Lecture 8 — The Morality of Pleasures

Since activities differ in goodness and badness, and some are to be chosen while others are to be avoided, and still others are indifferent, the same is true also of their pleasures. For, a proper pleasure corresponds to each activity. Thus, the pleasure proper to a virtuous activity is good and that proper to a vicious activity is bad. [2050]

Just as desires for honorable things are praiseworthy, those for base things are blameworthy. But pleasures accompanying activities are more proper to them than the desires. For, the latter are separated in time and distinct in nature from activities, while the former are intimately connected with them and so closely linked as to raise a doubt whether activity is identical with pleasure. However, we are not to understand that pleasure is thought or sensation—this would be unreasonable—although some people have identified them because they are connected. Therefore, just as activities are different, so too are their pleasures. [2051]

Now sight differs in purity from touch, and hearing and smell from taste. Similarly pleasures of intellect differ from those of the senses, and each class has differences within itself. [2056]

It is thought that each creature has its own pleasure just as it has its own activity, for pleasure corresponds to activity. This will be apparent to a person who considers each thing. Certainly a horse, a dog, and a man have different pleasures. As Heraclitus says, “an ass prefers grass to gold, since food is more pleasant than gold to asses.” Therefore, creatures differing in species have different kinds of pleasures. On the other hand, it is reasonable to hold that things of the same species have similar pleasures. [2057]

However, pleasures differ considerably among men. For, the same things delight some men but sadden others, and things distressing and odious to some are pleasant and attractive to others. This happens in the case of things sweet to the taste, since the same objects do not seem sweet to a sick man and to one in good condition; nor does the same temperature feel warm to an invalid and to a healthy man. The same holds good in other cases too. [2059]

In all cases, that seems to be really so that appears so to the good man. If this is correct, as it seems to be, and if the measure of everything is virtue and the good man as such, then the things that appear to him to be pleasures are really pleasures and the things that he enjoys are really pleasant. Therefore, it is not surprising that things painful to him are evidently pleasant to someone. For, men are subject to much perversion and deterioration. But these things are not pleasant; they are so only to these people and others similarly inclined. It is obvious, then, that pleasures admittedly disreputable are pleasures only to men of perverted taste. [2062]

But, of the pleasures that seem to be virtuous, we must discuss which kind and which particular pleasures are peculiarly human. This will be clear from the activities, for the pleasures result from the activities. Therefore, whether the perfect and happy man has one or many activities, it will be the pleasures perfecting these that will be called human in the principal sense. The other pleasures will be so only in various secondary ways, as are the activities. [2064]

2050. Since activities differ in goodness and badness. After the Philosopher has shown that pleasures differ in kind according to the difference of activities, he now shows that pleasures differ in goodness and evil according to the difference of activities.

First, in moral goodness;

second, at now sight differs (1175b36; [2056]), in physical goodness, which is judged according to purity and impurity.

He discusses his first point in a twofold manner.

First, he states his proposition.

Second, at just as desires (1175b28; [2051]), he proves his proposition.

He says first that, since activities differ according to goodness and badness—that is, virtue and vice—in such a way that some activities (the virtuous) are to be chosen, others (the vicious) are to be shunned, and still others are in neither class by their nature but can become either, so also do pleasures differ. The reason is that each activity is accompanied by a proper pleasure, as was stated previously [2039]. Hence, the pleasure proper to a virtuous activity is good, and the pleasure proper to a vicious activity is bad.

2051. Next, at just as desires (1175b28), he proves his proposition by a reason taken on the part of desires. We see that the desires by which we want good or honorable objects are praiseworthy, such as if a person wants to act justly or bravely. But desires for base objects are blameworthy, such as when a person desires to steal or fornicate. Obviously, the pleasures by which we enjoy these activities are closer and more proper to the activities than are the desires by which we want them.

2052. Desires are separated from activities by time, for we desire to do an act before we do it. They are also distinct by nature, because activity is an act of a perfect thing but desire is an act of something imperfect and not yet achieved. But pleasures are closely connected with activities, because both belong to something perfect. They are also closely linked by time, for if a person has not yet performed an action, he is not enjoying this action, because pleasure concerns a present thing, as desire does a future one. Pleasure is closely linked to activity to such a degree that it seems to be a matter of doubt whether activity is identical with pleasure.

2053. However, we must not say that this is so. Pleasure, indeed, can be felt only in the activity of the senses or intellect, for creatures lacking perception cannot experience pleasure.

2054. Nevertheless, pleasure is identical neither with the activity of the intellect nor with the activity of the senses. Pleasure pertains rather to the appetitive part. But it is unreasonable that some should think that pleasure is identical with activity because it is not separated from it.

2055. Thus, it is evident that, as activities differ according to virtue and vice, so too do pleasures. From this it is clear that some thinkers have inconsistently proclaimed that pleasures are [not] good and bad.

2056. At now sight differs (1175b36), he shows the difference between pleasures based on purity and impurity. Obviously, activities of the senses differ according to purity, for the activity of sight is purer than that of touch, and similarly, the activity of smell than that of taste. But activity that is more immaterial is called purer. According to this, the purest of all sensitive activities is sight, because it is more immaterial, having, as it does, less admixture of material conditions—both on the part of the object, which becomes actually visible by light derived from the sun, and on the part of the medium, which is altered only by a spiritual change. For the same reasons, the activity of touch is most material, because the qualities of passible matter are its objects and its medium is not separate, but contiguous. And the same difference in purity is observed between sensible pleasures among themselves. Likewise, activities and pleasures of intellect, as being more immaterial, are purer than those of the senses.

2057. Then, at it is thought (1176a3), he shows what the difference of pleasures is relative to the subject:

first, in regard to animals of different species;

second, at however, pleasures (1176a10; [2059]), in regard to men.

He says first that, since pleasure accompanies activity, it seems that each thing has its own pleasure, just as it has its own activity. That each thing has its own activity is apparent from the fact that activities follow the forms of things according to which the things differ in kind. That each thing has its own pleasure is apparent if anyone wishes to consider things individually.

2058. For it is clear that a horse finds pleasure in one thing, a dog in another, and man in a third; as Heraclitus says, an ass prefers grass to gold, since the nourishment afforded him by the grass is more pleasant to him than the gold. Thus, it is obvious that things differing in kind have pleasures specifically different. On the other hand, it is reasonable that the things that do not differ in kind have a similar pleasure following the nature of the species.

2059. At however, pleasure (1176a10), he explains the difference among pleasures in men.

First, he shows that men have different pleasures.

Second, at in all cases (1176a15; [2062]), he shows that the principal pleasure is found in the virtuous man.

Third, at but, of the pleasures (1176a24; [2064]), he shows which is the principal pleasure among the pleasures of a virtuous man.

He says first that, although it seems reasonable that creatures alike in kind should have a common sort of pleasure—this is so in the case of other animals—nevertheless men, who are all of the same species, do have very different pleasures, just as they have different activities.

2060. The reason is that activities and pleasures of other animals follow their natural tendency, which is the same in all animals belonging to the same species. But activities and pleasures of men spring from reason, which is not determined to one behavioral pattern. Consequently, certain things delight some men and sadden others, and things distressing and odious to some are pleasant and attractive to others.

2061. Situations of this kind occur because everyone takes pleasure in what he loves. And this happens because some are well or badly disposed according to reason. This is the case in regard to the taste of sweet things, since the same objects do not seem sweet to a sick man who has a diseased taste and to a well man who has a healthy taste; the same object does not seem hot to a person with a defective sense of touch and to a person whose touch is normal. This is true also of the other senses.

2062. Then, at in all cases (1176a15), he shows that the pleasure of virtuous persons is the principal human pleasure. He observes that, in all cases of this kind connected with human passions and activities, what seems to be really so is what appears as so to the good man who has correct judgment about such things (for example, the healthy man about what is sweet). And if it is correct—and it seems to be—that virtue is the measure by which we should judge all human affairs and that a man is good inasmuch as he is virtuous, it follows that real pleasures are those that appear so to the virtuous man, and that genuinely delightful things are those that the virtuous man enjoys.

2063. But it is not surprising that some things that are painful to the virtuous man are delightful to other men. For, this happens on account of the many corruptions and various deteriorations of man that pervert his reason and appetite. Thus, the things that the virtuous person repudiates are not pleasurable in themselves, but only to the evilly inclined. Therefore, it is obvious that pleasures that all admit to be disreputable must be declared pleasures only to depraved men.

2064. Finally, at but, of the pleasures (1176a24), he shows that there is one principal pleasure among those of the good man. Aristotle notes that, of the virtuous pleasures, we must consider which kind and which particular one constitutes the chief pleasure of man. This, he says, will be clear from the activities that the pleasures follow. The reason is that, whether the perfect and happy man has one or many proper activities, obviously the pleasures accompanying these activities are the chief pleasures of man. The others are contained under the chief pleasures in various secondary ways, as happens in the case of activities.