Lecture 12 — Happiness and the Moral Virtues

But life in accordance with the other kind of virtue is happy only in a secondary degree. [2111]

Its activities are merely human, for we perform works of justice, fortitude, and the other virtues when we observe what is due to everyone in our mutual dealings, our services and various kinds of actions and passions. And all these are human experiences. Besides, some of these matters seem to pertain to the body, and moral virtue is thought to be ascribed especially to the passions. Prudence is also connected with moral virtue, and moral virtue with prudence, since the principles of prudence are taken from the moral virtues, and the rectitude of the moral virtues from prudence. And both, being connected with the passions, will belong to the nature of the composite. Now, the virtues of the composite are human, and so then are life and happiness following these virtues. The intellect, however, is something separate. We have then sufficiently treated this point, and a fuller explanation would be more than our purpose requires. [2112]

But contemplative happiness seems to need little dispensing of external goods, or less than the happiness based on moral virtue. Both indeed need the necessities of life, and in an equal degree, even if the statesman is more troubled than the philosopher about the requirements of the body and the like. On this point, they differ little, but in their activities, there is a wide difference. For, the generous man needs the means to practice liberality, and the just man to make a return of services (since mere wishes are not evident and even the unjust pretend that they want to act justly). Likewise, the brave man will need strength if he performs any act in accordance with his virtue; and the temperate man will need opportunity. Otherwise, how can he or any other virtuous person be recognized? Further, it may be asked whether choice or action is more important in virtue, which appears to involve both; surely it is evident that perfection consists in both. Now, many things are required for action, and the more so the greater and nobler the deeds are; but for the activity of the contemplative man, nothing of the kind is needed. In fact, it can be said that external goods are obstacles to contemplation. But the contemplative person, insofar as he is man and lives with others, chooses to perform virtuous acts. Hence, he will need external goods to live a human life. [2117]

That perfect happiness is a form of contemplative activity will be clear from what follows. Now, we suppose that the gods are supremely happy and blessed. But what kind of actions should we attribute to them? Just actions? The gods will appear rather ridiculous making contracts, returning deposits and so on. Brave actions in undergoing terrors and running risks because it is good to do so? Or liberal actions? But to whom will they give? Besides, it will be strange for them to have money and the like. If they are called temperate, the praise will be distasteful, since they do not have lustful desires. In fact, a thorough review shows all the circumstances of these actions trifling and unworthy of the gods. However, we commonly think of them as living and active, for we must not suppose that they are asleep like Endymion. If, then, we take away from a living being action, and production besides, what is left except contemplation? Therefore, the activity of God, which is transcendent in happiness, is contemplative; and that most akin to it among human activities is the greatest source of happiness. [2121]

This is further indicated by the fact that the other animals do not partake of happiness, for they are completely deprived of this activity. The life of the gods is completely happy; the same is true of man’s life insofar as it contains a likeness of contemplative activity. But none of the other animals possess happiness, because they do not share in contemplation. So, then, contemplation and happiness are coextensive; and the more deeply people contemplate, the happier they are, not by accident, but by reason of contemplation, which is itself admirable. Consequently, happiness consists principally in some form of contemplation. [2124]

2111. But life in accordance with the other kind. After he has shown that perfect happiness consists principally and primarily in intellectual contemplation, the Philosopher next introduces a kind of secondary happiness arising from the activity of the moral virtues.

First, he proposes his intention: although a man who engages in the contemplation of truth is happiest, another is happy in a secondary degree as he lives by the standard of a different virtue, prudence, which directs all the moral virtues. For just as happiness of contemplative living is attributed to wisdom, which, as the preeminent virtue, contains in itself other speculative habits, so too the happiness of active living, which is gauged by the activities of the moral virtues, is attributed to prudence perfecting all the moral virtues, as was pointed out in book 6 [1275–84].

2112. Then, at its activities (1178a8), he proves his proposition by four reasons.

The first reason is that activities conforming to the other active virtues are human activities, since they concern human affairs.

In the first place, they deal with commonplace external matters in the life of man. For, the works of justice, fortitude, and the other virtues, which we do for one another, are manifest: in our dealings, as when men mutually exchange their goods in conformity with justice; in our services, as when one man succors another in need; and in all kinds of actions and passions where the moral virtues observe what is due to everyone. And all these are human experiences.

2113. In the second place, some matters of the virtues seem to pertain to the body and the passions of the soul, to which moral virtue is ascribed by a kind of affinity. For, many moral virtues deal with the passions, as is apparent from previous discussions [367]. So, then, moral virtue concerns human affairs inasmuch as it deals with external goods, bodily goods, and the passions of the soul.

2114. Prudence, considered as an intellectual virtue, is connected with moral virtue by a kind of affinity; the reverse of this is likewise true, because the principles of prudence are taken from the moral virtues, whose ends are the principles of prudence. Moreover, the rectitude of the moral virtues is taken from prudence, because prudence makes the right choice of means, as is evident from book 6 [1268–69]. Likewise, moral virtue and prudence are joined at the same time with the passions, because the passions are regulated by both. And, since the passions belong to the composite, they are common to the whole composite of soul and body.

2115. It is obvious, then, that both moral virtue and prudence are concerned with the composite. Now, virtues of the composite, properly speaking, are human, inasmuch as man is composed of soul and body. Hence, life in accordance with these, with prudence and moral virtue, is also human (and is called the active life). Consequently, happiness consisting in this kind of life is human. But contemplative life and contemplative happiness, which are proper to the intellect, are separate and divine.

2116. It should suffice for the present to say this much on the matter, for a fuller explanation would be more than what belongs to our purpose. The question is treated in De anima 3, (De anima 3.5.43a22; see Aquinas, In III de an., lec. 10, nn. 742–43.) where it is shown that the intellect is separate. Therefore, it is evident that happiness of contemplative living is more excellent than happiness of active living, according as something separate and divine is more excellent than that which is composite and human.

2117. He continues with the second reason at but contemplative. Life and happiness based on contemplative virtue have little need—or less than those based on moral virtue—for external goods to be dispensed to man. For it is true that both the contemplative and the active forms of happiness must have the necessaries of life, like food, drink, and so on; although the statesman is more concerned about the body than is the philosopher, since external activities are performed by the body. Nevertheless, on this point, there is little difference; rather, each equally needs the necessities. But in the matter of activities, the difference between them is considerable, because the virtuous man requires much for his activities, as the generous man obviously needs the means to practice liberality, and likewise the just man needs money to pay what he owes.

2118. And, if it be argued that even the will to give is an act of liberality and that the will to repay is an act of justice—these are possible without money—we should bear in mind that man’s will is hidden without external activities. In fact, many unjust persons pretend they want to act justly. But, in order to show whether a man is brave, some external act is necessary, and so he ought to perform some work of fortitude externally. Likewise, the temperate man must have the opportunity of enjoying pleasures in order to manifest temperance. Otherwise, if there is no occasion for action, neither the virtuous person—namely, the temperate or brave—nor any other can be recognized.

2119. For this reason, it can be asked which is more important in moral virtue, internal choice or external acts, for both are requirements of virtue. And although choice is more important in moral virtue, as indicated previously [322, 1129], nevertheless, external activity is also required for the complete perfection of moral virtue. But, for external actions, a man needs many things, and the greater and nobler the deeds are, the more the needs.

2120. On the other hand, the person engaged in contemplation needs none of these things for the exercise of his activity. Rather it can be said that external goods hinder a man from contemplation on account of the anxiety they impose on him, distracting his mind so he cannot give himself completely to contemplation. But, if the contemplative person requires external goods, this will be because a man needs the necessities of life, or because he lives with many persons, he must help at times, and to this extent, he chooses to live in accordance with moral virtue. Therefore, he will need these things to live a human life. Thus, it is evident that contemplative happiness is more excellent than active happiness, which follows moral virtue.

2121. In presenting the third reason, at that perfect happiness (1178b7), he says that perfect happiness evidently should consist in contemplative activity, because the gods (that is, separated substances) seem supremely happy and blessed. Yet we cannot ascribe to them the acts of the moral virtues. If the activities of justice were attributed to them, they would appear ridiculous in the role of making contracts, depositing their goods with others, and so on. Nor can bravery be attributed to them in the sense that they undergo terrors and run risks for the sake of the common good; nor does liberality, as a human virtue, befit them.

2122. They should not be described as giving to any mortal the kind of gifts that men freely bestow, because it is unseemly to say that they make presents of money or the like. And if anyone complimented them for temperance, such praise would be more distasteful than pleasing to God. For, it is not laudable for God to be without lustful desires, since his nature does not have them. So, then, in running through all the moral virtues, it is apparent that their acts are trifling and unworthy of the gods, that is, the superior substances.

2123. On the other hand, though, they are thought to live and consequently to be active. We cannot suppose they do nothing but sleep, like a certain philosopher who is said to have slept all his life. If, therefore, we take away from the life of the gods the action of the moral virtues and prudence, and then further take away production—which is the property of art—there remains in God no other activity excelling in happiness except contemplation, and he exercises all his activity in the contemplation of wisdom. From this, it is clear that, of all human activities, the one most akin to divine contemplation is the greatest source of happiness.

2124. He then proceeds with the fourth reason, at this is further (1178b24). An indication that perfect happiness consists in the contemplation of wisdom is that irrational animals, which do not partake of happiness, are completely deprived of this activity. The reason is that they are without intellect, by which we contemplate truth. To some extent, though, they share in the activities of the moral virtues: the lion, for instance, in the act of fortitude and liberality; the stork in the act of filial piety. And this they do in a reasonable way.

2125. The life of the gods (that is, the intellectual substances) is completely happy because they have only intellectual life, and the life of men is happy insofar as some likeness of this contemplative activity is found in them. But none of the animals possess happiness, because they do not share at all in contemplation. Consequently, it is evident that, the more extensive contemplation is, the more extensive happiness is; and people who can contemplate more deeply are happier, not from something incidental, but from the contemplation, which is in itself admirable. It follows, then, that happiness consists principally in some form of contemplation.