Prologue

Sirach 24:30–31

I, Wisdom, have poured out rivers; I flow down like a course of water without measure; I, like the channel of a river, and like an aqueduct, went out from paradise. I have said, ‘I will water the garden of plants, and I will inebriate the fruit of my field.’ (The Revised Standard Version (RSV) has no verses corresponding to the first two clauses; it reads as follows: I went forth like a canal from a river, and like a water channel into a garden. I said, ‘I will water my orchard and drench my garden plot.’ All subsequent quotations of Scripture will follow the RSV unless the sense of the Latin text deviates significantly.)

Among the many views that have been presented by diverse people about wisdom—namely, what true wisdom is—the Apostle has offered one that is particularly strong and true, saying, Christ, the power of God and wisdom of God . . . whom God made our wisdom (1 Cor 1:24, 30). But this was not said in the sense that the Son alone is wisdom—for the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one wisdom, just as they are one essence. Rather, this was said because wisdom is appropriated to the Son in a certain specific way, because the works of wisdom seem especially to harmonize with the properties of the Son. For through God’s wisdom the hidden things of the divine are made manifest, the works of created things are produced, and not only produced but even restored and perfected—I mean by that perfection whereby each thing is called “perfect” insofar as it attains its own proper end. But that the manifestation of divine things pertains to God’s wisdom is clear from the fact that God himself through his own wisdom fully and perfectly knows his very self. Hence, if we know anything about him, it must be derived from him, since everything imperfect draws its origin from the perfect. Hence, it is said, who will know your understanding unless you give wisdom? (Wis 9:17). But this manifestation is found to be accomplished in a specific way by the Son, for he is the Word of the Father, according to what is said in John 1. Hence, the manifestation of the Father speaking to himself is fitting also for that of the whole Trinity. Hence, it is said, no one knows the Father except the Son and him to whom the Son has wished to reveal him (Matt 11:27); and no one has ever seen God; the only Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has made him known (John 1:18).

Therefore, it is correctly said in the person of the Son: I, Wisdom, have poured out rivers. These rivers I understand as the flowing of the eternal procession by which in an ineffable way the Son proceeds from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from both. Formerly, these rivers were hidden and in a way poured together in the likenesses of created things, and also in the enigmas of the Scriptures, such that hardly any wise men held by faith the mystery of the Trinity. The Son of God has come and in a way poured out the blended rivers, by making public the name of the Trinity: teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit (Matt 28:19). Hence, he has searched the depths of rivers and brought forth hidden things into the light (Job 28:11). (RSV: he binds up the streams so that they do not trickle, and the thing that is hid he brings forth to light.) And this touches on the subject matter of Book I.

The second thing that pertains to God’s wisdom is the production of created things. For he himself has not only a speculative but also an operative wisdom about created things, just as the artisan has about the works of art. Hence, in wisdom hast thou made them all (Ps 104 [103]:24). And Wisdom itself says, with him I was forming all things (Prov 8:30). (RSV: then I was beside him, like a master workman.) This, too, is found attributed to the Son in a special way, insofar as he is the image of the invisible God, according to whose form all things have been formed. Hence, he is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation, for in him all things were created (Col 1:15–16), and all things were made through him (John 1:3). Therefore, it is correctly said in the person of the Son, I flow down like a course of water without measure. In this is noted both the order of creation and its mode.

Its order is indicated because just as a course is derived from a river, so too the temporal procession of created things is derived from the eternal procession of the persons. Hence, it is said, he spoke, and they were created (Ps 148:5). (RSV reads commanded instead of spoke.) He begot the Word, in whom it was that they were to come to be, according to Augustine. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 1, ch. 2, para. 6; bk. 2, ch. 6, para. 14 (Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum [CSEL] 28:1; Patrologia Latina [PL] 34:248, 268).) For that which is first is always the cause of the things that are after, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Metaphysics, bk. 2, ch. 1, 993b25‒30.) Hence, the first procession is the cause and reason for every subsequent procession.

But the mode of creation is indicated in reference to two things: first, on the side of the one creating, who, although he fills all things, nevertheless is not commensurate with anything—which is indicated by the fact that it is said, without measure; second, on the side of the thing created, since just as a rivulet proceeds outside of the channel of a river, so too what is created proceeds from God outside of the unity of his essence, within which, as within the channel, the flow of the persons is contained. And this indicates the subject matter of Book II.

The third thing that pertains to God’s wisdom is the restoration of his works. For the one who made something is the one who is appropriate for renewing it. Hence, it befits the things created through wisdom to be renewed through wisdom. Hence, it is said, thus the paths of those on earth were set right, and men were taught what pleases thee, and were saved by wisdom (Wis 9:18). But this renewal was brought about in a special way through the Son, insofar as he himself was made man. After man’s state had been restored, he in a certain way renewed all things that were made on account of man. Hence, through him to reconcile to himself all things, whether on earth or in heaven (Col 1:20). Correctly, therefore, it is said in the person of the Son himself, I, like the channel of a river, and like an aqueduct, went out from paradise. This paradise is the glory of God the Father, from which he went out into the valley of our misery—not that he lost this glory, but because he hid it. Hence, I came from the Father and have come into the world (John 16:28).

And with respect to this coming forth, two things are noted—namely, the mode and the fruit. For the channel of a river is very rapid; hence, it designates the mode by which Christ, as by a certain impetus of love, completed the mystery of our renewal. Hence, he will come like a rushing stream, which the wind of the Lord drives (Isa 59:19). But the fruit is designated from the fact that it says, like an aqueduct. For just as aqueducts are led separately from a single font to render the land fertile, so too from Christ flowed forth the kinds of diverse graces for sowing the Church. In this sense, it is said, and his gifts were that some should be apostles, some prophets, some evangelists, some pastors and teachers, for the perfecting of the saints, for the work of ministry, for building up the body of Christ (Eph 4:11–12). And this touches on the subject matter of Book III, the first part of which treats the mysteries of our renewal, and the second treats the graces gathered to us through Christ.

The fourth thing that pertains to God’s wisdom is the perfection by which things are preserved in their end. For if the end is removed, emptiness remains, which wisdom does not suffer to coexist with herself. Hence, it is said that wisdom reaches mightily from one end of the earth to the other, and she orders all things sweetly (Wis 8:1). But each thing has been ordered when it has been placed at the end which it naturally desires. And this also pertains to the Son in a special way, the one who, since he is the true and natural Son of God, has led us into the glory of the Father’s inheritance. Hence, it was fitting that he, for whom and by whom all things exist, in bringing many sons to glory (Heb 2:10). Hence, it is correctly said, I said: I will water the garden of plants. For preparation is required for the attainment of an end so that thereby everything that does not befit the end may be removed. So too Christ, so that he might lead us into the end that is eternal glory, has prepared the remedies of the sacraments, whereby the wound of sin is cleansed from us.

Hence, two things are indicated in the aforementioned words: namely, the preparation that is through the sacraments, and the admission into glory.

The first is indicated through the fact that it is said, I will water the garden of plants. For this garden is the Church, about which it is said, a garden locked is my sister, my bride (Song 4:12). In this garden are diverse plants, according to the diverse orders of the saints, all of whom the hand of the Almighty has planted. This garden is watered by Christ with the streams of the sacraments, which flowed out from his side. Hence, in praise of the beauty of the Church, it is said, how fair are your tents, O Jacob (Num 24:5). And then it continues, like gardens beside a river (Num 24:6). And for this reason, too, the ministers of the Church who dispense the sacraments are called “waterers”: I planted, Apollos watered (1 Cor 3:6).

But the admission into glory is indicated by the fact that it continues, and I will inebriate the fruit of my offspring. Christ’s own offspring (Aquinas seems to have divergent Latin texts for Sirach; previously, the text read pratus mei (“my field”), whereas here it reads partus mei (“my offspring”).) are the Church’s faithful, whom he has brought forth by his own labor, as though its mother. About this offspring it is said, shall I, who cause others to bring forth, not myself bring forth? says the Lord (Isa 66:9). But the fruits of this offspring are the saints who are in glory. About this fruit it is said, let my beloved come to his garden, and eat its choicest fruits (Song 4:16). He inebriates these with the most abundant enjoyment of him. About this enjoyment and inebriation it is said, they will be inebriated by the fertility of your house (Ps 36:8 [35:9]). (RSV: they feast on the abundance of thy house.) And it is called “inebriation” because it exceeds every measure of reason and desire. Hence, eye has not seen, O God, beside you, the things which you have prepared for those waiting for you (Isa 64:4).

And this touches on the subject matter of Book IV: in the first part of which the sacraments are treated; in the second, the glory of the resurrection. And so from the aforementioned words the aim of the Book of Sentences is clear.

Question 1

Sacred Doctrine

To make clear this Sacred Doctrine, which is being handed on in this book, five things are asked:

first, as regards the need for it;

second, supposing that it is necessary, whether it is one or many;

third, if it is one, whether it is practical or speculative; and if speculative, whether it is wisdom, science, or understanding;

fourth, as regards its subject;

and fifth, as regards its mode.

Article 1

Whether any doctrine other than the natural disciplines is necessary for man

We proceed to the first as follows. (Parallel texts: Summa theologiae (ST) I, q. 1, a. 1; I-II, q. 2, a. 3; Summa contra Gentiles (SCG) I, cc. 4‒5; Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 14, a. 10.) It appears that no other doctrine is necessary for man besides the natural disciplines.

Obj. 1: For as Dionysius says in his letter to Polycarp, philosophy is the knowledge of things that exist. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Epistle 7, “To Polycarp,” para. 2 (Patrologia Graeca [PG] 3:1079).) And it is clear that about every genus of existing things there is a consideration in philosophy, since it runs through each thing. For it is about the Creator and things created, and both about things that come from the activity of nature and things that come from our own activity. But no doctrine can be about things that do not exist, since there is no science of a non-being. Therefore there should be no doctrine besides the natural disciplines.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every doctrine is for the sake of a perfection, either one relative to the intellect, such as that of speculative doctrine, or for one relative to an affection leading to action, such as that of practical doctrine. But both of these are completed by philosophy, since the intellect is perfected through the demonstrative sciences, and the affections through the moral sciences. Therefore no other doctrine is needed.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, whatever things can be known by a natural understanding based on the principles of reason are either handed down in philosophy or can be discovered through the principles of philosophy. But the knowledge that one can have from natural understanding is sufficient for man’s perfection. Therefore no doctrine is needed besides philosophy. Here is proof of the middle premise: what attains its own perfection through itself is nobler than what cannot attain it through itself. But the other animals and created things which lack senses attain their own ends from merely natural powers, although not without God, who works all things in all things. Therefore, man too, since he is nobler than they, can have knowledge sufficient for his perfection through his natural understanding.

On the contrary, without faith it is impossible to please God (Heb 11:6). Now, pleasing God is necessary to the highest degree. Therefore, since philosophy cannot ascend to the things that belong to faith, there must be some doctrine that proceeds from the principles of the faith.

Furthermore, an effect that is not proportionate to its cause leads one imperfectly to knowing its cause. Now, everything created is such an effect relative to its Creator, from whom it is infinitely distant. Therefore such a thing leads one imperfectly to the knowledge of its Creator. Therefore, since philosophy proceeds only through accounts drawn from created things, it is insufficient for causing knowledge of God. Therefore there must be some other, higher doctrine, one that proceeds through revelation and supplies for philosophy’s defect.

I answer that, to make this matter evident, one should note that all who have rightly judged this matter have asserted that the end of human life is the contemplation of God. Now, the contemplation of God is of two sorts.

One occurs through created things, which is an imperfect contemplation, for the reason already stated; in this contemplation the Philosopher placed contemplative happiness, which is the happiness of the earthly path. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.7, 1177a17, 1178a1‒4.) And to this happiness is ordered all philosophical knowledge, which proceeds from the accounts of created things.

The other contemplation of God is that whereby he is seen immediately, through his own essence, and this, which will occur in the heavenly homeland and is possible for man according to the supposition of faith, is perfect. Hence it is necessary, inasmuch as things that are for the sake of the end are proportioned to their end, that to the extent that man is led by the hand toward that contemplation, in the state of the earthly path, this will occur through a knowledge not taken from created things, but immediately inspired by a divine light. And this is the doctrine of theology.

From this we can draw two conclusions. One is that this science rules all the other sciences as the principal science. The other is that it itself makes use of all the other sciences in their compliance to it, as though they were its vassals. This is clear in all the ordered arts, where the end of one is subservient to the end of another. For example, the end of the art of ointments, which is the making of medicines, is ordered to the end of medicine, which is health; this is why the physician rules the ointment-maker and uses the ointments he makes for his own end. So too, since the end of the whole of philosophy is beneath the end of theology, and is ordered to it, theology ought to rule all the other sciences and use the things that are treated in them.

Reply Obj. 1: Although philosophy considers existing things according to the accounts taken from created things, still there must be another doctrine that would consider existing things according to accounts received from the inspiration of the divine light.

Reply Obj. 2: The solution to this is clear, for philosophy suffices for the perfection of the intellect only according to natural knowledge, and that of the affections only according to acquired virtue. And this is why there must be another science whereby the intellect is perfected as regards infused knowledge and the affections as regards gratuitous love.

Reply Obj. 3: In things that admit of equal goodness as regards their end, the proposition introduced above holds true—that is, that it is nobler than what cannot reach its end through itself. But what receives a perfect goodness by means of more aids and motions is nobler than what receives an imperfect goodness through fewer aids, or through itself, as the Philosopher himself says. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.12, 292a22‒27; cf. Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens, bk. 2, lect. 18, n. 459.) And this is how man stands relative to other created things, he who was made for participation in the divine glory itself.

Article 2

Whether there should be one doctrine only besides the natural disciplines

As regards the second, we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.1.3, 4.) It appears there should not be only one doctrine besides the natural doctrines.

Obj. 1: For about all concerning which man is instructed through the accounts of created things, he can also be instructed through divine accounts. But there are many sciences based on the accounts of created things, sciences differing in both genus and species, such as moral science, natural science, and so on. Therefore, there should be many sciences based on divine accounts.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, one science is about one genus, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.6, 75a30; 1.7, 75a38‒b20.) But God and what is created, which are treated in divine doctrine, are not traced back to one genus, whether one univocally or analogically. Therefore the divine science is not one. Here is proof of the middle premise: whatever things agree in one genus, whether univocally or analogically, participate in the same thing, either as prior and posterior, just as substance and accidents do in the account of being, or as equals, as horse and cow do in the account of animal. But God and what is created do not participate in any same thing, since then that thing would be simpler and prior to both of them. Therefore in no way are they traced back to the same genus.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, things that arise from our activity, like the works of the virtues, and things that come from the work of nature are not traced back to the same science. Rather, the one pertains to moral science and the other to natural science. Yet the divine science, by treating the virtues and commandments, considers things that arise from our activity, but it also treats things that do not come from our activity, like the angels and other created things. Therefore it seems not to be one science.

On the contrary, whatever things agree in one account can pertain to one science; this is also why all things pertain to metaphysics, insofar as they agree in the account of being. But the divine science considers things through the divine account, which embraces all things, for all things are from him and for him. Therefore being one, it can be about diverse things.

Furthermore, things that belong to diverse sciences are considered distinctly and in different books. But in Sacred Scripture one finds mixed together in one book sometimes consideration of moral action, sometimes consideration of the Creator, and sometimes of created things, as is quite clear in all its books. Therefore this does not diversify the science.

I answer that one should note that insofar as knowledge is higher, to that degree is it more united and it extends to many; this is why God’s understanding, which is the highest, holds knowledge of all things distinctly through one, which is God himself. And so too, since this science is the highest, and has its efficacy through the very light of divine inspiration, remaining one and not many, holds a consideration of diverse things. And it does not do this merely with a common consideration, like metaphysics, which considers all things insofar as they are beings, without descending to the proper knowledge of moral matters or natural things—for the account of being, since it becomes diverse in diverse things, is not sufficient for the specific knowledge of things. But the divine light, while remaining one itself, has efficacy to make such things manifest, as blessed Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 1, para. 1 (PG 3:119).)

Reply Obj. 1: The divine light, from which the certainty of this science arises, is capable of manifesting the many things that are treated in the diverse sciences within philosophy, which sciences proceed from the accounts of those things to the knowledge of those things. And, therefore, it is not necessary that this science be multiplied.

Reply Obj. 2: The Creator and the created are traced back to something one not with a community of univocation, but one with a community of analogy. Now, such a community can occur in two ways: either due to certain things participating in something, one as prior and posterior, as potency and act participate in the account of being, and likewise substance and accident; or due to one thing receiving its existence and account from the other, and this is the analogy of what is created with its Creator. For what is created has existence only insofar as it comes from the first being, which is why it is called a being only insofar as it is an imitation of the first being. And so it is with wisdom and all other things that are said of what is created.

Reply Obj. 3: The things that come from our own actions and those that come from nature, considered according to their own proper accounts, do not fall in the same doctrine. Nonetheless, a single science can consider both, which has its certitude through the divine light that is capable of knowing both. Yet it can be said that the virtue that the theologian considers does not come from our own activity; rather, God works it in us without us, according to Augustine. (Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, bk. 2, ch. 19 (Corpus Christianorum Series Latina [CCSL] 29; PL 32:1267).)

Article 3

Whether this doctrine is practical or speculative; whether it is science; whether it is wisdom

Quaestiuncula 1

We proceed to the third as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.1.4.) It appears that this doctrine is practical.

Obj. 1: For the end of a practical doctrine is some activity, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.1, 993b20‒22.) But this doctrine, which belongs to faith, is principally for the sake of acting well; this is why James 2:26 says, faith apart from works is dead, and Psalm 111 [110]:10, fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom; a good understanding have all those who practice it. Therefore it appears that it is practical.

On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.2, 982a15.) that the noblest of the sciences is for its own sake. Now, the practical sciences are not for their own sakes, but rather are for the sake of an activity. Therefore, since this is noblest of the sciences, it will not be practical.

Furthermore, a practical science considers only the things that arise from our activity. But this doctrine considers the angels and other created things that are not the result of our actions. Therefore it is not practical but speculative.

Quaestiuncula 2

Further, one asks whether it is a science, and it appears that it is not. (Parallel texts: ST I.1.2; II‒II.1.5; On Truth, q. 14, a. 9, ad 3; Commentary on Boethius’s On the Trinity, q. 2, a. 2.)

Obj. 1: For no science is about particular things, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.4, 73b25‒74a3; 1.31, 87b34‒38.) But Sacred Scripture treats the deeds of particular men, like Abraham, Isaac, and the others. Therefore it is not a science.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every science proceeds from principles known through themselves that are manifest to anyone. Now, this science proceeds from things that can be believed but which are not conceded by all. Therefore it is not a science.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, in every science a certain habit is acquired through induced accounts. But in this doctrine no habit is acquired, since faith, on which this entire doctrine reposes, is not an acquired habit; rather, it is an infused habit. Therefore it is not a science.

On the contrary, according to Augustine, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 13, ch. 19 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1035‒36).) theology is the science about things that pertain to man’s salvation. Therefore it is a science.

Quaestiuncula 3

Moreover, one asks whether it is wisdom, and it seems that it is not. (Parallel texts: Commentary on the Sentences, bk. 2 (In II Sent.), prol.; ST I.1.6; SCG II.4.)

Obj. 1: For, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.1, 981a27‒b9.) the wise man should be the most certain about the causes. But in this doctrine there is no one who is most certain, since faith, on which this doctrine rests, is less than science and more than opinion. Therefore it is not wisdom.

On the contrary, among the mature we do impart wisdom (1 Cor 2:6). Therefore, since he himself taught this doctrine and is speaking about it, it appears that it is wisdom.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that this science, although it is one, is nevertheless perfect and even sufficient for every human perfection, on account of the efficacy of the divine light, as is clear from things said before. Whence it perfects man both in right activity and as regards contemplation of truth, and this is why in a certain respect it is practical and also speculative. Now, because every science should be weighed principally from its end, but the ultimate end of this doctrine is the contemplation of the first truth in the heavenly fatherland, it is therefore principally speculative. And since there are three habits of the speculative intellect—namely, wisdom, science, and understanding (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.7, 1141a20.)—we say that it is wisdom, because it considers the highest causes and is as the head, and chief, and what orders all the sciences. And it more than even metaphysics should be called wisdom, since it considers the highest causes through the mode of the causes themselves; for it does so through an inspiration immediately received from God, whereas metaphysics considers the highest causes through accounts taken from created things. Whence this doctrine even more than metaphysics should be called divine, since it is divine both as regards its subject and as regards its mode of receiving it, whereas metaphysics is called divine only as regards its subject. But wisdom, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.7 and 8.) considers both conclusions and principles, and therefore wisdom is science and understanding, since science is about conclusions and understanding is about principles.

Reply Obj. 1: Activity is not the ultimate thing intended in this science, but rather more the contemplation of the first truth in the heavenly fatherland, which contemplation we, when purified, attain due to our good actions: blessed are the pure in heart (Matt 5:8). And therefore it is more fundamentally speculative than practical.

Reply Sed Contra: We grant the other two arguments.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To the other thing asked, I say that this doctrine is a science, as was said.

Reply Obj. 1: To the fact that it is about particulars, I say that it is not about particulars insofar as they are particulars, but insofar as they are examples of things that should be done. And this is the practice even in moral science, since the actions of particular men also regard particular things, so the things that pertain to moral action are made more manifest through particular examples. Or it should be said that there are two things to consider in a science: its certitude, since not just any knowledge but only certain knowledge is called science; and the fact that the science itself is the terminus of the learning, for all the things that are found within a science are ordered to knowing.

Now, because of these two a science has two aspects: because of the first it is based on things that are necessary, since certain knowledge cannot be caused by things that are contingent; and because of the second it is based on particular principles. But this is in diverse sciences in diverse ways, since higher sciences are based on principles known through themselves, like if equals are taken from equals, the things leftover are also equal; whereas lower sciences that are subalternate to the higher ones are not based on principles known through themselves, but rather they suppose the conclusions proved in the higher sciences and use them as principles that in truth are not proved through principles known through themselves. For example, optics is about visual lines and is subalternate to geometry, from which it also supposes things that are proved about lines as lines, and through them as through principles it proves conclusions that are about lines as visual.

Now, one science is higher than another in two ways: either in the account of its subject, as geometry, which is about magnitudes, is higher than optics, which is about visual magnitudes; or in the account of the mode of knowing, and in this way theology is lower than the science that is in God. For we know imperfectly what he knows perfectly, and just as a subalternate science supposes particular things from a higher science, and it proceeds through them as through its principles, so theology supposes the articles of faith that are infallibly proved within God’s knowledge, and it believes them, and it proceeds through that to proving those further things that follow from the articles. Therefore theology is, as it were, a science subalternate to the divine science from which it takes its own principles.

Reply Obj. 2: This doctrine has for its first principles the articles of faith, which things when infused by the light of faith are known through themselves to one who has faith, just as principles naturally known to us are also implanted by the light of the agent intellect. Nor is it a wonder if they are not known by those without faith, who do not have faith’s light. For neither would the principles that are implanted naturally be known without the light of the agent intellect. And this science proceeds from such principles, while not rejecting the common principles, nor does it have a way to prove them; rather, it only defends them from those contradicting them, just as neither can an artisan prove his own principles.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as the habit of the first principles is not acquired through the other sciences but is had from one’s nature, whereas the habit of conclusions is deduced from the first principles, so too in this doctrine the habit of faith, which is the habit of its principles, is not acquired, whereas the habit of the things deduced from them, and which are valuable for their defense, is acquired.

Reply Sed Contra: We grant the other argument.

Response to Quaestiuncula 3

To what is being further asked—whether it is wisdom—I say that it is wisdom most properly, as has been said.

Reply Obj. 1: It is false that someone is not the most certain in this doctrine. For one is more faithful and more firmly assents to matters belonging to the faith than even to the first principles of reason. And the claim that faith is less than science is not speaking about infused faith, but about an acquired faith, which is an opinion strengthened by arguments. Now, the habit of these principles, that is, of the articles, is called faith, and not understanding, because these principles are above reason, and so human reason itself is not strong enough to grasp them perfectly. And thus arises a certain defective knowledge, not because of a defect in the certitude of the things known, but because of a defect of the knower. But, nevertheless, reason that has been led by the hand through faith grows thereby, such that things that can be believed, it comprehends more fully, and thereby it in a certain way understands them. Whence, in an alternative text, Isaiah 7:9 says, unless you had believed you would not have understood.

Article 4

Whether God is the subject of this science

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.1.7; Commentary on Boethius’s On the Trinity, q. 5, a. 4.) It appears that God is the subject of this science.

Obj. 1: For every science ought to be entitled by and named from its subject, whereas this science is called theology, as if to say speech about God. Therefore it appears that God is its subject.

On the contrary, Boethius says (Boethius, On the Trinity, ch. 2 (PL 64:1250).) that a simple form cannot be a subject. But God is such a form. Therefore he cannot be the subject.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to Hugh of Saint Victor, it appears that the works of our restoration are its subject. For he says that the deeds of the first condition of things are the matters of the other sciences, but the works of restoration are the matter of theology. (Hugh of Saint Victor (c. 1096–1141 AD), On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith, bk. 1, prol., ch. 2 (PL 176:183).) Therefore and so on.

On the contrary, whatever is considered in a science ought to be contained in its subject. But in theology one considers the works of creation, as is clear in Genesis 1. Therefore it appears that the works of restoration are not its subject.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it appears that things and signs are its subject. For that on which a science’s entire attention is focused is its subject. But theology’s entire attention is focused on things and signs, as the Master of the Sentences says. (Peter Lombard, Sentences, bk. 1, d. 1, ch. 1, para. 1 (Sent. I, 1.1.1).) Therefore things and signs are its subject.

On the contrary, one science should differ from another by the accounts of their subject, since every science has its own proper subject. But other sciences also consider things and signs. Therefore they are not the proper subject of this science.

I answer that a subject holds at least three relations to its science. The first is that whatever things are in the science ought to be contained under its subject. This is why those considering this condition asserted that things and signs are the subject of this science; however, some thought it was the whole of Christ, that is, the head and its members, in that whatever is treated in this science appears to be traced back to this. The second relation is that the knowledge of the subject is what is principally attended to in a science. Whence, since this science is principally for the sake of knowing God, they asserted that God is its subject. The third relation is that one science is distinguished from all the others through its subject, since sciences are divided in the same way that real things are, as is said in On the Soul 3. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.8, 431b24‒26.) And following this consideration, some asserted that the subject of this science is what can be believed. For this science differs from all others in the fact that it proceeds through the inspiration of faith. Moreover, some have said that the subject is the works of restoration because this entire science is ordered to attaining the effect of restoration.

However, if we wish to find the subject that embraces all of these things, we can say that the subject of this science is the Divine Being as knowable through inspiration. (Mandonnet notes that in ST I.1.7, Aquinas simply claims that God is the subject of this science, but there he is speaking of the formal subject, whereas here he is speaking of the material subject.) For all things that are considered in this science are either God, or from God, or related to God, as such. This is like the physician, who considers signs and causes and many things like this, insofar as they are healthy, that is, related to health in some way. Whence to the extent that something approaches closer to the true account of the divinity, it is more principally considered in this science.

Reply Obj. 1: God is its subject only as what is principally attended to and under the whose account all things within the science are considered. However, to what is objected to the contrary—that a simple form cannot be a subject—we say that this is true only of an accident. Yet a simple form can be the subject of a predicate in a proposition. And all such things can be the subject in a science, as long as that predicate can be shown to belong to it.

Reply Obj. 2: The works of restoration are not properly the subject of this science, except insofar as all things that are said in this science are ordered in some way to our restoration.

Reply Obj. 3: Things and signs, taken commonly, are not the subject of this science, but only insofar as they are certain divine things.

Article 5

Whether its mode of proceeding is by art

To the fifth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 34, q. 3, aa. 1, 2; In IV Sent., d. 21, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 1, ad 3; ST I.1.8‒10; SCG I.9; III.119; Commentary on Boethius’s On the Trinity, q. 2, aa. 3, 4; Quodlibet III, q. 14, a. 1; IV, q. 9, a. 3; VII, q. 6; Disputed Questions on the Power of God, q. 4, a. 1; Commentary on Galatians, ch. 4, lect. 7.)

Obj. 1: The mode of the noblest science should be the noblest mode. But to the degree that a mode is more artful, it is so much the nobler. Therefore, since this is the noblest science, its mode should be the most artful.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the mode of a science should be proportioned to that very science. But this science is the most one, as has been shown. (Above, in a. 2.) Therefore its mode should also be the most unified.

On the contrary, it seems that sometimes it proceeds by threatening, sometimes by commanding, and sometimes in other modes.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, there should not be one mode for the most different sciences. But the poetic art, which contains the least of the truth, differs most from this science, which is the truest. Therefore, since the former proceeds through metaphorical speech, this science’s mode should not be of this sort.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, Ambrose says, when faith is being sought, set aside arguments. (Ambrose, De Fide Libri V (Ad Gratianum Augustum), bk. 1, ch. 13 (CCSL 78; PL 16:548).) But in the sacred science faith is most of all sought. Therefore its mode should in no way be argumentative.

On the contrary, always be prepared to make a defense to any one who calls you to account for the hope that is in you (1 Pet 3:15). But it is not possible to do this without arguments. Therefore sometimes it should use arguments.

Furthermore, this fits what is said in Titus 1:9, that one should be able to give instruction in sound doctrine and also to confute those who contradict it.

I answer that the mode of any science ought to be discerned in reference to the consideration of its matter, as Boethius says, and as does the Philosopher. (Boethius, On the Trinity, bk. 1, prol. (PL 64:1247); Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.3, 1094b13.) Now, the principles of this science are received through revelation, and therefore the mode of receiving the principles themselves ought to be revelatory, on the side of the one infusing them, as in the visions of the Prophets, and spoken, on the side of the one receiving them, as is clear in the Psalms.

But besides the infused light, the habit of faith must be made distinct as regards the determinate things to be believed, coming from the teaching of the one preaching them, following what is said in Romans 10:14, how are they to believe in him of whom they have never heard? And how are they to hear without a preacher?

For just as the understanding of the principles naturally implanted in us becomes determinate through sensible things that have been received, so too the truth of the teaching of the preacher is confirmed through miracles, as is said in Mark 16:20: they went forth and preached everywhere, while the Lord worked with them and confirmed the message by the signs that attended it. For the mode of this science must also be narrative of signs, which serve to confirm the faith. And because these principles are also not proportioned to human reason according to the state of the earthly path—reason being accustomed to receiving from sensible things—therefore it is necessary that, through the likenesses of sensible things, we be led by the hand to know these things. Whence the mode of this science must be metaphorical, or symbolic, or use parables.

Now, in Sacred Scripture one advances from such principles to three things: first, to the destruction of errors, which cannot occur without arguments, so this science’s mode must sometimes be argumentative—arguing both by authorities, and even through natural reasonings and likenesses. Second, one advances to instruction about moral conduct, so in this respect its mode should be to give precepts, as is the case in the law, and threatening and promising, as in the Prophets, and narrative of examples, as in the Histories. Third, one advances to the contemplation of the truth in the questions about Sacred Scripture, so in this regard its mode must also be argumentative, which mode is especially upheld in the original works of the saints, and in this book, which is, as it were, forged from them.

And following this, one can also find four modes of interpreting Sacred Scripture. For insofar as the very truth of the faith is received, there is a historical sense. But insofar as one advances from these things to instruction about moral conduct, there is a moral sense. And moreover, insofar as one advances to the contemplation of the truth about things that belong to the path here below, there is an allegorical sense, but insofar as one advances to the contemplation of the truth about things that belong to the heavenly fatherland, there is an anagogical sense. However, one does not advance toward the destruction of errors except through the literal sense, in that the other senses are received in virtue of likenesses, and argumentation cannot be drawn from manners of speaking based on likenesses. This is why Dionysius says that symbolic theology is not argumentative. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Epistle 9, “To Titus,” para. 1 (PG 3:1103).)

Reply Obj. 1: A mode is called artful if it befits its matter. Whence the mode that is artful in geometry is not artful in ethics. And according to this, the mode of this science is artful most of all, since it befits its matter most of all.

Reply Obj. 2: Although this science is one, nonetheless it is about many things and avails for many things, according to which its modes must be multiplied, as was already made clear.

Reply Obj. 3: The poetic science is about things that, on account of their deficiency in truth, cannot be seized by reason. This is why it is necessary that reason be, as it were, seduced by certain likenesses. However, theology is about things that are above reason. And therefore the symbolic mode is common to both, since neither is proportioned to reason.

Reply Obj. 4: Arguments for proving the articles of faith are set aside. But one must use arguments for defending the faith, and for discovering the truth in questions based on the principles of the faith. So too the Apostle makes arguments: if the dead are not raised, then Christ has not been raised (1 Cor 15:16).

Division of the text of the prologue with its exposition

To this work the Master attaches a prologue that does three things.

First, he renders the reader good-willed;

second, he renders him ready to learn, at wishing to cast down the assembly of such people, which is hateful to God, and to stop up their mouths . . . we have, with God’s aid, put together with much labor and sweat a volume; (Sent. I, prol. 4.)

third, he renders him attentive, at and so this work should seem superfluous neither to the lazy, nor to the learned. (Sent. I, prol. 5.)

He renders the reader good-willed by designating the causes that moved him to compile this work, which motives show his affection for God and neighbor. Now, there are three moving causes. The first is taken from his own side, that is, his desire for progress within the Church; the second is from the side of God, that is, his promise of mercy and help; the third is on the side of his neighbor. Opposed to these, there are three causes drawing him back: the first is on his own side, that is, the defects of his mind and knowledge; second, on the side of the work, the height of the matter and the magnitude of the labor; and third, on the side of his neighbor, the contradiction of the envious. Now, of these moving causes, the first two recommend the love for God, and the third, love for neighbor; and so the prologue is divided in two: in the first, he lays out the moving causes that show love for God, and in the second, the cause that shows love for neighbor, at we were not able rightfully to resist the desires of our brethren devoted to study. (Sent. I, prol. 2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 3, prol. (CCSL 50; PL 42:869).)

Moreover, he connects the causes drawing him back to the causes that move him forward. Whence, he first notes a certain controversy about the motivating causes and the ones that draw him back. Second, he notes the victory, at zeal for the house of God overcomes it. (Sent. I, prol. 1.)

With wishing, he notes the first motivating cause, the desire to make progress; to give something to the Lord’s treasury signifies its smallness, and out of our penury and poverty touches on the first cause drawing him back, namely, a lack of knowledge. The lack of exterior substance is properly called penury, so it is extended to the lack of acquired knowledge, and poverty is properly a lack of interior substance, so it is extended to a defect of intelligence.

By saying, with the poor widow, he refers to the one described in Mark 12:41–44 and Luke 21:2–4. The repository of riches is called the treasury (gazophylacium), (Greek: γαζοφυλάκιον.) for gazae is Persian for riches, and phylasso is Greek for service. And sometimes this word is used for the vessel wherein the treasures are stored, as is said in 2 Kings 12:9: Jehoiada the priest took a chest (gazophylacium) . . . and put in it all the money that was brought into the house of the Lord, but sometimes it is used for the place wherein the vessel is reposed, as in John 8:20: these words he spoke in the treasury (gazophylacium). But here it signifies the study of Sacred Scripture, in which the saints have placed their own labors.

To scale the difficult heights is to note the second cause drawing him back, on the side of the work, and divine matters are said to be difficult in their very selves.

However, these things are climbed in three stages, as it were. The first lies in leaving behind the senses; the second in leaving behind the images of bodily things; and the third in leaving behind one’s natural reason.

He says, a work beyond our strength (Sent. I, prol. 1.) to show the heights of the matter in comparison with ourselves.

On the contrary, Sirach 3:21 says, seek not what is too difficult for you, nor investigate what is beyond your power.

I answer that this is true from the consideration of our own proper powers, but from the consideration of divine help, we can be elevated above our own capacity to contemplate.

We have dared. (Sent. I, prol. 1.)

On the contrary, Sirach 37:3 says, O most wicked presumption, (RSV: O evil imagination, why were you formed to cover the land with deceit?) so it seems like he is sinning.

I answer that we interpret we have dared (praesumpsimus) as meaning “we have taken it up (sumpsimus) before other things (prae aliis).” Or let us say that it would be presumption relative to human powers, but it is not presumption when related to God’s help, by which we can do all things: I can do all things in him who strengthens me (Phil 4:13). At we have grounded our confidence of completion, he notes the second motivating cause, on the side of God. In the Samaritan is drawn from the parable found in Luke 10, where the Samaritan signifies God: he who keeps Israel will neither slumber nor sleep (Ps 121 [120]:4), for Samaritan is interpreted as meaning “keeper.” Left half-dead refers to the man despoiled of grace by sin and wounded in his natural faculties. After giving two pieces of silver, indicates the two Testaments, as it were, marked with the image of the King, when they contain the stamp of truth from the first truth.

Who might have to spend more, (Sent. I, prol. 1.) that is, in addition, just as the holy fathers did in their own studies.

On the contrary, I warn every one who hears the words of the prophecy of this book: if any one adds to them, God will add to him the plagues described in this book (Rev 22:18).

I answer that there are two ways to add to it: by adding something contrary to or diverse from it—and this is an error and presumptuous—or by adding something that is implicitly contained in it, by expounding it—and this is praiseworthy.

At the truthfulness of the one making that promise delights us, (Sent. I, prol. 1.) he gathers together the four enumerated causes. God overcomes it asserts the victory. Then he speaks of zeal for the house of God; according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 13 (PG 3:711).) zeal is an intense love, so it does not tolerate anything contrary to the beloved; and by the house of God, he means the Church. Burning with that zeal, (Sent. I, prol. 2.) that is, since we do not tolerate the attacks upon the Church coming from those without faith.

The errors are those of carnal men, (Sent. I, prol. 2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 3, prol. (CCSL 50; PL 42:867).) insofar as they find errors for themselves so that they might make provision for the flesh, to gratify its desires (Rom 13:14); for example, those who deny that there is divine Providence over human affairs, and that the soul endures, so that they can sin with impunity. And they are brutish men (Sent. I, prol. 2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 3, prol. (CCSL 50; PL 42:867).) as regards their erring, by the fact that they are not lifted above sensible things, but rather they wish to make judgments about divine things according to bodily accounts.

And we have striven to protect with the bucklers of David’s tower (Sent. I, prol. 2.) is taken from Song of Songs 4:4, your neck is like the tower of David, built for an arsenal, whereon hang a thousand bucklers, all of them shields of warriors. Christ is signified by David, the faith or the Church is his towers, and the arguments and authoritative statements of the saints are the bucklers.

Or rather, we wish to show that it is already so protected, (Sent. I, prol. 2.) because he is not discovering the arguments, but is compiling ones that have already been discovered by others. And in this he touches on one use of this work: the exclusion of error. At we have also attempted to reveal the hidden depths of theological investigations, (Sent. I, prol. 2.) he touches on the other, as regards manifesting the truth. And this is in Books I–III.

At and we have attempted . . . to convey an understanding of the Church’s sacraments, with whatever little intelligence is ours, (Sent. I, prol. 2.) and this is in Book IV. He adds, we were not able rightfully to resist the desires of our brethren devoted to study, (Sent. I, prol. 2.) noting the moving cause for writing this; he will add, second, a cause that draws him back, at we do not doubt ‘that all human speech has always been subject to the calumny and opposition of the envious.’ (Sent. I, prol. 3, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 1 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:344).) He adds that he assists his brethren with our tongue, (Sent. I, prol. 2.) in reference to those who are present before him—or to the communication of the teaching—and with our pen, (Sent. I, prol. 2.) for the sake of those who are absent, or to perpetuating their memory.

He calls them, that is the tongue and the pen, yoked together (Sent. I, prol. 2.) as though by these two wheels the teaching is conveyed from the teacher to the student, the love of Christ being the driver. (Sent. I, prol. 2.) This is drawn from 2 Corinthians 5:14: the love of Christ controls us.

On the contrary, whether it is love or hate man does not know (Eccl 9:1); therefore and so on.

I answer that “charity” in one way names the infused habit, and no one can know whether he has this with certainty, except through revelation, but he can make a conjecture in virtue of certain probable signs. In another way, “charity” names a love that places great value on the beloved, and in this way someone can know that he has charity.

We do not doubt ‘that all human speech has always been subject to the calumny and opposition of the envious.’ (Sent. I, prol. 3, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 1 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:344).) Here he lays out a third cause drawing him back, namely the contradiction of the envious: and concerning this, he does three things.

First, he notes the evidence for the contradiction, through a likeness in other matters.

Second, he notes the cause of the contradiction as the disorder of the will, which gives rise to error, which gives rise to envy, which gives rise to the contradiction. This is when the movements of our wills dissent, so too does the understanding of our spirits. (Sent. I, prol. 3, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 1 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:344).)

And third, he notes the iniquity of those speaking against it, at who do not submit their will to reason. (Sent. I, prol. 3, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 1 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:344).) He mentions their calumny, which is a hidden and particular attack, and opposition (or “contradiction”), which is an open and total attack; he calls it noxious (There is no word in the Silano translation of the Sentences that translates obnoxium.) as bound to punishment and harm.

He says that even though every word be perfect with regard to truth, (Sent. I, prol. 3, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 1 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:344).) meaning it was made perfect by reason of its truth, relative to those who have a bad understanding, and yet with an obstinate will defend the bad understanding. He says they believe what pleases them, (Sent. I, prol. 3, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 1 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:344).) in reference to those whose will inordinately drags reason’s judgment after itself, so that whatever pleases them will be judged true. A truth one is offended at, that is, that displeases him.

On the contrary, all are blessed in his God’s works (4 Esdras 13:39); therefore and so on.

I answer that truth, with respect to itself, is always loved. But it can be hated incidentally, and this happens in an infinity of ways, because incidental causes are infinite, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 6.2, 1026b5.)

He adds, this is what the god of this world works in those children of unbelief, (Sent. I, prol. 3.) drawing on 2 Corinthians 4:4; this can be understood as about the true God, who works envy insofar as he permits it, or as about the devil, to whom this age obeys, who works envy by suggesting it. He calls it unbelief, either because of their disbelief in God or because one should disbelief those things, by reason of their malady, though not because of the physician’s power. When he says they do not submit their will to reason, (Sent. I, prol. 3; Silano mistakenly attributes the lines quoted in the following few paragraphs to Hilary.) he shows the iniquity of those in opposition: first, from their disordered profession; second, from their false religion, at they find a semblance of wisdom in superstition; third, from their obstinate contention, at eager for controversy, they struggle without restraint against the truth. (Sent. I, prol. 3.)

Now, he shows the first that they are disordered based on two things: because their will does not follow reason, but vice versa, which he notes when he says, who do not submit their will to reason, (Sent. I, prol. 3.) and because they do not subject their reason to sacred doctrine, which he notes at nor apply themselves to the study of doctrine.

He says they believe what they have dreamed up, as though imagining them, like a man in his dreams. They turn their ears . . . toward fables, (Sent. I, prol. 3.) taking this from 2 Timothy 4:4, for according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.2, 982b19; Poetics, ch. 4. Cf. Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 1, lect. 3, n. 55.) a fable is composed of wonders, and such men always want to hear of novelties. Their pursuit, that is, zeal, consists more in seeking what pleases them, than what ought to be taught, (That is, what is worthy of being taught.) their semblance of wisdom being their argument for showing their wisdom. This occurs in superstition, meaning a needless externally simulated religion. Because a lying hypocrisy follows the defection from faith, (Sent. I, prol. 3.) drawing on 1 Timothy 4:1–2: in later times some will depart from the faith by giving heed to deceitful spirits and doctrines of demons, through the pretensions of liars. They use all manner of lying words.

On the contrary, Bede says, no teaching is so false that does not have some truths mixed into it. (Taken in fact from Augustine, Questions on the Gospels, bk. 2, q. 40 (CCSL 44B; PL 35:1354).)

I answer that those truths that they speak, although they are true in themselves, still they are false as regards their use. For they use them for what is false.

Inflicting upon others the itching of their own ears, (Sent. I, prol. 3.) that is, their inordinate desire for hearing novelties, as an itch is excited by an inordinate heat. This is drawn from 2 Timothy 4:3: for the time is coming when people . . . having itching ears they will accumulate for themselves teachers to suit their own likings.

He says, they corrupt the faith by the teaching of false doctrine, on account of their reason following their will; he says that they are eager for controversy, which Ambrose says on the letter to the Romans, is the assault on truth with confidence in praise. (According to Mandonnet, an older gloss attributes this quote to Aymon (Haimo), while a newer gloss attributes it to Anselm, to either of whom it bears a greater similarity than to Ambrose, as the quote is not found in the works of either Ambrose or Ambrosiaster. See Vincent of Beauvais, Speculum doctrinale, which reads juxta Amb.: . . . per confidentiam clamoris.)

He adds that the battle will not cease so long as truth remains firm, (Sent. I, prol. 3, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 1 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:345).) following 1 Esdras 4:38: the truth will endure and prevail into eternity.

Wishing to cast down the assembly of such people, which is hateful to God, and to stop up their mouths, . . . we have, with God’s aid, put together with much labor and sweat a volume. (Sent. I, prol. 4.) Here he renders the listener teachable by setting out the causes of the work.

First, he lays down the final cause as regards two uses: the one is the destruction of error. This is why he speaks of the hateful assembly, (Sent. I, prol. 4.) following Psalm 26 [25]:5: I hate the company of evildoers, and says, so that they may not be able to spread the poison, that is, their venom, . . . to others.

The other is the manifestation of the truth. This is why he speaks of wanting to put the light of the truth on the lamp-stand; this is taken from Luke 8:16: no one after lighting a lamp covers it with a vessel, . . . but puts it on a stand, that those who enter may see the light. He says, on the lamp-stand, meaning out in the open.

Second, he touches on its efficient cause, both the principal one, when he says with God’s aid, and the instrumental one, at we have . . . put together. (Sent. I, prol. 4.) For this work is, as it were, a compilation of diverse authorities. He adds, with . . . sweat, meaning with whatever bodily defect that follows upon a spiritual labor.

Third, he shows its material cause, at from the witnesses of truth, drawing on Psalm 119 [118]:152: long have I known from thy testimonies, that thou hast founded them for ever.

Fourth, he shows its formal cause, as regards the distinction of its books: and divided it in four books; as regards the mode of the work, you will find the precedents . . . of our ancestors, meaning their examples, and the teaching of our ancestors, meaning their reasons.

We have denounced the falsehood of a poisonous doctrine. (Sent. I, prol. 4.) By poisonous he means heretical, for the heretics, by disposing others toward their heresy, kill like vipers.

We have pursued, that is, opened, a moderate middle, indicating the path, embracing, that is, taking, an approach that does not result in impiety, that is, unbelief, a middle course between the two—that is, neither going too high, nor remaining with too much humility, or between two contrary errors, like that of Sabellius and that of Arius.

And . . . our voice . . . has not transgressed the bounds set by our forefathers, (Sent. I, prol. 4.) following Proverbs 22:28: remove not the ancient landmark which your fathers have set.

And so this work should seem superfluous neither to the lazy, nor to the very learned. (Sent. I, prol. 5, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 3, prol. (CCSL 50; PL 42:869).) Here he renders the listener attentive, doing so first in virtue of the usefulness of the work, at in this brief volume, we have brought together the sentences of the Fathers. (Sent. I, prol. 5.) A sentence, according to Avicenna, (Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā, c. 980‒1037 AD), Liber de anima seu Sextus de naturalibus, pt. 5, ch. 1. The Liber de anima (Kitāb an-nafs) is itself a section of Avicenna’s larger Book of Healing (al-Shifa’) and was available to Aquinas through a translation by Dominic Gundisalvi (Gundissalinus).) is one’s definitive and most certain conception.

He does so, second, in virtue of the profundity of the matter, at I desire not only a pious reader, one who understands it according to the faith, but also a free corrector, who makes correction only for the sake of it being correct. For what is called free, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.2, 982b26.) is for its own sake, not due to hatred or envy. And he shows its utility in a third way from the orderliness of the mode of proceeding, at and in order that one may more easily find what one seeks, we have set out the titles under which the chapters of each book are distinguished. (Sent. I, prol. 5.)