Lecture 9 — The Nature of Happiness

After the discussion of the various kinds of virtue, friendship, and pleasure, it remains for us to treat happiness in a general way, inasmuch as we consider this to be the end of human activity. But our discussion will be more concise if we reassert what has been stated already. [2065]

We have said that happiness is definitely not a habit. If it were, it might be enjoyed by a person passing his whole life in sleep, living the life of a vegetable, or by someone suffering the greatest misfortune. If, then, this inconsistency is unacceptable, we must place happiness in the class of activity, as was indicated previously. [2066]

But some activities are necessary and desirable for the sake of something else, while others are desirable in themselves. [2068]

Now, it is clear that we must place happiness among the things desirable in themselves and not among those desirable for the sake of something else. For, happiness lacks nothing and is self-sufficient. But those activities are desirable in themselves that are sought for no other reason than the activity itself. [2069]

Such actions are thought to be in conformity with virtue, for to do virtuous and honorable deeds is a thing desirable in itself. But agreeable amusements also seem to be desirable in themselves; they are not chosen for the sake of other things, since they are rather harmful than helpful, causing men to neglect their bodies and property. [2070]

Many apparently happy persons have recourse to such pastimes. This is why the ready-witted in conversation are favorites with tyrants; they show themselves agreeable in furnishing the desired amusement for which the tyrants want them. So these pleasures are thought to constitute happiness, because people in high places spend their time in them. [2071]

But perhaps such persons prove nothing, for virtue and intelligence, the principles of good actions, do not depend on the possession of power. Nor should bodily pleasures be thought more desirable, if these persons without a taste for pure and liberal pleasure resort to physical pleasures. Children, too, think that objects highly prized by them are best. It is reasonable, then, that, just as different things are valuable to a child and to a man, so also are they to good and bad men. Therefore, as we have often mentioned, those actions are worthy and pleasant that appear so to a good man. Now, that activity is most desirable to everyone that is in accordance with his proper habit. But the activity most desirable to a good man is in accord with virtue. Consequently, his happiness does not consist in amusement. [2073]

Surely it would be strange that amusement should be our end—that we should transact business and undergo hardships all through life in order to amuse ourselves. For, we choose nearly all things for the sake of something else, except happiness, which is an end itself. Now it seems foolish and utterly childish to exert oneself and to labor for the sake of amusement. On the contrary, to play in order to work better is the correct rule according to Anacharsis. This is because amusement is a kind of relaxation that men need, since they are incapable of working continuously. Certainly, relaxation is not an end, for it is taken as a means to further activity. [2076]

Moreover, a life lived in conformity with virtue is thought to be a happy one; it is accompanied by joy, but not by the joy of amusement. Now, we say that those things that are done in earnest are better than ludicrous things and things connected with amusement, and we say that the activity of the better part or the better man is more serious. But an activity that belongs to a superior faculty is itself superior and more productive of happiness. Surely anyone can enjoy the pleasures of the body, the bestial man no less than the best of men. However, we do not ascribe happiness to the bestial man if we do not assign him a life properly human. Therefore, happiness does not consist in pursuits of this sort, but in virtuous activities, as has been stated already. [2078]

2065. After the discussion of the various kinds. After the Philosopher has considered pleasure, he now takes up the consideration of happiness.

First, he connects this with his earlier treatment.

Second, at we have said (1176a33; [2066]), he carries out his proposal.

He makes a threefold division of the first point.

First, he enumerates the subjects already treated: virtues were discussed from book 2–8 [245–1537]; friendship in books 8–9 [1538–1952]; and pleasure in the first part of book 10 [1953–2064].

Second, he mentions what remains to be discussed, namely, happiness, which we must touch upon and briefly treat in a general way of in outline, just as we have previously treated other moral questions [43–230]. Moreover, we must discuss happiness because everyone in general considers it the end of all human activities. Now, in order that activities be directed to an end without error, it is necessary for the end to be known.

Third, he indicates the method of treating happiness, observing that we must reassert what was said about it initially [43–230]. In this way, our discussion will be more concise if we treat it from the beginning.

2066. Then, at we have said (1176a33), he carries out his intention.

First, he explains the genus of happiness, showing that it is not a habit, but an activity.

Second, at but some activities (1176b2; [2068]), he shows the nature of virtuous activity.

Third, at if happiness (1177a12; [2080]), he investigates to what virtue the activity belongs.

He says first—as was indicated in book 1 [118–30, 152–53]—that happiness is not a habit.

For two incongruities might follow.

The first is that, since habits remain in a person asleep, it might follow—if happiness were a habit—that a sleeper might be happy throughout his whole life, or a greater part of it. But this is unreasonable, because one who is asleep does not perfectly exercise vital activities except those belonging to the vegetative soul found in plants, to which happiness cannot be attributed. It is certain that sensation and external movements cease when a man is asleep, and internal images are distorted and imperfect. Likewise, intellectual activity in a sleeping person is imperfect, if indeed there is any. On the other hand, only activities of the nutritive part are perfect (in the sleeping person).

2067. A second incongruity is that virtuous habits remain in persons suffering misfortune, but their virtuous activities are hindered by reason of the misfortune. If, then, happiness is a habit, it might follow that the unfortunate were really happy. The Stoics, though, did not think this to be an inconsistency, since they held that external goods are in no way human goods and that, for this reason, man’s happiness cannot be diminished by misfortunes. However, this is contrary to the common opinion that judges misfortune to be inconsistent with happiness. Therefore, according to those who reject these illogical consequences, it must be said that happiness is not a habit, but is to be placed among activities, as has been stated in book 1 [118–30, 152–53].

2068. At but some activities (1176b2), he shows that happiness is a virtuous activity.

He discusses this point from three aspects.

First, he shows that happiness is contained under the activities desirable in themselves.

Second, at such actions (1176b7; [2070]), he divides these actions into virtuous and agreeable.

Third, at many apparently happy (1176b12; [2071]), he shows under which classification happiness falls.

He treats the first point in a twofold manner.

First, he proposes a division of activities. He notes that some activities are necessary for something else and to be chosen for the sake of other things, being desirable only for this end; other activities are worthy of choice in themselves because, even if no further benefit might come from them, they have a characteristic of desirability in themselves.

2069. Second, at now, it is clear (1176b3), he shows that happiness falls under those activities that are desirable in themselves and not under those that are desirable for the sake of something else. For, it is of the nature of happiness to be self-sufficient and in need of nothing further, as is evident from what was said in book 1 [118]. But those activities are designated as desirable in themselves from which nothing further than the activity itself is sought, inasmuch as they lack nothing to make them worthy of choice. Thus, it is clear that happiness is an activity desirable in itself.

2070. Then, at such actions (1176b7; [2070]), he subdivides activities desirable in themselves.

He says first that these seem to be virtuous actions, because it is absolutely desirable to man that he choose those things that are of themselves good and honorable. Consequently, some people call an object honorable because it draws us by its virtue and attracts us by its excellence.

Second, even agreeable amusements seem to be desirable of themselves. For, it does not seem that men choose these pastimes for any utility, since people are more often harmed than helped by such activities. In fact, because of amusements, men seem to neglect both their bodies, which are exposed to pains and dangers, and their possessions, by reason of the expenses they incur.

2071. Next, at many apparently happy (1176b12), he shows under which classification happiness falls.

First, he explains why some may think that happiness consists in amusement.

Second, at but perhaps (1176b17; [2073]), he rejects the reason offered for this.

Third, at surely it would (1176b28; [2076]), he resolves the truth.

He says first that many who are looked upon as happy have recourse to pastimes of this kind, inasmuch as they want to be amused. Consequently, tyrants highly approve persons of ready wit in conversation for the sharpness of their jests.

2072. He calls such people in power tyrants because those who are occupied with amusements do not seem to strive for the common interest, but for their own gratification. Moreover, tyrants make favorites of the ready-witted because they show themselves pleasing to tyrants in the very things that are desired, that is, in the pleasant amusements for which the tyrants want such men. Thus, then, happiness is said to consist in pleasures of this nature because persons in power—whom men consider happy—spend their time in them.

2073. Then, at but perhaps (1176b17), he rejects the preceding reason. He remarks that rulers of this sort cannot be accepted as sufficient evidence that happiness consists in amusement. For, these persons are superior to other men only in worldly power, but from this it does not follow that their actions are virtuous, since moral and intellectual virtues—the principles of good deeds—do not depend on a man being powerful. Consequently, it is not necessary that amusements, to which princes devote their leisure, be the most excellent activities.

2074. Likewise, it does not necessarily follow that a prince is well-behaved in relation to the appetite that is directed by virtue. And so, if the powerful do not interiorly perceive in active and contemplative virtue the pleasure that is pure (that is, without the corruption of the one enjoying it) and liberal (that is, in keeping with reason, by which man is free in his actions), they therefore resort to bodily pleasures, among which amusements are numbered. For this reason, we must not judge that these pleasures or activities are more desirable than others. We see that boys, too, lacking understanding and virtue, consider the childish pleasures they pursue as precious and best, although these have no great significance and are little valued by grown men. It is reasonable, then, that, just as different things seem valuable to boys and mature men, so also are they valued by wicked and virtuous persons.

2075. We have often indicated before [494, 1905] that those actions are really excellent and pleasant that are judged such by a good man who is the norm of human acts. But, as an activity that is agreeable to anyone as it arises from a proper habit seems to him to be most desirable, so a virtuous activity is most desirable and excellent to a good man. Consequently, happiness must be placed in this activity and not in amusement.

2076. At surely it would (1176b28), he resolves the truth, proving by two arguments that happiness does not consist in amusement.

The first argument is taken from the fact that happiness is the end. If it should consist in amusement, this inconsistency would follow: the purpose of man’s whole life would be amusement, such that he would engage in trade and undergo all other labors solely to amuse himself. This would follow because we choose nearly all other things—except happiness, which is the ultimate end—for the sake of something else. But it seems foolish and thoroughly childish for a man to pursue contemplation and tiresome action for the sake of amusement.

2077. On the contrary, according to the opinion of Anacharsis it seems proper for a person to amuse himself for a time so that later he may work harder. The reason is that relaxation and rest are found in amusement. But. since men cannot work continuously, they need rest. Hence, it is clear that amusement or rest is not an end, because this rest is for the sake of activity, in order that men may afterward work more earnestly. Obviously, then, happiness does not consist in amusement.

2078. He presents the second argument at moreover, a life (1177a1). Some people place happiness in amusement because of the pleasure found in it. Now, happiness does have some pleasure because, it is an activity of virtue that is accompanied by joy, but not by the joy of amusement. The reason is that, since happiness is the highest good of man, it must consist in what is best. But we hold virtuous things, which are seriously done, to be better than amusing things, which are playfully done. This is evident from the fact that activity that belongs to the better part of the soul and is proper to man is more virtuous. But obviously an activity belonging to a better part is better and consequently more productive of happiness.

2079. Anyone can enjoy the pleasures of the body, even a bestial man no less than the noblest of men. But no one ascribes happiness to a bestial man, or to the animal part of the soul, just as we do not assign to him life that is properly human. Clearly, then, happiness does not consist in pursuits of this kind, that is, in physical pleasures (among which amusements are counted), but only in virtuous activities, as has been stated already [2075, 2078].