Lecture 13 — Happiness and External Goods

But, being man, the happy person will also need external prosperity, for human nature is not of itself sufficient for the activity of contemplation; the body too must have health and food and other requirements. [2126]

Yet, even if man’s happiness is not possible without external goods, we must not think that it will require many and great possessions. For, self-sufficiency does not depend on a superabundance—neither does judgment or action—and it is possible to do good deeds without ruling land and sea; one can act virtuously with moderate means. (Experience clearly demonstrates this, for private citizens seem to be not less but more active in good works than the powerful.) It is sufficient, then, that this much is available, for the life of the man who acts virtuously will be happy. [2128]

Solon probably gave a good description of a happy man as one who has a moderate share of external goods, has done (in Solon’s opinion) the most virtuous actions, and has lived temperately. For a man can do what he ought with only moderate means. [2130]

Anaxagoras also seems to think that a happy man need be neither rich nor powerful; and he is not surprised that this may seem strange to the majority, since they judge by externals, the only things they know. [2131]

So the views of the philosophers seem to harmonize with our arguments, and consequently have some credibility. However, in practical matters, the truth is tested by a man’s conduct and way of living, for these are the dominant factors. We must therefore examine the preceding opinions by judging them from the facts and from the actual life. If they agree with the facts, we should accept them; if they disagree, we should consider them mere theories. [2132]

But the man who is active intellectually and cultivates his mind seems to be most worthily disposed and most beloved of the gods. Now if the gods have any care of human affairs—it is generally believed they have—it would be reasonable for them both to delight in that which is best in us and most akin to them (this, of course, is the intellect) and to confer favors on those who love and honor this most—as if the gods themselves are solicitous for their friends who act rightly and honorably. But that all these attributes belong especially to the philosopher is obvious. He is therefore most beloved by the gods, and he will, in all probability, be also most happy. If this be so, then the philosopher will be the happiest of men. [2133]

2126. But, being man, the happy person will also need. Now that the Philosopher has shown what perfect happiness is, he here shows its relations to external things.

First, he explains how the happy man is disposed toward inferior creatures;

second, at but the man (1179a22; [2133]), toward God.

He discusses the first point in a twofold manner.

First, he shows to what extent the happy man needs external and earthly goods.

Second, at Solon probably (1179a9; [2130]), he confirms this by the authority of the philosophers.

He treats the first point from two aspects.

First, Aristotle proves that the happy person needs external goods;

second, at yet, even if (1179a1; [2128]), that he does not need many and great possessions.

The Philosopher remarks first that the happy man has need of external prosperity, since human nature is not self-sufficient for the activity of contemplation, due to the condition of the body, which requires external goods for its sustenance. On the other hand, an intellectual and incorporeal substance is of itself sufficient for contemplative activity.

2127. But man must first of all have a healthy body in order to contemplate, because the sensitive powers he uses in contemplation are weakened by sickness; the mind is also diverted from attention to contemplation. Likewise, man must have food and bodily nourishment and other help so that everything necessary for human living be furnished him.

2128. Then, at yet, even if (1179a1), he shows that a man does not need many external things for happiness. Aristotle notes that, even if it is not possible for a person to enjoy the happiness of this life without the external goods necessary for human living, nevertheless we must not think he needs great wealth. For, the self-sufficiency required for happiness does not consist in a superabundance of riches; nature, in fact, needs only a few things. Moreover, superabundance makes people less self-sufficient, since a man must have the help or service of many servants to guard and manage excessive possessions.

2129. Besides, rectitude of judgment, by both speculative and practical reason, and external virtuous action are possible without an abundance of riches. Because this statement regarding the judgment of reason is evident, he therefore explains it in relation to virtuous action, which seems to need many things—we noted this before [2112–16]. It is possible, he says, for people to do good deeds without ruling land and sea, without—so to speak—abundant wealth. A moderate portion of riches is sufficient for good deeds. Experience shows this clearly, for private citizens apparently perform not fewer, but rather more noble deeds than potentates do. Indeed, potentates are hindered from many virtuous actions both by too many occupations and cares and by pride and excessive riches. On the other hand, a moderate amount of wealth enabling a man to perform good works is sufficient for happiness, for if someone should act virtuously, his life would be happy, since happiness consists in virtuous activity—as was indicated previously [119, 124, 128, 190, 1267, 2085].

2130. Next, at Solon probably (1179a9), he confirms his opinion by the sayings of the philosophers.

First, he proposes their observations;

second, at so the views (1179a16; [2132]), he shows they are credible in this matter.

He makes two references on the first point.

First, he introduces the opinion of Solon that happy men are well supplied with external goods. For, such men especially act virtuously and live temperately, because people with moderate possessions can do what they ought; those with great resources are prevented from this by too much anxiety or by pride, while those without resources must be excessively solicitous about getting food. Besides, these persons lack the opportunity for virtuous activity in most cases.

2131. Second, at Anaxagoras also (1179a13), he reduces to the same position the opinion of Anaxagoras: a happy man need be neither rich nor powerful. Nor will he be surprised if this may seem strange to many, since the majority judge by externals, the only things they know. being ignorant of intellectual goods, which are the real human goods according to which a man is happy.

2132. At so the views (1179a16), he shows that we should accept the observations of the philosophers in this matter, concluding from the premises that their views harmonize with his arguments. Hence, they have some credibility. However, in practical matters, the truth of a man’s assertion is tested more by deeds and his way of living than even by argument, because the dominant or principal factor in practical affairs consists in them (deeds and way of life). For, in questions of this kind, our principal aim is not knowledge, but conduct, as stated in book 2 [255–56]. This is why we ought to consider what has been said by comparison with the actions and life of the philosophers. Statements in keeping with the conduct of the philosophers should be accepted. For instance, abundant riches are not needed for happiness, and the philosophers do not seek them. But, if their actions are not in accord, we should suspect that their words lack truth. This is evident concerning the opinion held by the Stoics, who maintained that external goods are not human goods, yet their actions show the contrary, for they desire and seek these as goods.

2133. Then, at but the man (1179a22), he shows how the happy man is disposed toward superior beings, namely, toward God: a man happy in contemplative happiness seems to be most worthily disposed—inasmuch as he excels in that which is best in us—and also most pleasing to God, since he exercises his intellect in contemplating the truth and cultivates intellectual pursuits. For, supposing that God exercises solicitude and providence over human affairs (as is really the case), it is reasonable for him to delight in that which is best in men and most akin or similar to himself. This part is the intellect, as is clear from the premises [2109]. Consequently, it is reasonable that God should confer his greatest favors on those who love and honor their intellect, preferring its good to all other goods—as if the gods themselves are solicitous for men who act rightly and honorably.

2134. Now, all these attributes clearly belong to the philosopher: he loves and honors his intellect, the most pleasing to God of all human things; he also acts honorably and rightly. It remains, then, that he is dearest to God. But that man is happiest who is loved most by God, the source of all good. Likewise, since man’s happiness is said to consist in the fact that he is loved by God, we conclude that the philosopher is happy in the highest degree.

2135. Arguing in this vein, Aristotle evidently places the ultimate happiness of man in the activity of wisdom—a question decided in book 6 [1267]—and not in an unbroken series of actions of the active intelligence, as some imagine.

2136. Likewise, we must keep in mind that he does not specify perfect happiness, but such as can be ascribed to human and mortal life. Hence, in book 1 [202], he states, those we call happy are men.