Lecture 4 — A Fourth Argument That Pleasure Is Not a Good

In answer to those who bring forward very disgraceful pleasures, it can be said that these are not pleasant. For, even if they are pleasing to the ill-disposed, we must not assume that they are really pleasant—except to such people—any more than what is wholesome or sweet or bitter to the sick is so in fact, or any more than objects that seem white to persons with diseased eyes are actually white. [1997]

Or we may concede that pleasures are desirable, but not from these sources. Thus, wealth is desirable, but not as the price of betrayal; so too is health, but not as a result of eating things indifferently. [1999]

Again, we may say that pleasures differ in kind, some derived from honorable sources and others from base sources. Now, it is impossible to enjoy the pleasure proper to the just man without being just, or to enjoy the pleasure proper to a musician without being musical. And this applies to other pleasures. [2000]

The distinction between a friend and a flatterer seems to show that pleasure is not a good or that pleasures differ in kind. For, a friend is thought to intend good in his association, but the flatterer to intend pleasure. The latter is blamed with reproach, but the former praised, for no other reason than the ends they pursue. [2001]

And certainly no one would choose to retain the mind of a child throughout life in order to have the pleasures that children are thought especially to enjoy. Nor would anyone choose to find pleasure in doing an extremely shameful act even though he might never have to suffer pain as a result. [2002]

Likewise, there are many things we should be eager about even though they do not produce pleasure, such as sight, memory, knowledge, and possession of virtues. It makes no difference whether pleasures necessarily follow these activities, for we would choose them if no pleasure resulted. It is obvious, therefore, that pleasure is not a good in itself, that not every pleasure is desirable, and that some pleasures are desirable in themselves, being different from the others in kind or in their sources. We have now treated sufficiently the opinions about pleasure and pain. [2003]

1997. In answer to those who bring forward. After the Philosopher has disproved the three arguments of the Platonists concluding that pleasure does not belong to the category of good, he now refutes a fourth argument that they draw from the vileness of some pleasures. The Platonists adduce certain disgraceful pleasures, like adultery and drunkenness, to show that pleasures do not come under the category of good. But Aristotle answers this argument in a threefold manner.

1998. First, as someone might observe, disgraceful pleasures are not pleasant in the absolute sense. If some pleasures are delightful to the ill-disposed, it does not follow that they are pleasing in themselves, but only to persons prone to vice. Just as the things that seem healthful to the sick are not in themselves healthful, so the things that seem sweet or bitter to people with perverted taste are not in themselves sweet or bitter; nor are objects that seem white to persons with diseased eyes really white. This solution proceeds on the assumption that unqualified pleasure for man is what is pleasant according to reason—a circumstance not possible with physical pleasures of this kind, although they are pleasing to the senses.

1999. He presents the second refutation at or we may concede (1173b25). It can be admitted that all pleasures are desirable, but not in relation to all persons. For example, it is good to be enriched, but it is not good for a traitor to his country to be enriched, for in this way he can do more harm. Likewise, health is good, but not for one who has eaten something harmful. Thus, eating a snake sometimes cures a leper, although it may destroy health. Similarly, bestial pleasures are certainly desirable for animals but not for men.

2000. At again, we may say (1173b28), he offers the third refutation, observing that pleasures differ in kind. Pleasures resulting from virtuous actions differ in kind from those resulting from shameful actions, for passions differ according to their objects. The unjust man cannot enjoy the pleasure proper to the just man, just as an unmusical person cannot enjoy a musician’s delight. And the same applies to other pleasures.

2001. Then, at the distinction between (1173b31), he proves that pleasure is not a good in itself and in a universal sense, for three reasons.

Concerning the first reason, he remarks that the difference between a friend and a flatterer shows that pleasure is not a good or that there are different kinds of pleasure, some honorable and others base. A friend converses with a friend to some good purpose, but the flatterer to please. Hence, a flatterer is blamed with reproach but a friend is praised, and so it is clear that they converse out of different motives. Therefore, pleasure is one thing and good another.

2002. He presents the second reason at and certainly no one (1174a1). No man, he says, would choose to retain a childish mind all his life so that he might always have the so-called pleasures of childhood. Nor would anyone choose to take pleasure in doing extremely shameful actions throughout his life even if he might never have to suffer pain. This statement is made against the Epicureans, who maintain that shameful pleasures are to be shunned only because they bring about greater suffering. Thus, it is clear that pleasure is not a good in itself, because it would have to be chosen under every circumstance.

2003. He states the third reason at likewise, there are (1174a4). Obviously, there are many things a man should be eager about even though no pleasure results from them, such as sight, memory, knowledge, the possession of virtue. It makes no difference in the case whether pleasures follow from these activities, because he would choose them even if they brought about no pleasure. But that which is good in itself is of such a nature that, without it, nothing is desirable, as is evident concerning happiness. Therefore, pleasure is not a good in itself.

2004. Finally, he summarizes in conclusion that it seems obvious from the premises that pleasure is not a good in itself, that not every pleasure is desirable, and that some pleasures are desirable even in themselves, being different from evil pleasures either in their kind or in their sources. We have now discussed sufficiently the opinions of others on pleasure and pain.