Lecture 3

Other evils, against which it is not easy for the authors of such a community to guard, will be assaults and homicides, voluntary as well as involuntary, quarrels and slanders, all which are most unholy acts when committed against fathers and mothers and near relations, but not equally unholy when there is no relationship. Moreover, they are much more likely to occur if the relationship is unknown, and, when they have occurred, the customary expiations of them cannot be made.

Again, how strange it is that Socrates, after having made the children common, should hinder lovers from carnal intercourse only, but should permit love and familiarities between father and son or between brother and brother, than which nothing can be more unseemly, since even without them love of this sort is improper. How strange, too, to forbid intercourse for no other reason than the violence of the pleasure, as though the relationship of father and son or of brothers with one another made no difference.

This community of wives and children seems better suited to the husbandmen than to the guardians, for if they have wives and children in common, they will be bound to one another by weaker ties, as a subject class should be, and they will remain obedient and not rebel.

In a word, the result of such a law would be just the opposite of which good laws ought to have, and the intention of Socrates in making these regulations about women and children would defeat itself. For friendship we believe to be the greatest good of states and the preservative of them against revolutions; neither is there anything which Socrates so greatly lauds as the unity of the state which he and all the world declare to be created by friendship. But the unity which he commends would be like that of the lovers in the Symposium, who, as Aristophanes says, desire to grow together in the excess of their affection, and from being two to become one, in which case one or both would certainly perish. Whereas in a state having women and children common, love will be watery; and the father will certainly not say 'my son,' or the son 'my father.' As a little sweet wine mingled with a great deal of water is imperceptible in the mixture, so, in this sort of community, the idea of relationship which is based upon these names will be lost; there is no reason why the so-called father should care about the son, or the son about the father, or brothers about one another. Of the two qualities which chiefly inspire regard and affection- that a thing is your own and that it is your only one-neither can exist in such a state as this.

Again, the transfer of children as soon as they are born from the rank of husbandmen or of artisans to that of guardians, and from the rank of guardians into a lower rank, will be very difficult to arrange; the givers or transferrers cannot but know whom they are giving and transferring, and to whom.

And the previously mentioned evils, such as assaults, unlawful loves, homicides, will happen more often amongst those who are transferred to the lower classes, or who have a place assigned to them among the guardians; for they will no longer call the members of the class they have left brothers, and children, and fathers, and mothers, and will not, therefore, be afraid of committing any crimes by reason of consanguinity. Touching the community of wives and children, let this be our conclusion.

After the philosopher shows that the cause which Socrates indicated for his law was not reasonable—namely, that it would be best for the city to be as unified as possible, and then that the greatest unity does not arise from the community of women and children—he here wants to show a third thing: the many difficulties and unfitting things that would follow from such a law: and he puts forward six reasons.

About the first of these, he says that for those who constitute this community of women and children, it is not easy to avoid these difficulties and unfitting things which were mentioned. First, because it cannot happen that assaults and murders will not happen in the city. Sometimes, of course, these things are done unwillingly, as happens with accidents, but sometimes they are willing, as when they happen out of hatred or anger. And then—brawls and curses or taunts—all of which are much more unfitting when done against parents, or other kindred relations, than against foreigners and those who are remote; for by however much someone is naturally more inclined toward the love of another, by so much is it more unfitting that he should advance harm against them. And this manner of injury or harm happens far more to those about whom it is not known for certain whether they are the sons of those against whom they advance these sorts of injuries than it does among those about whom it is known for certain. With this, it can also be reckoned that a certain dissolution of the relationship has been made, just as it sometimes happens that relationship is taken away either because of a distant generating, or when blood-relatives are rejected because of some offense. But those who are ignorant of relation cannot think that a dissolution of the relationship has been made. Hence it is clear that this manner of evils, which arise in the city, will be more unfitting if a community of women and children is set up, because it would frequently happen that such things would be done to relatives.

He posits a second rationale, at inconveniens autem, etc., and this rationale is taken up from the unfitting things that follow from lustful desire, just as the first was taken from the unfitting things that follow from anger and hatred. Therefore, it ought to be considered that among all men it was reputed unfitting and dishonorable for sons to have intercourse with their mothers, or fathers with their daughters; and this would have to occur if common sons were established, because it would happen that a son would know his mother just like any other woman; and likewise, it would happen that a father would know his daughter carnally, as he would anyone else. Socrates, therefore, anticipating this unfitting thing, wanted to shun such things with a statute, so that through the governors of the city, the intercourse of son with mother should be hindered, since it needed to be certain at least among the governors of the city, who took up the son for rearing; and likewise, to hinder through the same governors the intercourse of father and daughter when some conjecture could be had that this was his daughter.

But the philosopher attacks this statute of Socrates for two reasons.

First, because this statute seems to be insufficient. For it prohibited the son only from having intercourse with his mother, but it did not prohibit him lustful love, because it did not indicate to him that this was his mother, nor did it prohibit it from other lustful acts, such as embraces and kisses, which is utterly indecent between relatives, because even lustful love between them is unfitting.

Second, he blames this statute because of the cause that was indicated [for it]. For he said that the intercourse of mother with son ought to be prohibited because no other cause, except for shunning extremely vehement delight, which would have come forth from the natural love of mother and son, and which would have been added on top of the lustful love. The vehement delight in intercourse, however, he wanted to shun so that men would not be lured into intemperance. Therefore, Aristotle says that it is unfitting to say that because of this cause alone someone ought to abstain from intercourse with his mother, and not from this only: that she is his mother. And the reason is the same for other relatives: for from the very relationship of blood, they owe to their kinsmen a certain reverence of honor, which is taken away through wanton [licentious?] intercourse.

He posits a third reason, at videtur autem magis, etc., and says that this law of Socrates about the community of wives and sons will be more useful for the farmers and for other men of the lowest condition, than for the guardians of the city, that is, the governors of the city, or for other great men who have care of the communal affairs of the city; because the sons of the farmers will be elevated and the sons of the great will be cast down if all are reduced in common. And out of this it will follow that there will be less friendship between the great and the plebeians: for friendship among them is preserved insofar as farmers and others like this are subject to governors: because, as was said in Ethics IX, that which is proportional to each one saves friendship. But subjecthood is preserved through this, that the inferiors are obedient to the governors, and do not become insolent; and this would occur if they were put on an equal level with the great in women and children. Whence it is clear that this law of Socrates hinders the friendship of the city that ought to exist between governors and subjects.

He posits a fourth reason, at totaliter autem, etc., and he says that from such a law occurs the utter contrary of those things that they who set up correct laws intend; and again, something contrary to that on account of which Socrates thought that the law about wives and children ought to be ordered. For we all think in common that friendship is the greatest good in cities, because if there is friendship among citizens, they least make sedition: and this is what all legislators intend--that the city may be without sedition. Whence everyone who establishes correct laws intends this: that there may be friendship among the citizens. Socrates also said that the best thing in the city was that it should be one: but the unity of men toward each other is the effect of friendship, both as it seems to all in common, and also as Socrates said. Hence also Aristophanes said in the discourses he made about love, that lovers mutually desire that they should be made one through nature; and because this is not able to be, they desire that they should become one as much as possible. In this case of which Aristophanes spoke, it would follow that either both lovers would be corrupted, since from them, something would come to be that was one, or else one of them would be corrupted, as though turned into the other. But in the city, according to such a communion of women and sons, it follows that friendship would be diminished, and will have very little of the weight of love when a father says of someone, “this is my son,” since he would at the same time say it about many others existing in the city; or when a son says about his father, “he is my father,” since he would also say this of many others. For we see that if someone introduces a little bit of something sweet into much water, it will become imperceptible in the mixture, just as when too little honey is put into much water: none of the honey’s sweetness is perceived. Whence familiarity, which arises in the city from these names [when] one says “he is my father” or “son,” or “brother,” will be too little cared for if just anyone older could say about anyone younger, “this is my son,” and conversely, if anyone younger could say that anyone older is his father, and everyone of the same age said that they were brothers. And the reason for this is because there are two things that most of all make men utterly care about others, and most of all prize [diligere] them: the first of which is that they be their own, and uniquely theirs. Hence men care more about their own things than about common ones, as was previously stated. The other is the specific love that someone has toward another, which becomes a greater love toward him whom someone uniquely prizes than toward him whom he prizes along with many others [i.e. who many others also prize]. Just as we see that even parents more greatly prize only-begotten sons than they would if they had many, as if love were diminished by being common to many. Thus it is clear that if there were an ordering of the city like that which Socrates put in order by law, the friendship of citizens for one another would be diminished--which is contrary to the intention of legislators.

He posits a fifth rationale, and says that following the ordering of Socrates, there must have been a changeover of sons, such that those who were born from certain mothers would be given away to be reared, so that no one would know their own sons. But how this could come to be, such that the sons of farmers and artisans should be transferred to the nobles who were guardians of the city, or the converse, is not easily apparent: for such a transfer would bring a great disturbance to the citizens. And on the other hand, opinion about one’s own children could not be completely taken away, because for those who give and transfer the children, it would be necessary that they should know [scirent] from whom they received [the children], and to whom they gave them. Whence, the law of Socrates would not have followed through on his intention, and along with this, it would have brought about a great disturbance.

He posits a sixth rationale, and he says that because of this manner of transfer of sons, those sorts of things that were previously mentioned would most of all happen, namely, assaults, lustful loves, and murders among relations. For we see that even now, children who are given into the guard and rearing of others do not name their relatives with as great affection as they would if they were reared among them, and as a result, it is not as awful for them to commit one of the aforementioned things against their relatives. It will be even much more so if they do not know them to be their relatives: nothing like this will be awful for them to do. Lastly, he concludes in an epilogue that in this manner, it has been determined regarding the communion of sons and wives that Socrates wanted to introduce.