Lecture 2 — Opinions on Pleasure as a Good

Eudoxus thought that pleasure is an absolute good because he saw all creatures, both rational and irrational, seeking it. But in every case, what is desirable is good, and what is most desirable is the greatest good. Hence, the fact that all things are drawn to the same object shows that it is a most excellent good for all, since everything finds its own good just as it finds its own food. Now, what is good for all and what all desire is an absolute good. [1964]

But his arguments were accepted because of his excellent character rather than for their merit. For he appeared to be a man moderate in the different pleasures, and consequently did not seem to defend his opinion as a lover of pleasure, but because it was really true. [1966]

He also thought that his view was otherwise substantiated by pleasure’s contrary. Since pain in itself is an object to be avoided by all, so its opposite is likewise an object to be chosen. [1967]

Moreover, that is most worthy of choice that we choose not because or for the sake of another. Now, it is admitted that pleasure is such an object. For no one asks to what end a man is pleased, so that pleasure in itself is desirable. [1968]

Further, pleasure added to any good makes it more desirable. Thus, the addition of pleasure to just or temperate action enhances its goodness. [1969]

But this argument seems to prove only that pleasure is a good, not that it is a greater good than any other. For, every good joined to another is more desirable than by itself. [1970]

It is by an argument of this kind that Plato attempts to nullify the previous view by showing that pleasure is not an absolute good. He argued that the life of pleasure is more desirable with prudence than without it. But if the combination is better, pleasure is not an absolute good, for a good of this type does not become more desirable by any addition. [1971]

Obviously, nothing else will be an absolute good either if it is made more desirable by the addition of any of the things that are good in themselves. What, then, is there of this nature that we can share? This is what we are looking for. [1973]

Those who deny that what all beings desire is good are talking nonsense. For that which all men believe to be true, we say is really so, and the man who rejects this belief expresses beliefs hardly more acceptable. If only creatures without understanding desire pleasures, some weight might be conceded in the contention; but if intelligent beings do so too, it does not seem to make sense. Perhaps, even in evil men, there is some natural good better than themselves that seeks their own proper good. [1974]

Nor does the argument seem to be correct about the contrary. They say that, if pain is evil, it does not follow that pleasure is good, for evil is also opposed to evil. And both good and evil are opposed to what is neither the one nor the other. In this, they are correct, but their statement does not apply to the present question. For, if both are evil, both ought to be avoided; but if neither is evil, neither should be an object of aversion, or both should be equally so. However, as it is, man seems to avoid the one as evil and to seek the other as good. In this way, then, they are in opposition. [1978]

1964. Eudoxus thought that pleasure. After the Philosopher has shown that we must treat pleasure, he now begins to treat it.

First, he continues with the opinions of others.

Second, at the nature and quality (1174a13; [2005]), he defines the truth.

He discusses the first point under two headings.

First, he proceeds with the opinion of those who set pleasure in the category of good;

second, at it is by an argument (1172b28; [1971]), with the contrary opinion.

He considers his first point from two aspects.

First, he presents the arguments Eudoxus used to prove that pleasure is in the category of good.

Second, at moreover, that is (1172b20; [1968]), he offers the arguments Eudoxus used to prove that it is the greatest good.

He handles the first point in a twofold manner.

First, he shows how Eudoxus proved that pleasure is in the genus of good on the part of pleasure itself;

second, at he also thought (1172b18; [1967]), how Eudoxus proved this on the part of the contrary.

He treats the first point in two ways.

First, he proposes the opinion and argument of Eudoxus.

Second, at but his arguments (1172b15; [1966]), he shows why the opinion and argument were accepted.

1965. He says first that Eudoxus was of the opinion that pleasure comes under the category of good because he saw that all creatures, both rational and irrational (that is, men and brutes), seek pleasure. But what all choose seems to be proper and good and has great influence in goodness because it can attract every appetite to itself. And so, the fact that all are moved toward the same object, pleasure, indicates that pleasure is not only a good, but a most excellent good. For, it is obvious that everything seeks to find what is good. Thus, food is good to all animals, who commonly desire it. Therefore, it is evident that pleasure, which is sought by all, is a good.

1966. Then, at but his arguments (1172b15), he shows why Eudoxus was especially given credence. He observes that Eudoxus’ arguments were accepted because of the moral virtue of the speaker, rather than for their cogency. He was indeed a man moderate in the different pleasures, being more exemplary than others. For this reason, when he praised pleasure, he did not seem to be speaking as a lover of pleasure, but because it was really true.

1967. Next, at he also thought (1172b18), he presents Eudoxus’ argument that was taken on the part of the contrary. He remarks that Eudoxus thought it no less clear from the contrary (that is, on the part of pain rather than on the part of pleasure itself) that pleasure belongs to the category of good. For it is obvious that pain in itself ought to be avoided by everyone. Hence, the contrary—pleasure—apparently ought to be chosen by everyone.

1968. At moreover, that is (1172b20), he presents two arguments of Eudoxus to show that pleasure is the greatest good.

The first is this. That seems most worthy of choice, and consequently the greatest good, that is chosen not because of another incidental to it, or for the sake of something as an end. But all men plainly acknowledge this about pleasure. For no one asks another why he desires pleasure, which would indicate that pleasure is desirable in itself. Therefore, pleasure is good in the highest degree.

1969. He offers the second argument at further, pleasure (1172b23), explaining it in a twofold manner.

He first presents the argument itself. It is evident that pleasure added to any good makes it more desirable. Thus, the addition of pleasure to just action and temperate conduct increases their goodness, for a man is better who takes pleasure in a work of justice or temperance. From this, Eudoxus wished to conclude that pleasure was best, as enhancing the goodness in all actions.

1970. Next, at but this argument (1172b26), he shows the flaw in this argument. He remarks that the reason just given proves that pleasure comes under the category of good, but not that it is a greater good than any other. For it is also true of any good that, when joined to another, it constitutes a greater good than it was by itself.

1971. Then, at it is by an argument (1172b28), he pursues the opinion of those who maintain that pleasure is not a good.

First, he explains how they meet the preceding arguments.

Second, at however, it does not follow (1173a13; [1980]), he gives the arguments they allege to the contrary.

He discusses the first point from two aspects.

First, he shows how they used in the oppposite way the argument previously advanced to show that pleasure is the highest good.

Second, at those who deny (1172b35; [1974]), he shows how they met the other arguments.

He treats the first point in a twofold manner.

First, he explains how Plato used this argument to prove the opposite.

Second, at obviously, nothing else (1172b32; [1973]), he rejects Plato’s process of reasoning.

He observes first that, by the reason just given, Plato, who held the contrary opinion, attempted to nullify what has been asserted [1965–70] by showing that pleasure is not a good in itself, nor in the absolute sense. It is evident that pleasure is more worthy of choice when accompanied by prudence. Since, then, pleasure combined with something else is better, he concluded that pleasure is not a good in itself. That which is a good in itself does not become more desirable by an addition of something else.

1972. On this point, we must understand that Plato named as a good in itself that which is the essence of goodness; for example, man in himself is the essence of man. But to this essence of goodness nothing can be added that is good in a way other than by participating in the essence of goodness. So, whatever goodness is an addition is derived from the very essence of goodness. Thus, the good in itself does not become better by any addition.

1973. At obviously, nothing else (1172b32), Aristotle rejects Plato’s process of reasoning. According to this argument, obviously nothing in human affairs will be good in itself, since every human good added to any good in itself is rendered more desirable. For nothing can be found associated with human life that is of such a nature that it does not become better by the addition of another good. But we are seeking something of this kind associated with human life. People who hold that pleasure is a good mean a human good, and not the divine good itself, which is the essence of goodness.

1974. Next, at those who deny (1172b35), he shows how the Platonists met Eudoxus’ arguments proving that pleasure is a good.

First, how they met the argument taken on the part of pleasure itself;

second, at nor does the argument (1173a5; [1978]), the argument taken on the part of the contrary.

They answered the first argument by denying that what all desire is good. But Aristotle rejects this, observing that those who oppose the argument of Eudoxus by maintaining that what all desire is not necessarily good seem to talk nonsense.

1975. That which all believe to be true, we say, is really so. And we hold this as a principle because it is impossible for natural judgment to fail in all cases. But, since the appetite tends only to that which seems good, what is desired by all seems good to all. So, pleasure, which all desire, is good.

1976. The man who rejects what is accepted by everyone expresses views that are hardly more acceptable. That position might be defended if only those creatures who are without understanding, like dumb animals and evil men, desired pleasures. The reason is that the senses judge good only in its immediacy, and in this way, it would not be necessary that pleasure be a good simply, but only that it be a good here and now. But since even intelligent creatures desire some pleasure, it does not seem to make any sense.

1977. However, if even all creatures that act without understanding desired pleasure, it might still be probable that pleasure was a good, for even in wicked men, there is some natural good that tends to the desire of a suitable good, and this natural good is better than evil men as such. As virtue is a perfection of nature—and for this reason moral virtue is better than natural virtue (we noted this in book 6 [1275–80])—so, since vice is a corruption of nature, the natural good is better: the integral thing is better than the corrupt. But it is clear that evil men are diversified by their connection with vice, for vices are contrary to one another. Therefore, the object on which evil men agree, namely, the desire of pleasure, seems to belong rather to nature than to vice.

1978. Then, at nor does the argument, he shows how they answered the argument taken on the part of pain. They held that, even if pain is an evil, it does not follow that pleasure is good, since we know that evil is opposed not only to good but also to evil (for example, rashness is opposed not only to fortitude but also cowardice). And both good and evil are opposed to that which is neither good nor evil, as the extremes are opposed to the mean, for there is such an act considered according to its species, such as to pick up a straw from the ground, or the like.

1979. However, in refutation of this process of reasoning, Aristotle remarks that they are correct in reference to this opposition of evil to evil, but their statement does not apply to the present question. For, pain is not opposed to pleasure, as evil to evil. If both were evil, both would have to be avoided; just as good as such is to be sought, so evil as such is to be avoided. But, if neither of them was evil, neither should be an object of aversion, or they should be viewed in the same light. However, as it is, all men seem to avoid pain as evil and seek pleasure as good. Thus, then, they are opposed to each other as good and evil.