D. 10 - Procession of the Holy Spirit

Division of the text

After the Master has considered the generation of the Son from the Father, here he considers the procession of the Holy Spirit from each. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he considers his eternal procession; in the second, the temporal procession, at moreover, it is to be diligently noted that the procession of the Holy Spirit is a double one. (Sent. I, 14.1(45).1.)

The first is divided into three parts: in the first, he determines the mode of the procession; in the second, the principle of the procession, at here, it must be stated that the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son; (Sent. I, 11.1(37).1.) in the third, the difference of procession from generation, at it is next to be considered . . . why the Holy Spirit is not said to be born, but rather to proceed, and why he is not called son. (Sent. I, 13.1(41).1.)

The first is divided into two parts: in the first, he shows the mode of the procession; in the second, he concludes from the mode of proceeding to the proper name of the one proceeding, at here it is to be noted that, just as the Holy Spirit in the Trinity is especially called love, . . . so he properly has a name which is in some way suitable to the Father and Son in common. (Sent. I, 10.3(36).1.)

The first is divided into two: in the first, he shows through the authority of the canon of Scripture that the Holy Spirit proceeds as love; in the second, he shows the same thing through the authority of the saints, at but let us now attend to what we had started to show. (Sent. I, 10.2(35).4.)

Regarding the first, he does three things: first, following the words of Augustine, he appropriates to the Holy Spirit the charity that is said of God in 1 John 4:16, God is love; second, he posits a likeness of appropriation, at for it can be taught by many examples that many names of things are used both universally and specifically by application to particular things; (Sent. I, 10.2(35).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 15, ch. 17 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1079).) third, he brings forward an authority for this appropriation, at but the Word of God, that is, the only-begotten Son of God, is plainly called the wisdom of God. (Sent. I, 10.2(35).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 15, ch. 17 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1082).)

Question 1

Mode of procession of the Holy Spirit

In order to understand this part, we inquire into five things:

first, whether the Holy Spirit proceeds as love;

second, whether he is the love that the Father has towards the Son, and vice versa;

third, whether he is the bond or union of the Father and the Son;

fourth, whether from his procession he can be properly called the “Holy Spirit”;

fifth, of the number of the persons.

Article 1

Whether the Holy Spirit proceeds as love

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 2, qa. 2; ST I.37.1.) It seems that the Holy Spirit does not proceed as love.

Obj. 1: For the Holy Spirit proceeds as a person subsisting in himself. But “love” does not signify anything by the mode of something subsisting, but rather by the mode of an inhering form or passion. Therefore, the Holy Spirit does not proceed as love.

Obj. 2: Further, a nature is communicated only through an act of the nature. But “love” does not signify an act of a nature, but rather of a will. Therefore, since through the procession of the Holy Spirit the whole divine nature is communicated to the person proceeding, it seems that the Holy Spirit does not proceed as love.

Obj. 3: Further, there is not the same mode of procession for a created thing and a divine person. But created things proceed from God through an act of his will, the work of which is creation, according to Damascene. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 8 (PG 94:811).) Therefore no divine person proceeds through the mode of love, which is an act of the will.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a person’s mode of procession is proper to the proceeding person, since one person is distinguished from another through the procession. But love is common to the three persons, as is said in the text. (Sent. I, 10.1(32).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 15, ch. 17 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1079).) Therefore no person proceeds as love.

Obj. 5: Further, what is appropriated is not the same as what is proper. For what is appropriated is taken alongside the account of the proper; hence, wisdom, which is appropriated to the Son, is proper to no person. But love, as is said in the text, (Sent. I, 10.1(34).4.) is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. Therefore that he should proceed as love is not the proper mode of his procession.

On the contrary, the created image in the soul represents the Trinity in the creature. But in the created image something proceeds through the mode of knowledge, and something proceeds through the mode of love. Therefore, because in the uncreated Trinity the Son proceeds through the mode of knowledge, there will be another person proceeding through the mode of love.

Furthermore, knowledge is not perfected unless the will is conjoined to it. But as the intellect stands to the will, so a word stands to love. Therefore a word will not be perfected without love. But the Word of God is perfect. Therefore a perfect love is also associated with it, and this is the Holy Spirit.

I answer that that there are two things to consider in the procession of created things, on the side of the Creator himself: his nature, from the fullness and perfection of which the perfection of every created thing is brought about and on which it is modeled, as was said above; (Above, d. 2, q. 1, a. 2.) and his will, from the liberality of which, not by any necessity of his nature, all these things are conferred upon the created thing.

Now, supposing, in accordance with our faith, that there is a procession of divine persons in the unity of the essence, for the proof of which no sufficient argument is found, this procession of persons, which is perfect, must be the account and cause of the procession of what is created. Hence, we trace back the procession of created things, imperfectly representing the perfection of the divine nature, to the perfect image containing the divine perfection most fully—that is, the Son—as to its principle, exemplar, and account, as it were, of the natural procession of created things from God, according to an imitation of his nature. In the same way, then, insofar as the procession of what is created is due to the liberality of the divine will, it must be traced back to one principle which is the account, as it were, of the entirety of liberal giving. However, this is love, under the account of which all things are conferred by the will. And therefore there must be some person in God proceeding through the mode of love, and this is the Holy Spirit. This is also why certain philosophers (For example, Empedocles.) posited love as the principle of the whole of nature.

Reply Obj. 1: Although love as love does not indicate something perfect and subsistent, nevertheless insofar as it is God’s love, from whom every imperfection is removed, it has to be something perfect and subsisting; and it is similar with the Word.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as the whole divine nature is communicated through the first procession of the nature, since it is perfect, so also the whole will is communicated through the first procession of the will, which is the account of every voluntary procession from God. And since will and nature are the same thing in God, and since the whole will, which is infinite, cannot be except within an infinite nature and for an infinite good, as for an object equaling, as it were, the infinite will—which is why the love that is the account of the will can only be infinite—therefore the infinite nature must be communicated as well. Hence love, although it does not signify a communication of a nature insofar as it is love, nevertheless it does signify it insofar as it is God’s love and the first procession of the divine will.

Reply Obj. 3: Created things proceed from his will as realities brought about through the will, but the Holy Spirit proceeds as the account of any act of the will whatsoever, just as the Son too is brought forth as the “art” of all the things that are constituted through the divine intellect. (That is, the Holy Spirit is not a work of will, nor is the Son constituted as an artifact; the Holy Spirit is the ratio of works willed, as the Son is the ratio of works conceived.)

Reply Obj. 4: In God, “love” is taken in three ways, for sometimes it is taken essentially, sometimes personally, and sometimes notionally. When it is taken essentially, it does not indicate any procession or a real relation, but only a relation of reason, like when we say God “understands” and is “understood” by himself, for one and the same person can be both understanding and understood. But when “love” is said personally, then a procession and a real relation are being indicated, and the person himself is being signified: that is, the reality proceeding, as love is something proceeding. However, when “love” is said notionally, it signifies the very account of the person’s procession, since the love is not only proceeding, but also indicates the account under which other things proceed.

Therefore, insofar as love is essential, it is common to the three persons, but is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, as when it is said, God is love (1 John 4:16); insofar as it is personal, it is proper to the Holy Spirit and it is said that the Holy Spirit proceeds “as love”; but insofar as it is notional, it is a certain relation or notion common to the Father and the Son, which is also called “common spiration”; and it is in this way that “love” is signified in the verb “love,” when it is said, “the Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit.”

Reply Obj. 5: Insofar as it is proper to the Holy Spirit, love is not appropriated to him. But wisdom is appropriated to the Son in such a way that it can never be proper to him. The reason for this is that wisdom is not signified in the manner of something going out from anything, but rather in the manner of something resting in a subject; and therefore it is always essential and never personal. Love, on the other hand, is signified in the manner of going-out, yet it nonetheless signifies something absolute. Now, that going-out can be understood either as something real or as merely something according to reason. Therefore, on the side of its signifying something absolute, it is essential in God, and then the indicated relation or going-out will be one of reason alone, as when it is said that “the same thing is the same as itself.” When, on the other hand, that going-out is signified not only as belonging to reason but also as something real, then it signifies the personal love.

Article 2

Whether the Holy Spirit is the love which the Father has toward the Son

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 32, q. 1; ST I.37.2; On the Power of God, q. 9, a. 9, ad 13.) It seems that the Holy Spirit is not the love that the Father has toward the Son, or vice versa.

Obj. 1: For whatever proceeds by tending into another does not proceed as subsisting through itself. But the Holy Spirit proceeds as a person subsisting through himself. Therefore he does not proceed into the Son.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what proceeds into something is received in it unless there is a failure in the recipient. But there is no failure in the Son. Therefore, if the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father as to the Son, the Son receives the Holy Spirit. But whatever the Son receives from the Father, he receives through his generation. Therefore the procession whereby the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father to the Son is the generation, or even prior to the generation in account, as something included in it. And this is absurd.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, although the Son receives something from the Father, nevertheless the Father receives nothing from the Son. Therefore, since “that into which something is received” belongs to the account of a receiver, in no way will the Holy Spirit be able to be called the love which the Son has toward the Father.

On the contrary, all love proceeds from the lover to the beloved. But the Holy Spirit is love, as was said above. (Above, a. 1, ad 4.) Therefore it seems that, since the Father loves the Son, and vice versa, the Holy Spirit is the love of the Father toward the Son, and vice versa.

Furthermore, this is seen through the authority of Jerome in the text. (Sent. I, 10.2(35).4, referring to Jerome, Breviarium in Psalmos, Psalm 17 (PG 26:863): “the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son, but the love which the Father has toward the Son and the Son toward the Father.”)

I answer that there are two things to consider in the procession of the Holy Spirit: the procession itself, and the mode of proceeding. And since the Holy Spirit proceeds as a reality distinct and existing through itself, it is due to his procession as a procession not that he is from the Father to the Son, or vice versa, but rather that he is subsisting in himself. However, if one considers the mode of procession, because he proceeds as love, (Above, a. 1, ad 2.) then, since according to its intelligible account the beloved is where love reaches its terminus, and the lover is that from which love goes out, thus it is that, because the Father loves the Son, the Holy Spirit can be called the “love of the Father toward the Son,” and because the Son loves the Father, he can be called the “love of the Son toward the Father.”

Reply Obj. 1: The solution here is evident. For the Holy Spirit does not have the fact that he is the love of one person for another from the fact that he is a proceeding person, but from the fact that he proceeds as love.

Reply Obj. 2: When the Son is said to be loved by the Father, it is not being predicated that the Son receives something from the Father, in reference to something real, but rather, that the act of love reaches its terminus in him. And therefore when the Holy Spirit is said to be the love of the Father toward the Son, this does not pertain to the generation of the Son, but to the procession of the Holy Spirit.

Reply Obj. 3: This solution is evident. For just as when we say the Father “has love toward his very self,” we do not there signify any termination or reception according to reality, but a reception only according to our mode of signifying, so too when we call the Holy Spirit “the love of the Son toward the Father,” we are not asserting that the Father receives anything, except that, according to our mode of signifying, the love of the Son reaches its terminus in him as in the beloved.

Article 3

Whether the Holy Spirit is the union of the Father and the Son

To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that the Holy Spirit is not the bond or union of the Father and the Son.

Obj. 1: For what is discrete and distinct from things is not unitive of them. But the Holy Spirit is distinct from the Father and the Son. Therefore he is not the union of both.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a bond or union has the account, as it were, of a mean or middle between the things which are united or connected. But the Holy Spirit is not the middle person in the Trinity, but the third. Therefore he is not the union or bond.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, what binds things is their bond. But whether this be understood efficiently or formally, what binds things has a certain attached account of a principle. Therefore, since the Holy Spirit is in no way the principle of the Father and the Son—but rather the converse—he could not be called the bond or union of both.

On the contrary, Dionysius says, when we speak of love, whether divine, angelic, intellectual, animal, or natural, we mean a certain unitive and intermingling power. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 15 (PG 3:714).) But the Holy Spirit is the love of the Father and the Son. Therefore he is their union.

Furthermore, this is seen from the authority of the Apostle in Ephesians 4:3: be eager to maintain the unity of the Spirit in the bond of peace. And so love has the account of a bond and a connection.

I answer that love always asserts a contentment of the lover in the beloved. But whenever someone takes pleasure in someone, he draws himself into that other, and joins himself to him as much as he can, in such a way that the other might become his own. And it is for this reason that love has the account of a uniting of lover and beloved. And because the Holy Spirit proceeds as love, he has from this mode of procession the fact that he is the union of the Father and the Son. For the Father and the Son can be considered either insofar as they come together in essence, and in this way they are united in the essence, or insofar as they are distinguished in their persons, and in this way they are united by the harmony of love. For if the impossible were asserted to be so—that they were not one by essence—it would be necessary, for their perfect joy, that a union of love be understood to be present in them.

Reply Obj. 1: The Holy Spirit from the procession itself he has it that he proceeds as a person, and thus he is distinct from the Father and the Son; but from the mode of his procession he has it that he is a bond or union of lover and beloved. But whether the Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit will be discussed below. (In I Sent., d. 32, q. 1, aa. 1, 2.)

Reply Obj. 2: He has the fact that he is the third person in the Trinity because he proceeds from two persons, but the fact that he is the union of both persons he has from his mode of proceeding.

Reply Obj. 3: The Father and the Son are said to be united by the Holy Spirit not as by an agent, but, as it were, formally. However, form is of two sorts. For a certain form remains and rests in the things of which it is the form; and in this way the divine essence stands to the persons through the mode of form, and thus they are united formally by the essential love. There is also something formally uniting things not as though inhering in them, but as proceeding from both of the things united, as though we were to say that two bodies were united through some liquid proceeding from them. And in this way the Father and the Son are united by the Holy Spirit. Hence it does not follow that He is the principle of the Father and the Son, but rather the converse. Still, as was said above, this will be analyzed more when it will be inquired whether the Father and the Son love themselves by the Holy Spirit. (See d. 32.)

Article 4

Whether the person who proceeds as love is properly called the “Holy Spirit”

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.36.1; SCG IV.19; Compendium theologiae, cc. 46, 47.) It seems that the person who proceeds as love is not properly called “Holy Spirit.”

Obj. 1: For what is common to the three persons becomes proper only by something proper being joined to it. But “spirit” belongs to the three persons, as is said in John 4:24, God is spirit. But the “holy” that is added is also common to them, and not proper. Therefore it seems that “Holy Spirit” is not the proper name of any person.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the persons are distinguished through relations of origin. But such relations, according to the mode of understanding, follow upon the processions of the persons. Therefore each person ought to be denominated according to some procession. But “Holy Spirit” expresses no procession or mode of procession. Therefore it does not seem to be the name of any person.

Obj. 3: You might say that he is called “Holy Spirit” because he proceeds as love, that is, by way of likeness to two lovers who in their love breathe together by a kiss of the mouth, whence arises a reciprocal breathing.

On the contrary, in this way, the name “spirit” would be taken from a likeness of bodily breath. But every such name is said of God metaphorically, and not properly, nor by priority. Therefore, since the personal names are used properly in the divine, as well as with priority over those used in created things—as is said in Ephesians 3:15, from whom all paternity in heaven and on earth is named (RSV reads family instead of paternity.)—it seems that through that metaphorical mode no divine person should be named “Holy Spirit.”

Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as the procession that is through the mode of love is holy, so too is that through the mode of nature. Therefore just as the Son is not called the “Holy Son,” so the Spirit should not be called the “Holy Spirit.”

On the contrary, there is the entirety of Scripture and the Church’s entire usage, which so names the third person in the Trinity.

I answer that “spirit” is a name imposed for signifying a certain nature’s subtlety, so it is said of both corporeal and incorporeal things. For air is called a “spirit” on account of its subtlety; this is why taking air in and expelling it is called “inspiration” and “respiration”; this is also why a wind is called a “spirit,” and even the most subtle vapors through which the soul’s powers are diffused throughout the parts of the body are called “spirits.” And in like manner, incorporeal things are called “spirits” on account of their subtlety; for example, we call God, an angel, and a soul, “spirits.” And from this, too, comes our manner of saying that two human beings who love each other and are of one heart are “of one spirit” or “share a spirit,” just as we also say that they are one heart and one soul. For, as is said in Ethics 9, it is proper to friends to be one soul in two bodies. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.8, 1168b8.)

Now, “subtlety” is spoken of by way of a remoteness from materiality. Accordingly, things that are very material, like earth, we call “gross,” and things that are much less so, like air and fire, we call “subtle.” Hence, since to be removed from matter belongs more to incorporeal things, and most of all to God, “spirituality,” according to the account of its signification, is found by priority in God, and more so in incorporeal things than in corporeal things. However, perhaps according to the first imposition of the name does “spirituality” apply more to bodily things, because their subtlety is more manifest to us, who have imposed the name.

Therefore, following this, I say that “spirit,” insofar as it names the subtlety of a nature, is common to the three persons; but the Holy Spirit is named from spirituality for two reasons. One reason and the chief one is, as I believe, that through him and the gift of himself we are drawn into a participation of the divine spirituality, insofar as we are removed from temporal things. This is why those who are contemptuous of temporal things are called “spiritual.” And this belongs to him insofar as he proceeds as love, which has the account of the first gift in which all gifts are given. The other reason is that he is the love of the Father for the Son, by which they love each other, and we say that the lover and the beloved are “united in spirit.”

Reply Obj. 1: When I say “Holy Spirit,” this can be considered in two ways: either with respect to the force of the words, and in this way it belongs to the whole Trinity, exactly as it is taken in the force of the two words; or with respect to the imposition of the Church, through which this name is imposed as a circumlocution of one name to signify the one person, owing to the deficiency of our vocabulary, since our tongues fall short in describing God. And in this way it belongs properly to the Holy Spirit. And Augustine assigns the rationale of fittingness in the text; (Sent. I, 10.3(36).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 15, ch. 19 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1085).) for since he is the community of the Father and the Son, it is becoming that he should be named by a common name.

Reply Obj. 2: The Holy Spirit, from the account of his procession, proceeds as love; and insofar as he is love, it befits him that he be named through spirituality, as was said in the body of the article, and thus in some way the name “Holy Spirit” does express a certain mode of procession, since it is that of love.

Reply Obj. 3: “Spirit” is said with priority of the divine rather than the bodily, as was said before, and therefore that objection does not hold. Nor do I believe that the Holy Spirit is named from that likeness of two lovers breathing together.

Reply Obj. 4: Dionysius says, sanctity is free from all uncleanness, and is perfect and immaculate cleanness; (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 12, para. 2 (PG 3:970).) and therefore “sanctity” is fittingly adjoined to “spirituality,” which also indicates separation from materiality, since separation from matter is designated by “spirituality,” and separation from material defects is designated by “sanctity.” Or it may be said that nature always acts in the same way, so one does not find the right and the not-right in an act of nature, whereas one can find them both in an act of the will. Therefore “sanctity,” which indicates a rectitude of will, is fittingly joined to the procession of love, and not to that of generation, which is an act of nature.

Article 5

Whether there are only three persons in the divine

To the fifth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 3, a. 2, ad 1; ST I.30.2; SCG IV.26; On the Power of God, q. 9, a. 9; Compendium theologiae, cc. 56, 60.) It seems that there are not only three persons in the divine.

Obj. 1: For in the divine, the will does not stand further from the nature than does the intellect. But the person proceeding through the mode of will, or love, is other than that one who proceeds through the mode of nature, or generation. Therefore there should be yet another person, one who proceeds through the mode of intellect.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as the Father loves the Son, so he also loves the Holy Spirit. But the love by which the Father loves the Son is one person. Therefore the love by which he loves the Holy Spirit is also one person, and so there are more than three.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as there is perfect goodness and liberality in the Father and the Son, so also in the Holy Spirit. But it belongs to the Father, on account of his highest goodness and liberality, that he communicate his nature to another, since the good communicates itself. Therefore, for the same reason, the Holy Spirit will communicate his own nature by a perfect communication. But he does not perfectly communicate it to the created. Therefore he will communicate it to another divine person.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, in God there is not only his nature and will, but many other attributes, any one of which has the account of a principle. But a certain procession corresponds to his will and another to his nature insofar as they have the account of a principle. Therefore to the other attributes in God will correspond still other processions, according to which the persons will be multiplied to far more than three.

On the contrary, it seems that there are only two persons. For persons are not distinguished except according to relations of origin. But a relation of origin is one according to which someone is from another. Therefore it seems that there is only one person who is a being from another, and the latter is the one from whom the former is other. Therefore there are only two persons.

I answer that there are only three persons in God. And the reason of this is that in the divine, on account of simplicity of its essence, there can be no distinction according to anything absolute, but only according to relation, and only according to relation of origin, as will be proved below. (In I Sent., d. 26, q. 2, a. 2.) Moreover, a relation of origin cannot constitute a person if it signifies something in common; rather, it must signify something proper and determinate, for it stands in the place of a constitutive difference for the person, which difference must be proper to the person.

Moreover, since “person” is a name of dignity, that relation must pertain to dignity. Therefore in this way one must consider three things in the constituting of persons: what is the relation of origin, what is proper, and what pertains to dignity. Now, a relation of origin is indicated commonly in these two things: “someone from another” and “the other from whom he is.” However, when I say “the other from whom,” this is something pertaining to dignity, but it is common. Hence to constitute a person he must be determined through a specific mode of origin.

However, in the divine there can be only two modes of origin, insofar as every agent is divided into one that acts by nature and one that acts by will. And these actions, which are found in created things, (Above, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1.) are traced back, as to a cause and exemplar, to the two processions in God, of which the one is through the mode of nature—and is called “generation”—and the other through the mode of will—and is called “spiration.” (Above, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1.) Therefore, one must specify “the other from whom” through generation, and “the other from whom” through spiration. But these two do not conflict with each other, since the same thing can be a principle of many things in diverse ways. Hence from this “the other from whom” is not constituted two persons, but only one; for nothing has the power to bring about a distinction except what has some account of opposition. In this way, therefore, we have one person—someone from whom there is someone through generation and spiration, namely, the Father.

However, if we take the other—the one who is from another—although this indicates a relation of origin, it nevertheless does not suffice to constitute a person, both because it is common, and because it indicates nothing of dignity. For something can be from another in either a noble or an ignoble manner. Hence to constitute a person, he must be determined through a specific mode pertaining to dignity; and there are only two such modes in God. Therefore it will be necessary to speak thus: he who is from another through generation, and he who is from another through spiration. But these two cannot belong to one person, since one real thing has only one mode by which it arises from another. For what comes about by nature and what about by art are not the same in species, nor what comes about through putrefaction and through fertilization. And therefore there will be one person who is from another through generation, and this is the Son, and another who is from another through spiration, and this is the Holy Spirit. And since these relations cannot be numerically multiplied in such a way that there would remain a unity in species, because in God there is no material division, there must be only three persons.

Reply Obj. 1: The processions of intellect and of nature have a certain likeness by which they are distinguished from the procession through the mode of will. For something can proceed from one or from many. For what proceeds through the mode of nature, proceeds as from one, if that one is perfect; and in like manner this is true of what proceeds through the mode of intellect, for many men do not have numerically one conception. And thus each mode is attributed to the Son, who is only from one, that is, from the Father; for as a son he proceeds through the mode of nature, and as a word he proceeds through the mode of intellect. But the will tends into another, and therefore there can be reciprocation, such that from the two proceeds one conformity of will, which is the union of both. And therefore to proceed through the mode of will belongs to the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from the two, uniting them insofar as they are distinct persons. For insofar as they are one essence, they are united by essence, and according to this the love between them is essential.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as, in lower things, a power is not carried to its object and its own act by different acts, for in the same act intellect understands itself and understands itself to be understanding, so too because the Holy Spirit proceeds as the love by which the Father loves the Son, there need not be yet another love by which he loves that love. This is especially so because that love would not differ from the first except according to number, and not according to its account. And such numerical diversity cannot be in God, as was proved above. (Above, d. 9, q. 1, a. 1.)

Reply Obj. 3: Liberality and goodness are essential in God. Now, essential things are principles of notional acts only insofar as the essence is really the same as the property or notion, as was said above. (Above, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3.) Hence, the goodness or liberality in the Father is the principle of the generation only insofar as the goodness is his paternity, whereas in the Son the goodness is not paternity, but filiation. Hence by the very same goodness and liberality the Father generates and the Son is generated, and the Father spirates and the Holy Spirit is spirated. Thus, according to Augustine, (Augustine, Against Maximinus, bk. 2, ch. 18, para. 3 (CCSL 87A; PL 42:786).) when I say “of whom someone is,” this is a question of origin and not of equality; but it is a question of equality when one inquires “of what kind or how much.” And therefore from the fact that he does not bring forth another person, the Holy Spirit is not of a lesser liberality or goodness.

Reply Obj. 4: All the divine attributes are the principle of production through the mode of an efficient exemplar; for example, all goods imitate divine goodness, all beings imitate divine essence, and so with the others. Hence, every such procession is through the mode of nature; and thus it is not necessary that there be more modes of procession in the divine.

Reply Sed Contra: The solution is clear from things said in the body of the article.

Exposition of the text

The Holy Spirit is love or charity or dilection of the Father and the Son. (Sent. I, 10.1(34).2; in light of what Aquinas says below, Silano’s translation has been modified to read dilection instead of affection.) These three things are related to one another by addition. For “love” indicates the affect’s simple inclination toward the beloved; hence it sometimes also indicates a passion, insofar as it is in the sensitive part of the soul, and in this way love is found even in irrational things. However, “dilection” presupposes choice (electio), as the name itself shows; hence it belongs only to rational things. But “charity” asserts a certain vehemence of dilection, insofar as the beloved is held at an inestimable price, insofar as many precious things are called ‘dear’ (carae).

For whether it is a question of the unity, or of the holiness, or of the love of the first two persons, it is clear it is not one of these two who is the one by whom the two are joined. (Sent. I, 10.2(35).5, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 6, ch. 4 (CCSL 50; PL 42:927).) He is said to be the unity insofar as he is the bond of the Father and the Son, as was said, (Above, a. 3.) but he is said to be their holiness insofar as he proceeds by the procession of will, wherein consists the whole of sanctity.