in an epilogue, he concludes that the things that are in the laws about the regime of Socrates are in the aforementioned mode.