Lecture 1 — Pleasure

After these matters, we ought perhaps next to discuss pleasure. [1953]

For it seems to be adapted especially to humankind. This is why masters of households teach children by means of pleasure and pain. [1955]

Likewise, it seems that a man’s rejoicing in the things he ought and hating the things he ought has great importance for moral virtue. They extend throughout the whole of life, having influence and power for virtue and a happy life, since men choose pleasure and shun pain—motives that should not, it seems, determine our choice. [1956]

Moreover, pleasure and pain particularly admit of much uncertainty. Some people say that pleasure is a good, while others, on the contrary, maintain it is something very evil—some of them because they are convinced and others because they think it better for human living to declare pleasure an evil, though it is not—because most men are disposed to it and are in fact slaves of pleasure. Therefore, they are to be induced to the opposite, since in this way they will attain the mean. [1958]

But perhaps this is not a wise attitude, for in questions concerning the passions and actions, arguments are less convincing than facts. Therefore, when arguments are at variance with facts they are spurned and their truth destroyed. If a man who censures pleasure is seen in his own way to desire it, his inclination to it seems to indicate that all pleasure is desirable. For the majority of people do not draw nice distinctions. Consequently, true arguments are most useful not only for science but also for living, for when they are in accord with the facts, they are accepted, and so move those who understand their truth to live by them. [1960]

These matters have been discussed sufficiently. Let us pass on to the treatment of pleasure. [1963]

1953. After these matters, we ought perhaps. After the Philosopher has finished the consideration of the moral and intellectual virtues—and of continence and friendship, which have a relation to virtue—he intends in book 10 to consider the end of virtue.

He does this first concerning the end of virtue that perfects man in himself;

second, at have we sufficiently (1179a33; [2137]), concerning the end of virtue in relation to the common good, the good of the whole state.

He discusses the first point from two aspects.

First, he defines pleasure, which is designated by some as the end of virtue.

Second, at after the discussion (1176a30; [2065]), he defines happiness, which in the opinion of everyone is the end of virtue.

He treats the first point in a twofold manner.

First, by way of introduction, he shows we must consider pleasure.

Second, after the introduction, at Eudoxus thought (1172b9; [1964]), he pursues his proposition.

He considers the first point under two headings.

First, he proposes his intention.

1954. He remarks that after the previous treatise [245–1952], it is logical for pleasure to be treated in passing, that is, briefly. To be sure, he had already treated of pleasure in book 7 [1354–67] insofar as it is the object of continence. Hence, there his study dwelt chiefly on sensible and bodily pleasures. But here he intends to consider pleasure as an adjunct to happiness. Therefore, he gives special attention to intellectual and spiritual pleasure.

1955. Then, at for it seems (1172a19), he proves by three reasons why we must treat pleasure.

The first is taken from the relation of pleasure to us. For pleasure seems in a marked degree to be naturally adapted to humankind. For this reason, orakizontes, that is, rulers of households, teach children especially by means of pleasure and pain. People who wish to induce children to good or restrain them from evil try to please the well-behaved, such as with small presents, and to punish those who misbehave, such as by whipping. Since moral philosophy considers human affairs, it is the business of moral science to treat pleasure.

1956. At likewise, it seemed (1172a21; [1956]), he presents the second reason, which is taken from a comparison with virtue. He says that it seems to be a particular concern of moral virtue that a man enjoy the things he ought and hate the things he ought and grieve over them. For, moral virtue consists principally in the regulation of the appetite; and this is judged by the regulation of pleasure and pain, which all the movements of the appetitive part follow, as has been pointed out in book 2 [296]. And he adds that they, pleasure and pain, extend to all phases of human life, exerting great influence on man to be virtuous and live happily. This cannot happen unless his pleasures and pain are properly ordered.

1957. Men frequently choose even harmful pleasures and avoid even salutary afflictions. But it seems that the man who wishes to be virtuous and happy ought not to choose pleasure and reject pain as such, that is, commit evil deeds or omit virtuous actions on this account. And, conversely, it can be said that he must not choose to do evil or avoid good for the sake of these, namely, to obtain pleasure and shun pain. Obviously, then, it is the function of moral philosophy to treat pleasure, just as it treats moral virtue and happiness.

1958. He offers a third reason at moreover, pleasure and pain (1172a27). It is taken from the uncertainty prevalent concerning pleasure.

He discusses this point from two aspects.

First, he enumerates the different opinions about pleasure, from which the uncertainty arises.

Second, at but perhaps this (1172a33; [1960]), he rejects a statement contained in the opinions.

He says first that we must treat pleasure and pain for another reason: they admit of much uncertainty. This is obvious from the different views of thinkers who discuss these subjects.

1959. Some say pleasure is a kind of good. Others, on the contrary, maintain that it is something very bad, and this in different ways. Some hold the opinion because they are convinced that it is so and believe they are speaking the truth. But others, though they may not believe that pleasure is an evil, nevertheless judge it better for human living to declare that pleasure is an evil—although it is not—to withdraw men from pleasure, to which the majority are inclined (for people are, in fact, slaves to pleasure). For this reason, men must be induced to the opposite, namely, to have an aversion to pleasures by declaring them evil. In this way, we attain the mean; that is, men use pleasures with moderation.

1960. Then, at but perhaps this (1172a33), he rejects the last statement. It hardly seems correct for people to say what they do not believe—that pleasures are evil—just to withdraw us from them, for in questions of human actions and passions, we give less credence to words than to actions. For, if a man does what he says is evil, he incites by his example more than he restrains by his word.

1961. The reason for this is that everyone seems to choose what appears to him good in a particular case, the object of human actions and passions. When, therefore, a man’s arguments are at variance with his clearly manifest actions, such arguments are spurned; consequently, the truth enunciated by them is destroyed. Thus it will happen in our proposition.

1962. If someone censuring all pleasure is seen to give way to a pleasure, he might give the impression that all pleasure ought to be chosen. The common people cannot determine by distinguishing this as good and that as evil, but without discrimination they accept as good what appears good in one instance. In this way, then, sound arguments seem to be useful not only for science but also for good living, for they are convincing to the extent they are in accord with actions. For this reason, such arguments move those who understand their truth to live by them.

1963. Finally, he concludes in an epilogue that these matters have been discussed sufficiently. Now we must pass on to the observations made by others about pleasure.