Lecture 5 — Pleasure is Neither a Motion Nor a Process of Change

The nature and quality of pleasure will become clearer if we take up the question again from the beginning. [2005]

Now, seeing seems perfect at any moment whatsoever, for it does not require anything coming later to complete its form. But pleasure appears to be a thing of this nature: it is a whole, and at no time can anyone find a pleasure whose form will be completed if it lasts longer. [2006]

Therefore, pleasure is not a form of motion. [2008]

For every motion involves duration and is a means to an end, such as the process of building; it is perfect when it effects what it aims at—a thing achieved either over the whole time or at the final moment. All the movements are imperfect during the portions of that time and are different in kind from the completed process and from one another. Thus, in building a temple, the fitting of the stones is different from the fluting of a column and both are different from the construction of the whole edifice. And while the building of the temple is a perfect process requiring nothing more to achieve the end, laying the foundation and constructing the triglyph are imperfect processes, producing only a part. Therefore, they differ in kind, and it is not possible to find motion specifically perfect at any one moment, but if at all, only in the whole space of time. [2010]

The same is true of walking and other movements. For, if locomotion is motion from one point in space to another, it also has differences in kind—flying, walking, leaping, and so on. And not only this, but there are differences in walking itself, for the starting and finishing points of the whole racecourse are not the same as those of a part of the course, nor are those of one part the same as those of another. Nor is the motion of traversing this line and that line the same, since a runner travels not only along a line, but along a line existing in place, and this line is in a different place from that. We have adequately discussed motion in another work, and it seems that motion is not complete at any moment, but there are many incomplete motions differing in kind, since the starting and finishing points specify the motion. Pleasure, on the other hand, is specifically complete at any and every moment. It is obvious, then, that motions are different from one another and that pleasure belongs to the things that are whole and complete. [2013]

Likewise, this is thought to be the case because motion necessarily occupies a space of time, but pleasure does not, because that which occurs in a moment is a whole. [2018]

From these considerations it is obviously a mistake to speak of pleasure as motion or a process of generation. For these attributes cannot be predicated of all things, but only of such as are divisible and not wholes. Thus, there is no process of generation in the act of seeing, in a point, or in unity, nor is there any motion in them. Consequently, there is no motion or process in pleasure either, for it is a whole. [2020]

2005. The nature and quality of pleasure. After the Philosopher has outlined other opinions about pleasures, he now gives the real definition.

First, he shows that pleasure does not come under the category of motion or process of generation, as the Platonists held.

Second, at again, every sense (1174b14; [2022]), he defines its nature and characteristic quality.

He treats the first point from two aspects.

First, he proposes his intention and method of procedure, remarking that the nature of pleasure according to its genus and its quality as either good or bad will be made clearer from the following discussion if we take up this question again from the beginning.

2006. Next, at now, seeing seems (1174a14), he carries out his proposition.

He does this in a threefold manner.

First, he introduces a principle necessary for an explanation of the proposition.

Second, at therefore, pleasure (1174a19; [2008]), he proves the proposition.

Third, at from these considerations (1174b9; [2020]), he concludes what he principally intended.

He says first that the operation of the sense of sight, called seeing, is complete at any moment whatsoever. It does not require anything coming later to perfect its form. This is so because seeing is completed in the first instant of time. Now, if time were needed for its completion, no time whatsoever would suffice, but a certain duration would be necessary, as is the case with other activities occurring in time whose generation requires a particular measure of time. But seeing is perfected in a moment. The same is true of pleasure.

2007. Pleasure is a whole, that is, something completed in the first instant of its inception. Thus, a space of time cannot be assigned in which pleasure may take place, in the sense that more time is needed to complete its form, as in those activities whose generation requires an interval of time. The moment of human generation can be indicated because more time is necessary to perfect the human form.

2008. At therefore, pleasure (1174a19), he proves the proposition by two arguments.

The first is that every movement or process of generation is perfected after a lapse of time and the motion is not yet completed in a part of that time. This is not true of pleasure. Therefore, pleasure is neither a movement nor a process of generation.

2009. In connection with this argument, he first states a conclusion deducing from the preceding principle—in which virtually the whole reason is contained—that pleasure is not a motion.

2010. Next, at for every motion (1174a19), he presents the major premise of the previous argument: every motion involves duration, and every motion is a means to an end, that is, has an end to which it is ordered and that it attains with the lapse of time.

He shows this first concerning the process of generation. For, the art of building perfects its operation when it completes what it intends, namely, a house. It does this in some whole interval of time, and all the processes are imperfect during the portions of that time and are different in kind—and even among themselves—from the complete process. The reason for this is that generation receives its species from the form that is the end of the process.

2011. But the form of the whole operation is one thing, and the forms of the individual parts are another. Hence, the processes also differ from one another in kind. For, if a temple is constructed in a certain period of time, one portion of time is occupied in fitting the stones for the building of the wall and another portion in fluting the columns, that is, sculpturing them in the manner of rods. But, during the whole time, the temple itself is constructed. And these three operations differ in kind: the fitting of the stones, the fluting of the columns, and the construction of the temple.

2012. On this point, we should note that, as the form of the whole temple is perfect but the forms of the parts are imperfect, so also the building of the temple itself is a perfect process—it requires nothing else to complete the plan of the builder—but laying the foundation is an imperfect process, as is also constructing the triglyph, the sculptured columns arranged in three rows above the foundation. And both of these are the making of a part having the nature of what is imperfect. It is evident, then, that the preceding constructions of the whole and of the parts differ specifically, and that we are not to understand that motion is specifically perfect at any part of the time, but is completed in the whole period of time.

2013. Then, at the same is true (1174a29), he shows the same thing concerning locomotion. He observes that what is said about the process of generation seems also to be true about walking and all other movements, for it is obvious that all locomotion or local movement is motion from one point in space to another, that is, from one term to another. Thus, motion must be differentiated in kind according to a difference of terms. There are different kinds of locomotion among the animals: flying (suitable to birds), walking (suitable to gressorial creatures), leaping (suitable to grasshoppers), and other movements of this kind. These differ according to the different kinds of moving principles, for the souls of different animals do not belong to the same classification.

2014. The kinds of locomotion differ not only in the foregoing manner but also in one of these species, such as walking, which is of different kinds. For traveling the whole racecourse and traveling a part of it do not have the same starting point and finishing line, that is, the same terms “from which” and “to which.” And the case is similar to traveling this or that part of the course, because the boundaries are not the same. The motion of traversing this line and that line is not the same specifically, although all lines as such belong to the same species.

2015. As motions are constituted in a determined position or location, they are understood as differing specifically according to the difference of places, which is taken according to a different disposition in regard to the first encompassing place. Now, a runner travels not only along a line, but along a line existing in place, because this line is in a different place from that. Clearly, then, the whole locomotion differs specifically from each of its parts according to the difference of boundaries, but in such a way that the whole motion is perfect specifically, but the parts imperfectly so.

2016. Because complete knowledge of the nature of motion might be required for a clarification of these points, he adds that a precise—that is, adequate and complete—account of motion has been given in another work, the Physics. (Physics 3.1–3.200b12–202b29; see Aquinas, In III phys., lecs. 1–5 [275–325].) However, it is enough to say here that motion is not perfect at every moment, but there are many imperfect motions differing in the different parts of time from the fact that the starting points and the finishing lines, the terms of the motion, specify the motion.

2017. Having thus explained the major premise of the proposition, he then adds the minor premise: the form of pleasure is complete at any and every moment, as has been shown from previous discussions [2007]. He concludes, then, that pleasure and generation or change obviously differ from one another, and that pleasure is numbered among things that are whole and complete, because pleasure has the completion of its form in every part.

2018. He proposes the second argument at likewise, this is thought (1174b7). It is that motion is impossible except in a space of time, as proved in Physics 6, (Physics 6.3.234a24–234b9; see Aquinas, In VI phys., lec. 5, nn. 794–95.) but pleasure is possible without an interval of time. It has been pointed out that a feeling of pleasure is a whole for the reason that this feeling occurs in a moment and is completed immediately. Therefore, pleasure is not a motion.

2019. We should note that the difference from which this argument proceeds is the cause of the difference from which the first argument proceeded. Therefore, the form of pleasure is complete at every moment, but not so motion, because pleasure is instantaneous, while all motion occupies an interval of time. And the Philosopher’s way of speaking shows this when he says likewise, this is thought to be the case.

2020. Then, at from these considerations (1174b9), he concludes from the premises what he principally intended. He remarks that it is clear from the premises [2006–19] that philosophers are mistaken in speaking of pleasure as a motion or process of generation. The concept of motion and generation cannot be predicated of everything, but only of divisible things that are not whole and are not completed immediately.

2021. Neither is it possible to speak of seeing as a process of generation in such a way that seeing attains completion successively. Nor can we speak of a point or unity in a similar fashion. For these are not generated, but accompany certain things. Likewise, motion cannot be attributed to them, and consequently not to pleasure, which is also a whole, that is, has its perfection in being indivisible.