Lecture 16 — How to Learn the Science of Lawmaking

Then we must inquire, after these discussions, from whom and how the science of lawmaking may be learned. [2164]

Is it not, as in the other areas of knowledge, from those versed in political science? It seems to be a part of political science. [2165]

Or are we to say that political science is different from the other sciences and arts? Certainly, in the other practical sciences, persons who teach technique, like doctors and painters, seem to be the very ones who put it into practice. However, in political science, the Sophists profess to teach the art but none of them puts it into operation, that being left to those who are engaged in politics. [2166]

These seem to perform their public activities more from a kind of habit and experience than from intellectual discernment. [2168]

Apparently, they do not produce anything either in speeches or in writing about matters of this kind, although it might be more to their credit than the composition of speeches on judicial procedure and the art of persuasion. Furthermore, they do not make their own sons or any of their friends statesmen. Nevertheless, they would reasonably have done so if they could. Surely they could leave nothing better to their countries; nor could they choose anything more acceptable to themselves—nor, for that matter, to their best friends—than the ability to make others statesmen. [2169]

Nevertheless, experience does seem to contribute not a little, for merely living in a political environment would not have made statesmen of them. And thus we may conclude that those who would wish a knowledge of politics must have practice. [2171]

But the Sophists who profess to teach political science seem to be a long way from teaching it. Indeed, they appear to misunderstand completely what kind of science it is and what its subject matter is. [2172]

Otherwise, they would not make political science identical with rhetoric, and even lower; nor would they think it easy to make laws simply by collecting approved statutes and then choosing the best of them—as though a choice did not demand the actual employment of intellect, and as though right judgment were not the greatest thing, as is evident in music. In fact, people who have experience with particulars make correct judgments about performances and understand by what means and in what way the works are accomplished and what harmonizes with what. But the inexperienced understandably are ignorant whether a work is done well or badly, on the basis of what is in books. Now, laws are, as it were, the effects of the art of politics. Therefore, how can a man learn law-making from compilations of laws, or judge what laws are best? Surely men do not seem to become doctors from books, although the authors try to describe not only the cures, but the means of curing, what remedies must be prescribed for each individual condition. Nevertheless, these things seem to be useful to the experienced but not to the inexperienced. [2173]

Perhaps, then, collections of laws and constitutions will be useful to those who are able to consider and judge which works or laws may be good or bad and which are suitable to the circumstances. But those who review things of this kind without ability cannot properly judge except by chance, although perhaps they will become more capable of understanding them. [2178]

Since our predecessors have left the subject of legislation uninvestigated, perhaps it will be much better for us to attempt to treat this and the forms of government in general. In this way, we can complete philosophy with regard to political science as it deals with human affairs. [2179]

Therefore, first we will attempt in passing to secure whatever fragments of good are to be found in the statements of our predecessors. Next, on the basis of the constitutions we have collected, we will study the things that preserve states and the things that corrupt states; we will consider what influences corrupt particular forms of government, and why some states are governed well and others badly. After these discussions, we will begin to inquire what is the ideal state, how it ought to be organized and what laws and customs it should follow. This, then, will serve as a beginning. [2180]

2164. Then we must inquire, after these discussions. After the Philosopher has shown that a man should be a lawmaker, he now asks how one becomes a lawmaker.

First, he states his intention. He concludes from the premises that, since it was shown [2157–63] to be expedient for man to become a legislator, he must inquire after these discussions whence a man may learn the science of lawmaking, by experience or education, and how this may be achieved.

2165. Second, at is it not (1180b29), he carries out his intention.

First, he shows that the means familiar to previous philosophers were not sufficient to teach anyone the science of lawmaking.

Second, at since our predecessors (1181b12), he concludes that this has to be discussed by itself.

He treats the first point from two aspects.

First, he shows the way someone should learn lawmaking.

Second, at or are we to say (1180b31; [2166]), he shows that this does not follow in practice.

He says first that it seems reasonable that the origin and manner of becoming a legislator take place as in other practical sciences that are for the sake of political science. Nor is it out of place for him to speak of political science while inquiring about positive law. The reason, as stated in book 6 [1197–98], is that positive law is a part of political prudence, for positive law is a kind of architectonic political science.

2166. Then, at or are we to say (1180b31), he shows that this—that it seems reasonable—does not follow in practice, because of the difference among those who busy themselves about legislation.

First, he proposes their diversity.

Second, at these seem (1181a1; [2168]), he shows their deficiencies.

He says first that, although there would reasonably appear to be a resemblance between this and other sciences, nevertheless something different seems to be observed in political science and the other practical arts: the others are called sciences inasmuch as they have principles of knowledge, and aptitudes inasmuch as they are principles of operation. Indeed, in the other practical arts, the people who impart these arts by teaching them seem to be the very ones who practice them; doctors, for example, teach medicine and practice their art. The same situation prevails for painters and any others who operate by art.

2167. However, it seems to be otherwise in political science. Some, the Sophists, profess to teach legislation, but none of them puts it into practice. But others, the politicians, seem to practice it.

2168. Next, at these seem (1181a1), he shows the deficiencies of both:

first, of the politicians;

second, at but the Sophists (1181a12; [2172]), of the Sophists.

On the first point, he does three things.

First, he states what he has in mind about the deficiency of the politicians. Their public activities seem to be performed more from an aptitude or a kind of habit acquired by custom and from experience than from intellectual discernment, that is, reason or science.

2169. Second, at apparently they (1181a3), he verifies his statement by two indications.

The first is that those who work scientifically can give the reason, written or oral, for the things they do. But politicians do not seem to produce any work on political science either in speeches or writing. Certainly, writing of this kind would be much better than the discourses on judicial procedure by which people are taught how they ought to judge according to certain fixed canons, and on eloquence, by which they are taught to speak publicly according to the rules of rhetoric.

2170. The second indication is that men who work scientifically can form other scientific workers by teaching. But men of the kind who practice politics do not make their sons or any of their friends statesmen. Nevertheless, it is reasonable that they would so if they could. Surely, they could confer on their countries no greater benefit, which would remain after them, than to be the means of making other good statesmen. Likewise, there would be nothing more acceptable to themselves than the ability to make other men statesmen; they could do nothing more useful even for their best friends.

2171. Third, at nevertheless, experience (1181a9), he refutes an error. Someone might judge from the premises that experience in practicing politics would not be useful. But Aristotle says that, although it is not enough, nevertheless it contributes not a little toward making a man a statesman. Otherwise, some would not become better statesmen by the practice of political life. And experience in political life seems necessary for those who desire to know something about the art of political science.

2172. At but the Sophists (1181a12), he shows the deficiency that the Sophists suffer.

On this point, he does three things.

First, he states his proposition, saying that the Sophists who profess to teach political science seem to be a long way from teaching it. Indeed, they appear to misunderstand completely what kind of knowledge of political science is, as well as what its subject matter is.

2173. Second, at otherwise, they (1181a14), he verifies his proposition by indications.

He does so first in regard to his statement that they do not know its characteristic nature. If they understood this, they would not identify it with rhetoric, for rhetoric can give persuasive arguments in praise or censure of a person both in assemblies and in the courts—and this on a threefold basis:

demonstrative,

deliberative,

and judicial.

But, according to them, political science teaches a man only to form judgments. They think men are good statesmen who know how to make laws for forming a judgment.

2174. He then gives the second indication for his statement that they do not know the subject matter of political science. If they knew this, they would not think it easy to frame laws—in accordance with legislation, which is the principal part of political science—for they declare that it suffices for lawmaking to collect different approved statutes, choose the best, and institute them.

2175. They err in two ways on this point.

They err in one way by maintaining that, to become a legislator, it is enough to collect laws and choose the best among them. The reason is that, for legislation, a man must not only judge about the laws in use but also devise new laws, in imitation of the other practical arts, for a doctor not only judges about the known remedies for effecting a cure, but can discover new ones.

They err in another way, which he touches upon after disposing of the first error. It is not easy for a man to choose the best laws, since choice does not depend on the intellect alone, and right judgment is an important matter, as is evident in music.

2176. People who have experience with particulars make correct judgment about results and understand by what means and in what manner these results can be produced, and what kinds are suited to what persons or things. But the inexperienced are understandably ignorant whether a work is done well or badly on the basis of what they read in books, for they do not know how to put into practice what is in the books. Now, laws to be framed are, as it were, the results of the art of politics; they are framed as rules for activities of the state. Consequently, men who do not know what kind of results are suitable do not know what kind of laws are suitable.

2177. Therefore, it is impossible for a man to learn the science of lawmaking or to judge what kind of laws are best from a collection of laws unless he has experience. Likewise, it seems impossible for men to become good doctors only from remedies given in books, even though the authors of these remedies try to determine not only the cures but also the means of curing—how remedies must be prescribed according to the individual conditions of men. Nevertheless, all these things seem useful only to people with experience, and not to those who are ignorant of particulars because of inexperience.

2178. Third, at perhaps, then (1181b6), he infers from the foregoing remarks that we must reject the error that a collection of written laws is absolutely useless. He says—we have already indicated this—that the same applies to remedies in textbooks as to our problem: to collect laws and constitutions—that is, ordinances of different states—is useful for those who can consider and judge from practice which works or laws may be good or bad and what kinds are suitable in the circumstances. But those who have not the habit acquired by practice and want to review written documents of this kind cannot properly judge them except by chance. However, they do become more capable of understanding such things by the fact that they have actually read through the written laws and constitutions.

2179. At since our predecessors (1181b12), he points out that he is about to discuss how a man may learn lawmaking.

First, Aristotle shows that this is incumbent upon him. He says that previous persons, philosophers who preceded him, left a poorly organized treatise on legislation. Hence, it is well for us to attempt to treat legislation and, in general, the whole question of government, of which lawmaking is a part. In this way, we can extend philosophic teaching to political science, the practical knowledge concerned with human affairs—a subject that seems to have been taught last according to this view.

2180. Then, at therefore, first (1181b15), he shows in what order he is going to carry this out. He says that he will first attempt in passing to touch upon what in part was well treated in political science by our predecessors, that is, by earlier philosophers. This he will do in book 2 of the Politics.

After that, he will consider which of the various forms of government preserve the states (the good forms are the kingdom, aristocracy, and the citizens’ government) and which forms corrupt the states (the bad forms are tyranny of one ruler, oligarchy, and democracy).

Besides, we must consider what things preserve or corrupt particular forms of government, and the reasons why some states are governed well and others badly. This he will determine in books 3–7 of the Politics.

Then, after the previous discussions, he begins to inquire what is the ideal state, how it ought to be organized, and what laws and customs it should follow.

But, before all these things, he sets down in book 1 of the Politics certain principles from which he says we must begin. This will serve as a connecting link with the work on the Politics and as a conclusion to the whole work of the Ethics.