Lecture 3 — Pleasure is Not a Good According to Plato

However, it does not follow that, if pleasure is not a quality, therefore it is not a good; for neither virtuous activities nor happiness are qualities either. [1980]

However, some maintain that good is determinate but pleasure is indeterminate, since it admits of more and less. [1982]

Now, if they judge in this way about partaking of pleasure, then the same applies to justice and other virtues according to which some are clearly said to be more or less virtuous. For, people are in fact just and brave in a greater or lesser degree and can act more or less justly and temperately. However, if their judgment is based on the nature of the pleasures themselves, perhaps they are not stating the real cause, since some pleasures are pure and others mixed. Why may not pleasure be like health, which is determinate and still admits of degrees? Health is not constituted by the same proportion of humors in all men, nor by one proportion always in the same person; but, even when diminished, it remains up to a certain point, and so differs in degree. [1983]

Again, they postulate that the good in itself is perfect but that movements and processes of generation are imperfect; then they try to show that pleasure is a motion or process. [1989]

But they do not seem to be correct. In fact, pleasure is not a motion, for swiftness and slowness are proper to all movement, if not absolutely like the motion of the earth, then relative to another moving body. But neither of these is true of pleasure. A man can become pleased quickly just as he can get angry quickly; but he cannot be pleased quickly, not even in relation to somebody else, as he can walk, grow, and so on quickly. Therefore, someone can change into a pleasurable state quickly or slowly, but he cannot function or be pleased in that state quickly. [1990]

And how can it be a process of generation? It does not seem that any chance thing can be generated from any other chance thing, but everything is dissolved into that from which it came; and pain would be the destruction of that which pleasure generates. Further, they affirm that pain is a deficiency of the natural state and pleasure a replenishment. But these experiences are bodily passions. If, then, pleasure is a replenishment of the natural state, the part replenished will feel the pleasure. Consequently, the body can feel pleasure. However, this does not seem to be the case. Therefore, pleasure is not replenishment; but after replenishment takes place, a man will feel pleasure, just as after a surgical operation, he will feel pain. [1993]

This opinion seems to arise from pains and pleasures associated with food. Certainly, people who are distressed beforehand by lack of food receive pleasure by replenishment. However, this is not the case with all pleasures, for pleasures of knowledge are not preceded by pain, nor are the pleasures of sense—for example, smell, sounds, and sights. And the same is true of memories and hopes. If these are the result of generation, by what are they generated? No lack of anything has occurred to be replenished. [1995]

1980. However, it does not follow. After the Philosopher has dismissed the Platonists’ opposition to the arguments of Eudoxus, he now presents their arguments against Eudoxus’ position.

He treats this point in a twofold manner.

First, he proposes the arguments designed to show that pleasure does not belong to the category of good.

Second, at the distinction between (1173b31; [2001]), he offers the arguments to show that pleasure is an absolute and universal good. Since the first set of arguments conclude falsely, Aristotle presents and disproves them at the same time.

He gives four arguments on the first point.

The first is this. Good seems to come under the genus of quality; for, to a person asking what the quality of a thing is, we answer that it is good. But pleasure is not a quality. Therefore, it is not a good.

1981. But Aristotle rejects this, observing that, even if pleasure does not come under the genus of quality, it does not follow that pleasure is not a good. For even the works of virtue and of happiness itself, which are obviously goods, are not qualities. For, good is predicated not only of quality but also of every genus, as was indicated in book 1 [81].

1982. He presents the second argument at **but they maintain **(1173a31).

First, he offers the reason of the Platonists themselves. They hold that good is determinate, as is evident from the discussion in book 9 [1887]. Now pleasure is indeterminate according to them—a statement they proved from the fact that it admits of degrees. Thus, they concluded that pleasure did not come under the genus of good.

1983. Next, at now if they (1173a17), he rejects such an argument.

On this point, we must remember that a thing admits of degrees in two ways:

one, in the concrete;

the other, in the abstract.

Something is called more and less by reason of nearness to an object or remoteness from it. When, therefore, a thing that exists in a subject has oneness and simplicity, it does not admit of more and less in itself. Hence, it is not said to admit of degrees in the abstract. But it can be predicated according to more and less in the concrete, because the subject partakes more and less of such a form, as is evident in the case of light, which is an undivided and simple form. Consequently, light itself is not predicated according to more and less. However, a body is termed more or less luminous from that it partakes of light more or less perfectly.

1984. On the other hand, when there exists a form that, in its nature, indicates a proportion between many individuals referred to one principle, that form admits of degrees even according to its own nature. This is evident of health and beauty: each implies a proportion appropriate to the nature of an object designated as beautiful or healthy. And, since a proportion of this kind can be more or less appropriate, consequently, beauty and health considered in themselves are predicated according to more and less. It is obvious from this that unity, by which something is determinate, is the reason why a thing may not admit of degrees. Since, then, pleasure does admit of degrees, it seemed not to be something determinate, and consequently not to belong to the genus of good.

1985. Therefore, in opposing this, Aristotle observes that, if the Platonists hold that pleasure is something indeterminate because it admits of degrees in the concrete—by reason of the fact that someone can be pleased more and less—they will have to admit the same about justice and other virtues according to which people are designated such more and less. Certainly, some men are just and brave in a greater or less degree. The same is true concerning actions, for someone can act more and less justly and temperately. Thus, either virtues will not belong to the genus of good, or the reason offered does not remove pleasure from the genus of good.

1986. However, if they maintain that pleasure admits of degrees on the part of the pleasures themselves, we must consider that perhaps their argument may not apply to all pleasures, that they may be [rather] indicating the reason why some pleasures are pure and unmixed—such as the pleasure following the contemplation of truth—and other pleasures are mixed, like those following a pleasing combination of some kinds of sensibles, such as pleasures resulting from musical harmony or the blending of tastes or colors. Obviously, pure pleasure of itself does not admit of degrees, but only mixed pleasure does, inasmuch as a pleasing combination of sensibles causing pleasure can be more or less agreeable to the nature of the person enjoying it.

1987. Nevertheless, neither is it necessary that pleasures, which in themselves admit of degrees by reason of their admixture, are not determinate or good. Nothing prevents pleasure, which allows of more or less, from being determinate—as health is, in fact. Qualities of this kind may be called determinate inasmuch as they reach in some way that to which they are ordered, although they might come closer. Thus, a mixture of humors contains the reason for health from the fact that it attains a harmony in human nature; by reason of this, it is called determinate attaining its proper end, so to speak.

1988. However, a temperament that in no way attains this is not determinate, but is far from the notion of health. For that reason, health of itself admits of more and less, because the same proportion of humors is not found in all men, nor is it always the same in one and the same person. But, even when diminished, health remains up to a certain point. Hence, health differs according to degrees, and the same is true of pleasure.

1989. At again, they postulate (1173a29), he offers the third argument and discusses it in a twofold manner.

First, he proposes the argument. The Platonists held that what is good in itself is something perfect. But motion and processes of generation are imperfect, for motion is an act of an imperfect thing, as stated in Physics 3. (Physics 3.2.201b27–202a2; see Aquinas, In III phys., lec. 3, n. 296.) Consequently, they maintain that no motion or process of generation belongs to the genus of good. And they try to establish that pleasure is a motion or a process of generation. Hence, they conclude that pleasure is not a good in itself.

1990. Then, at but they do not seem (1173a31), he rejects this argument under two aspects.

He first rejects their assertion that pleasure is a motion. He states that they are apparently not correct when they maintain that pleasure is a motion, for every motion seems to be swift or slow. But swiftness and slowness are not proper to motion considered absolutely and in itself but in relation to something else. For example, the motion of the earth, the daily motion in which the whole heavens revolve, is called swift in comparison with other motions.

1991. The reason for this—as is pointed out in Physics 6 (Physics 6.2.232a25–232b20; see Aquinas, In VI phys., lec. 3, nn. 766–73.)—is that a thing is called “swift” that moves a great distance in a short time, and a thing called “slow” that moves a little distance in a long time. Now “great” and “little” are predicated relatively, as indicated in the Categories. (Categories 6.5b15–30.) But neither swiftness nor slowness are attributable to pleasure. To be sure, a man can become pleased quickly, just as he can become angry quickly. But we do not say that a man can be pleased quickly or slowly, not even in comparison with someone else, as we do say that a man can walk quickly or slowly, can grow quickly or slowly, and so on. So, then, obviously, someone can be changed into a state of pleasure—that is, can arrive at it—quickly or slowly.

1992. This is so because we can attain pleasure by a kind of motion. But we cannot function quickly in the state of pleasure such that we are quickly pleased. The reason is that the act of being pleased consists in something done rather than in something taking place.

1993. Next, at and how can it be (1173b4), he rejects the Platonists’ argument to uphold their opinion that pleasure is a process of generation.

He discusses this point in a twofold manner.

First, he shows that pleasure is not a process of generation.

Second, at this opinion seems (1173b13; [1995]), he shows the origin of this opinion.

He remarks first that pleasure does not appear to be a process of generation, for it does not seem that any chance thing is generated from any other chance thing. But everything is dissolved into that from which it is generated. If pleasure is a generation, pain must be the destruction of the same thing that pleasure generates. This is affirmed by the Platonists who hold that pain is a deficiency in what is according to nature, for we see that pain follows a person’s privation of those things to which he is naturally united. Likewise, they maintain that pleasure is a replenishment because pleasure follows when something naturally belonging to a man is added to him.

1994. But Aristotle rejects this argument because privation and replenishment are bodily passions. If, then, pleasure is a replenishment of what is according to nature, the part replenished will feel pleasure. Consequently, the body can feel pleasure. But this does not seem to be the case, because pleasure is a passion of the soul. Therefore, it is clear that pleasure is not a replenishment or a process of generation, but a consequence of it. A man feels pleasure after replenishment just as he feels pain and distress after a surgical operation.

1995. Then, at this opinion seems (1173b13), he shows its origin. He observes that the view that sees pleasure as a replenishment and pain as a privation seems to arise from pains and pleasures concerned with food. People who beforehand are distressed by the lack of food, afterwards are pleased by replenishment. But this does not occur in connection with all pleasures where replenishment of a deficiency does not take place. For, pleasures resulting from mathematical studies do not have an opposite pain, which they say consists in a deficiency. Thus, pleasures of this sort do not exist for a replenishment of a need. It is evidently the same with some pleasures of sense such as smell, sound and the sight of physical objects.

1996. Besides, many delightful hopes and memories exist; and no cause can be assigned whose generations are pleasures of this sort, because there are no preceding defects that are replenished by means of these pleasures. But it was pointed out [1993] that, if pleasure is the generation of a thing, pain is its destruction. Therefore, if any pleasure is found without the defect of pain, it follows that a pain is not the correlative of every pleasure.