Lecture 14 — The Need of Virtue

Have we sufficiently discussed in a general way what should be investigated in these matters about virtues, friendship, and pleasure in order to bring our project to a conclusion? [2137]

Indeed, as they say, the end of science in practicable matters is not to investigate and to know individual things, but rather to do them. Therefore, it is not sufficient to have knowledge of virtue; we must try to possess and practice virtue, or try any other actual way of becoming virtuous. [2138]

Were persuasive words sufficient of themselves to make men virtuous, many great rewards would be due, according to Theognis, and it would be necessary to give them to those who persuade. At present, it seems that persuasive discourse can challenge and move youths of excellent character and can fill the lover of the good with virtue. But it cannot arouse the majority to virtue, for most people are not subject by nature to shame, but to fear; nor do they refrain from evil because of disgrace, but because of punishment. In fact, since they live by passion, they follow their own pleasures, by which the passions themselves are nourished, and avoid the contrary pains. They do not know what is truly good and pleasant, nor can they taste its delight. What words would reform people of this sort? It is impossible or at least difficult to change by argument what is held by inveterate habit. [2139]

It is perhaps a thing worthy to be esteemed if we attain virtue after having everything that seems to make men just. Some philosophers think that men are virtuous by nature; others, that they become virtuous by practice; still others, that they become virtuous by instruction. Certainly, what pertains to nature is not in our power, but comes from some divine cause to a man who is very fortunate. However, discourse and instruction are not effective with everyone; the soul of the hearer must be prepared by good habits to rejoice in the good and hate the evil, just as the soil must be well tilled to nourish the seed. Indeed, the man who lives according to passion will not listen to a discourse on virtue, nor will he understand it. How is it possible to persuade such a man? In general, passion does not yield to argument, but to violence. Obviously, there must preexist a natural disposition in some way akin to virtue by which a man loves what is good and hates what is evil. [2143]

But it is difficult properly to direct anyone to virtue from his youth unless he is reared under good laws; to live a temperate and hard life is unattractive to most people, but particularly the young. For this reason, the rearing of children and their activities ought to be regulated by law. Thus, good things will not be distasteful after they have become habitual. [2148]

It is not enough that the young receive proper rearing and care: on arriving at manhood, they must learn these very things by experience and become accustomed to them. For this, we need laws even throughout the whole of man’s life, for most men are more attentive to coercion than argument, to what is hurtful than to what is good. [2150]

For this reason, some think (Plato, Laws 722.) that legislators ought to stimulate men to virtue and exhort them on moral grounds; the obedient who are just should be aroused by means of preexisting habits, while the insubordinate and the degenerate should be visited with pains and punishments, but the absolutely incurable should be completely banished. (Plato, Protagoras 325.) The reason is that the just man living a good life obeys exhortation, but the evil man seeking pleasure is punished like a beast of burden. Hence, they say, those pains should be inflicted that are especially opposed to the pleasures men love. [2151]

As we have stated, the man who is going to be virtuous must have careful rearing and good habits; then he should live according to a moral code and refrain from evil, either by his own will or by coercion. This is possible only with men whose lives are directed by intelligence and right order having coercive force. Certainly, this power is not contained in the precept of a father, nor does it belong to anyone who is not a ruler or a person in authority. But the law includes coercive force, whereas instruction proceeds from prudence and reason. [2153]

Some men hate people who oppose their inclinations, even when the opposition is just. But the law, in commanding what is just, is not irksome. [2154]

2137. Have we sufficiently discussed in a general way. After the Philosopher has determined virtue’s end, which, in the virtuous man, is pleasure or happiness, now he determines the other end, which is understood in comparison with the common good. He shows that, besides this moral science, it is necessary to have another science, the legislative, whose object is the common good.

On this point, he does three things.

First, he shows the necessity of legislation.

Second, at only in Sparta (1180a24; [2155]), he shows the necessity of a man’s becoming a legislator.

Third, at then we must inquire (1180b28; [2164]), he shows how a man can become a legislator.

He treats the first point from two aspects.

First, he asks a question about the adequacy of the general discussion—inasmuch as the matter should be discussed generally and schematically—on the subjects for investigation: happiness, virtues, friendship, and pleasure. Is the choice we made of treating the good of man really finished and perfected, or is there some more to be added?

2138. Next, at indeed, as they say (1179a35), he settles the question, showing that something more is required.

First, he shows it is necessary that a man become good.

Second, at were persuasive words (1179b4; [2139]), he shows that habituation to virtuous living is required for a man to become good.

Third, at but it is difficult (1179b31; [2148]), he shows that to have this habituation legislation is required.

He says first that the end of the science concerned with practicable matters is not to know and investigate individual things, as in the speculative sciences, but rather to do them. And, since we become virtuous and doers of good works in accordance with virtue, it is not sufficient for the science whose object is man’s good that someone [simply] have a knowledge of virtue; he must try to possess it as a habit and practice it. Or if it is thought that a man can become good in another way than by virtue, then he must try to possess that.

2139. Then, at were persuasive words (1179b4), he shows that habituation is required in order that a man become good.

First, he shows that persuasive words alone are not enough;

second, at it is perhaps (1179b18; [2143]), that habituation is needed.

He says first that, if persuasive words sufficed to make men virtuous, many great rewards would be due to a man for his skill, that is, because of the art of persuading to the good, and it would be absolutely necessary to give great rewards to those who persuade. But this is not generally true.

2140. We see that persuasive words can challenge and move to good generous youths who are not slaves of vice and passion and who have excellent natural dispositions, inasmuch as they are inclined to virtuous operations. And those who truly love the good can become catocochimon—full of virtue and honor—since such as are well-disposed to virtue by good advice are incited to the perfection of virtue.

2141. But many men cannot be induced to virtue because they are not subject to shame, which fears disgrace, but rather are coerced by the dread of punishment. They do not refrain from evil because of disgracefulness, but because of the punishments feared. In fact, they live according to their passions and not according to reason, chasing after their own pleasures; thus their own desires increase and they avoid pains opposed to the pleasures sought, which pains are inflicted on them by punishments. They do not know what is really good and pleasant, nor can they taste its delight. But people like these cannot be changed by any argument.

2142. Something acceptable must be proposed to change a man by argument. Now, one who does not relish an honorable good but is inclined toward passion does not accept any reasoning that leads to virtue. Hence, it is impossible, or at least difficult, for anyone to be able to change a man by argument from what he holds by inveterate usage. So also in speculative matters, it is not possible to lead back to truth a man who firmly cleaves to the opposite of those principles to which goals are equivalent in practical matters, as indicated previously [223, 474, 1431].

2143. Next, at it is perhaps (1179b18), he shows that habituation is required for a man to become virtuous. To acquire virtue, Aristotle says, we ought not to be satisfied with mere words. But we ought to consider it a thing of great value if—even after possessing everything that seems to make men virtuous—we attain virtue.

There are three views on these matters.

Some philosophers maintain that men are virtuous by nature, that is, by natural temperament together with the influence of the heavenly bodies.

Others hold that men become virtuous by practice.

Still others say that men become virtuous by instruction.

All three opinions are true in some degree.

2144. Certainly, the natural temperament is a help to virtue; this agrees with what was said in book 6 [1276–80] that some people seem brave or temperate right from birth through a natural inclination. But natural virtue of this kind is imperfect, as we pointed out then, and its completion requires that the perfection of the intellect or reason supervene. For this reason, there is need of instruction that would be enough if virtue were located in the intellect or reason alone—this is the opinion of Socrates, who maintained that virtue is knowledge. However, because rectitude of the appetitive faculty is needed, there must be habituation inclining this faculty to good.

2145. But what pertains to nature manifestly is not in our power, but comes to men from some divine cause—from the influence of the heavenly bodies in regard to man’s physical condition, and from God Himself, who alone governs the intellect, in regard to the movement of man’s mind to good. In this, men are really very fortunate to be inclined to good by a divine cause, as is evident in the chapter De bona fortuna. (A compilation from a chapter of the Eudemian Ethics (1246b37–1248b2) and a chapter of the Magna Moralia (1206b30–1207b19).)

2146. It was explained previously [2139–42] that discourse and instruction are not effective with everyone. But, in order that they be effective, the soul of the hearer must be prepared by many good customs to rejoice in the good and hate the evil, just as the soil must be tilled well to nourish the seed abundantly. As seed is conditioned in the earth, so is admonition in the soul of the hearer. Indeed, the man who lives by passion will not eagerly hear words of advice, nor even understand, so that he can judge the advice to be good. Therefore, he cannot be persuaded by anyone.

2147. Generally speaking, passion that, when firmly rooted by habituation, masters man does not yield to argument, but must be attacked by violence to compel men to good. So, evidently, for exhortation to have an effect on anyone, there must necessarily preexist habituation by which man may acquire the proper disposition to virtue so that he can love the honorable good and hate what is dishonorable.

2148. Then, at but it is difficult (1179b31), he shows that legislation is required for virtuous habituation.

First, he shows that all men become virtuous by means of law.

Second, at as we have stated (1180a14; [2153]), he shows that this cannot be done properly without law.

He discusses the first point in a twofold manner.

First, discloses his proposition.

Second, at for this reason (1180a5; [2151]), he presents evidence for it.

On the first point, he does two things.

First, he explains his proposition about the young;

second, at it is not enough (1180a1; [2150]), about others.

He says first that it is difficult for anyone to be guided from his youth to virtue according to good customs unless he is reared under excellent laws by which a kind of necessity impels a man to good.

2149. To live a temperate and a hard life by refraining from pleasures and by not abandoning the good on account of labors and pain is unattractive to many, especially to young men who are prone to pleasures, as we have indicated in book 7 [1531]. For this reason, the rearing of children and their activities must be regulated by good laws; thus they will be forced, as it were, to become accustomed to good things, which will not be distasteful after the habit has been formed, but pleasant.

2150. At it is not enough (1180a1), he shows that others too need legislation. He says that it is not enough for young men to be reared under good laws and to be well taken care of, but even more, adults must discover honorable ways to act and become accustomed to them. For this reason, we need laws not only in the beginning, when someone is growing to manhood, but generally throughout man’s entire life. Many indeed there are who obey by necessity or force instead of persuasion; they pay more attention to deprivation—that is, the hurt they receive from punishment—than to what is honorable.

2151. Next, at for this reason (1180a5), he presents some evidence for his proposition. He says that, since the restraint induced by law is required for the virtuous life of man, some legislators think that man must be summoned to virtue in this way: the virtuous, who of their own free will comply with what is honorable, should be aroused to good by means of preexisting customs, by showing the goodness of what is proposed. But the insubordinate and the degenerate are allotted physical punishments like beatings and other chastisements, censure, and loss of their possessions. However, the absolutely incurable are exterminated—the thief, for instance, is hanged.

2152. It is this way because the virtuous man, who adjusts his life to the good, heeds the mere counsel by which good is proposed to him. But the evil man who seeks pleasure ought to be punished by pain or sorrow like a beast of burden—the ass is driven by lashes. Hence, they say, those pains should be inflicted that are directly contrary to cherished pleasures: for example, a drunkard should be forced to drink only water.

2153. Then, at as we have stated (1180a14), he shows that law is necessary to make men good for two reasons. The first is that the man who is going to become virtuous must have careful rearing and good customs, and afterward he should live by a moral code so that he refrains from evil either by his own will or even by coercion contrary to his will. This is possible only when a man’s life is directed by some intellect that has both the right order conducive to good and the firmness—that is, the coercive power—to compel the unwilling. Certainly, the coercive power is not contained in the precept of a father, nor does it belong to any other counselor who is not a ruler or a person in authority. But the law includes coercive power, inasmuch as it is promulgated by the ruler or prince; likewise, it is an instruction issuing from prudence and reason that gives guidance toward the good. Therefore, law is obviously necessary to make men virtuous.

2154. He gives the second reason at some men (1180a22), saying that people willing to oppose the inclinations of others are hated by their opponent, even when the opposition is just; they are considered to act from a malicious zeal. But the law commanding good deeds is not irksome—that is, burdensome, or odious—because it is proposed in a general way. Therefore, the conclusion stands that law is necessary to make men virtuous.