Lecture 6 — The Nature and Properties of Pleasure

Again, every sense functions in relation to its object, and functions perfectly when it is in good condition and directed to the finest object falling under it. This seems to be the best description of perfect activity. [2022]

It does not seem to make any difference whether the sense itself acts, or rather the man in whom the sense resides; in either case, the most perfect activity proceeds from the best-conditioned agent in relation to the most excellent of the objects falling within its competence. [2024]

And this activity is most perfect and most pleasant, for there is a pleasure corresponding to each sense, and also to thought and contemplation. Now, that activity is most pleasant that is most perfect, and the most perfect activity belongs to the best-conditioned faculty in relation to the most excellent object falling within its competence. [2025]

However, pleasure does not perfect the activity in the same way as the sensible object and the sense—both of which are good—perfect it, just as health and a doctor are not in the same way the cause of being healthy. [2027]

That there is a pleasure corresponding to each sense is obvious, for we speak of sights and sounds as pleasant. [2028]

It is also obvious that pleasure is greatest when the sense is keenest and active in relation to its corresponding object. So long, then, as the sensible object and the perceiving subject remain in this condition, the pleasure will continue, since the agent and the recipient are both at hand. [2029]

But pleasure perfects activity not as an inherent habit, but as a kind of supervenient end, like the bloom of health perfects youth. [2030]

So long, then, as the sensible or intelligible object and the discerning or contemplative subject are as they should be, there will be pleasure in the activity. For, while the active and passive elements are unchanged in themselves and in their relation to one another, the same result is produced. [2032]

How is it, then, that no one can feel pleasure continuously? Is it from fatigue? Certainly no creature with a body is capable of uninterrupted activity. Therefore, pleasure also is not continuous, for it accompanies activity. [2033]

Some things give us pleasure when new but later do not, for at first, the mind is stimulated and is intensely active about them. This is so in the case of sight when we look at something intently; later, however, our reaction is not of this nature, but becomes relaxed. For this reason, pleasure also slackens. [2034]

It might be thought that all men seek pleasure because they desire life. Now, life is a form of activity, and everyone is concerned with the things he loves most and devotes himself to their activities. For example, a musician pays close attention to good music, a student of philosophy is intent on intellectual problems, and so on. Since, then, pleasure perfects these activities, it also perfects life, which all desire. Consequently, it is reasonable that men seek pleasure, for it perfects life, which is desirable to everyone. [2036]

The question of whether we choose life for the sake of pleasure or pleasure for the sake of life can be dismissed for the present. Indeed, they seem to be united and not to admit of separation, since there is no pleasure without activity. [2037]

2022. Again, every sense functions in relation to its object. After the Philosopher has shown that pleasure is not in the category of motion, as some thinkers maintained, he now explains the nature and properties of pleasure.

First, he shows what pleasure is.

Second, at consequently pleasures (1175a21; [2039]), he treats the variations among pleasures.

The first point is discussed in a twofold fashion.

First, he shows what pleasure is.

Second, at so long then (1174b33; [2032]), from this he defines the properties of pleasure.

He considers the first point under two headings.

First, he shows that pleasure is a perfection of activity.

Second, at that there is a pleasure (1174b26; [2028]), he clarifies what he has said.

He handles the first point in a threefold manner.

First, he explains what is the perfect activity.

Second, at and this activity (1174b19; [2025]), he shows that pleasure is the perfection of activity.

Third, at however, pleasure (1174b23; [2027]), he shows how pleasure can perfect activity.

He discusses the first point from two aspects.

First, he explains his proposition.

2023. He observes that the activity of each sense is the functioning of an agent in respect to a sensible thing that is the sense’s object.

Hence, in the activity of sense, two elements are considered:

the sense itself that is the active principle,

and the sensible thing that is the object of the activity.

Consequently, the best condition on the part of both sense and object is required for the perfect activity of sense. For this reason, he adds that sense functions perfectly when the activity of sense is well-conditioned in relation to the finest or fittest of the objects falling under the sense. This activity seems to be especially perfect that proceeds from sense in relation to an object of this kind.

2024. Next, at it does not seem (1174b17), he mentions a doubt. Since he has just said that sense is active [2023] and—in De anima 1 (De anima 1.4.408b11–18; see Aquinas, In I de an., lec. 10, nn. 151–62.)—that the soul does not act, but man acts by means of the soul, consequently he adds that it makes no difference to our purpose whether it is the sense itself that acts or the man (or animal) in whom the sense resides. The reason is that no matter which is affirmed, obviously it is true concerning each that the most perfect activity proceeds from the best-conditioned agent with respect to the most excellent object falling within the competence of such an agent. For, the perfection of the activity seems to depend especially on the active principle and the object.

2025. Then, at and this activity (1174b19), he shows that pleasure is a perfection of activity. We shall see that the same activity that we said is most perfect is also most pleasant; wherever a perfect activity is found in any percipient, there also a pleasant activity is found, for a pleasure corresponds not only to touch and taste but also to every sense, and not only to sense but also to contemplation inasmuch as the intellect contemplates some truth with certitude.

2026. Among these activities of sense and intellect, the most pleasant is that which is most perfect. But the most perfect is that belonging to the sense or intellect well-conditioned in relation to the best of the objects that fall under sense or intellect. If, then, perfect activity is pleasant, and most perfect activity most pleasant, it follows that activity is pleasant to the extent that it is perfect. Therefore, pleasure is the perfection of activity.

2027. At however, pleasure (1174b23), he shows how pleasure can perfect activity. He observes that pleasure does not perfect activity (of sense, for example) in the same way as do the object (which is the sensible) and the active principle (which is the sense)—all of which are good elements contributing excellence to the activity. Thus, health and a doctor are not in the same manner the cause of being healthy, but health is a cause by way of form and a doctor by way of agent. Likewise, pleasure—the perfection of activity—perfects activity by way of form: a well-conditioned sense, which is a moved mover, by way of agent. But a suitable sensible object perfects activity as a mover that is unmoved. The same reasoning is also valid concerning the intellect.

2028. Next, at **that there is **(1174b26), he clarifies what he has said.

He first states that, from the fact that we say and perceive that there are pleasant sights like beautiful forms and sounds like melodious songs, it is clear that there is a pleasure corresponding to each sense—as was just pointed out [2025].

2029. Second, at it is also (1174b28), he clarifies another premise by remarking that it is clear from experience that seeing, hearing, and every activity of sense are exceedingly pleasant when the sense is keenest or strongest and acts in relation to its corresponding best object. So long as the sensible object itself and the animal possessing the sense remain in this condition, the pleasure remains, as is apparent also in other activities. And, so long as the condition of the agent and recipient are the same, the effect is necessarily the same.

2030. Finally, at but pleasure perfects (1174b31), he clarifies a previous statement [2027] about the manner in which pleasure perfects activity. For it was stated that pleasure perfects activity not efficiently, but formally.

Now, formal perfection is twofold.

One is intrinsic, constituting a thing’s essence;

the other is added to a thing already constituted in its species.

2031. He says first that pleasure perfects activity not as an inherent habit—that is, not as a form intrinsic to the essence of the thing—but as a kind of end or supervenient perfection, like the bloom of health comes to young people: not as being of the essence of youth, but as following from a favorable condition of the causes of youth. Likewise, pleasure follows from a favorable condition of the causes of activity.

2032. Then, at so long, then (1174b33), he defines the reasons for certain properties of pleasure from what has been defined about its nature.

First, he considers the duration of pleasure;

next, at it might be thought (1175a10; [2036]), its desirability.

He discussed the first point from three aspects.

First, he shows how long pleasure should last. He observes that there will be pleasure in activity so long as the object (sensible or intelligible) and the agent itself (which perceives by sense or contemplates by intellect) are well-conditioned. The reason for this is that, as long as the condition of the active and passive elements remains the same and the relation between them remains the same, so long will the effect remain the same. Hence, if the good condition of the knowing faculty and of the object is the cause of pleasure, as long as this lasts, pleasure necessarily lasts.

2033. Next, at how is it, then (1175a3), he assigns the reason why pleasure cannot be continuous. He says that no one continuously feels pleasure, for he grows weary from activity that pleasure accompanies, and in this way, activity is not pleasant. This is so because all creatures with bodies capable of suffering are unable to be continuously active, for their bodies are changed in their condition by motion connected with activity. The body itself is subservient in some manner to every activity of the being whose body it is: either immediately, to sensitive activity, which is produced by a bodily organ; or mediately, to intellectual activity, which uses the activities of the sensitive powers generated by bodily organs. Therefore, activity cannot be continuous on the part of its productive principle, and so pleasure also cannot be continuous, for it accompanies activity [155, 1486, 1496].

2034. Third, at some things (1175a6), he gives the reason why new things are more pleasing. He remarks that things when new are more delightful, but later are not equally so. The reason for this is that, at first, the mind is eagerly inclined toward such things on account of desire and curiosity, and so is intensely or vehemently active about them.

2035. Vehement pleasure accompanies this, as is evident in people who, from curiosity, look hard at something they have not seen previously. Later, though, when they become accustomed to the sight, their reaction is not of such a nature that they look so intently or do anything else as before. But they act in a relaxed manner, and for this reason, the pleasure also fades, that is, is felt less keenly.

2036. Then, at it might be thought (1175a10), he presents the reason why pleasure is desired by everyone.

He treats this point in a twofold manner.

First, he explains his proposition, observing that a man can judge with reason that all men naturally seek pleasure, because they all naturally desire life. But life according to its ultimate perfection consists in a form of activity, as pointed out in book 9 [1846]. Therefore, everyone is especially active about those things that he loves most of all and devotes himself to their activities. Thus, a musician listens most attentively to good music and a lover of wisdom applies himself especially to the contemplation of intellectual problems or studies. Since, then, pleasure perfects activity, as was indicated [2036], it consequently perfects life itself, which all desire. Thus, it is reasonable that everyone should seek pleasure, from the fact that it perfects life, which is desirable to everybody.

2037. Next, at the question of whether (1175a18), he raises a doubt by reason of the discussion. We have stated that all desire pleasure and likewise all desire life, which is perfected in activity. But objects of desire, as well as objects of knowledge, have an order among themselves. Therefore, a doubt can arise over whether men seek life for the sake of pleasure or, conversely, pleasure for the sake of life.

2038. He says that the doubt must be dismissed at present because the two questions are so joined that they do not admit of any separation. For there is no pleasure without activity, and on the other hand, there can be no perfect activity without pleasure, as has been noted [2025–26]. However, activity seems to be the principal, rather than pleasure. For pleasure is a repose of the appetite in a pleasing object that a person enjoys by means of activity. But a person desires repose in a thing only inasmuch as he judges it agreeable to him. Consequently, the activity itself that gives pleasure as a pleasing object seems to be desirable prior to pleasure.