Lecture 10 — Happiness, an Activity According to the Highest Virtue

If happiness is an activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest virtue, and this will be the virtue of the best part in us. Whether this part be the intellect or something else that seems to rule and control us by nature and to understand noble and divine things, or whether it be itself divine or the most divine element in us, the activity of this part in accordance with its proper virtue will constitute perfect happiness. [2080]

Now we have already said that this activity is contemplative—a conclusion in harmony both with our previous discussion and with the truth. [2086]

For contemplation is the highest operation, since the intellect is the best element in us and the objects of the intellect are the best of the things that can be known. [2087]

It is also most continuous: we can contemplate truth more continuously than we can carry on any other activity. [2088]

Again, we think that pleasure is necessarily mingled with happiness. But the most delightful of all activities in accordance with virtue is admittedly activity in accordance with wisdom. For, philosophy, or the pursuit of wisdom, offers pleasures marvelous both in purity and in permanence, and it is reasonable that those who have attained the truth will spend their life more pleasantly than those who are occupied in pursuing the truth. [2090]

Then too, the quality of self-sufficiency will be found especially in contemplation. For, the philosopher indeed needs the necessaries of life no less than the just man and other virtuous men do. However, when the necessities have been provided, the just man still needs people toward whom and with whose aid he may act justly. The same is true of the temperate man and the brave man and so on. But the philosopher can contemplate by himself, and the more so, the wiser he is. While it is perhaps better for him to have fellow workers, nevertheless he is the most self-sufficient. [2093]

Moreover, this activity would seem to be loved for its own sake, for nothing is produced by it apart from the act of contemplation. On the other hand, we acquire from practical activities a greater or less benefit apart from the action itself. [2097]

2080. If happiness is an activity. Now that the Philosopher has shown that happiness is an activity in accordance with virtue, he begins here to show which virtue this activity follows.

First, in general;

second, at **now we have **(1177a17; [2086]), in particular.

He states first that, since happiness is an activity in keeping with virtue—as explained also in book 1 [119, 124, 128, 131, 151, 160]—we reasonably deduce that happiness is an activity in accordance with the highest virtue. For it was shown in book 1 [65, 67, 128, 169, 171] that happiness is the best of all human goods as the goal of them all. Likewise, since the better activity flows from the better faculty—as was just stated [2078]—logically the best activity of man will be the activity of the part that is best in him. The truth of the matter is that the best part of man is his intellect.

2081. But, as some have thought differently on this point and there is no place here to discuss such matters, he leaves the question in doubt for the present: is the intellect or something else best in man? However, he does offer some evidence from which we can conclude that the intellect is the best of us.

2082. First, he offers a comparison with inferior things that the intellect rules and controls by reason of its superiority. Certainly, the intellect or reason rules the irascible and concupiscible appetites in presiding over them by a quasi-political power, though they can of course resist reason to some extent. On the other hand, the reason controls the physical members, which obey its command blindly without contradiction. Therefore, the reason or intellect governs the body as a slave by a despotic power, as pointed out in Politics 1. (Politics 1.5.1254b4; see Aquinas, In I pol., lec. 3, n. 64.)

2083. Second, he offers some indications of the intellect’s superiority by comparison with higher or divine things, to which the intellect is compared in a twofold manner.

The first is by a special relation to these objects: only the intellect understands things that are essentially noble or divine.

Second, the human intellect is compared to divine things by a natural affinity for them—in a different fashion corresponding to the knowledge of different objects.

2084. Some philosophers held that the intellect is something imperishable and separate; in their system, the intellect would be a divine thing, for we call those beings divine that are imperishable and separate. Others, like Aristotle, considered the intellect a part of the soul, and in this view, the intellect is not something divine by itself, but the most divine of all the things in us. This is so because of its greater agreement with the separated substances, inasmuch as its activity exists without a bodily organ.

2085. But whatever way the intellect may be constituted, in keeping with what has been said, happiness is necessarily an activity of this best element in accordance with the virtue proper to it. For, the perfect activity required for happiness can come only from a power perfected by a habit that is the power’s virtue making the activity good.

2086. Then, at now we have (1177a17), he shows in particular the activity of what virtue constitutes happiness.

He makes two points here.

First, he shows that perfect happiness consists in the activity of contemplative virtue.

Second, at but, being man, (1178b33 (lec. 13).) he connects perfect happiness with external things.

He discusses the first point from two aspects.

First, he shows that perfect happiness consists in the activity of contemplation.

Second, at but life (1178a8; [2111]), he prefers this happiness to that which consists in action.

He treats the first point in a twofold manner.

First, he shows that happiness consists in contemplative activity.

Second, at such a life (1177b26; [2105]), he shows how happiness is related to man.

He handles the first point in two ways.

First, he states his intention. From the previous discussion in book 6 [1190], contemplative activity obviously belongs to the intellect in accordance with its proper virtue, that is, principally in accord with wisdom, which includes understanding and science. And that happiness consists in such activity seems in harmony with our discussions on happiness in the first book [118–30] and with truth itself.

2087. Next, at for contemplation (1177a19), he proves his statement by six arguments.

The first is that happiness is the highest activity, as was pointed out before [2080]. But the highest of human activities is contemplation of truth, and this is evident from the two reasons by which we judge the excellence of activity.

It is evident first on the part of the faculty that is the principle of the activity. Thus, this activity is obviously the highest, as the intellect is also the best element in us, as explained before [2080–85].

Second, it is evident on the part of the object determining the species of the activity. Here, too, this activity is the highest, for among the objects that can be known, the supra-sensible—especially the divine—are the highest. And so it is in the contemplation of these objects that the perfect happiness of man consists.

2088. He offers the second argument at it is also (1177a21). As shown in book 1 [129], happiness is especially continuous and lasting. But the most continuous of all human activities is the contemplation of truth. For, it is clear that man can persevere in the contemplation of truth more continuously than in any other activity.

2089. The reason for this is that interruption of our activity is necessary, for we are incapable of laboring without a break. Now, distress and weariness come about in our labors from the passibility of the body, which is changed and removed from its natural condition. Since the intellect uses the body very little in operating, it follows that its activity is only slightly affected by toil and fatigue. And there would be none of this if the intellect did not need the phantasms existing in the organs of the body. Thus, it is clear that happiness is found most of all in the contemplation of truth because of its freedom from labor.

2090. He presents the third argument, at again, we think, by observing that we commonly suppose that pleasure is associated with happiness, as was indicated in book 1 [129]. But the most delightful of all virtuous activities is the contemplation of wisdom—an evident fact conceded by everyone. For, in the contemplation of wisdom, philosophy offers pleasures marvelous both in purity and permanence. The purity of these pleasures is perceived in that they deal with immaterial objects. Their permanence is perceived in that their objects are unchangeable.

2091. A person taking pleasure in material objects incurs some impurity of affection from being engrossed with inferior things, and a person taking pleasure in changeable objects cannot have lasting enjoyment, for when the object affording pleasure is changed or destroyed, the pleasure itself ceases and sometimes becomes painful. Now, he calls the pleasures of philosophy marvelous because of the infrequency of such pleasures among men who find enjoyment in material things.

2092. Contemplation of truth is twofold.

One consists in the investigation of truth,

and the other in the reflection on the truth already discovered and known.

The second is more perfect, since it is the term and end of investigation. Consequently, greater pleasure is found in the consideration of truth already known than is found in its investigation. For this reason, he declares that people who already know the truth and have their reason perfected by its intellectual virtue spend their life more delightfully. Hence, perfect happiness does not consist in contemplation indiscriminately, but in that which corresponds to its proper virtue.

2093. He gives the fourth argument at then, too, the quality. We have shown in book 1 [107–14] that self-sufficiency—in Greek, autarchia—is necessary for happiness. But this self-sufficiency is found most of all in contemplation, for which man needs only what is commonly required for social living. For the necessaries of life are indeed needed both by the wise or contemplative man and by the just man and others possessing the moral virtues that perfect the active life.

2094. When the necessaries of life are sufficiently provided, the man who is good according to moral virtue needs still more. The just man needs other men for his activity.

First, he needs those toward whom he should act justly, since justice refers to another person—as was pointed out in book 5 [909, 934].

Second, he needs others as helpers to do justice, for in this, a man frequently requires the assistance of many people. The same argument holds for the temperate or the brave man and for other persons who are good according to moral virtue.

2095. But this is not the case with the contemplative philosopher, who can contemplate truth even if he lives by himself. The reason is that contemplation of the truth is an entirely internal activity, not proceeding externally. And, the more a person can contemplate the truth when living by himself, the more perfect he will be in wisdom. This is so because such a man knows much and has little need of help and instruction from others.

2096. This does not mean that companionship is not a help to contemplation, since two together are more effective in intellectual and practical activity, as was pointed out in book 8 [1540]. For this reason, he adds that it is better for the philosopher to have fellow workers in the study of truth because sometimes one sees what does not occur to another, who is perhaps wiser. And, although the philosopher is helped by others, nevertheless, of himself, he is more adequate than anyone for his own activity. So, it is evident that happiness is found in the activity of wisdom most of all.

2097. He states the fifth reason at moreover, this activity (1177b1; [2097]). Now happiness is so desirable in itself that it is never sought for the sake of anything else, as explained in the book 1. But this is evident only in the contemplation of wisdom, which is loved for itself and not for something else. In fact, the contemplation of truth adds nothing to a man apart from itself, but external activity secures for him a greater or lesser benefit beyond the action, for example, honor or favor with others. This is not acquired by the philosopher from his contemplation except incidentally, inasmuch as he communicates to others the truth contemplated—something that is now a part of external activity. Therefore, it is obvious that happiness consists in contemplation most of all.