D. 3 - Knowledge of the Creator through the created
Division of the first part of the text
In this part, the Master shows the unity of essence and the Trinity of persons through arguments and certain likenesses. It is divided into two parts: in the first, he shows the unity of the divine essence through natural arguments; in the second, he shows the Trinity of persons through likenesses in created things, at now it remains to show whether it may have been possible to obtain some indication, if a small one, of the Trinity through those things which are made. (Sent. I, 3.1(9).7.)
As regards the first he does three things.
First, he shows, through the Apostle’s authority, the possibility of proving the unity of the divine essence;
second, he brings in proof, at as Ambrose says; (Sent. I, 3.1(9).2.)
third, he excludes a certain objection, at God is a single and simple essence . . . But the Apostle says in the plural, ‘the invisible things of God.’ (Sent. I, 3.1(9).6, quoting Romans 1:20.)
But the second part, in which he lays out the proof, is divided into four, according to the four arguments that he lays out. Now, the diversity of these arguments is taken from the ways of coming to God from created things that Dionysius asserts. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7, para. 3 (PG 3:870).) For he says that we come to God from created things in three modes: through causality, through removal, and through eminence. And the reason for this is that a created thing’s existence is from another, so following this, we are led to the cause from which it exists. Now, this can occur in two ways: either with respect to that which is received from the cause, and in this way we are led through the mode of causality; or with respect to the mode of receiving it, since it is received imperfectly. And in this latter way we have two modes: according to the removal of an imperfection from God, and insofar as what is received in the created thing exists more perfectly and more nobly in the Creator, and this latter is the mode through eminence.
The first argument, therefore, is taken through the path of causality, and is formed as follows. Everything that has existence from nothing must exist due to something else from which flowed its existence. But all created things have their existence from nothing, which is manifest from their imperfection and potentiality. Therefore they must exist due to some one first thing, and this is God.
The second argument is taken through the path of removal, and is as follows. Beyond every imperfect thing there must be something perfect, to which there is no admixture of imperfection. But a body is imperfect, because it is bounded and finite in its dimensions, and is mobile. Therefore there must be, beyond bodies, something that is not a body. Furthermore, every changeable incorporeal thing is imperfect from its nature. Therefore beyond all changeable species, such as souls and angels, there must be some incorporeal, immobile, and altogether perfect being, and this is God.
The other two arguments are taken through the path of eminence. But eminence can be considered in two ways, either with respect to being or with respect to knowledge. Therefore the third argument is taken through the path of eminence in being, and is as follows. The good and the better are said through a comparison to the best. But in substances we find a body to be good, and a created spirit to be better, yet even in the latter the goodness is not from its very self. Therefore there must be something best, due to which goodness is present in each thing.
The fourth is taken through eminence in knowledge, and is as follows. In whatsoever one can find the more and the less beautiful, one can find some principle of beauty, through proximity to which one thing is said to be more beautiful than another. But we find bodies to be beautiful by a sensible form, whereas spirits are more beautiful by their intelligible form. Therefore there must be something due to which both of them are beautiful, something to which created spirits are closer.
Now it remains to show whether it may have been possible to obtain some indication, if a small one, of the Trinity through those things which are made. (Sent. I, 3.1(9).7.) Here he shows the Trinity of persons through likenesses in created things, and first through the likeness of a vestige, and second through a likeness of image, at but now we have come to the debated point of where one may find the image of the Trinity in the human mind. (Sent. I, 3.2(10).1.) As regards the first, he does two things: first he shows through the authority of Augustine how the Trinity of persons is represented in the vestige of created things; and second he makes a conclusion about the distinction of persons from the very likeness of the vestige, at thus, by our consideration of creatures, we perceive the Trinity to be of one substance. (Sent. I, 3.1(9).8, quoting Augustine, On True Religion, ch. 55, para. 113 (CCSL 32; PL 34:172).)
Here he distinguishes the three persons: first relative to us, and this in three ways: according to our going forth from God; according to our return to him, at the beginning to which we return; (Sent. I, 3.1(9).8, quoting Augustine, On True Religion, ch. 55, para. 113 (CCSL 32; PL 34:172).) and according to the blessing of God himself, at by whose act we are created. (Sent. I, 3.1(9).8, quoting Augustine, On True Religion, ch. 55, para. 113 (CCSL 32; PL 34:172).) Second, he concludes through a comparison to all things, at God who said ‘let there be.’ (Sent. I, 3.1(9).8, quoting Augustine, On True Religion, ch. 55, para. 113 (CCSL 32; PL 34:172).) And lastly, he shows that the representation of a vestige is insufficient, at and so it has been shown how the image of the Trinity in some measure is revealed in creatures. (Sent. I, 3.1(9).9.)
However, because this part manifests how one comes to the knowledge of God through a vestige in created things, therefore two things are sought.
The first is about divine knowledge; (Q. 1.)
and the second is about the vestige in created things. (Q. 2.)
Question 1
Knowledge of God
As regards the first, four things are asked:
first, whether created things can know God;
second, whether God’s existence is known through itself;
third, whether he can be known through created things, and to whom does it belong to know God through created things;
fourth, what the philosophers have been able to know of God through created things.
Article 1
Whether God can be known by a created intellect
To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In III Sent., d. 27, q. 3, a. 1; ST I.12.7 and 12; I.32.1; I.86.2, ad 1; SCG IV.1; Commentary on Boethius’s On the Trinity, q. 1, a. 2; Commentary on Romans, ch. 1, lect. 6.) It seems that God is not knowable by any created intellect.
Obj. 1: For Dionysius says (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 1, para. 1 (PG 3:587).) that we can neither speak of nor understand God. He proves this as follows: knowledge is only of existing things, but God is above all existing things. Therefore he is above knowledge.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, God is more distant from any of the existing intelligible things known to us than the intelligible is distant from the sensible. But sense cannot know the intelligible. Therefore neither can God be known by our intellect.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, every knowledge is through some species, through the informing of which the knower becomes like the reality known. But no species can be abstracted from God, since he is the simplest thing there is. Therefore he is not knowable.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Physics 3.6, 207a25.) everything infinite is unknowable, the reason being that it belongs to the account of the infinite that there is always something more beyond someone trying to grasp it, and such a thing is unknowable. But God is infinite, so he too is unknowable.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, the Philosopher says (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.7, 431a15; 431b2.) that imaginations stand to the intellect as colors stand to sight. But bodily sight can see nothing without color. Therefore our intellect can understand nothing without an image. Therefore, since no imagination can be formed of God—as Isaiah 40:18 says, to whom then will you liken God, or what likeness compare with him?—it seems that he is not knowable to our intellect.
On the contrary (6), Jeremiah 9:24 says, let him who glories glory in this, that he understands and knows me. But God does not exhort us to vainglory. Therefore it seems that it is possible for us to know God.
Furthermore (7), as was said, and even according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.7, 1177a22.) the ultimate end of human life is the contemplation of God. Therefore if man could not reach this, he would have been so constituted in vain, since, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Physics 2.6, 197b22‒198b30.) the vain is what is for some end that it does not reach. And this is unfitting, as is said in Psalm 89:47 [88:48]: for have you constituted him in vain? (In RSV this is not a question: for what vanity thou hast created all the sons of men.)
Furthermore (8), as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429a30‒b5.) the intelligible differs from the sensible in that what is exceedingly sensible destroys the sense, whereas the greatest intelligible does not destroy the intellect, but rather strengthens it. Therefore, since God is in himself the most intelligible thing there is, because he is the first intelligible, it seems that he could be understood by our intellect. For this understanding would be impeded only on account of his own excellence.
I answer that the question here is not whether God can be seen immediately in his own essence, for this belongs to a different consideration, (See In III Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 3; In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 2, a. 1.) but whether he can in any way be known. And therefore we say that God is knowable, but he is not so knowable that his essence might be comprehended. For every knower has knowledge about a known reality not through the mode of the known reality, but through the mode of the knower. Now, the mode of no created thing reaches the height of the divine majesty. Whence it is necessary that he is known perfectly by nothing, in the way that he knows his very self.
Reply Obj. 1: God does not exist in the way that such things exist; rather, the nature of entity is in him eminently. Whence, just as he is not altogether apart from entity, so neither is he altogether apart from knowledge, thus he might be known. But he is not known through the mode of other existing things, which can be comprehended by a created intellect.
Reply Obj. 2: Although God is more distant from any intelligible thing, according to what is proper to his nature, than is the intelligible from the sensible, nonetheless he is more like the intelligible in the account of the knowable. For everything that is separated from matter has the account of the known as intelligible, whereas what is material is known as sensible.
Reply Obj. 3: The species through which knowledge occurs is in the knowing power according to the mode of the knower himself. This is why the species of things that are more material than the intellect are simpler in the intellect than they are in the realities. And therefore such things are said to be known through a mode of abstraction. Now, God and angels are even simpler than our intellect, and therefore the species that is brought about in our intellect, through which we know them, is less simple. Whence we are not said to know them through abstraction, but through their impression in our intellects.
Reply Obj. 4: Infinity is spoken of in two ways, privatively and negatively. What is privatively infinite is what according to its genus is naturally apt to have an end but it does not have it; and such an infinite, since it is imperfect, is not known perfectly, due to its imperfection, but is known in a certain respect. But that is called infinite negatively which is in no way finite; and such is something most perfect that extends to all things, not being capable of being comprehended by a created intellect, but only of being touched by it.
Reply Obj. 5: The Philosopher is speaking of knowledge that is connatural to us according to the state of being on the earthly path. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.7, 431a14–17.) And in this way God is not known to us except through images—not images of him, but of his effect, through which we come to him. But this does not exclude the fact there might be some other knowledge of the intellect, not through a path natural to us, but a higher one—that is, through the inflowing of a divine life—for which an image is not necessary.
Reply Sed Contra 6–7: We concede the other arguments.
Reply Sed Contra 8: Yet as regards the last argument, when it concludes that God is right now the thing most known by us, one should reply that in a certain way there is a likeness between the intellect and sense, and in certain way they are unlike. For they are like in that just as sense cannot be for what is not proportioned to it, so too neither can intellect, since every knowledge exists through the mode of the knower, according to Boethius. (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 5, prose 6 (CCSL 94; PL 63:858).) However, they differ in that what is exceedingly intelligible does not corrupt the knowing power, as does the exceedingly sensible. And so, the intellect falls short of knowing the exceedingly intelligible not because it is corrupted by it, but rather because it does not reach it. Therefore the created intellect cannot see God perfectly.
Article 2
Whether the existence of God is known through himself
To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.2.1; SCG I.10, 11; III.38; On Truth, q. 10, a. 12; On the Power of God, q. 7, a. 2, ad 11; Commentary on Psalms, Psalm 52; Commentary on Boethius’s On the Trinity, q. 1, a. 3, ad 6.) It seems that God is known through himself.
Obj. 1: For those things are called “known through themselves” the knowledge of which is naturally implanted in us, such as every whole is greater than its part. But the knowledge of the existence of God, according to Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 1 (PG 94:790).) is naturally implanted in all. Therefore the existence of God is known through itself.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as sensible light stands to sight, so does intellectual light to the intellect. But visible light is seen by its very self, and in fact nothing is seen except by its mediation. Therefore God is immediately known by his very self.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, every knowledge occurs through the union of the thing known with the knower. But God is through his very self intrinsic to the soul, even more than the soul is to itself. Therefore he is known through his very self.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, what is known through its very self cannot be thought not to exist. But God cannot be thought not to exist. Therefore his very existence is known through itself. The proof of the middle premise is from Anselm: (Anselm, Proslogion, ch. 15 (PL 158:235).) God is that than which a greater cannot be thought, but what cannot be thought not to exist is greater than what can be thought not to exist, so God cannot be thought not to exist. It can also be proved in another way: no reality can be thought without what it is, like man without mortal rational animal, but what God is is his very existence, as Avicenna says, (Avicenna, De intelligentiis, ch. 1. See note above on the doubtful authorship of the De intelligentiis, at d. 2, q. 1, a. 3.) so God cannot be thought not to exist.
On the contrary, things that are known through themselves, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.4, 1006a20‒b12; 1008a2‒b30.) even if they are denied exteriorly with one’s mouth, cannot be denied interiorly with one’s heart. But God’s existence can be denied in the heart: the fool says in his heart, ‘there is no God’ (Ps 14 [13]:1).
Furthermore, whatever is the conclusion of a demonstration is not known through itself. But the existence of God is demonstrated even by philosophers. (Aristotle, Physics 8.5, 256a13–20, furthermore, Metaphysics 12.7, 1072a23–26.) Therefore the existence of God is not known through itself.
I answer that one can speak about the knowledge of any real thing in two ways: either with respect to the thing itself, or with respect to us. In speaking about God with respect to his very self, therefore, the existence is known through itself, and he himself is understood through himself—not because we make him intelligible, as we make material things actually intelligible. However, in speaking about God through relation to us, he can be considered again in two ways. We can consider him either according to his own likenesses and participation—and in this way the divine existence is known through itself, for nothing is known except through its own truth, which is from God as exemplar, but the existence of truth is known through itself. Or we can consider him as the supposit, that is, by considering God himself insofar as he is in his nature something incorporeal—and in this way he is not known through himself. Indeed, many have been found to have denied that God exists, such as all the philosophers who did not assert that there is an agent cause, like Democritus and some others. (Aquinas, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 1, lect. 9, n. 145.)
And the reason for this is that things that are known to us through themselves are made known right away through sensation; for example, upon seeing a whole and a part, right away we know that every whole is greater than its part, without any inquiry. This is why the Philosopher says, we know the principles when we know the terms. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.3, 72b24.) But we do not come to God upon seeing sensible things, except progressively, insofar as such things are caused, and we understand that everything caused is due to some agent causing it, and that the first agent cannot be a body. And thus, we do not come to God except through argumentation, and no such thing is known through itself. This is Avicenna’s argument. (Avicenna, De intelligentiis, ch. 1.)
Reply Obj. 1: The authority of Damascene should be understood to be about the divine knowledge implanted in us as a likeness of him, and not as what he is in his own nature. So too it is said that all things desire God insofar as he is considered not in his own nature, but in his likeness. For nothing is desired except insofar as it has a likeness of him, and so too is nothing known.
Reply Obj. 2: Our sight is proportionate to seeing bodily light through its very self, but our intellect is not proportionate to knowing by its natural light anything except through sensible things. And therefore it cannot come to purely intelligible things except through argumentation.
Reply Obj. 3: Although God is in the soul through his essence, presence, and power, nonetheless he is not in it as an object of the intellect, which is what is required for knowing. Whence even the soul is present to its very self, yet there is great difficulty in knowing the soul; nor does one come to it except by reasoning from objects to acts, and from acts to a power.
Reply Obj. 4: Anselm’s argument should be understood as follows. After we understand God, it cannot be understood that God exists and can be thought not to exist. But still from this it does not follow that someone cannot deny it and think that God does not exist; for he can think that there is no such thing as that than which a greater cannot be thought. And therefore his argument proceeds from this supposition: let it be supposed that there is something than which a greater cannot be thought.
Reply Sed Contra: And one can speak likewise as regards the other proof.
Article 3
Whether God can be known by man through created things
To the third we proceed as follows. It appears that man can know God through created things.
Obj. 1: For through the things that were made, the invisible things of God, when understood, are seen by a creature of the world (Rom 1:20). (RSV: ever since the creation of the world his invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made.) Now, the creature is said to be man, according to the Master’s interpretation. (Sent. I, 3.1(9).1.) Therefore God can be known by man through created things.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, he is seen by an angel. For the knowledge of God occurs through created things by the fact that the divine goodness is seen shining forth in what is created. But an angel knowing realities in their proper genus sees the divine goodness in them. Therefore it knows the Creator from created things.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, it seems that brutes also know God. For no precept is made except to one who can know a precept. But in Jonah 4:7 it is said that the Lord commands the worm that he attack the plant. Therefore the worm can know a divine precept, and so it can also know the one giving the precept.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, it appears that he can be known even by sinners. For Romans 1:21 says, although they knew God, they did not honor him as God. And these were sinners. Therefore and so on.
On the contrary (5), every effect leading to the knowledge of its cause is in some way proportionate to it. But created things are not proportionate to God. Therefore man cannot come to a knowledge of him from them.
Furthermore (6), it seems that neither is this so for an angel. For what is known through itself is not known through something else. But angels know God through themselves, seeing him within their own essence. Therefore they do not know him through created things.
Furthermore (7), it appears that neither is it possible for brutes. For no power attached to an organ has the power to know anything but a material species, in that knowledge is in the knower according to the mode of the latter. But brutes have only sensory cognitive powers, which are attached to an organ. Therefore in no way can they know God, who is altogether immaterial.
Furthermore (8), it seems that neither is he known by sinners. For Ambrose says, on Matthew 5:8, blessed are the pure in heart, for they will see God, that if they are pure in heart, they will see God, so then the others will not see him. For neither will the wicked see God, nor can someone see God who does not wish to see God. (Ambrose, Expositio evangelii secundum Lucam, bk. 1, para. 27, ln. 413 (CCSL 14; PL 16:1624).)
I answer that a created thing proceeds by way of exemplarity from God himself, as from a cause that is in a certain manner like it by analogy. One can come to God from created things in those three modes spoken of before: through causality, removal, and eminence.
Now, for someone to come to God from created things, two things are required: that he can in some manner take in God—and therefore such a progression of knowledge does fit the beasts; second, it is required that the divine knowledge begins in them from created things and ends at the Creator—and therefore to know God through created things does not fit the angels, nor even beatified men, who proceed from knowledge of the Creator to that of creatures. But this progression does fit men according to the state of the earthly path, both the good and the evil.
Reply Obj. 1: Therefore we concede the first objection.
Reply Obj. 2: Although an angel knows the divine goodness shining forth in what is created, nonetheless it does not come to the Creator from what is created, but vice versa.
Reply Obj. 3: God’s precept did not come to the worm in such a way that it apprehended the intention of the precept, but because its estimative power was moved by the divine power with a natural motion for fulfilling what God was arranging.
Reply Obj. 4: We concede the fourth objection.
Reply Sed Contra 5: To the fifth argument, it should be said that a created thing is not an effect proportionate to the Creator, and therefore it does not lead to a perfect knowledge of him, but an imperfect knowledge.
Reply Sed Contra 6–7: We concede the sixth and seventh arguments.
Reply Sed Contra 8: Ambrose is speaking of the vision of God through his essence, which will occur in the heavenly fatherland, to which no evil man will be able to reach. Likewise also no one except the believer comes to the knowledge of faith. But natural knowledge of God is common to both the good and the bad, believers and those who do not believe.
Article 4
Whether philosophers by means of natural knowledge came to the Trinity from created things
To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.32.1; On Truth, q. 10, a. 13; Commentary on Boethius’s On the Trinity, q. 1, a. 4; Commentary on Romans, ch. 1, lect. 6.) It appears that by natural knowledge the philosophers did come to the Trinity from created things.
Obj. 1: For Aristotle says that through this number, namely three, we apply ourselves to magnifying the one God by way of the properties of things that have been created. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.1, 268a15.) So too Plato said many things about a father intellect, (Plato, Parmenides; see also Augustine, Confessions, bk. 7, ch. 9 (CCSL 27; PL 32:740‒41).) as did many other philosophers.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the philosophers were able to come to knowledge of the things that shine forth in created things. But within the soul there is an expressed likeness of the Trinity of persons. Therefore it seems that through the powers of the soul, which the philosophers frequently contemplated, they were able to come to the Trinity of persons.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, Richard of Saint Victor says, I believe without a doubt that for any explanation of a truth that is necessary, there are not lacking arguments that are not merely probable, but even ones that are necessary. (Richard of Saint Victor (d. 1173 AD), De Trinitate, bk. 1, ch. 4 (PL 196:892).) But it is necessary to know the Trinity. Therefore it seems that the philosophers were able to have an argument for knowing it. And this also seems true based on the proofs brought in above, (In I Sent., d. 2, a. 4.) by which the Trinity is proved.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, a Gloss on Romans 1 (See the Glossa interlinearis, at Romans 1:20 (in Glossa ordinaria 6.24).) says that the philosophers did not reach an awareness of the third person, the Holy Spirit; the same is held at Exodus 8, where it is said that the Pharaoh’s magicians failed in the third sign. (The third sign, or plague, wrought upon Egypt was the plague of gnats; unlike the first two plagues, Pharaoh’s magicians were not able to duplicate it (Exod 8:16‒19). This failure in the third sign, according to a gloss, symbolized their ignorance of the Holy Spirit.) Therefore it seems that they at least came to an awareness of two of the persons.
On the contrary, Hebrews 11:1 says, faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen. But God being three and one is an article of the faith. Therefore it is not apparent to reason.
I answer that through natural reason one cannot come to the knowledge of the Trinity of persons, and therefore the philosophers knew nothing about this, except perhaps through a revelation, or something heard from others. The reason for this is that natural reason can know God only from created things, but all the things said of God through reference to created things pertain to his essence, and not to the persons. And therefore from natural reason one comes only to attributes of the divine essence. Nonetheless, the philosophers were able to know the persons in reference to things that are appropriated to them, knowing his power, wisdom, and goodness.
Reply Obj. 1: According to the exposition of the Commentator, (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens, bk. 1, text. 5.) Aristotle does not intend to assert a trinity of persons here. Rather, on account of the fact that in all created things their perfection is apparent in the threefold, like in beginning, middle, and end, the ancients therefore honored God in triple sacrifices and prayers. Moreover, Plato is said to have known many things about the divine from reading the books of the Old Law, which he found in Egypt. Or perhaps he names the divine intellect the “father intellect” insofar as in a certain way he conceived the idea of the world in himself, which is the archetype world.
Reply Obj. 2: The likeness of the Trinity that shines forth in the soul is altogether imperfect and deficient, as the Master will say below. (Sent. I, 3.3(11).1.) But it is called “expressed” in comparison to the likeness of a vestige.
Reply Obj. 3: If Richard’s statement is understood universally, that everything true can be proved through reason, then it is expressly false, since first principles known through themselves are not proved. If, however, some things that are known through themselves are hidden to us, such are proved through things more known relative to us. However, the effects of the principles are more known to us. Moreover, the Trinity of persons cannot be proved from the effects of created things, as has been said. Therefore what remains is that it can in no way be proved, and all such arguments that are introduced are certain suitabilities, rather than arguments concluding with necessity. For were the intellect to do the impossible and remove the distinction of persons, still supreme goodness, beatitude, and love will remain in God.
Reply Obj. 4: The philosophers did not reach the knowledge of two of the persons with regard to what is proper to them, but only as regards things appropriated to them—and not as appropriated, since then the knowledge of them would depend on what is proper to them, but as attributes of the divine nature. And if one objects that they came to the knowledge of the divine goodness, which is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, in the same way that they came to the knowledge of his power and wisdom, which are appropriated to the Father and the Son, then I say that they did not know his goodness with regard to its most powerful effect: the Incarnation and the Redemption; or they did not so much intend the veneration of the divine goodness, which they also did not imitate, as they venerated his power and wisdom.
Question 2
The vestige of God in created things
Next, one asks about the vestige, regarding which three things are asked:
first, what is a vestige;
second, what are the parts of a vestige;
third, whether a vestige is found in everything created.
Article 1
Whether the Creator’s likeness in created things can be called a vestige
To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.45.7; 93.6; SCG IV.26; On the Power of God, q. 9, a. 9.) It seems that the likeness of the Creator that is found in what is created cannot be called a vestige.
Obj. 1: For one investigates a thing through its vestige, or trace. (The primary meaning of vestigium is footprint, or track, but the general sense of it is “trace,” “vestige,” or any mark left behind by an agent that vaguely indicates the shape or at least presence of that agent. See the body of the article that follows.) But the divine majesty cannot be investigated; whence Romans 11:33 says, O the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments and how incapable of investigation his ways! (What here is translated “incapable of investigation” is literally “incapable of being a vestige”; RSV: inscrutable.) And Psalm 77:19 [76:20] says, and thy vestiges will not be known. (RSV: footprints.) Therefore it seems that the likeness of the Creator in the created is not a vestige.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, a vestige is a certain impression consequent on the motion of that of which it is the vestige. But God produces things without any motion of his own, as James 1:17 says, with whom there is no variation or shadow due to change. Therefore the likeness in the created produced by the Creator cannot be called a vestige.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, a vestige, as understood here, leads one to the knowledge of the persons. But knowledge of the Trinity cannot be possessed through created things, as has been said. Therefore the likeness found in created things should not be called a vestige; or a vestige does not lead one to the Trinity.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, commenting on Job 11:7, do you perhaps comprehend the vestiges of God?, (RSV: can you find out the deep things of God? Can you find out the limit of the Almighty?) Gregory says, the blessing of his visitation wherein he shows us the way are called his ‘vestiges.’ (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 10, ch. 8 (CCSL 143; PL 75:927).) Therefore it seems that the likeness of God found in created things is not his vestige.
I answer that “vestige,” in the way understood here, is being used metaphorically, and is taken according to a likeness with a vestige properly so said, which is a certain impression that leads in a confused way to the knowledge of something else. For it represents it only according to its part, that is, the foot, and according to its surface only. Therefore three things can be considered in the account of a vestige: the likeness, the imperfection of the likeness, and the fact that through the vestige one comes to the knowledge of him whose vestige it is. According to this, then, because the Creator’s likeness is found in created things, through which we can come to knowledge of him, and that likeness is imperfect, thus there is said to be a vestige of the Creator within created things. And because they fall short of representing the distinction of the persons even more than they fall short of representing the essential attributes, therefore a created thing is even more properly called a vestige insofar as it leads to the persons than insofar as it leads to the divine essence.
Reply Obj. 1: The divine ways are said to be incapable of investigation because we cannot fully comprehend his works, not because we can in no way come to them from created things.
Reply Obj. 2: In things that are said through metaphor it is enough that some sort of likeness be attended to; it is not necessary that there be a likeness in all respects. Otherwise this would be a property, not a likeness.
Reply Obj. 3: Through the vestige we come to the knowledge of the persons only very confusedly, since we do so through things appropriated to persons more than through things proper to them, as is clear from the text. (Sent. I, 3.1(9).7‒9.) The appropriated attributes, however, are essential, even though they have a likeness with things proper to the persons.
Reply Obj. 4: There can be many likenesses of one reality, so it is not unfitting that by the same thing certain diverse things are changed according to diverse likenesses with the one. And therefore it can be the case that a likeness found in created things might be called a “vestige” insofar as it represents the Creator in a confused way, and the works of the divine goodness shown in the mystery of the Incarnation might be called God’s “vestiges” insofar as through them a path is prepared for coming to him.
Article 2
Whether a vestige has three parts or only two
To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that there should be only two parts of a vestige.
Obj. 1: For a vestige is a certain property of a created thing, but a created thing has only two essential parts: matter and form. Therefore it seems that, in accordance with these two parts, there are only two parts of a vestige.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, it seems like there are four. For not only the Trinity of persons is represented by a vestige, but so is the unity of their essence. Therefore there must be three things corresponding to the three persons and a fourth corresponding to the unity of the essence.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, there is said to be a vestige in a created thing insofar as it represents its Creator. Therefore, since within created things God’s several attributes are represented, which are participated in by the created things, as is clear from Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 9, para. 1 (PG 3:910).) it seems that there are several parts of the vestige.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, diverse people are found to have assigned diverse parts of it; for example, when Wisdom 11:20 says, you have disposed all things in number, weight, and measure, Augustine asserts (Augustine, On the Nature of Good, ch. 3 (CSEL 25:856; PL 42:553).) that the parts are mode, species, and order, and others assign these parts in many other ways. Therefore one asks for a reason for the diversity of assignments.
I answer that a vestige is found in what is created insofar as it imitates the divine perfection. Now, a created thing’s perfection is not possessed immediately from its principles, which are imperfect, as is clear with matter and form, neither of which has perfect existence through itself; rather, it is possessed in the created thing’s being joined to its end. However, nature does not join distant things without a medium, and therefore in created things one finds a beginning, a middle, and an end; according to this Pythagoras asserted that three is the perfection of every created thing. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.1, 268a10.) And according to the account of these three things even the distinction of the divine persons is represented in created things, wherein the Son is the middle person, but the Holy Spirit is the one wherein the procession of the persons is terminated.
However, it is possible for there to be many middles between two extremes. Therefore it happens that the beginning, middle, and end can be assigned in diverse ways, insofar as from all of them, certain ones can be taken as a beginning, and certain others as a middle, and certain others as an end, by combining them in diverse ways. Thus it happens that parts of the vestige have been assigned in diverse ways by diverse people. For example, the first thing that pertains to the perfection of a thing are the very thing’s principles, and the last is the perfection of the thing according to its comparison with respect to other things, not only insofar as it is perfect in itself. But between these there are many middles. For there is the disposition of the principles: their inclination to the existence of what comes from the principles; also, the limitation of the principles under the form of what comes from the principles; the form of the very thing coming from the principles; and its power and activity and many other such things.
Therefore the vestige can be assigned such that only what is first, that is, the very substance of the principles, is taken as the “beginning,” and what immediately follows, that is, the principles’ disposition or inclination to the existence of the principle, is taken as the “middle,” and all that follows this is taken as the “end.” And this is how “number, weight, and measure” in Wisdom 11:20 is taken, since number pertains to the plurality of the principles, weight pertains to the inclination of the principles to the existence of what comes from them, and measure pertains to the limitation of the principles under the limited existence of the created thing, such that under such limitation is taken a limitation in existence, in activity, and in all other things.
It can also be taken another way, such that the principles’ very substance, inclination, and whatever else pertains to the principles are taken as the “beginning,” and the very form of what is from the principles is taken as the “middle,” and the thing’s very relation to things outside it is taken as the “last.” This is how Augustine’s words, what he establishes, what is discerned, and what is suitable, (Augustine, Book of Eighty-Three Different Questions, q. 18 (CCSL 44A; PL 40:15).) are taken. For God establishes a thing through its own principles, it is discerned through its form, and it is made suitable through its relation to another; and mode, species, and order are, as it were, taken in a similar way, such that “mode” pertains to the principles determined under the existence of what comes from them, “species” pertains to the form, and “order” pertains to its relation to another. Or it can be taken such that these latter are the abstract and the former are the concrete. And in a somewhat similar way the one, the true, and the good are taken, such that the unity of a thing pertains to its determination as constituted by its principles, its truth is insofar as it has its form, and its good insofar as it is ordered to its end. The entire thing insofar as it too is perfected through its form can also be taken as the “beginning,” its power for the “middle,” and its activity for the “end”; this is how Dionysius takes them, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 5, paras. 8–10 (PG 3:822–26).) as the essence, power, and activity.
And thus it is clear that, insofar as the perfection of a thing can be understood to be limited at diverse termini, and insofar as one member of the three can include more or fewer, the diversity of the parts of a vestige is found in all things, according to one common designated account of “beginning, middle, and end.”
Reply Obj. 1: Although there are two essential parts of a creature, still one can take the orientation of one to another, and also the many consequent perfections, relative to which the parts of a vestige can be assigned.
Reply Obj. 2: Just as in God the essence does not constitute a number with the persons, so it is in created things that the creature’s very existence, representing the divine essence, stands under the three parts of the vestige, with this existence not being numbered with the three parts of the vestige.
Reply Obj. 3: The properties of created things, from which we are led to the divine attributes, although they be many, have a certain order to each other of beginning, middle, and end; under their accounts they lead us to the three persons, however they are diversified. (The reply to the fourth objection can be found in the body of the article above.)
Article 3
Whether there is a vestige in every created thing
To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.45.7; 93.6; SCG IV.26; On the Power of God, q. 9, a. 9.) It seems there is not a vestige in every created thing.
Obj. 1: For the likeness of a vestige is divided against the likeness of an image. But there are some created things in which there is the likeness of an image, like in man. Therefore a vestige is not in them.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, a vestige is a likeness that represents in an imperfect way. But there are some created things that are perfect likenesses of the divine goodness, such as graces that render one pleasing to God, (Gratia gratum faciens, “grace rendering one pleasing,” is the expression Aquinas uses to describe what is now called “sanctifying grace.” Cf. ST I-II.111.1.) since by them God is said to dwell within a man. Therefore a vestige is not in such.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, if we take the individual parts of a vestige, such as mode or species, each of them is created. Therefore if there is a vestige in every created thing, then there will be a mode, species, and order of the mode, and one will have to go to infinity—which neither intellect nor nature tolerates.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, Ambrose says, it is the nature of light that it does not exist in number, weight, and measure, the way other created things are. (Ambrose, Hexameron, bk. 1, ch. 9, para. 34 (PL 14:154).) Now, according to Augustine, (Augustine, On the Nature of Good, ch. 3 (CSEL 25:856; PL 42:553).) the vestige is noted in these three things, as was said in the previous article. Therefore, since light is a created thing, it seems that a vestige is not found in every created thing.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, Bernard says, the mode, or measure, of charity is not to have a measure. (Bernard of Clairveaux, Liber de diligendo Deo, ch. 1 (PL 182:974).) Therefore charity, since it is created, does not have mode, species, and order; and thus, the same thing follows as before.
On the contrary, Wisdom 11:21 says, you have disposed all things in number, weight, and measure. Furthermore, Augustine, in speaking of mode, species, and order, says, where these three are great, the good is great; where small, the good is small; where they are absent, the good is absent. (Augustine, On the Nature of Good, ch. 3 (CSEL 25:856; PL 42:553).) But every created thing is a certain good, so every created thing has these three.
I answer that a vestige is found in what is created insofar as it attains perfect existence from God, as was said in the previous article. Whence only in those things that are perfected in themselves does one simply speaking find a vestige, and only individuals in the genus of substance are such. However, accidents do not have existence except as depending on substance, so in accidents also there is no vestige except according to their order to substance. Thus accidents more are the modes, species, and orders of substances than they themselves have species, mode, and order—unless God as efficient cause might be said to be the species, mode, and order of accidents. Yet insofar as every accident is some existence added to substance itself, one can in a certain way consider a vestige with respect to that existence. Whence what lacks that accident, lacks parts of a vestige, that is, the mode, species, and order, with respect to that existence; for example, sin, which lacks grace, is said to be a privation of mode, species, and order, with respect to graced existence. Nonetheless, these three remain with respect to the existence of the nature.
Reply Obj. 1: The power of the lower is always included within the power of the higher, just as the power of nature is also within the soul. For the soul is a nature of the very body that moves through its very self, and it gives it natural existence, and over and above this, it has its own proper activities. And therefore although the likeness of being an image follows the soul as intellectual, there is not excluded from it thereby the account of a vestige; for it attains the latter insofar as it is a created nature.
Reply Obj. 2: So too one must say that grace rendering one pleasing, insofar as it adds something to other created things, is called a perfect likeness not simply speaking, but rather, relative to the likenesses in other created things. But with respect to that wherein it has something in common with the other created things, it has the account of a vestige.
Reply Obj. 3: Something is said to be modified, or measured, by something in two ways: either formally, and thus a thing is said to be modified by its mode, which is in it; or efficiently, and thus all things are modified by that which imposes the mode upon things. And this latter is how God is said to be the mode of all things, as the efficient cause. Therefore, according to this I say that a created thing’s mode does not have a mode whereby it is modified formally, but a mode modifying it efficiently. And so it is with all other parts of the vestige.
Reply Obj. 4: Considered in itself, light was created in number, weight, and measure, since it has a finite existence and potential, as do other created things. But relative to the other bodily creatures it has an indeterminate power, in that all bodies in some way receive formation through light, and all lower bodies are perfected in their own natures through it. And this happens insofar as it is a universal form, and that of the first altering body, namely, of the heavens; and because of this, it is said not to have been created in number, weight, and measure.
Reply Obj. 5: Charity can be considered in two ways.
First, it can be considered according to the existence that it has in a subject—and in this way it has mode according to the measure of the capacity of its recipient, whether from its nature or from its exertion.
Or second, it can be considered according to its inclination to its object—and in this way it is understood not to have a mode; for the object, because it is infinite, is not proportionate to our will. Whence one can never love God as much as he ought to be loved, and as he wills to love himself.
Exposition of the first part of the text
Invisible things of God, (Sent. I, 3.1(9).1, quoting Romans 1:20: from the creation of the world his invisible things of God, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made.) refers to the attributes by which God is perfect in himself; power is mentioned in reference to his production of created things; divinity is mentioned insofar as created things return to him as to their end. Or, invisible things refers to his activities, which are invisible, power to his might, and divinity to his essence.
Because of the excellence by which man stands above all other creatures. (Sent. I, 3.1(9).1.) On the contrary, an angel is more excellent than man, as it says in the Psalm: you have made him a little less than the angels (Ps 8:5 [6]). (RSV: thou hast made him little less than God.) To this I say that man and angel can be considered in three ways: either through their relation to the end—and thus they are equal, for men will be as the angels in heaven, as is said in Matthew 22:30; with respect to the divine restoration—and thus man is greater than an angel, insofar as human nature has been assumed into the unity of a divine person; or with respect to each nature in itself—and thus the angel’s nature is nobler. Or one could say that the world here (Romans 1:20.) is taken only as containing visible things, and in this way an angel is not counted among the creatures of the world that man exceeds.
From the perpetuity of creatures, the Creator is understood to be eternal. (Sent. I, 3.1(9).6.) For the cause is always nobler than what is caused, so if what is caused is perpetual, the first cause must be eternal; and so it is for the others.
The most perfect beauty is understood to be the Son. (Sent. I, 3.1(9) 8.) Beauty consists in two things: in splendor and in the proportion of parts. However, truth has the account of splendor, and equality holds the place of proportion.
Division of the second part of the text
But now we have come to the debated point of where one may find the image of the Trinity in the human mind. (Sent. I, 3.2(10).1.) In this part he shows the Trinity of persons and the unity of the essence through a likeness of image. It is divided into three parts: in the first, he shows the substance of the image; in the second, he shows in what respect the image is being considered, at but see, the mind remembers, understands, and loves itself; (Sent. I, 3.2(10).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 14, ch. 8 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1044).) in the third, he takes us from the likeness of the image to the Trinity of persons, at in accordance with this consideration, . . . ‘let us believe that Father and Son and Holy Spirit are one God.’ (Sent. I, 3.4(12).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 9, ch. 1 (CCSL 50; PL 42:961).)
But see, the mind remembers, understands, and loves itself. (Sent. I, 3.2(10).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 14, ch. 8 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1044).) Here he makes inquiry as regards what the image attends to in the mind.
First, he assigns the image in reference to the powers;
second, he does so in reference to the habits, at the trinity in the soul, . . . can also be distinguished in another way and by other terms. (Sent. I, 3.3(11).3.)
As regards the first he does three things: first, he assigns the parts of the image; second, he manifests in them the likeness of the three persons, at and so let us most particularly discuss these three things; (Sent. I, 3.2(10).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 11 (CCSL 50; PL 42:983).) third, he manifests their dissimilarity, at and yet let him beware lest he so compare to its maker this image made by the Trinity as to believe it to be entirely like it. (Sent. I, 3.3(11).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 15, ch. 20 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1088).)
And so let us most particularly discuss these three things. (Sent. I, 3.2(10).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 11 (CCSL 50; PL 42:983).) Here he shows the likeness of the persons within the three designated powers. And first he brings in a proof; second, he lays out a manifestation of the things said, at but the mind here is taken to stand for the spirit itself; (Sent. I, 3.2(10).5.) third, he excludes an objection, at here it is to be diligently examined. (Sent. I, 3.2(10).6.)
In the first, he does two things: first, he manifests the likeness as regards the distinction of persons and the unity of the essence; second, he does this as regards the equality of the persons, at also, they are equal not only each to each, but also each to all. (Sent. I, 3.2(10).4, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 11 (CCSL 50; PL 42:983).) He shows this equality with the following argument. Whatever things include each other are equal to each other; but each of the aforesaid powers holds the other, and each holds all of them; therefore each is equal to each, and each of them is equal to all of them at once, as is so of the divine persons. He proves the minor premise at and I remember concurrently my whole memory and intelligence and will; (Sent. I, 3.2(10).4, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 11 (CCSL 50; PL 42:983).) and he first does this for memory; second, for understanding, at similarly, when I understand these three, I understand all of them at once; (Sent. I, 3.2(10).4, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 11 (CCSL 50; PL 42:983).) and third, for will, at my will also contains my whole intelligence and my whole memory. (Sent. I, 3.2(10).4, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 11 (CSL 50; PL 42:983).)
He shows the first as follows. Whatever is present to the memory is in the memory. But the whole of memory itself is present to itself. Therefore it holds its entire self. Furthermore, whatever I understand and will, I know myself to understand and will. But whatever I know myself to understand and will is in my memory. Therefore memory holds its entire self, and the intellect and the will. Second, he proves the same thing about intelligence, in this way: everything that is not unknown is in the intellect, but whatever is willed or understood or held in memory is not unknown. Therefore every such thing is in the intellect. Therefore intelligence holds all three. Third, he shows the same thing about the will. For everything that I make use of is in my will, with whatever activity I use, because the will is the universal mover of one’s powers. But I use everything that I will or understand or remember. Therefore everything of this sort is in my will, and thus my will holds all of them. Having established this, he concludes to the likeness, at and so, since all of them in their entirety are mutually contained by each, they are each severally equal to each severally. (Sent. I, 3.2(10).4, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 11 (CCSL 50; PL 42:984).)
But the mind here is taken to stand for the spirit itself. (Sent. I, 3.2(10).5.) Here he manifests some of the things that he had said: and first, how “mind” should be taken; and second, how “memory” should be taken, at it is also to be noted. (Sent. I, 3.2(10).5.)
Here it is to be diligently examined in what sense is to be taken what was said above. (Sent. I, 3.2(10).6.) Here he removes an objection against what he has said, that the three aforesaid powers are one essence. And first he presents the objection; second, he presents its solution, at but we must now examine how these three can be termed one substance. (Sent. I, 3.2(10).8.) Now, the objection is drawn from two sources, first from the fact that no property is the essence to which the property belongs, whereas these powers are natural properties of the soul itself, so they are not the one essence of the soul. The second is presented at and these three also refer to themselves. (Sent. I, 3.2(10).7.) And it is drawn from the fact that these powers are spoken of in relation to each other, whence they differ from each other. Therefore how all of them could be one essence appears wondrous.
And yet let him beware lest he so compare to its maker this image made by the Trinity as to believe it to be entirely like it. (Sent. I, 3.3(11).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 15, ch. 20 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1088).) Here he shows its unlikeness, and this is divided into two parts, according to the two dissimilarities. The second is at moreover, this image, which is man endowed with those three things, is one person. (Sent. I, 3.3(11).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 15, ch. 23 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1090–91).)
The Trinity in the soul . . . can also be distinguished in another way and by other terms. (Sent. I, 3.3(11).3.) Here he assigns the image in reference to the habits. And first he assigns the parts of the image; second, he proves the likeness, at these three things, even though they are mutually distinct, yet are said to be one; (Sent. I, 3.3(11).4.) third, he concludes his intention, at and so the rational mind, considering these three things and the one essence in which they exist, extends itself to the contemplation of the Creator. (Sent. I, 3.3(11).8.) Moreover, he shows the likeness in three respects: first, as regards the distinction of the persons in the unity of the essence; second, as regards the procession of the persons, at and the mind is, as it were, the parent, and its knowledge is, as it were, its offspring; (Sent. I, 3.3(11).5.) third, as regards their equality, at nor is the offspring less than the parent. (Sent. I, 3.3(11).6.) This he shows in two ways: first, because to the degree that it is a mind, so far does it understand and love; second, because these three mutually contain each other, at these three things also exist severally in themselves. (Sent. I, 3.3(11).7, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 9, ch. 5 (CCSL 50; PL 42:965).)
Question 3
Image of God
To understand this part, two things are asked about:
first, the subject of the image; (Q. 3.)
second, the enumerated parts of the image. (Qq. 4–5.)
Article 1
Whether the subject of the image is only the mind
To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.93.1, 3, 6.) It seems that the subject of God’s image is not only the mind.
Obj. 1: For Augustine shows (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 2, ch. 2 (CCSL 50; PL 42:985).) that there is an image of the Trinity within bodily vision with respect to the three things necessary for vision: the exterior reality, its image in the eye, and the intention of the one seeing it, which joins together the first two. But bodily vision does not pertain to the mind. Therefore and so on.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Damascene (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 18 (PG 94:1071).) points out the image within our free decision, which also does not seem to be among things pertaining to the mind.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, Augustine says, the image of the Trinity should be sought in our soul, and it holds nothing better than it. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 14, ch. 8 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1044).) But this appears to be the higher reason, according to which the soul adheres to eternal contemplations. Therefore it seems that the image is in our higher reason.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, Dionysius says, an angel is a divine image. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 22 (PG 3:723).) Therefore it seems that the image is not only in our mind.
On the contrary (5), it seems that God’s image is not in any created thing. For an image, as Hilary says, is a thing’s indistinguishable and united likeness to a coequal thing. (Hilary of Poitiers, Liber de synodis, ch. 13 (PL 10:490).) But nothing created is coequal with its Creator. Therefore in no created thing can there be found an image of the Creator.
I answer that an image differs from a vestige in this: a vestige is a confused and imperfect likeness of some reality, whereas an image represents the reality more determinately with respect to all its parts and the dispositions of its parts, from which also something of the interior parts of the reality can be perceived. And therefore God’s image is said to be only in those creatures that, on account of their nobility, more perfectly imitate and represent him. And therefore it is in the angel and in man with respect to what is nobler in him. However, other things that participate in more and less of God’s goodness more approach the account of an image.
Reply Obj. 1: Augustine shows that there is a likeness of the Trinity in many things, but in none of them is there as perfect likeness as there is in the powers of the mind, where one finds a consubstantial distinction and equality. However, it is certain that those three elements spoken of in vision are not consubstantial, and therefore he asserts that the image is only in the mind.
Reply Obj. 2: There cannot be a perfect likeness in free decision, since no distinction of powers is found there. Nor is it even a more excellent part of the soul, since it is only an operative part, whereas the contemplative part of the soul is nobler than the operative. But Damascene points out the image there by calling broadly just any likeness an “image.” However, free decision does imitate God insofar as it is the first principle of their actions that is incapable of being coerced.
Reply Obj. 3: The higher reason adheres to eternal contemplations insofar as they are rules and norms for things to be done, that is, insofar as we are directed by divine reasons in our actions. Whence an image is not there, but in that part that contemplates eternal things in reference to themselves.
Reply Obj. 4: The Trinity’s image can be considered in three ways. The first is with respect to an express representation of the divine attributes. And in this way, since divine goodnesses more copiously shine forth in an angel than in a man, the angel is a more express image of God than is man; according to Gregory’s exposition, (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 32, ch. 23 (CCSL 143B; PL 75:665).) this is why it is also called the “signet of perfection” (Ezek 28:12). The second is with respect to the distinction of the persons. And in this way there is more express likeness in a man than in an angel, since in an angel its powers are less distinct from each other. The third is inasmuch as God himself is the principle of things. And in this way the image is found in man and not in the angel, insofar as one man is the principle of all men just as God is the principle of all things, and insofar as the soul is a whole in the entire body just as God is in the world. But because this representation is in reference to exterior things, one should grant that simply speaking the angel is more according to the image of God than is man.
Reply Sed Contra 5: The image is found in the Son and what is created in different ways, as Augustine says, (Augustine, Sermones ad populum, sermon 9: De decem chordis, ch. 8 (CCSL 41:125; PL 38:82).) like the king’s image in his son and in a coin. For the Son of God is a perfect image of the Father representing him perfectly, whereas the creature, insofar as it falls short of representing him, falls short of the perfect account of an image. So too he is called both the image and “according to the image” (Gen 1:26–27), which latter is not said of the Son. Therefore it is not necessary that the creature be simply speaking equal to the Creator, for this is true only of the Son, who is the perfect image, but insofar as the image represents in only a certain respect, as imperfect, so too it is equal only in a certain respect.
Question 4
Parts of the image of God
Next one asks about the parts of the image: and first about the first assignment of its parts; (Namely, memory, intelligence, and love/will; see Sent. I, 3.2(10).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 11 (CCSL 50; PL 42:938).) second, about the second. (Namely, mind, knowledge, and love; see Sent. I, 3.3(11).3, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 9, ch. 3 (CCSL 50; PL 42:963).) As regards the first, five things are asked about:
first, what each of the parts of the image is, and how they differ from each other;
second, how they relate to the essence, whether they themselves are the soul’s essence;
third, how they relate to each other, that is, whether one arises from another;
fourth, about themselves in relation to their object, that is, with respect to what object is the Trinity’s image considered to be in them;
fifth, about themselves in relation to their act, that is, whether the aforesaid powers are always active.
Article 1
Whether memory pertains to the image
To the first we proceed as follows. It appears that memory does not pertain to the image.
Obj. 1: For, as Augustine says, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 12, ch. 1 (CCSL 50; PL 42:997).) what you find in the soul that we share in common with the beasts pertains to the sensory part. But memory is common to us and the beasts. Therefore, since the image is not in the sensory part, it appears that memory does not pertain to the image.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, every power apprehending a determinate difference of time pertains to the sensitive part of the soul, and not to the intellect, which apprehends universal matters, which the intellect abstracts from every time. But memory concerns time past. Therefore it does not pertain to the intellectual part, wherein is the image, but to the sensitive.
Obj. 3: The Commentator says (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 12, text. 39: intellectio esse quiddam maxime delectabile, memoria autem propter hanc, “understanding is a certain most delightful thing, but memory is because of this.”) that the intellectual nature is divided into the intellect and the will; nor has any philosopher who has considered the powers of the soul ever asserted that memory is within the intellectual part. Therefore memory does not pertain to the image.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, it seems that neither does what is intellectual pertain to the image. For according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 4, para. 2 (PG 3:179).) four grades of beings are distinguished: the intellectual, the rational, the sensitive, and the simply existing. Now, man is not contained under the intellectual, but under the rational. Therefore, since here we are asking what the image is insofar as it is in man, it seems that intelligence does not pertain to the image.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, powers are distinguished through their acts. But to know and to understand do not differ except perhaps as to possess in habit and to behold in act; and powers are diversified in this way, since having the habit and eliciting the act belong to the same power. Therefore intelligence, whose designated act it is to understand, is not a different power from memory, whose designated act is to know.
Obj. 6: Furthermore, it seems that neither does the will. For the will is a principle of activity. But the image should be sought in the highest part, which is the speculative part. Therefore the will does not pertain to the image.
Obj. 7: Furthermore, Augustine says, the image is in the power of knowing, but the likeness is in the power of loving. (Rather: Alcher of Clairvaux, The Spirit and the Soul, ch. 10 (PL 40:786).) But the will is not a power of knowing, but rather one of loving. Therefore the will does not pertain to the image, but to the likeness of God.
Obj. 8: Furthermore, what commands others and moves others is prior to them. But the will moves all the other powers, as Anselm says. (In fact, Anselm’s student: Eadmerus the Monk, Liber de similitudinibus, ch. 2 (PL 160:605).) Therefore it is prior to memory and intelligence, and so this designation does not correspond to the order of persons, since the will is appropriated to the Holy Spirit.
I answer that every property consequent on the soul’s essence according to its nature is here being called a power of the soul, whether or not it is ordered to action. Therefore, since the soul’s nature is receptive insofar as it has something of possibility—in that everything possessing being from something else is possible in itself, as Avicenna proves, (Avicenna, De intelligentiis, ch. 4. See note above on the doubtful authorship of the De intelligentiis, at d. 2, q. 1, a. 3.)—and is not impressed on a bodily organ, since it has an activity independent of the body, that is, understanding, therefore a certain property is consequent on it, such that it retains things impressed on it. This is why it is said (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429a27.) that the soul is the place of the species, and not the whole soul, but the intellect. Therefore such a power of retaining is here being called the power of memory. Furthermore, because the soul is untainted by matter, and every such nature is intellectual, it follows that what it holds onto within itself is understood by it, and thus, after memory there follows intelligence. And furthermore, because what is understood is received as suitable to the one understanding it, the will then follows, which stretches toward what is suitable to it. Nor can one proceed further, since the will is related to the end, the object of which is the good, and a thing’s perfection does not extend further than its end. And in this way the three powers—memory, intelligence, and will—are distinct from each other.
Reply Obj. 1: In the way it is being taken here, memory is not something shared in common by us and the beasts. This is clear from the authority of the Philosopher mentioned in the body, since only the intellectual soul retains what it receives within itself, whereas the sensitive soul retains things in a bodily organ.
Reply Obj. 2: The name “memory” is equivocal. For memory, as it is being taken here, abstracts from every difference of time, as is said in the text, (Sent. I, 3.2(10).5.) since it is of things present, past, and future. But it is being taken in the objection for the memory that that belongs to the sensitive part of the soul, which has an organ in the back part of the head, and is the storehouse of the sensible intentions that are with sensation, but which have not been received from sensation, as Avicenna says. (Avicenna, Liber de anima, pt. 4, ch. 4.)
Reply Obj. 3: The philosophers accepted as powers only those that are ordered to some act. But the retentive property of the soul does not have any act; rather, in place of an act it has this very thing, that it retains. And this is why they made no mention of memory, so spoken of, among the powers of the soul.
Reply Obj. 4: Dionysius says (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7, para. 3 (PG 3:871).) that the lower nature at its highest touches the lowest part of the higher nature. And therefore the soul’s nature, at its highest, touches the lowest part of the angelic nature, and therefore in some way in its highest part participates in intellectuality. And because the image is designated in the soul in reference to what is best in it, therefore it is designated more as intelligence than as reason. For reason is nothing other than the intellectual nature when darkened; this is why it knows only by making inquiry, and over a continuous time, what is bestowed on the intellect at once, and with a full light. And therefore the knowing of first principles, which offer themselves at once to cognition, is said to be an act of intellect.
Reply Obj. 5: To understand and to know are different. For knowing is holding knowledge of a thing within oneself, whereas understanding speaks of looking upon it. Now, although to every power belongs a holding of its own habit and object, still this belongs to them only insofar as the power of memory is present in them, which latter immediately follows on the essence of the nature, just as the power of the prior is always in the posterior.
Reply Obj. 6: The object of the will is the good, and the good has the account of an end. But the end belongs to both contemplation and action. And therefore the will stands not only on the side of the active part of the soul, but also on the contemplative. Whence it pertains to the highest part of the soul.
Reply Obj. 7: Augustine uses power of knowing (Rather: Alcher of Clairvaux, The Spirit and the Soul, ch. 10 (PL 40:786).) in a broad sense, whether it be what is ordered to knowing, as is memory, or that by which one knows, as is intelligence, or what follows upon knowing, as is will. However, he calls the “power of loving” the gratuitous habits by which we love God meritoriously. And this is why it is said that a man who by sin casts off the likeness of God enters a region of unlikeness, but he does not cast off the image.
Reply Obj. 8: Just as in the arts what considers the end commands and moves the arts that consider things that are for the sake of the end—as the physician commands the pharmacist, as has been said above—so it is with the powers of the soul. For the will, since it considers the end, moves all the other powers ordered to the end and commands their acts for them. Whence, although it is prior in moving them, still it does not follow that it is prior in existence, just as the end too is last in existence and yet it moves the efficient cause.
Article 2
Whether the soul’s essence is its powers
To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that the essence of the soul is its powers.
Obj. 1: First, because of what is said in the text: they are one life, one mind, one essence. (Sent. I, 3.2(10).3, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 11 (CCSL 50; PL 42:983).)
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the same thing is the principle of being and of acting. But the soul is the principle of being, since it is the substantial form of the body. Therefore through itself it is the principle of its actions. Therefore intermediate powers are not needed.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, a substantial form is nobler than an accidental form. But an accidental form performs its actions without any intermediate power. Therefore so does a substantial form, and thus the same thing as before follows.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, prime matter is its own potency. But just as passive potency follows from matter, so too active potency follows from form. Therefore an essential form is also its own active potency, and so the same thing as before.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, everything that does not belong to a thing’s essence is an accident. But sensation and reason, which are certain powers, are not accidents, since they are principles of substantial differences. Therefore they belong to the essence of the soul itself.
On the contrary, as ability relates to being, so does potency relate to essence. But in God alone is it true to say that his being is his ability. Therefore in nothing else is its essence its power, and so neither in the soul.
Furthermore, every agent that acts through its own essence is a first agent, as Avicenna says. (Avicenna, De intelligentiis, ch. 1. See note above on the doubtful authorship of the De intelligentiis, at d. 2, q. 1, a. 3.) The reason for this is that every secondary agent acts insofar as it participates in something, and so it acts through something added to its essence. But the soul is not a first agent. Therefore it is not an agent through its own essence, but through its power. Therefore its power is not its essence.
Furthermore, because perfection and the perfectible are proportionate, perfectible things of diverse proportions must receive diverse perfections. Now, the diverse organs of an ensouled body have diverse proportions in their combination. Therefore they are perfected in diverse ways by the soul. However, they are not perfected diversely as regards existence, since the soul, being a substantial form, gives one existence to the entire body. Therefore they must be perfected in diverse ways as regards the perfections that follow on existence, in virtue of which they have diverse activities. But these perfections that are principles of the soul’s activities we call “powers.” Therefore the powers of the soul must be different from its essence, as emanating from it.
I answer that the proper and immediate effect must be proportionate to its cause. This is why in all things in which the proximate principle of activity belongs to the genus of substance, its activity is its substance—and this is so only in God. And therefore he alone is the one who does not act through an intermediate power that is different from his substance.
However, in all other things activity is an accident, and therefore the proximate principle of its activity must be an accident. We see this in bodies: the substantial form of fire has no activity except by mediation of active and passive qualities, which are, as it were, its virtues and powers. Likewise I say that no activity comes from the soul, since it is a substance, except by a mediating power, and neither does a perfect activity come from the power except by a mediating habit. Now, these powers flow from the essence of the soul itself, some as perfections of the parts of the body—the activity of which takes place with the body mediating, such as sensation, imagination, and the like—and some as being in the soul itself, the activity of which does not require a body, such as the intellect, the will, and the like. And therefore I say that these are accidents, but not that they are common accidents, which do not flow from the principles of the species but follow upon the principles of the individual, but rather as proper accidents, which do follow upon the species, having taken their origin from its principles. Yet they simultaneously belong to the integrity of the soul itself, insofar as it is a potential whole, possessing a certain perfection of power that is constituted of diverse capacities.
Reply Obj. 1: When it is said that the three powers are one mind, this is not an essential predication, but the predication of a potential whole of its parts. This is why mind is being predicated more proximately and first of the powers of imagination than of the essence or life, since these powers in which consists the integrity of the image belong to the mind as such. Less properly is life predicated of them, which nevertheless includes the powers generally that are the principles of life’s activities, and even less properly are they called one essence, in which, as essence, powers are not included—except as in their origin, insofar as from an essence arise the powers, in which the image is found.
For a potential whole is, as it were, intermediate between an integral whole and a universal whole. For a universal is present in its every subjective part with respect to existence and perfect power, and therefore it is predicated properly of its part. But an integral whole is not present to its every part either with respect to existence or with respect to power. For the whole house is not in the wall, and neither is its entire power, and therefore in no way is it predicated of its part. A potential whole, however, is present in its every part with respect to its existence and with respect to something of its power, but not with respect to its perfect power; indeed, with respect to perfect power it is present only in its supreme power. And therefore the potential whole is indeed predicated of its part, but not quite so properly, the way a universal whole is.
Reply Obj. 2: The essence of the soul itself is also a principle of acting, but by mediation of the power. However, it is the principle of existing immediately, since existence is not an accident.
Reply Obj. 3: An accidental form is the power of another, through which an activity is produced, which activity is the effect proportionate to it as to a proximate cause. But a substantial form is not in this way proportionate to an activity, as was said in the body of the article.
Reply Obj. 4: If by “passive potency” we understand the relation of matter to form, then matter is not its own potency, since the essence of matter is not a relation. However, if “potency” is understood insofar as it is a principle in the genus of substance, insofar as potency and act are principles in every genus, as is said in Metaphysics 12, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.5, 1071a20.) then I say that matter itself is its own potency. And in this way prime matter, which is the first recipient, stands to passive potency as God, who is the first agent, stands to active potency. And therefore matter is its own passive potency just as God too is his own active potency. However, all intermediate things have both potencies by participation, and the potency of matter is not relative to any activity, but only to receiving.
Reply Obj. 5: Sensation as the name of the power is not a principle of the specific difference of animals, which is sensitive, but is insofar as it names the sensitive nature. And so it is for the others.
Article 3
Whether one power arises from another
To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 2; ST I.77.7; Disputed Questions on the Soul, a. 13, ad 7–8.) It seems that one power of the soul does not arise from another.
Obj. 1: For whenever things are simultaneous, the one does not arise from the other. But all the powers are simultaneously in the soul from its creation. Therefore one does not arise from another.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, every accident is caused by its subject. But one power is not the subject of another, since the subject of an accident is not an accident. Therefore one power does not arise from another.
On the contrary, powers are determined relative to their acts. But the act of one power follows naturally on the act of another power, and originates from it; for example, understanding follows from the fact that one possesses knowledge. Therefore so too is it in the powers.
Furthermore, if you say that the order is in the acts by reason of the objects, not by reason of the powers, this reduces to the same thing. For the objects are the perfections of the powers, and of their very forms, but a perfection is proportionate to what is perfectible, and so the same thing follows as before.
I answer that every manifold thing that descends naturally from some one thing must descend according to an order, since only one thing goes forth from one thing. And therefore, since many powers come forth from the soul’s essence, we say that there is a natural order in the powers of the soul. And although all of them flow from the essence, still one flows by the mediation of another; and this is why a posterior power supposes the prior power in its definition, and the act of the posterior depends on the prior. For if we were to define intellect, it would be defined through its act, which is understanding, and within its definition would fall the act of the prior power, and the power itself. For within the definition of the act that is understanding there must fall the image, which is its object, as is said in the De anima, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.8, 432a3–14.) and which, through the act of imagination, is presented back to the intellect. And we see this also in the accidents of bodies, that all the different accidents of the elements flow from their essence, by the mediation of the first qualities.
Reply Obj. 1: Although they are simultaneous in time, nonetheless one is naturally prior to another.
Reply Obj. 2: An accident from its very self does not have the power of producing another accident; rather, one accident can go forth from substance by the mediation of another accident insofar as the latter is presupposed in the subject. And so too an accident cannot be through itself the subject of an accident; rather, the subject, by mediation of the one accident, is subjected to a second accident. On account of this, surface is said to be the subject of color.
Article 4
Whether the image is seen in these rational powers in reference to all of their objects
To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.93.8; On Truth, q. 10, a. 7.) It seems that God’s image is seen in these powers in reference to all of their objects.
Obj. 1: For a power by its nature as a power relates to all its objects in the same way, but through its diverse habits it is restricted to these ones or those ones. Therefore, since assignment of the first image is with respect to the powers, (ST I.93.7, resp.: primo et principaliter attenditur imago Trinitatis in mente secundum actus . . .; secundario et quasi ex consequenti potest attendi secundum potentias.; “the image of the Trinity in our mind is primarily and principally associated with the act. . . . There can be in the soul a secondary and, as it were, implied image of the Trinity that is associated with the soul’s powers and mainly with its habits, insofar as the acts exist virtually in the habits.” Nevertheless, the first assignment, not that which is first and principally attended to, is in the soul according to its powers. Indeed, the first is not necessarily chiefly and first found.) not the habits, it seems that it is in reference to all of their objects.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says, when we seek the Trinity in the nature of the human mind, we seek it in the whole of it, not separating its action about temporal matters from the contemplation of eternal ones. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 12, ch. 4 (CCSL 50; PL 42:1000).) Now, all the mind’s objects are either eternal or temporal. Therefore the image is considered in reference to all the objects.
On the contrary, equality is required for the account of an image. But the equality of an image is not found in all these objects, for it is not the case that to the degree that I know something, so too do I will it. Therefore it appears that the image is not considered in reference to all the objects.
Furthermore, according to this designation of the image, understanding follows on memory. But in things that we know through an acquired knowledge, memory follows on understanding. Therefore it seems that this designation of the image is not considered in reference to all the objects.
I answer that, as has been said, (Above, q. 3, a. 1.) “image” signifies an express representation, but an express representation is found in these very powers. There are five reasons for this, two of which hold because of the soul itself—the consubstantiality and distinction of the powers—and therefore they stand indifferently with regard to all the objects; but the other three—equality, order, and actual imitation—are in reference to the objects, whence they stand in diverse ways with regard to the diverse objects.
However, two sorts of equality can be attended to in the powers of the soul: that of power to power, and that of power to object. And this second equality is preserved here in diverse ways in reference to the diverse objects. For in things that are learned through an acquired habit, the order is not upheld, as was said above; (In the second sed contra, and also above, q. 2, a. 3.) for the act of understanding precedes the act of remembering, so the actual representation of the Trinity itself is not there, insofar as it intends those objects that do not express the Trinity. However, a certain equality is upheld here, namely, that of a power to a power, since whatever things are comprehended by one power are comprehended by the other; for it is not the case that whatever we understand we also will, simply speaking, but in a certain way those things are in the will insofar as we will ourselves to understand them. But the equality of power to object is not upheld, since bodily things are in the soul in a nobler way than they are in themselves, since the soul is nobler than them, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Trinity (CCSL 50), bk. 10, ch. 6; De duabus animabus, ch. 2 (CSEL 25).) However, if such powers are considered in reference to the object that is the soul, the order is preserved, since the soul itself is naturally present to itself; this is why the act of understanding comes from knowledge, and not vice versa. The equality of power to power is also preserved simply speaking, since to the degree that it understands itself, so too does it will and love itself—not as in the others, that it willed itself only to understand, but simply speaking. And the equality of power to object is also preserved there.
And the actual imitation of the Trinity itself is also preserved there, insofar as the soul itself is an image expressly leading to God. Moreover, if they are considered in reference to the object who is God, then an actual imitation is preserved there.
However, the order is preserved most of all because understanding proceeds from memory insofar as the order is in the soul by its essence, and it is held by the soul not through any acquisition. Also, the equality of power to power is there simply speaking, but not that of power to object, since God is higher than the soul. Whence I say that the image is in a certain way considered in reference to all of its objects, but it is there more truly in reference to its very self, and is there most truly in reference to the object that is God—except only that the equality of power to object is absent, which also does not contribute greatly to the image.
Reply Obj. 1: Although such a designation of the image is considered in reference to the powers absolutely speaking, nonetheless it is considered chiefly in reference to what is highest in them. And this is in reference to their objects, which are in the soul by its essence.
Reply Obj. 2: Augustine means that in reference to all of the objects the image is present in some way, but chiefly in reference to the object that is God and the object that is the soul. For he seeks the likeness of the Trinity in many things so that he might come to a perfect image.
Reply Sed Contra: The response to the other side is clear from the things that have been said.
Article 5
Whether these powers are always in act as regards the objects wherein the image is found
To the fifth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.93.7; On Truth, q. 10, a. 3.) It seems that these powers are not always in their acts as regards the objects wherein the image is chiefly found.
Obj. 1: For the Philosopher says (See perhaps Aristotle, On the Soul 2.2, 414a20–28; 3.1, 425b6‒10; 3.2, 427a2–8.) that, with one power being in act, the soul is drawn away from another power by that power’s act. But these three are diverse powers. Therefore it is impossible for every one always to be in its act in reference to its every object.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Philosopher says (See perhaps Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.3, 1005b20‒32.) that one cannot understand many things simultaneously. But the soul sometimes understands certain things other than itself. Therefore at that time it does not simultaneously understand itself.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, for the soul to understand or see, according to Augustine, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 11, ch. 2 (CCSL 50; PL 42:985).) the intention of the knower is required, through which the species of the knowable is brought back to the reality. But whenever the soul understands, it intentionally understands self-understanding. Therefore, since we do not perceive ourselves always understanding the soul and God, it seems that our intellect is not always in act in reference to these objects.
On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.5, 430a23.) that the agent intellect always understands. But this seems to be so most of all relative to the things that are always present to it, like the soul and God. Therefore it seems that the intellect, in reference to these things, is always in act.
Furthermore, Augustine says, whatever is in my memory I remember. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 11 (CCSL 50; PL 42:983).) But the soul and God are always present to memory. Therefore memory is always in act in reference to them; and so too with the other powers.
I answer that, according to Augustine, (Augustine, De utilitate credendi, ch. 11, para. 25 (CSEL 25:31; PL 42:82); the words he uses are intellegere (sic), credere, and opinari, in that order.) thinking, discerning, and understanding are different. For to discern is to know a thing through its difference from other things. But to think is to consider a thing in reference to its parts and properties; this is why “to think” (cogitare) is, as it were, “to drive together” (coagitare). And “to understand” signifies nothing other than the intellect’s simple looking upon something intelligible that is present to it. Therefore I say that the soul does not always think about and discern God, nor itself, since then everyone would naturally know the entire nature of his soul, which one reaches only barely, and with great study. For the presence of a thing in just any way is not enough for such knowledge; rather, it must be there in the account of an object, and the intention of the knower is required. But insofar as “understanding” indicates nothing other than the look, which is nothing other than the presence of the intelligible to the intellect in whatever manner, then in this way the soul does always understand itself and God, and a certain indeterminate love is consequent upon this.
Nonetheless, according to the philosophers, one can understand that the soul always understands itself in another way, in that everything understood is understood only as illuminated by the light of the agent intellect and received in the potential intellect. Whence, just as bodily light is seen in every color, so too the light of the agent intellect is seen in every intelligible object—yet not in the account of an object, but in the account of a means of knowing.
Reply Obj. 1: This should be understood to be when the powers are active as regards their diverse objects. For then one impedes another in its own act, or it draws it back from the whole. But when they are ordered to the same object, one assists the other; for example, what we see, we imagine more easily.
Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher is speaking about understanding insofar as it is a complete activity of the intellect when distinguishing or thinking about something, and not the way understanding is being taken here.
Reply Obj. 3: In the same way, the intention of the intellect is not required for the latter understanding, as was said in the body of the article.
Question 5
Designation of the parts of the image
Article 1
Whether these parts of the image: mind, knowledge, and love, differ from the other parts
Next, one asks about the designation of the image, namely, in the mind, knowledge, and love. (This is the second formulation of the image that Lombard takes from Augustine; Sent. I, 3.3(11).3.) And it seems that this designation does not differ from that stated before, as it was said that this one is assigned with respect to the habits, whereas the former was with respect to the powers.
Obj. 1: For the image in the soul is attended to chiefly in reference to the object that is the soul and the object that is God. But the soul does not know itself with the mode of knowledge that we are speaking about here by the mediation of a habit, but through its own essence. Therefore it does not seem that the image should be designated in reference to any habits.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, no habit is consubstantial with the one to whom it belongs, since every habit is an accident. But knowledge and love are consubstantial with the mind itself, as it is spoken of here. Therefore they are not habits.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the “mind” above was taken (Above, q. 3, a. 1.) not for a habit, but for the subject of the powers. Therefore, since it is being made known by the Master in the same way here as before—that is, as the more excellent thing in the soul—it seems that it is not a habit, and this designation is not according to habits.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, a habit is not an action, but rather a principle of action. Therefore, since here he says (Sent. I, 3.3(11).3.) that the mind knows and loves itself, it seems that it is not being taken here for a habit.
On the contrary (5), to every power corresponds its own habit. Therefore, if the mind is not a habit, but the soul’s very essence (as its being taken here), there will be four parts of the image, the mind and the three habits of the three powers. And then it will not represent the Trinity.
I answer that “mind” is said in many ways according to some. For sometimes it is said to be the intellectual nature itself, just as Dionysius calls angels “divine minds.” (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4 (PG 3:694).) Sometimes it is said to be the intellect itself as examining things, according to which “mind” (mens) is said from “I measure/you measure” (metior), and it is said above that in this sense the mind is the higher part of the soul. Sometimes “mind” is used for memory, being derived from recollecting (reminiscendo); and this is how it is being spoken of here. Whence they say that “mind” here is being taken for the habit of memory, “knowledge” for the habit of the understanding, and “love” for the habit of the will.
But because this opinion does follow the Master’s opinion, and is too tortuous, one should explain it otherwise, such that “mind” here is being taken, as above, for the higher part of the soul that is the subject of the aforesaid image, and knowledge is the habit of memory, and love the habit of the will. And this designation is taken according to the essence and its consubstantial habits, whereas the earlier one was according to the powers. This is why in this there is not as great a conformity as in the previous one, nor is the designation so proper, on account of which also it is placed last.
Reply Obj. 1: Two things come together for the existence of an intellectual habit: the intelligible species and the light of the agent intellect, which makes the former intelligible in act. Whence, if there were some species that has light within itself, it would have the account of the habit as far as pertains to it being the principle of the act. So I say that when something that is in the soul not through its likeness, but through its essence is known by the soul, the very essence of the thing known stands in place of the habit. Whence I say that the very essence of the soul, insofar as it is moved by itself, has the account of a habit. And this is how “knowledge” is being taken here, for the thing known. And one should speak similarly of “love.”
Reply Obj. 2: The solution here is also clear because such habits will be consubstantial, since they are in the very substance of the soul, nor are there other habits there. However, if we were to say that “knowledge” and “love” signify the acts and not the habits, this would be even clearer, and then they would be called consubstantial, as was said of the powers above. (Above, q. 4, a. 2.)
Reply Obj. 3–4: We concede the third and the fourth objections.
Reply Sed Contra 5: A habit is a principle that elicits an activity. Whence, since memory does not through itself have an act that is simply speaking an activity, no habit corresponds to it; rather, by the same habit, namely, knowledge, memory and intelligence are traced back to one activity.
Exposition of the second part of the text
For in the mind itself, even before it becomes a partaker of God, his image is to be found. And even if the mind should become deformed by the loss of partaking in God, yet the divine image remains in it. (Sent. I, 3.2(10).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 14, ch. 8 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1044).) On the contrary, Lord, in your city you turn their image to nothing (Ps 73 [72]:20). (RSV: on awaking you despise their phantoms.) To this one should say that, as it says in the Gloss on Psalm 4:6 [4:7], you have marked your countenance on us, Lord, (RSV: lift up the light of thy countenance upon us, O Lord.) that the image of God in man is of three sorts. (Mandonnet notes that this interpretation is not exactly found in the Glossa ordinaria 3.463B (PL 113:849), but only: imago creationis, ratio; recreationis, gratias; similitudinis, tota Trinitas, “the image of creation, reason; the image of recreation, grace; and the image of likeness, the whole Trinity.”) There is the image of creation, which is reason insofar as it approaches imitation of the divine intellectuality; this is called an “image” through the manner in which, in bodily things, the trunk can be said to be the image [of a tree]. (Truncus could also mean the torso of a person, so an alternative interpretation is that the torso is an image of a person.) Further, there is the image of likeness, which consists in the distinction of the powers representing the Trinity of persons; and this too is likened to an image in bodily things, insofar as it is distinguished through the limitations of its parts. And lastly, there is the image of re-creation, which consists in the habitual graces and actually imitates God; and this is likened to an image in bodily things in reference to their colors and other things that adorn an image. And when spoken of this way, the image does not remain after sin, though it does in the other two ways.
For by this very fact is the mind an image of God: that it is capable of God and can partake of him. (Sent. I, 3.2(10).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 14, ch. 8 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1044).) This seems false, for everything that has the capacity for something is either greater than it or equal to it, as Augustine argues (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 14, ch. 4 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1010).) about the powers that have a mutual capacity for each other. Therefore it seems that our mind cannot have the capacity for God.
And if you say that it is called “capable” insofar as God is in the soul, then since he is in every created thing through his essence, presence, and power, it seems that even created things incapable of sensation have the capacity for God.
To this one should say that our mind is said to have the capacity for God as the perfectible has the capacity for its own perfection. For the object of an activity is in some way the perfection of the one performing it. However, our mind has an activity as regards God, through knowledge and love, that irrational creatures do not. And therefore the capacity is possessed by the mind as by what is perfectible, yet not as by what is proportionately perfectible. And therefore God is not comprehended but only reached by the mind, and thus it does not follow that the mind is equal to him.
Also, memory is said to be toward-something (That is, in the category of relation.) not according to being but according to speech.
But they are three by that same reason by which they are referred reciprocally to each other. (Sent. I, 3.2(10).3, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 11 (CCSL 50; PL 42:983).) This seems false, in that memory is not spoken of as relative to the will. One should say that, although it is not spoken of in reference to the will under the name “will,” still it is referred to the will insofar as the will can be remembered. Or one should say that they refer to each other according to a relation of origin, insofar as the one has a natural order to the other, as was said above. (Above, q. 4, a. 4.)
And I remember concurrently my whole memory and intelligence and will. (Sent. I, 3.2(10).4, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 11 (CCSL 50; PL 42:983).) This appears to be badly said, since “whole” is spoken in relation to its parts, but the power of the soul does not have parts, since it is simple. One should say to this that quantity is of two sorts. One is bulk or dimensive quantity, and a totality of this sort is considered relative to the parts into which it is divided. And there is also a certain quantity of power, the totality of which is considered relative to its objects. And this latter is the totality or wholeness in the powers of the soul. But furthermore, it seems that the one power is not equal in all of them, since every whole is greater than its part. One should say that this is true of a whole of dimensive or numerical quantity, the parts of which are of one account, but not of a whole of a quantity of power. For it can happen that one power has the capacity for just as many objects as several others, each of which has the capacity for all those objects, yet one of them has not the capacity for those objects in as many ways as the others.
Chapter 4 of 186