Lecture 11 — Happiness and Leisure

And happiness is thought to depend on leisure, for we are busy in order to have leisure, and we wage war in order to attain peace. Now the exercise of the practical virtues is evident in political and military affairs, but actions concerned with these seem to be without leisure. This is completely the case with warlike activity, for no one chooses to wage war or provoke it merely for the sake of fighting. Indeed, a man would be considered a murderous character if he turned his friends into enemies for the sake of causing battles and slaughter. But the activity of the statesman is also without leisure, and—apart from participation in politics—aims at positions of power and honor or even the happiness of himself and fellow citizens as something distinct from political activity (and we are investigating it as something distinct). Even if, among the activities of the moral virtues, political and military actions stand out prominent both in nobility and in greatness, they are without leisure, aiming at some other end, and are not desirable for their own sakes. On the other hand, the activity of the intellect, being contemplative, is thought to be different by reason of serious application, both in desiring no end beyond itself and in possessing a proper pleasure that increases its activity. So contemplation seems to have self-sufficiency, leisureliness, freedom from labor (as far as humanly possible), and all other activities usually assigned to the happy man. Therefore, man’s perfect happiness will consist in this activity of the intellect, if a long span of life be added (as nothing belonging to happiness should be incomplete). [2098]

Such a life is higher than the human level, and it is not lived by man according to the human mode, but according to something divine in him. And, so far as this differs from the composite, to that extent its activity differs from the activity flowing from the other kind of virtue. Therefore, if the intellect is divine in comparison with man, so is its life divine in comparison with human life. [2105]

Nor ought we to follow the philosophers who advise man to study human things, and mortals to study mortality, but we ought to strive to attain immortality so far as possible and to exert all our power to live according to the best thing in us. For, though this is a small part of us, it far surpasses all else in power and value; it may seem even to be the true self of each, being the principal and better part. Consequently, it would be strange if a person were to choose to live not his own life, but the life of some other. Moreover, our previous statement is applicable here: what is proper to the nature of each thing is best and most pleasant for it. So, then, the life of the intellect is best and most pleasant for man, since the intellect more than anything else is man. This life, therefore, will be the happiest. [2107]

2098. And happiness is thought to depend on leisure. After Aristotle has presented five reasons to show that happiness consists in the contemplation of truth, he now adds a sixth reason not previously mentioned arising from a feature of happiness. Now, happiness involves a kind of leisure. For a person is said to have leisure when he has nothing further to do—a condition in which he finds himself on arriving at some goal. For this reason, the Philosopher adds that we are busy in order to have leisure; that is, we are active in working—this is being busy—in order to rest at the end, and this is having leisure. And he finds an example of this in soldiers who wage war to obtain a desirable peace.

2099. We should note, as the Philosopher stated before [2077], that rest should be taken for the sake of activity. But there he was speaking of rest that, before attaining the end, suspends activity because of the impossibility of uninterrupted labor—this rest being ordered to activity as an end. On the other hand, leisure is rest to which activity is ordered in the end. Thus understood, leisure is a special property of happiness, the ultimate end; it is not found in the activities of the practical virtues. Prominent among these are the virtues dealing with political affairs involving the direction of the common or most divine good and with warfare involving the defense of the common good against enemies; nevertheless, in such activities, leisure has no part.

2100. In the first place, this is entirely clear in military operations, since no one chooses to wage war or to provoke it solely for the sake of fighting, which would be to have leisure for warfare. The reason is that, if someone were to make his end the waging of war, he would be a murderous character turning his friends into enemies so that he could fight and kill.

2101. Second, it is obvious that there is no place for leisure in political activities. But a man wants something besides mere participation in politics, like positions of power and honor. And, since these objectives do not constitute the ultimate end, as was pointed out in book 1 [60–72], it is rather fitting thatm, by means of politics, a person should wish to obtain happiness for himself and everyone else. Happiness of this kind sought in political life is distinct from political life itself, and in fact we do seek it as something distinct. This is contemplative happiness, to which the whole of political life seems directed; as long as the arrangement of political life establishes and preserves peace, it gives men the opportunity of contemplating truth.

2102. Among the activities of the moral virtues, political and military actions stand out preeminent both in nobility (they are most honorable) and in greatness (they concern the greatest good, which is the common good), and these actions do not themselves possess leisure, but are directed to a further end and are not desirable for their own sakes. Hence, perfect happiness will not be found in the activities of the moral virtues.

2103. But the activity of the intellect, which is contemplative, seems to differ from the preceding activities by reason of serious application, since man applies himself to it for its own sake such that he seeks no further end. This activity also contains a proper pleasure proceeding from itself and augmenting it. So, then, such contemplative activity of the intellect clearly provides for man the attributes customarily assigned to the happy person: self-sufficiency, leisureliness, and freedom from labor. And I say this insofar as it is possible for man living a mortal life in which such things cannot exist perfectly.

2104. Therefore, man’s perfect happiness consists in contemplation of the intellect, if a long span of life be added. This indeed is necessary for the well-being of happiness, as nothing belonging to happiness should be incomplete.

2105. Then, at such a life (1177b26), he shows how this contemplative life is associated with man.

First, he explains his proposition.

Second, at nor ought we (1177b31; [2107]), he rejects an error.

He says first that the kind of life that has leisure for the contemplation of truth is higher than the human level. Since man is composed of soul and body with a sensitive and intellectual nature, life commensurate to him is thought to consist in that he directs by reason his sensitive and bodily affections and activities. But to engage solely in intellectual activity seems proper to the superior substances possessing only an intellectual nature, in which they participate by their intellect.

2106. For this reason, in explaining his statement, he adds that man living in this manner, occupied in contemplation, does not live as man, composed of diverse elements, but as something divine is present in him, partaking in a likeness to the divine intellect. And, on that account, as the intellect considered in its purity differs from a composite of soul and body, so the contemplative activity differs from the activity following moral virtue, which is properly concerned with human affairs. Therefore, just as the intellect compared to man is something divine, so the contemplative life, which is based upon the intellect, is compared to the life of moral virtue as divine to human life.

2107. Next, at nor ought we (1177b31), he rejects the error of some philosophers who advised man that he must strive to know the things of man, and mortals the things of mortals. This was the advice of the poet Simonides, as appears in the beginning of the Metaphysics. (Metaphysics 1.2.982b30–983a4; see Aquinas, In I metaph., lec. 3, nn. 61–63.) But the Philosopher calls it false, since we must strive to attain immortality so far as possible and exert all our power to live according to reason—the best of all the elements in man, who is truly divine and immortal. For, though this best element is a small part, being incorporeal and most simple, and consequently lacking greatness, it nevertheless surpasses everything human in the extent of its power and value.

2108. It excels in power by its activities, which are akin to superior beings and have authority over inferior beings, and so, in a way, it embraces all things. Likewise, it excels in value as regards the excellence of its nature, since the intellect is immaterial and simple, incorruptible and incapable of suffering. Now each human being, meaning the whole man, seems to be the intellect if it is true—nay, rather because it is true—that the intellect is the principal and better part of man.

2109. We have stated in book 9 [1868, 1872] that each thing is thought to be especially that which constitutes its chief part, since all other parts are its tools, so to speak. And so, when man lives in accordance with the activity of the intellect, he lives in accordance with the life most proper to him; for it would be strange if a person were to choose to live not his own life, but the life of some other. Hence, they give unwise counsel who say that man should not engage in intellectual contemplation. And the statement made in book 9 [1807, 1847, 1869–72] that what accords with reason is proper to man is applicable also to our present purpose. For that which is best in each thing’s nature is most proper to it. But what is best and proper, consequently, is most delightful, because everyone delights in a good that is pleasing to him. So then, if man is especially his intellect, since this is the principal element in him, evidently life according to the intellect is most delightful and proper to him in the highest degree.

2110. Nor is it contrary to our previous assertion [2106] that this is not on the human level, but above man. Indeed, it is not on the human level considering man’s composite nature, but it is most properly human considering what is principal in man—a thing found most perfectly in superior substances but imperfectly and by participation, as it were, in man. Nevertheless, this small part is greater than all the other parts in man. Thus, it is clear that the person who gives himself to the contemplation of truth is the happiest a man can be in this life.