D. 13 - Procession of the Holy Spirit in comparison to the generation of the Son

Division of the text

Having considered the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit in reference to its mode and principle, here he considers it in its relation to the generation. And it is divided into two parts: in the first, he inquires whether the proceeding Holy Spirit can be called “begotten” as a Son; in the second, whether he could be called “unbegotten,” at it must now be considered, since the Holy Spirit is not begotten, whether he ought to be called unbegotten. (Sent. I, 13.4(44).1.)

The first part is divided into two: first, he shows that the proceeding Holy Spirit cannot be called a “Son”; second, he inquires about the difference between the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit, at but while we are in this life, we are not able to distinguish between the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit. (Sent. I, 13.3(43).1.)

As regards the first, he does two things: first, he asks whether the Holy Spirit can be called “begotten”; second, since he is not called “begotten,” but “proceeding,” why the Son is called not only “begotten,” but also “proceeding,” at since the Holy Spirit is not called begotten, but only proceeding, it is usual to ask why the Son is not only called begotten, but also proceeding. (Sent. I, 13.2(42).1.) Each of these parts is divided into the question and its response.

But while we are in this life, we are not able to distinguish between the generation of the Son and the procession of the Holy Spirit. (Sent. I, 13.3(43).1.) Here he is asking about the difference between generation and procession. And regarding this he does two things: first, he considers it according to what we can know—namely, that the Holy Spirit proceeds and is not begotten, whereas the Son proceeds and is begotten. Second, he considers it according to what we cannot know perfectly—namely, in what way the procession and the generation differ. For we are not strong enough to comprehend fully the mode of each of them, because each of them is ineffable, at as to the difference between being born and proceeding, who can explain it? (Sent. I, 13.3(43).4, quoting Augustine, Against Maximinus, bk. 2, ch. 14 (CCSL 87A; PL 42:770).)

It must now be considered, since the Holy Spirit is not begotten, whether he ought to be called unbegotten. (Sent. I, 13.4(44).1.) Here he shows that just as the Holy Spirit is not begotten, so too he should not be said to be unbegotten: and first he makes the truth manifest; second, he removes an objection, at and yet Jerome . . . calls the Holy Spirit unbegotten, (Sent. I, 13.4(44).3.) and here he does three things: first, he leads to the contrary; second, he presents the solution, at but in order to resolve this apparent contradiction, we say; (Sent. I, 13.4(44).4.) and third, he presents a confirmation of the solution, at that Jerome himself understood the term in this sense is shown in his own words. (Sent. I, 13.4(44).5.)

Question 1

The procession of the Holy Spirit in comparison to the generation of the Son

To understand this part, four things are asked about:

first, whether there is any procession in God;

second, if there is, whether there is one alone, or many;

third, in what way the two processions should be named; and

fourth, if the Holy Spirit, who proceeds, is not called “begotten,” whether he should be called “unbegotten.”

Article 1

Whether there is procession in God

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.27.1; SCG IV.11; On the Power of God, q. 10, a. 1.) It seems that there is no procession in God.

Obj. 1: For “procession” indicates a certain progressive motion. But every motion indicates a lack and imperfection, and does not befit God. Therefore there is no procession in God.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, procession indicates one thing’s going out from another. But going out puts distance between the one going out and the one from which he goes. Therefore, since there is simply no distance between the divine persons, it seems that there is no procession.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every procession is from something to something. But the divine persons, since they subsist through themselves, do not exist as to something. Therefore it seems that proceeding does not befit them.

On the contrary, John 15:26 says, when the Counselor comes, whom I shall send to you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth, who proceeds from the Father. Therefore and so on.

Furthermore, an image of the Trinity is in the soul. But in the soul knowledge is found to proceed from the mind, and love from both. Therefore it seems that there is also procession in the divine persons.

I answer that “procession” is spoken of in two ways. In one way, it signifies a local motion that, properly speaking, belongs to the motion of an animal by means of its progressive motion. And such a procession cannot occur in the divine, unless we speak metaphorically. For according to a likeness with such a procession, the divine wisdom or goodness is said to “proceed into created things,” insofar as he by gradations brings about his likeness in them. According to this mode some things are more like God than are others. In the other way, “procession” is said of the leading forth of what has a principle from its principle. And since in the divine persons, one is from another as from his principle, in this manner “procession” is properly said in the divine.

Reply Obj. 1: In created things every procession is through some motion or change, because a thing does not proceed locally except through a motion, nor does a thing go forth from its cause except by some change occurring as regards that from which it goes, if the change is of its essence, or at least a change as regards the thing that goes forth. Now, in the divine the origin of one person from another occurs without any change, as was said above about the generation; (Above, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1.) for nothing is predicated of God in reference to what belongs to imperfection in it.

Reply Obj. 2: Although in the divine persons there is no distance according to place, nor according to essence, there is nonetheless a distinction in the persons according to their personal properties. And this is enough for the account of a procession.

Reply Obj. 3: Local procession is toward something as toward the terminus of the motion, but what proceeds from its cause need not proceed toward another; and this is how “procession” is being taken in the divine.

Article 2

Whether there is only one procession in the divine

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.27.3 & 4; SCG IV.19; On the Power of God, q. 10, aa. 1–2; On the Catholic Faith of the Greek Fathers (Contra errores Graecorum), pt. 1, ch. 3.) It seems that there is only one procession in the divine.

Obj. 1: For just as “paternity” denotes the property of the origin, from whom someone exists, so does “procession,” as the one who is from another. But it was said earlier (Above, d. 7, q. 2, a. 2.) that in the divine there can be only one paternity. Therefore there can be only one procession.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in all things that possess specifically one nature there is only one mode by which that nature is communicated; this is why the Commentator says (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 8, text. 46.) that vermin generated from the putrefaction of earth and the ones generated from seed are not of the same species. But the divine nature is communicated through the procession of the persons, and this nature is one not only in species but even in number. Therefore there is only one mode of procession in the divine.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, actions or acts are distinguished from each other according to their termini or according to their principles. But in the divine a procession is always from the same principle, since every procession is by the power of the nature of the very one bringing it forth. And what is received in the procession occurs always at the same terminus, since in a divine procession the divine nature is always received. Therefore it seems that there is only one procession in the divine.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, if there are two processions, they will have their difference either on the side of the essence or on the side of the relations, since there is nothing more in the divine. But on the side of the essence, in reference to the plurality of the attributes, one finds only a diversity of account. Now, a diversity of account does not cause a real plurality, which is the sort necessary for two processions, according to which two really distinct persons proceed. Therefore on the side of the essence, no real diversity of processions can be found. Likewise, neither is there one on the side of the relations. For the relations follow upon the processions, according to the account of understanding; for he is a Son by the fact that he proceeds from the Father. Therefore it seems that in no way can there be many processions in the divine.

On the contrary, according to one procession there is only one who is proceeding. But in the divine there are two persons proceeding, the Son and the Holy Spirit, as is noted in the text. (Sent. I, 13.2(42).2.) Therefore it seems that there must be two processions.

I answer that some say that these two processions are really distinguished, and it is not necessary to ask by what they are distinguished, since they are the first things distinguishing the persons, just as we do not ask by what rational and irrational are distinguished. But this does not seem fitting, since generation and procession have no mutual opposition, whereas every formal distinction is according to some opposition. And further, procession and generation are signified through the mode of actions. But it is not fitting that the doers or the things done be distinguished through their actions or motions; rather, the converse seems more correct, because actions are different in species according to the forms of their agents, for example, to heat and to cool, and motions differ according to their termini.

And therefore others say that the difference is drawn from the fact that generation is a procession of nature, and the procession of the Holy Spirit is a procession of will. But even this is not adequate, since in the divine, the will and the nature are distinguished only in account. Whence such a distinction cannot be the reason for a real distinction of the processions, since a principle is not weaker than what is based on the principle. And further, according to this, the procession of the intellect, according to which he is called the Word, would be other than the procession of the nature, according to which he is called the Son.

And therefore one should say that in the divine there cannot be a real distinction and plurality except according to relations of origin. This is why we must investigate the plurality of the ones proceeding and of the processions according to this. Therefore I say, following this, that there is in the divine a certain procession according to which one person proceeds from one, and this is the procession of generation according to which the Son is from the Father; and this is why it is said to be through the mode of nature or intellect: for he proceeds as a son and as a word. For in each mode of such processions, that is, of nature and of intellect, the procession is of one from one. Moreover, in the divine there is a certain procession that is simultaneously from two—that is, from the one who proceeds and from the one from whom he proceeds. And this is distinguished from the first procession according to origin, because this second procession is from the one proceeding according to the aforesaid procession, which is through the mode of nature. And that is why this second procession is said to be through the mode of will, because through their mutual affection one love can proceed from two willing it.

And according to these two diverse modes of origin, multiple persons distinct by relation of origin are led forth—that is, the Son, who is from the Father, and the Holy Spirit, who is from both. Whence I grant that unless the Holy Spirit is from the Son, one cannot assign a real distinction between the Son and the Holy Spirit.

Reply Obj. 1: “Paternity” indicates a determinate mode of origin, which cannot be multiplied further according to a diverse account of origin, but only according to matter, such that it would be divided in number. But “procession” indicates origin commonly, and can be made determinate according to modes of origin—namely, such that there is a procession of one from one who does not proceed, and also a procession from the one proceeding. More modes cannot be found that are distinguished from the account of origin, so there cannot be more processions in the divine than the two. For if a procession were taken from one proceeding or many proceeding, there would be a difference only according to the one or many—and this difference in no way pertains to origin, any more than if one were to divide what can walk, not by the bipedal and the quadrupedal, but by the white and the black.

Reply Obj. 2: In a created nature there are two communications: one that is through the mode of nature, and the other that is through the mode of love. Now, the nature is not communicated in both ways, but only in the one through the mode of nature. However, it is due to the imperfection of the created will that the nature cannot be communicated through it; for what proceeds through the mode of will, that is, love, is not a hypostasis subsisting through itself, as it is in the divine. And therefore it is due to the perfection of the divine nature that it is communicated not only through the act of nature, which is generation, but also through the act of will, which is the mutual affection of love.

Reply Obj. 3: In the divine, the processions are distinguished both according to the principle and according to the terminus. For above it was said that, although the divine nature is the principle of generation in the Father, nonetheless it is not absolutely under the account of nature, but under the account of paternity. And likewise the Son does not have the fact that he is the Son from the nature inasmuch as it is the divine nature that is received in the Son through the generation; rather, he has it from the fact that the nature in the Son is, according to reality, the filiation itself. And thus it is clear that the relations stand in a certain way as the principle and the terminus for these processions.

Reply Obj. 4: Because the persons, which are really many, are distinguished according to the processions, one cannot say that the processions do not differ in reality but only in account. For nothing causes a greater distinction, formally speaking, than the distinction by which they themselves are distinguished from each other. But just as the personal properties, insofar as they are compared to the essence, are really the same as the essence, since they are the divine essence from which they differ only in account—whereas insofar as they are spoken of as toward-something, they are many according to reality—so it is with the processions. For insofar as they are compared to the nature as a principle or terminus, they are distinguished only in account, insofar as the will and the nature in God are said to differ in account. But because they are also compared to the relative properties as to their principle or terminus, (Above, d. 2, q. 1, a. 5.) therefore from this they also have real difference from each other.

Therefore when it is objected that relations follow on processions, such that it seems that diverse processions cause the diversity of relations more than the converse, or at least that there will be a circle, to this one should say that, in the divine, relation has not only that it be a relation, but also that it be personal, that is, constitutive of a person. And from this the relation has, as it were, the act of a constitutive difference, and of the proper form, the person himself to whom belongs the action of generation or spiration. And therefore it is not unfitting that the relations, according to the account of relation, follow the processions themselves, and receive their difference from them. However, insofar as they are proper forms of the persons themselves, they cause the difference of the processions.

Article 3

Whether the procession of the Holy Spirit should be named a procession or a generation

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In III Sent., d. 8, a. 1, ad 8; ST I.27.4; I.30.2, ad 2; SCG IV.19; On the Power of God, q. 2, a. 4, ad 7; q. 10, a. 2, ad 22; Compendium theologiae, ch. 46.) It seems that the procession of the Holy Spirit should not be named a procession but rather, a “generation.”

Obj. 1: For if it is not a generation, then it is divided against generation. But no common name is divided against a proper one. Therefore, since “procession” is the common name for both the generation and the procession of the Holy Spirit, it seems that the procession of the Holy Spirit should not be named a “procession” either.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as the Son’s generation indicates a specific mode of origin, so too does the procession of the Holy Spirit; otherwise it would not be the property constitutive of the person, as was said in the previous article. But “procession” does not indicate any specific mode of origin. (Above, a. 1.) Therefore the Holy Spirit’s mode of origin should not be named a “procession.”

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as the Son receives the entire nature and substance of the Father, so does the Holy Spirit. But that procession according to which someone receives the nature of that from which he proceeds is called a “generation”; this is so even among lower things, as is clear by making an induction from individual cases. Therefore it seems that the procession of the Holy Spirit should be called a “generation.”

Obj. 4: Furthermore, Damascene defines generation by saying, generation is the existing act of the divine nature, such that he who generates does not admit a change, and such that God is neither prior nor posterior. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 8 (PG 94:814).) But the procession of the Holy Spirit is an act of the divine nature, and so on. Therefore it seems to be a generation. However, that it is an act of the divine nature, and not of the will, is proved by Hilary, who says (Hilary of Poitiers, Liber de Synodis seu Fide Orientalium, para. 58 (PL 10:520).) that the divine will brings forth the substance in all created things, but the divine nature gives it to the Son. But the Holy Spirit is not created, so it does not have its substance by means of the Father’s will, but by means of the Father’s nature.

On the contrary, whatever proceeds through the mode of generation proceeds as begotten, and this is especially so in living things. But the Holy Spirit does not proceed as begotten; otherwise there would be two Sons in the Trinity—which cannot be so. Therefore the procession of the Holy Spirit should not be called a “generation.”

I answer that in the divine one can find the common and the proper, but not the universal and particular. For some real diversity is required for there to be universal and particular, as was said above, (Above, d. 8, q. 4, a. 1.) about the communicable “whatness” and the existence that is proper. And such a diversity cannot exist in the divine.

But one can find the common and the proper there in two ways: that is, according to a reality, and according to an account. They are there according to reality as when we say the essence is common to the three persons, and each person is distinguished through what is proper to him. But they are there according to account only as when our intellect takes something in the divine both with regard to a common and indeterminate account, and with regard to a determinate and proper account. For each of these pertains to the divine dignity, as does the account of genus and the account of difference; this is just as in the divine there is the account of cognition, which is common, and the account of knowledge, which is proper and determinate, and yet one is not the genus of the other, insofar as they are in God. So I say that “procession” is said according to the common account of origin, whereas “generation” is said according to a determinate account of origin. Whence they stand as common and proper, but not as genus and species.

Reply Obj. 1: A procession, insofar as it is being taken in its common account, is not divided from generation; but it is, insofar as it is taken in reference to the determinate mode of procession that belongs to the Holy Spirit.

Reply Obj. 2: Frequently we find that something proper is denominated by the common name, just as whatever is convertible with a thing is said to be proper to it, whether or not it signifies what the thing is. But nevertheless this name specifically retains for itself the convertible name that does not signify the substance, since it does not add anything of nobility whereby the substance could be named. However, we do not speak this way in the proposed matter; for the origin of the Holy Spirit is not named by the common name “procession,” since according to the account, it adds nothing over and above the common and adds nothing less than the “generation” of the Son, since the Holy Spirit is equal to the Son in dignity.

But three reasons are assigned for this. The first is that the Holy Spirit fits procession most of all, for not only does he proceed, as does the Son, but he goes forth from one proceeding, which does not belong to the Son. The second is that, because procession is spoken of in two ways—with respect to local motion and with respect to an effect’s going out of its cause—each mode in some way belongs to the origin of the Holy Spirit. For insofar as he proceeds as a distinct person, in this way his procession has a likeness with an effect’s going out from its cause; on the other hand, insofar as he proceeds as love—which stretches toward another, not as receiving but as towards its object—it has a likeness with a local procession, which is from something to something. For the Father loves the Son with the love that is the Holy Spirit, but procession belongs to the Son only according to one mode, that is, the going out from the cause. The third reason, and I believe this is the best, is that in created things we find that something subsisting in itself proceeds through the mode of nature, and we call this “being generated”; this is why, according to this, we have been able to name the procession of the Son with a proper name, that is, with the name “generation.” But we do not find in created things anything subsisting through itself that proceeds through the mode of love, as the Holy Spirit proceeds. And therefore we have not been able to name this procession with a proper name, but only with the common one.

Reply Obj. 3: The procession of love as such does not have it that any nature is communicated through it; rather, it has this insofar as it is in the divine, where there can be nothing imperfect. And therefore the Holy Spirit does not have the fact that the divine nature is communicated to himself according to the account of “procession,” taken in its common meaning. And therefore this procession cannot be called a “generation” according to its proper account, for it comes from the very account of generation that the nature would be communicated to the one begotten. For although a diversity of account is not enough for a real difference of processions, it is nonetheless enough for a different naming.

Reply Obj. 4: The divine nature is not the principle of the Holy Spirit’s procession under the account of nature, but rather under the account of will, from which love proceeds. And therefore his procession is not called a “birth,” since “birth” (nativitas) is said from “nature.” Yet it does not follow from this that the Holy Spirit is a creature. For the will is related as a principle either to the very things that come from it, and this is how it is related to created things, or to the very account of being a principle, and this is how it is related to the love who is the Holy Spirit, like the way the intellect is related to an art, as was said above. (Above, d. 10, q. 1, a. 3.)

Article 4

Whether the Holy Spirit should be called unbegotten

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 28, q. 1, a. 1; ST I.33.4; On the Catholic Faith of the Greek Fathers (Contra errores Graecorum), pt. 1, ch. 8.) It seems that the Holy Spirit should be called “unbegotten.”

Obj. 1: For he is so called by the authority of Jerome, noted in the text. (Sent. I, 13.4(44).3; Lombard mistakenly attributes to Jerome what was in fact written by Bishop Syagrius (5th century bishop who fought against the heresy of Priscillianism), Regulae definitionum contra haereticos prolatae, n. 8.)

Obj. 2: Furthermore, when the subject’s existence is presupposed, an indefinite term is convertible with a negation; for example, a non-man is not a man, for whatever exists and is not a man is a non-man. But “unbegotten” is an indefinite term. Therefore, since the Holy Spirit exists and is not begotten, it seems that he is unbegotten.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, “unbegotten” indicates either a relation or something absolute. But it does not indicate a notional relation, since then the essence could not be called “unbegotten.” Therefore it seems that it is among the absolutes, and so it seems to befit the Holy Spirit.

On the contrary, it is said in the text (Sent. I, 13.4(44).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 15, ch. 26 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1094).) that only the Father is unbegotten. Therefore the Holy Spirit is not.

I answer that in the divine, properly speaking, nothing privative can be said, since the account of privation requires that something be naturally apt to have what it does not have; and this cannot belong to God. Whence it must be that “unbegotten” when said of God is taken negatively, and not privatively. But some negations negate within a determinate genus, and these have a certain likeness with privations, insofar as something is placed in the determinate genus. There are also some negations that do so outside of a genus, and this is an absolute negation, since it determines no genus.

Therefore I say that “unbegotten,” if it indicates a negation outside of a genus, befits all that exists and is not from another through generation, whether it be from something else or not, and whether it be created or uncreated. And according to this, we can say that the Father is “unbegotten,” and the Holy Spirit is “unbegotten,” and the divine essence is “unbegotten,” and the first created things as well, which do not go into existence through a generation. However, if “unbegotten” is a negation within a genus, this can be said in two ways, insofar as it is applied to the divine: either within the genus of the divine nature—and in this way it still befits the Father, the Holy Spirit, and the divine essence; or within the genus of a principle in the divine nature—and in this way it befits only the Father, and thus it will be the notion of the Father. For “principle” can make a thing known either insofar as something is from it, and thus the Father is made known through his active generation and spiration, or insofar as it is not from another, and in this way “unbegotten” is the notion of the Father.

Reply Obj. 1: Jerome is taking “unbegotten”—that is, not begotten—insofar as it is a negation outside a genus, or within the genus of the divine nature, and not in the genus of principle.

Reply Obj. 2: The negation of an indefinite term is not a negation within any determinate genus, but only within the genus of being. And therefore it can be said of every being to which the affirmation does not belong. But a negation that negates within some determinate genus cannot be said outside that genus.

Reply Obj. 3: “Unbegotten,” insofar as it befits the Father alone, signifies the notion of the Father, and in this way it does not befit the divine essence. However, insofar as it befits the essence and the Holy Spirit, it does not signify any notion, nor even something absolute, for it does also befit the Son in this way. Rather, it removes a certain account, that is, passive generation.

Exposition of the text

If the Holy Spirit were called son, he would be called the son of both, which is most absurd. For no one is a son of two persons except of a father and mother; far be it from us to suspect any such thing between God the Father and God the Son. (Sent. I, 13.1(41).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 15, ch. 26 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1094). We have amplified the quotation here for context.) For in this way the procession of the Holy Spirit would appear material, since a father stands to generation as its active principle, whereas a mother stands as its material principle, since she provides the matter.

I do not know how, that is, through any acquired art, and am neither able, through a natural power or ingenuity, nor sufficient, through a defect of application or exercise, to distinguish between that generation and this procession. (Sent. I, 13.3(43).4, quoting Augustine, Against Maximinus, bk. 2, ch. 14, para. 1 (CCSL 87A; PL 42:770).)

All which exists is either unbegotten, or begotten, or made. (Sent. I, 13.4(44).5, quoting pseudo-Jerome (Bishop Syagrius), Regulae definitionum contra haereticos prolatae, nn. 1‒2.) One must note that the members of this division are distinct by a material multiplication, and not by a formal one. And therefore one member is recorded twice, insofar as it belongs to two of them, the Father and the Holy Spirit.