Lecture 15 — Man Must be Capable of Legislating

Only in Sparta and a few other states does the lawmaker seem to have considered the questions of education and modes of conduct. For, matters of this kind are neglected in most states, and each man lives as he pleases, dealing with wives and children as the Cyclopes do. (Homer, Odyssey 9.114.) Therefore, it seems best that there be strict public supervision and that we should be able to carry it out. Since men neglect this as a common duty, it seems fitting that each man should do something to help his children and friends become virtuous; or at least select the means for it. Apparently, this can best be done, judging by the preceding statements, if a man becomes a legislator. [2155]

Public supervision is obviously done in accordance with law; and good supervision is achieved by good laws. It makes no difference whether the laws are written or not, nor whether they instruct one or many, any more than it does in music, gymnastics, or other skills. In fact, public laws and customs have the same place in states as paternal precepts and customs have in families. In the latter case, supervision is even more effective by reason of relationship and benefits conferred, for children first love their parents and readily obey them out of natural affection. [2157]

Furthermore, instruction for general use varies according to each case: in the art of medicine, for instance, fast and rest are usually beneficial to people running a fever, but perhaps not for a particular patient. So, in athletic contests, an athlete presumably does not use the same plan of battle against every opponent. Thus, it would seem that individual attention produces better results in particular cases, for everyone is more likely to get what is suitable. But a thing will be done with the greatest care if a doctor or a trainer or any other working artist knows in a universal way what is common to all men or to a particular class. This is so because the sciences are said to be—and actually are—concerned with universals. But the unscientific individual may also be successful; for nothing hinders a person from producing a cure even without universal knowledge, provided that he can diagnose the symptoms in each case from experience. Thus, people seem to be skillful in doctoring themselves but are unable to help others. Nevertheless, if a man wishes to become an artist or a theoretician, he must have recourse to the universal and know it in some measure; for the sciences deal with the universal, as we have indicated previously. Likewise, the man who wants to make people—either a few or many—better by his supervision must try to become a legislator, if it is true that we are made virtuous by means of laws. The reason is that the ability to dispose any individual adequately is not possessed by everyone, but if anyone can do it, it is the man who knows scientifically. This is evident in the medical art and in other fields where prudence and supervision are employed. [2160]

2155. Only in Sparta and a few other states. After the Philosopher has shown that legislation is necessary to make men virtuous, he now shows that a man should be a maker of laws.

First, he indicates his intention.

Second, at **public supervision **(1180a34; [2157]), he proves his proposal.

He says first that, as was just pointed out [2148–54], legislation is needed for education and the activities of men; nevertheless, only in Sparta and a few other states does the legislator seem to have paid attention to the legal regulation of the education of children and to the established modes of conduct. But matters of this kind are neglected in most states where each man lives as he pleases dealing with his children and wife as he wishes, like the Cyclopes—certain barbarous tribes who are not accustomed to laws. Therefore, it is best that there be strict supervision by public authority over the education of children and the virtuous activities of the citizens and that man be so instructed to be able to do this properly.

2156. But men commonly neglect this duty, because it is plain they show no public concern for it. Hence, it seems fitting that each private person do something to help his children and friends to become virtuous, or if he cannot, at least he should select the means to make this possible. Apparently, it can best be done, according to the preceding statements, if a man becomes a legislator, that is, if he acquires the skill to be able to make good laws. Thus, to be a legislator pertains principally to a public person, but secondarily also to a private person.

2157. Next, at public supervision (1180a34), he proves his proposal by two arguments.

He says first that general supervision, as it is exercised by public officials whose function is to frame laws, obviously is done in accordance with law; thus the supervision is exercised over some people inasmuch as laws are made for them. But good supervision is properly achieved by means of good laws.

2158. It makes no difference for our proposal whether this is done by means of written or unwritten laws, or by laws instructing one or many. As is evident also in music, gymnastics, and other skills, it does not matter in the present connection whether instruction is imparted in writing or not; for writing is used to keep information for the future. Neither does it matter whether instruction in such subjects is offered to one or many. Therefore, it seems to come to the same thing that a father of a family should instruct his son or a few domestics by a verbal or written admonition and that a prince should make a law in writing to govern all the people of the state. In fact, public laws and customs introduced by rulers hold the same place in states as do paternal precepts and customs introduced by parents in families.

2159. This is the only difference: a father’s precept does not have full coercive power like the royal decree, as was noted previously [2153]. Consequently, he shows that, to some extent, this is more suitable to a private than a public person by reason of relationship and benefits, because of which children love their parents and are readily obedient out of natural affection. So, then, although the royal decree is more powerful by way of fear, nevertheless the paternal precept is more powerful by way of love—a way that is more efficacious with people not totally depraved.

2160. At furthermore, instruction (1180b7), he gives the second argument. He says that instruction that is generally useful varies for particular cases. Thus, it is evident in the art of medicine that a fast and rest are usually beneficial to people running a fever, such that nature will not be burdened with an abundance of food and heat will not be generated by activity. But perhaps this is not advisable for a particular fever-stricken patient because a fast might weaken him too much, and perhaps the patient might need activity to dissolve the gross humors. The same thing is obvious in athletic contests, because the athlete does not use the identical plan of battle against every opponent. In this way, the operation of each practical art will seem more certain if special attention is paid to each individual; thus everyone will better acquire what is suitable to him.

2161. However, a thing will be done with the greatest care if a doctor or a trainer or any other artisan knows in a universal way what is common to all men or what will benefit all men of a particular class, such as the irascible. This is so because science is said to be, and actually is, concerned with universals. Therefore, he who proceeds from universal knowledge can best care for an individual case. Nevertheless, this is not the only way a healer can produce a cure; nothing hinders him from curing a particular patient without universal knowledge, provided that, from experience, he can properly diagnose the symptoms of each patient. Thus, some people seem to be skillful in doctoring themselves because they know their own symptoms from experience, but they are not qualified to help others.

2162. Although a man can operate well in a particular situation without universal knowledge, nevertheless, if he wishes to become an artist, he must strive for generalized knowledge, that he may know the universal in some measure. This is likewise necessary for one who wishes to be a speculative scientist like the geometrician or the physicist. It was indicated before [1213, 1352] that the sciences deal with this matter, namely, universals. This is the case too with men who exercise supervision to make people virtuous.

2163. It is possible that someone, without the art and science by which the universal is known can make this or that man virtuous because of the experience he has had with himself. However, if someone wants to make people—either a few or many—better by his supervision, he ought to try to acquire a universal knowledge of the things that make a man virtuous; in other words, he ought to try to become a legislator so that he knows the art by which good laws are framed, since we are made virtuous by means of laws, as was pointed out previously [2153–54]. The reason is that the ability to prepare properly any good disposition in man by introducing it and by removing its opposite—for example, health and sickness, virtue and vice—does not belong to everyone, but only to the man who knows scientifically. This is evident in the medical art and in all other fields where supervision and human prudence are employed. In all these, a man must not only know particulars, but have a knowledge of universals, because some things may happen that are included under universal knowledge but not under the knowledge of individual cases.