Lecture 7 — Pleasures Differ in Kind

Consequently, pleasures seem to differ in kind. For we judge that different kinds of things are perfected by different perfections. This is thought to be true both of natural organisms and of productions of art, such as animals, trees, paintings, statues, a house, and a receptacle. Likewise, activities differing in kind are perfected by things differing in kind. Moreover, activities of intellect differ from those of the senses, and the latter differ from one another, and so then do the pleasures that perfect them. [2039]

This will also be evident from the fact that each pleasure is akin to the activity it perfects, for an activity is stimulated by a pleasure proper to it. People who work pleasurably judge each thing better and investigate them more accurately. For example, those who find pleasure in the study of geometry become geometricians and grasp each problem more clearly. Similarly, those who love music, architecture, and other arts make progress in their own field when they enjoy their work. But pleasure intensifies activity, and what intensifies a thing is proper to it. Therefore, properties of things differing in kind must themselves differ in kind. [2042]

A still clearer indication of this is given by the fact that activities are hindered by pleasures arising from other activities. For people who love the flute are incapable of paying attention to a discussion when they hear someone playing the flute because they enjoy the music more than their present activity. Therefore, the pleasure connected with flute playing destroys that activity that is concerned with discussion. A similar thing happens in other cases where a person tries to do two things at the same time; the more pleasant activity drives out the other, and if it is much more pleasant, it does so more effectively so that the other ceases altogether. For this reason, when we take intense pleasure in something, we can scarcely do anything else; and when we take relaxed pleasure in some things, we can be engaged in others. For example, people who eat sweets at stage plays do so especially when the actors are poor. Since, then, pleasure proper to activities strengthens, prolongs, and improves them, and since other pleasures injure these activities, it is clear that pleasures differ greatly. [2044]

Indeed, alien pleasures produce nearly the same effect as proper pains, for activities are destroyed by their proper pains. For instance, if writing or doing sums proves to be an unpleasant and painful task, a person neither writes nor does sums, since the activity is painful. Activities, then, are affected in a different manner by their proper pleasures and pains—these arise from the nature of the activities. But alien pleasures are said to have an effect resembling pain, for they both destroy activity, although not to the same degree. [2048]

2039. Consequently, pleasures seem to differ in kind. After the Philosopher has explained the nature and properties of pleasure, he now explains the difference among pleasures.

He discusses this point from two aspects.

First, he explains the difference of pleasures taken on the part of the activities;

second, at it is thought (1176a3; [2057]), the difference taken on the part of the subject.

He treats the first point in a twofold manner.

First, he shows how pleasures may differ in kind according to the difference among activities;

second, at since activities differ (1175b24; [2050]), how they differ in goodness and badness.

He handles the first point in two ways.

First, he shows by reason that pleasures differ in kind on the basis of differing activities;

second, at this will also (1175a29; [2042]), he manifests the same proposition by indications.

He observes first that, since pleasure is the perfection of activity, it follows that, just as activities differ in kind, so pleasures too seem to differ. Thus, we commonly judge it to be intrinsically evident that those things that differ in kind are perfected by specifically different perfections. Certainly, this is obvious concerning essential perfections that constitute a species. And it is necessarily the same with other consequent perfections, provided they are proper, because they follow the essential principles of the species. We see this happen in the cases of both natural and artistic objects.

2040. In natural objects, it is because the perfection of animals, which consists in keenness of sense, is one thing and the perfection of trees, which consists in their fruitfulness, is another. In artistic objects, it is because the perfection of paintings—that they be characterized by pleasing colors—is one thing, while the perfection of statues—that they aptly represent the individuals whose images they are—is another. Likewise, the perfection of a house—that it be a solid dwelling—is one thing, and the perfection of a receptacle—that it have a large capacity—is another. Consequently, activities differing specifically must be perfected by specifically different pleasures.

2041. It is clear that activities of mind or intellect differ in kind from activities of the senses; similarly, the activities of the senses differ from one another. The reason is that they are differentiated according to objects and according to the faculties that are the principles of the activities. Consequently, pleasures that perfect activities differ specifically.

2042. Then, at this will also (1175a29), he manifests the same proposition by indications.

First, by the fact that activity is stimulated by its own pleasure;

second, by the fact that it is impeded by external pleasure, at a still clearer indication of this (1175b1; [2044]).

He observes first that this difference among pleasures corresponding to activities is evident from the fact that each pleasure is ascribed by a kind of affinity to the activity it perfects, because each activity is intensified by its own pleasure, as everything is naturally intensified by what is similar and agreeable.

2043. We notice that people who do any intellectual work with pleasure can judge each point better and investigate accurately the questions that pleasantly engage their attention. Geometricians, for example, who take pleasure in the study of geometry, can grasp more clearly each problem of this science because their mind is detained longer by that which is pleasant. And the same reason holds for all others, such as those who love music and delight in it, those who love architecture, and so on: because they find pleasure in such work, they make great progress in their art. Evidently, then, pleasures intensify activities. But it is clear that what intensifies an action is proper to it. Consequently, things that are different are intensified by different things. Therefore, if activities that are intensified by pleasure differ in kind, as we have shown [2039–40] they are, then the intensifying pleasures themselves should be specifically different.

2044. At a still clearer (1175b1), he presents another indication taken from the hindrance to the activities derived from other activities.

First, from this he shows the difference among pleasures.

Second, at indeed, alien pleasures (1175b16; [2048]), he compares alien pleasures with pains belonging to the activities.

He says first that the remarks about the difference among pleasures corresponding to the activities [2042–43] are more apparent from the fact that the activities are hindered by the pleasures arising from other occupations. From this, then, our contention is more evidently sustained, because the fact that pleasures intensify activities might be ascribed to the general nature of pleasure, but not to the particular nature of this pleasure, according to which pleasures differ from one another.

2045. But it is very clear that pleasures differ in kind when we discover that activity is promoted by its own pleasure but impeded by extraneous pleasure. For we see that flute-favorers simply cannot hear people talking to them when listening to flute playing because they take more pleasure in the music of the flute than in their present activity, namely, hearing talk intended for them. Evidently, then, pleasure arising from flute playing impedes the mind’s reflective activities. The same thing apparently happens in other situations when someone is doing two things at once.

2046. For, it is obvious that the more pleasant activity drives out the other to the extent that, if there is a great difference in the amount of pleasure, a person entirely neglects the activity less pleasurable to him. Consequently, when we take vehement pleasure in something, we are incapable of doing anything else. But when something pleases us quietly—that is, mildly or hardly at all—we can be doing other things too, as is evident of people at a show. Those who find little amusement in what they see there can be busy eating sweets—a diversion only moderately pleasant. People do this especially when watching athletes fighting so poorly in public games that viewing such a contest is not pleasing.

2047. A proper pleasure, then, strengthens the activities from which it proceeds, such that a person exerts himself more vigorously in them; it prolongs the activities such that a person stays longer at them; it improves the activities such that they attain their end more perfectly. Likewise, other pleasures—those accompanying other activities—obstruct or harm all this. Hence these facts clearly demonstrate that pleasures differ much from one another, for what one pleasure helps, another hinders.

2048. Next, at indeed alien pleasures (1175b16), he compares extraneous pleasures with pains proper to the activities, so that the difference among pleasures may in this way be more obvious. He observes that extraneous pleasure, which is caused by some other activity, and proper pain, according to which a person suffers from the activity itself, produce nearly the same effect on an activity. For, pain arising from an activity evidently destroys it. For instance, if it is unpleasant or rather trying for someone to write or tally figures, he will neither write nor tally, owing to the painful nature of such activity.

2049. In this way, then, activities are affected in a different manner by proper pleasures and pains, as it were, being caused by these very activities, but extraneous pleasures are caused by other activities. We have just noted [2045–46] that extraneous pleasures have an effect resembling proper pain. For, in either case, activity is destroyed, although not in the same manner, but more so by proper pain, which is directly and by reason of itself opposed to pleasure. On the other hand, the contrariety of extraneous pleasure arises from another source, namely, activity.