D. 17 - Invisible Sending of the Holy Spirit

Division of the first part of the Text

After he has considered the visible sending of the Holy Spirit, here he considers his invisible sending. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he determines the truth, according to his own opinion; in the second, he responds to objections made against it, at if the Holy Spirit is charity, and since charity may increase and diminish in a person . . . , here it is asked whether it is to be granted that the Holy Spirit may increase or diminish in a person. (Sent. I, 17.5(64).1.)

Concerning the first, he does three things: first, he announces his intention; second, he proposes the truth, at in order that this may be taught more intelligibly and perceived more fully, a certain premise must be made which is very necessary to this end; (Sent. I, 17.1(60).2.) third, he brings forward proof, at lest in such a great matter we should appear to interject anything of our own, let us confirm by sacred authorities what has been said above. (Sent. I, 17.1(60).3.)

This last part is divided into two, according to the two things he proves: first, he proves that charity is the Holy Spirit himself; second, he proves that the Holy Spirit is given to us precisely when he makes us love God, at accordingly, he is said to be sent or given when he is in us in such a manner as to make us love God. (Sent. I, 17.4(63).1.)

The first is divided into two parts: in the first, he proves that charity is the Holy Spirit; in the second, he excludes a certain response to his own position, at but lest someone perhaps may say that we say, ‘God is charity,’ in order to express a cause, . . . Augustine comes to our aid. (Sent. I, 17.3(62).1.)

Concerning the former, he does two things: first, he shows that charity is God; second, that, in a special way, charity itself is the Holy Spirit, at but although brotherly love is God, it is not the Father or the Son, but only the Holy Spirit who is properly and specifically called love or charity in the Trinity. (Sent. I, 17.2(61).1.)

Question 1

Charity

In order to understand this part of the text, we will inquire into five things:

first, whether charity is something created in the soul;

second, whether it is a substance or an accident;

third, according to what measure it is given;

fourth, whether he who has it can know this;

fifth, whether charity itself should be loved from charity.

Article 1

Whether charity is something created in the soul

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST II-II.33.2; Disputed Questions on the Virtues, q. 2, a. 1.) It seems that charity is not something created in the soul.

Obj. 1: For an agent that acts without using any means is more perfect than one that acts only by some means. But in our meritorious acts, the Holy Spirit acts within us both to will and to complete them, according to the Apostle: for all who are led by the Spirit of God are sons of God (Rom 8:14). (Aquinas may also have in mind Philippians 2:13: God is at work in you, both to will and to work.) Therefore, since he is the most perfect agent, it seems that he does not move us to this action through any intermediary created habit.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as the soul stands to the body as its life, so God stands to the soul as its life, as Augustine says. (Augustine, Sermones ad populum, serm. 161, ch. 1, para. 2; serm. 180, ch. 7 (CCSL 41Aa:129; PL 38:880 and CCSL 41Bb:673; PL38:976).) But the soul does not give life to the body by the mediation of any form. Therefore neither does the Holy Spirit give life to the soul by the mediation of any habit.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, grace’s existence is more immediately from God, and closer to him, than nature’s existence. But God, in creating, did not make use of any means when he instituted nature. Therefore neither does he in re-creating, when he infuses grace.

Obj. 4: This is also shown from the dignity of charity. For everything created is vanity. Therefore, if charity is something created, it too will be vanity. But vanity does not join us to the truth, nor does it confirm us in the truth. Therefore charity would not join us to God—which is false.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, nothing finite has an infinite power, since power flows from the essence, and every created thing is finite, so infinite power belongs to nothing created. But the power of charity is infinite, because it moves one over an infinite distance, for it joins the creature to the Creator, and makes a just man out of a sinner. Therefore it seems that it is not a created thing.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, nothing created is of greater dignity than the soul of Christ. But charity is of greater dignity than the soul of Christ, because it is by its charity that Christ’s soul is good. Therefore charity is not a created thing.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, a greater love is owed to a greater good. But God is an infinite good and has done infinite things for us. Therefore we owe him an infinite love. But the love by which we love God is charity. Therefore charity is something infinite, and hence is not something created.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, every created thing is in some category. But whatever is contained in the ten categories is some nature. Therefore, if charity is something created, it will be a certain nature. But a nature coming to a nature effects only nature. Consequently, if charity is something created, the soul in possession of charity will have only the existence of a nature. But through charity one is able to merit. Therefore some nature through itself will be capable of meritorious acts—which is the Pelagian heresy. Therefore it seems that charity is not something created.

On the contrary, whatever is received in anything is received in it according to the recipient’s mode. But the uncreated Love, which is the Holy Spirit, is participated in by what is created. Therefore this must occur according to the created thing’s mode. But its mode is finite. Therefore what is received in a created thing must be some finite love. But everything finite is created. Therefore in a soul that possesses the Holy Spirit, there is a created charity.

Furthermore, every assimilation occurs through some form. But through charity we are conformed to God himself, and when it is lost, the soul is said to be deformed. Therefore it seems that charity is a certain created form remaining in the soul.

Furthermore, it is certain that God is present in the saints in some way in which he is not present in merely created things. But that diversity cannot be on the part of God himself, who stands to all things in the same way. Therefore it seems that it is on the part of the creature—namely, that the saintly creature has something that the others do not. Consequently, either he has the divine existence itself—and if this were so, all the just would be assumed by the Holy Spirit into the unity of his person, just as the human nature was assumed by Christ into the unity of the person of the very Son of God, which cannot be the case; or else the creature in whom God is said to be present in this special way must have in himself some effect of God that the others do not have. But that effect cannot be merely some action, because then God would not be present in the just who are asleep otherwise than he is present in other created things. Therefore, it must be some habit. Accordingly, there must be a certain habit of charity created in the soul, according to which the Holy Spirit is said to dwell within the soul itself.

I answer that the soul’s entire goodness is from charity. Hence, the greater the charity a soul possesses, the greater is its goodness; and if it does not have charity, it is nothing, as is said in 1 Corinthians 13:1–3. Now, it is clear that a soul does not have less goodness in the being of grace, which is due to its charity, than it has in political being, which is due to its acquired virtue. But political virtue does two things: it makes the one who has it good, and it renders his work good. Therefore, much more does charity do this.

Yet neither of these things will be able to be done unless charity is a created habit. For it is certain that all being is from some inhering form, as being white is from whiteness and substantial being from a substantial form. Therefore just as a wall’s being white cannot be understood apart from the whiteness inhering in it, so the soul’s being good in the freely-given being of grace cannot be understood apart from the charity and grace informing it. In like manner, too, since an act is proportioned to an active power as an effect is proportioned to a proper cause, it is impossible to understand that an act perfected in goodness should come from a power not perfected by a habit, just as heating cannot come from a fire except by means of its heat.

And therefore, since an act of charity has a certain perfection from the fact that it is meritorious in all ways, it is necessary to assert that charity is a habit created in the soul; indeed, this habit is from the whole Trinity as its efficient cause, but flows from the love that is the Holy Spirit as its exemplar cause. This is why it is frequently found written that the Holy Spirit is the love by which we love God and neighbor, just as Dionysius also says that the divine being is the being of all things (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 4, para. 1 (PG 3:178).)—namely, insofar as all being is led forth from him as from an exemplar.

Nonetheless, the Master would have it (Sent. I, 17.1(60).2, 2(61).1, 3(62).1.) that charity is not some habit created in the soul, but is only an act from a free decision moved by the Holy Spirit, whom he calls charity. To explain this position, some have said that just as light can be considered in two ways: either as it is in itself, and in this way it is just called “light”; or as it is in the limit of a bounded transparent body, (This is an extension of Aristotle’s definition of color in On Sense and the Sensed 3, 439a27.) and in that way light is called “color,” since light is the hypostasis of color and color is nothing other than embodied light. So too, they say that, when considered in himself, the Holy Spirit is called “Holy Spirit” and “God,” but considered as existing in the soul that he moves to an act of charity, he is called “charity.” For they say that, just as the Son united human nature to himself alone, even though it was the action of the whole Trinity, so the Holy Spirit unites the will to himself alone, even though it is the action of the whole Trinity.

But this cannot stand. For the union of the human nature in Christ has its terminus in the one existence of the divine person, and therefore numerically the same act belongs at once to the divine person and to the assumed human nature. In contrast, a saint’s will is not assumed into the unity of the supposit of the Holy Spirit. Hence, because an action has unity and diversity from its supposit, there cannot be understood to be one action of the saint’s will and the Holy Spirit’s, except in the way in which God acts in anything whatsoever. But that way is not enough for the perfection of action. For, in regard to necessity, contingency, perfection, and such, an action follows the conditions of the proximate cause, and not those of the first cause. Hence one cannot understand that there is a perfect action of the will whereby it is united to the Holy Spirit, unless one also understands that there is also a habit perfecting the active power itself. Nor can a will’s act be a likeness of the Holy Spirit unless the Holy Spirit’s likeness be in the soul through some form, which is the principle of the act whereby it is conformed to the Holy Spirit; hence some form must be placed in the soul through which it is conformed to the Holy Spirit, for an act is not enough for this conformity, as was said.

Reply Obj. 1: In the soul’s receiving of grace, one should consider two actions of the Holy Spirit: one that has its terminus in existence according to a first actuality, which is to be graced, within the one who has the habit of charity; the other, according to which a second actuality is brought about, which is the action moving the will, in the act of love. And in each way, a middle must be involved, not on account of any weakness or defect on the part of the acting Holy Spirit, but on account of a necessity on the part of the receiving soul—yet this middle is involved in different ways. For as regards the first effect, which is the existence of grace, charity is a middle after the manner of a formal cause, since no existence can be received in a creature except through some form. But as regards the second effect, which is action, charity is a middle under the account of an efficient cause, insofar as the power that is the principle of acting we reduce to agent cause; for it is also impossible for any perfect action to come forth from a created thing unless the principle of that action be a perfection of the agent’s power, just as we say that the habit that elicits an act is its principle.

Reply Obj. 2: The soul is compared to the body not only as its agent cause, insofar as it is the body’s mover, but also as its form; hence, it itself formally makes the body alive, insofar as “to live” means “to be a living thing.” However, God is not the form of the soul itself or of the will, by which it is formally able to live; rather, he is called “the life of the soul” as an exemplar principle pouring the life of grace into it. Something similar should be said about light, which one can consider in two ways: either as light is in the luminous body itself, and in this way it stands to the illumination of air as its efficient principle, nor does it illuminate it except through the form of light poured into the illuminated transparent air; or as light is in the illuminated transparent body, and in this way it is its form, by which the transparent is formally luminous. Now, God is said to be an “illuminating light” after the manner of the light that is in a body that is luminous through itself, and not after the manner in which an illuminated body is formally illuminated by the form of light that has been received into it. But to this received light are likened the charity and grace received into the soul.

Reply Obj. 3: Creation and re-creation are altogether similar. For just as God through creation bestowed the existence of nature upon things, and that existence is formally due to a form received in the created thing itself, which is the terminus, as it were, of the agent’s act—and again, just as that form is the principle of the natural actions that God works in things—so it is in re-creation as well. There God bestows the existence of grace upon the soul, and the formal principle of that existence is a created habit, whereby the meritorious action that God works in us is also perfected. And thus, that created habit stands to the action of the Holy Spirit partly as a terminus, and partly as a middle.

Reply Obj. 4: Charity, insofar as it is from nothing, has a vanity; but insofar as it proceeds from God as his very likeness, it does not have the account of vanity, but quite to the contrary, the account of joining one to God himself.

Reply Obj. 5: Something is said “to make” in two ways: either in the manner of an efficient cause, as a painter makes a wall white, or in the manner of form, as whiteness makes a wall white. Therefore to make a sinner become just or joined to God is from God himself as from an efficient cause, and from charity as from a form. Hence, it cannot be concluded that charity is of infinite power, but only that it is the effect of an infinite power.

Reply Obj. 6: The nobility of things can be looked at in two ways: either simply speaking, or in a certain respect. Now, something seems to be of greater dignity simply speaking insofar as it is nobler according to its existence; and in this way Christ’s soul, and the soul of any just man whatsoever, is nobler than created charity, which has the existence of an accident. But in a certain respect, created charity is nobler than Christ’s soul. For in any genus, act is nobler than potency, in relation to that genus. Hence, just as the whiteness of Christ’s body is nobler than Christ’s body precisely with respect to being white, so too his created knowledge is nobler than his soul precisely with respect to being knowing, which is being in a certain respect. And in like manner, his charity is nobler than his soul precisely with respect to such accidental being, because charity stands to Christ’s soul as act to potency.

Reply Obj. 7: According to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.7, 1158b20‒35.) in some friendships it happens that an equivalent return is never made, but still it suffices for the equity of friendship that whatever return is possible be made; for example, a son can never return to his natural father something equivalent to what he receives from him, that is, existence, education, and nourishment. Much less is it possible for us to return a love equivalent to the divine benefits and to God’s goodness. Hence it does not follow that the love by which we love God is infinite with respect to the substance of the act; although it does have an infinity from the fact that the object of this love is preferred to all others. But it is enough that we should love God with a love commensurate to us.

Reply Obj. 8: “Nature” is said in many ways, according to Boethius. (Boethius, Liber contra Eutychen et Nestorium (De duabus naturis), ch. 1 (PL 64:1341).) For in one way, “nature” signifies everything that exists, whether substance or accident; and in this way grace is a certain nature. In another way, “nature” signifies the principle of motion and rest of the very thing in which it is present. Hence on this understanding, something is said to be “natural” that either is caused by natural principles or is able to be so caused. And in this way charity is not a nature, since it cannot be caused by a created thing’s natural principles; and Pelagius speaks according to this latter sense when he says that man can accomplish meritorious acts by natural principles alone.

Article 2

Whether charity is an accident

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that charity is not an accident.

Obj. 1: For no accident extends beyond its own subject. But charity extends beyond its subject, because by charity we also love others. Therefore it seems that charity is not an accident.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every accident is caused by substance, since, according to Avicenna, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 2, ch. 1.) a subject is what is complete in itself, offering to another an occasion for being. But charity is not caused by the principles of the soul in which it exists. Therefore it seems that it is not an accident.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, no accident is better and nobler than its subject. But charity is better than the soul. Therefore it is not in the soul as an accident in its subject. Proof of the middle premise: that on account of which anything is such, is itself more such; but the soul is good on account of its charity; therefore charity is better than the soul.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the agent is always more honorable than the patient, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.5, 430a18.) But charity acts in the soul by cleansing it from sins. Therefore it is more honorable than the soul, and so the same conclusion follows as before.

On the contrary, whatever can be present and absent without destroying the subject is an accident. But charity is such. Therefore, charity is an accident.

I answer that everything that comes to something after complete existence, comes to it accidentally, unless perhaps that thing is taken into a participation of the substantial existence itself. (Above, d. 8, q. 5, a. 2.) Nevertheless, this (that is, that it comes to it after complete existence) is not enough to call it an accident in itself, for something can be a substance in itself and come to something else in an accidental way, such as garments. But if it should come to a thing as an inhering form after that thing’s complete existence, it is necessarily an accident. And since it is after the soul’s natural existence that charity comes to it, as a form perfecting it in regard to the existence of grace, (Above, d. 8, q. 5, a. 2.) therefore it must be an accident.

Reply Obj. 1: Numerically one accident never extends beyond its own subject in such a way that it would be in another as in a subject; but it can extend well outside of its subject as to the object of its action. Yet this takes place in different ways in active and passive operations. For in an active one, the accident extends to an extrinsic object, impressing the likeness of its own form upon it, as it is evident that the heat of fire actively heats another body and is an active operation. Similarly, even when an operation is passive, the accident extends to another extrinsic object, too, but the likeness of that object is received into it. And in this way the soul, through the habit of science, knows those things that are outside of it, and through the habit of love, loves the same things.

Reply Obj. 2: A subject stands to diverse accidents in diverse ways. Now, some accidents are natural—namely, those that are created from the principles of their subject—and this occurs in two ways: because they are caused either by the principles of the species, and in this way they are proper passions that follow upon the whole species; or they are caused by the principles of the individual, and in this way they are common results of the natural individual principles. There are also certain accidents induced through violence, like heat in water, and these are repugnant to the principles of the subject. However, there are some accidents that are indeed caused by something outside the subject, yet are not repugnant to the subject’s principles—rather, they are more perfective of them, like light in the air. And it is in this manner too that charity in the soul comes from something outside it. Nevertheless, one must note that for all accidents, generally speaking, the subject is the cause in a certain way, insofar as the accidents are supported in the subject’s existence, but not in such a way that all the accidents are brought forth from the subject’s principles.

Reply Obj. 3: By the same argument one could just as well prove that no perfection of soul or body is an accident, since any perfectible thing whatsoever has goodness from its perfection. Therefore one should say that, simply speaking, the soul is better than charity, and any subject than its accident; but in a certain respect the converse is true as well. The reason for this is that, according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 5, para. 1 (PG 3:815).) being is nobler than everything else following after it. Hence to be is nobler, simply speaking, than to understand, if it were possible to understand understanding without understanding being. Hence, what exceeds in existence is nobler, simply speaking, than everything that exceeds in something that follows after existence—although in another respect, existence can be less noble. And since the soul, and any substance, has a nobler existence than does an accident, therefore it is nobler, simply speaking. But with respect to a certain existence, in some way, the accident can be nobler, since it stands to substance as act to potency; and this consequent goodness the substance has from its accidents, but not the first goodness of being.

Reply Obj. 4: Charity is not said to act in the soul in the manner of an efficient cause, but only formally; and according to what the form is, it is nobler with respect to its second being.

Article 3

Whether charity is given according to natural capacity

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST II-II.24.3.) It seems that charity is given according to the capacity of one’s natural endowments.

Obj. 1: For it says so in Matthew 25:15: he gave . . . to each according to his ability; upon which Jerome’s gloss says, not on account of God’s liberality or frugality do different men receive more or less, but according to the power of the recipients. (Jerome, Commentarii in Evangelium Matthaei, bk. 4 (CCSL 77; PL 26:186).) But prior to the arrival of charity, no power is understood to be in a man other than what is according to natural endowments. Therefore it seems that charity is infused according to the capacity of natural endowments.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as substantial form stands to the existence of nature, so charity stands to the existence of grace. But substantial form is given according to the capacity of the matter, as Plato says. (See Plato’s Timaeus, 29e–30d; he wanted everything to become as much like himself as was possible. . . . Guided by this reasoning, he put intelligence in soul, and soul in body, and so constructed the universe. He wanted to produce a piece of work that would be as excellent and supreme as its nature would allow (Plato, Timaeus, trans. Donald J. Zeyl, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper, 29e–30b).) Therefore charity is also given according to the capacity of the nature that is perfected by it.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as glory presupposes grace, so grace presupposes nature. But glory is given according to the measure of grace, so that he who has the greater capacity also receives more glory. Therefore it seems that charity is also given according to the capacity of nature, so that a greater charity is infused into him who has better natural endowments.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, in whatever things one finds a perfection of the same account, there seems to be the same mode of attaining that perfection, since each reality has its own proper mode. But charity is found in men and angels according to the same account; this is evident from its act and its end. Therefore, since angels attain a greater charity and better gratuitous endowments according to the level of their natural endowments, it seems that it would be the same in men.

On the contrary, the angelic nature is higher and more sublime than the human nature. But some men, in terms of the level of grace, are taken up to a more sublime reward than angels are; for some men are taken up into each of the angelic orders, according to Gregory. (Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Evangelia, hom. 34, para. 11 (CCSL 141; PL 76:1252).) Therefore it seems that the perfections of grace and glory are not given according to the measure of natural endowments. The same thing may also be seen through what is said in Proverbs 30:28: the lizard exerts himself by hands, (In RSV, this verse reads slightly differently, but the context of the surrounding verses seems to fit Gregory’s reading.) in explaining which Gregory says, a greater grace is infused insofar as someone exerts himself more to have grace. (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 6, para. 10 (CCSL 143; PL 75:736).)

I answer that, since God stands equally towards all things, the diversity of gifts received from him must be viewed according to the diversity of their recipients. Now, this diversity of recipients is viewed in reference to one thing’s being more apt and prepared for receiving than another. But we see among natural forms that matter is rendered more or less disposed to receiving a form by accidental dispositions, like heat, cold, and the like, so too in regard to perfections of soul, the soul is made more or less capable of attaining its own perfection by the soul’s very actions. However, the soul’s actions are related in different ways to infused and acquired perfections.

For acquired perfections are within the nature of the soul itself potentially, not in a merely material way but even actively, insofar as something is in its seminal causes. So too it is evident that all acquired knowledge is within the knowledge of the first principles, which are naturally known to us, as within the active principles from which conclusions can be drawn. And similarly, the moral virtues exist in the very rectitude and order of reason as in a certain seminal principle. This is why the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.13, 1144b1‒7; 10.9, 1179b21‒28.) that there are certain natural virtues which are the seeds, as it were, of the moral virtues. Consequently, the soul’s actions stand to the acquired perfections not only in the manner of a disposition to them, but also as their active principles.

However, the infused perfections are within the nature of the soul itself as in a potency that is material only, and in no way active, since they elevate the soul above all of its natural action. Hence the soul’s actions stand to infused perfections as dispositions only.

Therefore, one should say that the measure according to which charity is given is the capacity of the soul itself, which is at once from its nature and from the disposition that comes through the effort of works. And because a better nature is more disposed according to the same effort, thus one who has better natural endowments, as long as there is an equal effort, will receive more of the infused perfections; and one who has inferior natural endowments, if there be a greater effort, will sometimes receive more.

Reply Obj. 1: The recipient’s power should be considered not in reference only to its nature, but also in reference to the disposition of the effort added to the nature. And so it is even in substantial forms with respect to matter.

Reply Obj. 2: Whence the reply to the second objection is evident.

Reply Obj. 3: Grace itself is a disposition of the nature to glory. Hence, it is not required that yet another intermediate disposition between charity and glory should intervene. But between nature and grace falls the intermediary effort, which is, as it were, a disposition.

Reply Obj. 4: In angels there is nothing that contends with the intellectual nature’s motion, due to which the nature’s effort is retarded, whereas in man’s nature there is the sensitive nature, which tends of itself to what is contrary to that to which the intellective nature’s motion tends, namely, to the pleasurable according to sensation, unless the former is compelled and ruled by the latter. And as a result, in angels there is diversity of gratuitous endowments according to a diversity of nature. Nevertheless this will be explained better in Book II. (Below, In II Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 4.)

Article 4

Whether one who has charity can be certain that he has it

To the fourth we proceed as follows. It seems that he who has charity can know for certain that he has it.

Obj. 1: For so it is said in the text: for he knows the love by which he loves more than he knows the brother whom he loves. (Sent. I, 17.1(60).3, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 8, ch. 7 (CCSL 50; PL 42:957).) But he knows his brother with certainty. Therefore much more does he know with certainty the charity by which he loves him.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 2.19, 99b27.) against Plato, that it is unfitting for us to have the noblest of habits and yet they be hidden from us. But charity is the noblest habit. Therefore it seems that it is known for certain by the one having it.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, whoever has faith knows that he has faith. But faith is not more present to the soul than charity is. Therefore he who has charity, too, knows that he has it.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, whatever the soul knows, it knows through the fact that it is made present to the soul by way of its likeness. But what is in the soul essentially is more present to it than what is in it by way of its likeness. Therefore, since charity is in the soul essentially, it seems that it would be known more certainly by the one who has it than are exterior things that are known by way of their likenesses.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, charity is a spiritual light, as can be gathered from 1 John 2:10: he who loves his brother abides in the light. But light is seen in virtue of itself. Therefore it seems that so it is with charity; and in this way it is known more certainly than other things.

On the contrary, it is by the charity within him that someone is made worthy of God’s love. But Ecclesiastes 9:1 says, the righteous and the wise . . . are in the hand of God; whether it is love or hate man does not know. Therefore it seems that no one knows for certain that he has charity.

Furthermore, the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians 4:4, I am not aware of anything against myself, but I am not thereby acquitted. Therefore, since no greater sign of charity can be had than not to have mortal sin on one’s conscience, and even this is not enough to be sure of acquittal, it seems that it is not possible through any sign for someone to know for certain that he has charity.

I answer that, as the Philosopher explains, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.1, 993a30‒b11.) something is said to be difficult to know in two ways: either in itself, or with regard to us. Therefore one should say that things that, in their own existence, are not in matter, are in and of themselves most knowable, but with regard to us, they are the most difficult to know. On account of this, the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.1, 993b8.) that our intellects stand to the most manifest things of nature as the eye of the bat to the light of the sun. The reason is this: our potential intellect is in potency to all intelligible things, and before understanding takes place, none of these things are actually in our intellect. It follows that in order for our intellect actually to understand, it has to be brought into act by species received from the senses, illuminated by the light of the agent intellect. For, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.5, 430a16; 3.7, 431a15‒19.) as colors stand to sight, so do phantasms stand to the potential intellect. Hence, since it is natural for us to proceed from sensible things to intelligible things, from effects to causes, and from subsequent things to prior things—at least according to the wayfaring state, since in the heavenly fatherland there will be another mode of understanding. This is why we cannot know the soul’s powers and habits except through their acts, and the acts themselves through their objects.

Now, in an act of the soul there are many things to consider: the species of the act itself, which is from the object, the manner, and the effect. Therefore, if we take the act of charity, which is to love God and neighbor, then merely from the species of the act it cannot be discerned whether an act of love comes from an imperfect power or one perfected by a habit; for a power and its habit are ordered to the same object, just as knowledge and the potential intellect are both ordered to the same object.

However, the manner that a habit puts into an action is its ease and pleasure; hence the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.3, 1104b5.) that one must take the pleasure of the action as a sign of the habit. Yet it cannot be discerned from the mere fact of someone’s having such a manner in his works whether it comes from the infused habit of charity or from an acquired habit.

Moreover, love’s proper effect, insofar as it comes from charity, consists in the power of meriting. But this effect does not in any way fall within our knowledge, except through a revelation. And therefore no one can know with certainty that he has charity; but he can make a conjecture from some probable signs.

Also, while we yet live we do not see uncreated charity, which is God, as is said in 1 Corinthians 13:12. However, some think otherwise, saying that we see within ourselves the very charity which is God, but that the sight is so poor that it cannot even be called sight, nor does anyone perceive that he is seeing God, because the sight of God himself is confused and mingled, as it were, with the knowledge of other things. This is just as they also say that the soul always understands itself, but nevertheless does not always think about itself. But in what way this may be understood to be true was already discussed above. (Above, d. 3, q. 1, a. 2.)

Reply Obj. 1: The authoritative quotations from Augustine set down in the text are speaking of knowledge on the part of the knowable thing itself, and not on the part of the knower.

Reply Obj. 2: The Philosopher is speaking there about the noblest habits of the cognitive part of the soul. But the acts of those habits perfectly express their habits according to what is proper to them, as in the act of knowledge there is certitude through the cause, in which the knowledge is expressly demonstrated; and this holds even more when it comes to the understanding of principles. Accordingly, the one who has knowledge knows that he has it, although the converse is not the case, because some men who do not in fact have knowledge believe that they have it. For the bent is always measured by the straight; and this is why, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.11, 1119a11‒20.) the virtuous man is the measure in human actions, because what the virtuous man desires is good. And it is similar even with rectitude of intellect, since that is true which seems so to the one who has a correct (In Latin, rectus covers a range of meanings, from “straight” and “direct” to “correct” and “right,” and so it has geometrical, moral, and cognitive senses; so it is also with rectitudo, as it may translated as both “straightness” and “rightness” or “rectitude.”) understanding, not what seems so to just anyone.

Reply Obj. 3: Thereby the solution to the third is also evident. For the act of faith is distinguished by its very object—the thing believed—from the acts of other habits, or acts of an imperfect power that cannot be directed through itself to such an object. And therefore one who has faith knows that he has it.

Reply Obj. 4: For something to be known by the soul, it is not enough that it be present to it in just any way whatsoever; rather, it must be present under the account of an object. Now, in our state as earthly wayfarers, nothing is present as an object to our intellect except by means of some likeness of the thing itself, perhaps taken from its effect, since we arrive at causes through their effects. Therefore we do not know the soul itself and its powers and habits except through their acts, which are known in turn through their objects—unless we wish to speak of “knowledge” in the broader sense Augustine is using, according to which “to understand” is nothing other than for something to be present to the intellect in any way whatsoever.

Reply Obj. 5: When we say that created or uncreated charity is a “light,” this shows that in itself it is something knowable. But it is not known in itself by our intellect, except through its effect, for the reason given in the body of the article.

Article 5

Whether charity is to be loved from charity

To the fifth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST II-II.25.2; Commentary on Romans, ch. 12, lect. 2.) It seems that charity should not be loved from charity.

Obj. 1: For only four things should be loved from charity, as will be said in Book III: (In III Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 5.) God, neighbor, the soul, and the body. But charity is none of these. Therefore, and so on.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a denominative name does not apply to its very source, since “whiteness” is not called “white.” But “loved” is denominated from “love.” Therefore love is not loved, nor is charity loved by charity.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as a sense-power stands to sensing, so an affective power stands to loving. But a proper sense-power does not sense itself sensing. Therefore neither does an affective power love its own love. But charity is in an affective power. Therefore charity is not loved from charity.

Obj. 4: Further, everything loved is loved by some love. Therefore, if the act of charity is loved, it must be loved by some other act, and for the same reason, that act will also be something that should be loved. Therefore in this way one goes on to infinity—which should not be asserted. Therefore it seems that charity should not be loved from charity.

On the contrary, we have what is in the text from the words of Augustine: he who loves his neighbor must necessarily love that love itself above all else. (Sent. I, 17.1(60).3, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 8, ch. 7 (CCSL 50; PL 42:957).) But the neighbor should be loved from charity; therefore so should charity.

Furthermore, one’s neighbor should be loved from charity only insofar as he has the image of God. But charity represents God more expressly than the natural image that is in the soul. Therefore it seems that it should be loved from charity even more so.

I answer that something is lovable in two ways: either as the reason (See the note in the respondeo of d. 14, q. 1, a. 1, on this usage of the word ratio; alternative translations could be “type” or “causal reason” or even “account,” our usual translation of ratio.) for the love, or as the object of the love, just as even color is seen as the object, and light is seen as the reason why color is actually visible. But just as color and light are seen in the same act of seeing, so too what is loved as the object and what is loved as the reason for the object are loved in the same act of loving.

Therefore it should be known that “charity” can be taken in three ways: either for uncreated charity, which is the Holy Spirit, or for habitual charity, or for the act of charity. Now, each of these things is a reason for loving, and can also be an object of love. For example, we love our neighbor insofar as God dwells within him, and he has the habit of charity, and he exercises its act; and in this way they are loved as a reason for lovability. However, if they be considered in themselves, they are also loved as the object of love. But in this way one does not love the habit of charity, or its act, with a love of friendship or of benevolence, which one cannot have for inanimate things, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 8.2, 1155b27‒30.) Rather, they are loved with a love of a sort of complacency, according to which we are said to love that which we approve and wish to exist.

Reply Obj. 1: Charity is, in a certain way, a mean between God and neighbor, because it is a likeness of God and also the reason for loving the neighbor himself; and therefore it accompanies the love of both.

Reply Obj. 2: Denomination, properly speaking, happens according to the orientation of an accident to a subject. But the “loved” is not denominated from “love” in this way, but rather is given its name as the object of love; and therefore the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 3: The fact that in material powers the power cannot bend back upon its own act is because such a power is determined according to the organ’s composition. For sight of the particular cannot know anything except that of which the species can be spiritually received into the pupil, and this is why sight cannot comprehend its own act. Now, if it were necessary in all cases that the act of no power whatever could be known by the proper power, but only by a superior one, then either one must go to infinity among powers of the soul, or some act of the soul must remain imperceptible. And therefore one should say that immaterial powers do bend back beyond their own objects, because the intellect understands itself understanding, and likewise, the will wills its willing and loves its loving.

The reason for this is that the act of an immaterial power is not excluded from the account of that power’s object, for the will’s object is the good, and since it is under this account that the will loves everything it loves, it can therefore love its own act as a good; and the case is similar on the part of the intellect. And on account of this, it is said in the Book of Causes (Proclus, Book of Causes, proposition 15.) that the essence of anything whose action returns into the agent’s essence through a sort of bending-back, must return to its very self—that is, into its subsisting existence itself, and not any existence based upon another, that is, not dependent on matter.

Reply Obj. 4: It is certain that the act of love, insofar as it stretches toward another, differs in number from that act of love that is loved in that other, whether it is loved as the object or as the reason for the loving. But because someone can love even his own soul from charity, he can also love his own act of charity from charity. And then one must make a distinction. Either love is borne toward the proper act of love only as toward the reason for loving, and in this way it is certain that both the one loving and his act are loved by numerically the same act, and so the same act is loved through the act which is itself; or love is loved as the object of love, and in this way the act of love that is loved and the act of love by which it is loved are numerically different acts—as is evident more plainly in the act of the intellect. For since acts are distinguished through their objects, one must say that acts having their termini in different objects are themselves different. Hence, just as the acts by which the intellect understands horse and man are different, so the acts by which it understands horse and by which it understands that very act of understanding horse under the account of an act are numerically different. Nor is it unfitting that in acts of the soul one might go to a potential infinity, as long as the acts are not an actual infinity. Hence, Avicenna, too, concedes (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 3, ch. 10.) that it is not impossible that relations following upon an act of the soul might be multiplied into infinity.

Exposition of the first part of the text

He who loves his neighbor must necessarily love that love itself above all else. (Sent. I, 17.1(60).3, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 8, ch. 7 (CCSL 50; PL 42:957).) This may be understood about created as well as uncreated love. For the one who loves someone wishes to love him, and thus he loves his own act of love; and in this very act of love, uncreated love itself is loved as the exemplar in that which is patterned after it, since nothing is good or lovable except insofar as the likeness of the uncreated good is within it.

For he knows the love by which he loves more than he knows the brother whom he loves. (Sent. I, 17.1(60).3, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 8, ch. 7 (CCSL 50; PL 42:957).) The whole passage that follows after these words, concerning the certainty about one’s love, whether love here be understood to be the created habit or the uncreated love, may be explained insofar as something is called “certain from itself,” but not “certain on the side of the knower.” But the act of love is known even on the side of the knower. Yet whether it proceeds from such a habit remains uncertain.

And with what is he filled who is full of love, if not with God? (Sent. I, 17.1(60).3, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 8, ch. 7 (CCSL 50; PL 42:957).) He says this because, along with the gift of charity, the Holy Spirit himself is also given, insofar as he is said to dwell within the creature in a new way through a new likeness of himself being in it.

He who loves his brother remains in the light. (Sent. I, 17.1(60).4, quoting 1 John 2:10.) Light is parallel to charity not in terms of its power of manifestation—because in that way light pertains more to the gifts of the intellect—but in terms of the strength of its action. For just as light is a form that is universally motive within the whole of nature, because it is a quality of the first altering body, (That is, the sun.) so charity moves and informs all gifts insofar as it is a likeness of the first gift, which is the Holy Spirit.

This passage declares sufficiently plainly that this same brotherly love . . . is declared by such great authority . . . to be not only from God, but also to be God. (Sent. I, 17.1(60).4, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 8, ch. 8 (CCSL 50; PL 42:958), referring to 1 John 4:7‒8.) The other phrase found in that passage, for brotherly love is that by which we love one another, is parenthetical. Now, fraternal love is said to be God by a causal predication, in the manner in which Dionysius says that the divine being is the being of all things, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 4, para. 1 (PG 3:178).) because every being is drawn forth from him and patterned after him.

We are not about to say that charity is called God not because charity itself is a substance worthy of the name of God, but because it is a gift of God. (Sent. I, 17.3(62).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 15, ch. 17 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1082).) In this way charity differs from the other virtues, according to the intention of the Master and Augustine: because other virtues that in themselves imply something of imperfection in the one who has them, such as faith, patience, and things of this sort, are from God, but are not in God essentially, whereas charity, which has nothing of imperfection, is both predicated of God essentially and in us from him. Nevertheless it does not follow that the charity that is a form of our mind is numerically the same as the charity that is said of God essentially—just as even existence is said of God properly, yet nonetheless that existence is not numerically the same as our existence.

There is nothing more excellent than this gift of God, charity. (Sent. I, 17.4(63).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 15, ch. 17 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1082).) This seems to be false, because wisdom is set down as the most excellent of the gifts. To this one should say that, insofar as the gifts are distinguished from the virtues, wisdom is called the worthiest of the gifts, and this worth it has from the charity to which it is always joined, inasmuch as wisdom tastes divine truth. However, if “gift” is taken universally for everything we possess from God’s giving, then in this way charity, which joins us to the divine end itself, is simply speaking the most powerful of all gifts.

Division of the second part of the Text

If the Holy Spirit is charity, and since charity may increase and diminish in a person . . . . here it is asked whether it is to be granted that the Holy Spirit may increase or diminish in a person. (Sent. I, 17.5(64).1.) In this part, the Master raises objections against matters already determined, and this is divided into two parts. In the first, he objects with arguments drawn from reason; in the second, he objects with arguments drawn from authorities, at it was said above that the Holy Spirit is the charity of Father and Son. (Sent. I, 17.6(65).1.)

The first is divided into three parts: first, he sets down an objection; second, he sets down the response, at to these, we respond by saying that the Holy Spirit or charity is entirely unchangeable; (Sent. I, 17.5(64).3.) third, he offers a confirmation of the response, at in order that what we have said should be made more certain, we confirm it by authority. (Sent. I, 17.5(64).5.) Now, the objection has two parts, as does the solution, as is evident in the text. (Sent. I, 17.5(64).1‒4.)

It was said above that the Holy Spirit is the charity of Father and Son. (Sent. I, 17.6(65).1.) Here he raises objections from authorities; and this is divided into three parts, following the three things gathered from the authorities against the Master’s position. The first is this: the love by which we love God is other than the love by which God loves us; but the love by which God loves us is the Holy Spirit; therefore the love by which we love God is other than the Holy Spirit. The second is this: charity is said to be from God just as faith is; but faith is from God in such a way that it is not God; therefore charity is also not God. He speaks of this, at but there is something else, they say, which is even more pressing. (Sent. I, 17.6(65).5.) The third is this: charity is called an affection or motion of the mind; but the Holy Spirit is not this sort of thing; therefore, charity is not the Holy Spirit. He speaks of this at they also adduce other reasons to show the same point. (Sent. I, 17.6(65).6.) Each of these parts is divided into the objection and its solution.

Question 2

The growth of charity

In order to understand this part, we will inquire into five things:

first, whether charity admits of increase;

second, the manner of its increase;

third, whether it increases by any act of charity;

fourth, whether there is any limit to the increase;

fifth, whether it admits of decrease.

Article 1

Whether charity admits of increase

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.52.1; II-II.24.4; On the Virtues, q. 1, a. 11; On Evil, q. 7, a. 2; Quodl. IX, q. 6.) It seems that charity does not admit of increase.

Obj. 1: For only a quantity increases. But since every quantity is divisible, nothing simple is a quantity. Now, charity is a simple habit, and thus it is neither a quantity through itself, nor likewise incidentally, since its subject, the soul, is also indivisible. Therefore it does not increase.

Obj. 2: You might say that it is a quantity not in terms of mass but in terms of power.

On the contrary, the quantity of a power is divided according to the objects the power has the capacity for. But any charity, no matter how small, has the capacity for all the objects of charity. Therefore it does not increase according to a quantity of power.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, since increase is a species of motion, whatever increases moves, and what essentially increases moves essentially. But whatever moves is a body, as the Philosopher proves; (Aristotle, Physics 6.4, 234b10‒20.) and what moves naturally is corrupted. Therefore, since charity is not corrupted, because charity is never cut out (1 Cor 13:8), (RSV: love never ends.) nor is it a mobile body, it seems that it does not essentially increase.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a thing is neither increased nor diminished nor in any way varied if its cause always exists in the same way. But the immediate cause of charity is God, who always exists in the same way. Therefore charity is not varied through increase.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it is certain that the increase of a quality cannot be traced back to any species of motion except alteration. But as the Philosopher proves, (Aristotle, Physics 7.3, 246a24‒247b20.) in the soul alteration occurs only in regard to its sensitive part and its objects. Therefore, since charity is a quality and is in the intellectual part, for otherwise it would not be in the angels, who lack the sensitive part, it seems that it cannot be increased.

On the contrary, Augustine says, once born, charity receives nourishment; when strengthened, it reaches perfection. (Augustine, Tractates on the First Epistle of John, tract. 5, para. 4 (CCSL 37; PL 35:2014).) But everything in which one can see a progression according to different degrees can increase. Therefore, charity admits of increase.

Furthermore, we come to knowledge of a habit through knowledge of its act. But it can happen that an act of charity becomes more intense. Therefore the habit of charity, too, can increase.

I answer that some have asserted that charity essentially does not increase, and among them there have been four different opinions.

For some have said, as the Master does in the text, (Sent. I, 17.5(64).3.) that charity in itself does not increase, but is said to increase in us insofar as we make progress in charity; and he said this because he had stated that charity is the Holy Spirit, in whom there is no variation. But this view cannot stand, since it is not intelligible to say that we would be making progress in charity, which is the Holy Spirit, unless something should come to be within us which was not there before. And this new thing cannot be merely an act, since every act comes from some power, and a perfect act—the kind whereby we are united to the Holy Spirit—comes from a power perfected by a habit.

Others have said that charity does not essentially increase, but is said to increase insofar as it is more firmly established in its subject, according to its very rootedness there. But from this, too, it follows that it does essentially increase. For no form can be understood to be more firmly established in its subject except by having a greater conquest over its subject. But an increase of conquest overflows into an increase of power, and consequently into an increase of essence. For if the power is not the essence itself, it must be from the essence and commensurate with it, as an effect is commensurate with its proximate cause.

Others have said that charity does not essentially increase, but that the lesser charity that was present is destroyed by the arrival of a greater charity. This view also cannot stand, because form is destroyed in two ways only: either due to a contrary agent, or incidentally, due to a corruption of the subject. Therefore, since the subject of charity remains, and the arriving charity is not contrary to the charity already found there, it cannot be destroyed either through itself or incidentally, just as a small fire is destroyed incidentally due to a great fire, on account of the consumption of its matter.

Others have said that charity does not increase except with respect to its fervor. But this too cannot stand. For the “fervor of charity” may be taken in two ways: properly and metaphorically. Metaphorically, we say that charity is “heat,” and metaphorically we call the intensity of the act of charity its “fervor,” as Dionysius speaks (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 7, para. 1 (PG 3:206).) when he attributes “fervent” to the love of the angels. But fervor taken in this sense through itself follows on charity’s essence. Hence there can be no increase in such fervor unless the charity itself is essentially increased; for whenever a thing is varied, all the things that through themselves follow upon it are simultaneously varied. In the other way, taking “fervor” properly, we may speak of fervor as we find it in the sensitive part, for just as the lower powers follow the motion of the higher if it is more intense, as we see that a man’s whole body is inflamed and set in motion at the sight of the woman he loves, so too, when the higher affection is moved toward God, a certain impression follows even in the sensitive powers, according to which they are spurred on to obeying divine love. But the intensity of such fervor is not enough to increase one’s charity, because the quantity of merit is not viewed according to an increase of such fervor, since it consists in a disposition of the body. Hence, the more fervent do not always merit more. But one who is said to grow in charity grows also in merit, if he is in the state that allows for meriting.

And therefore one should say that charity is increased essentially. Nevertheless one must note that “to increase” is nothing other than to take on a greater quantity; hence, as something is related to quantity, so it is related to increase. Now, “quantity” is spoken of in two ways: some is virtual, (Note that virtus can be translated as either “virtue” or “power,” the latter being a less determinate sense; unless the context requires otherwise, we have usually opted for “power” in order to avoid unnecessarily restricting the application of the word. The adjective virtualis, however, can only be translated as “virtual,” as we have no adequate adjectival form of “power” in English. This leads to some ambiguity about the meaning of “virtual quantity,” since in English “virtual” usually means “almost but not really”; this is not Aquinas’s meaning here, but rather, he means the power that measures a power or virtue (quantitas virtutis, as he gives it below).) and some is dimensive. A virtual quantity is not a quantity from its own genus, because it is not divided by a division of its own essence; its magnitude is looked at in relation to something divisible or multipliable outside of it, which is either the power’s object or its act. But from its own genus, a virtual quantity is either an accidental form in the genus of quality, or a substantial form, which nonetheless cannot be greater or lesser. And therefore an increase according to a quantity of power does not pertain to the species of motion called “increase,” but more to alteration. And it is in this way that charity increases, and other qualities as well.

However, dimensive quantity belongs to certain things incidentally; for example, it may be said to belong to whiteness, which is said to be “so much” according to the quantity of its surface, as is said in the Categories. (Aristotle, Categories 6, 5b1‒9.) Hence, it increases only incidentally, whereas it is found through itself in bodies, which increase through themselves. Now, this latter happens in two ways. For sometimes what takes on a greater quantity moves from a lesser quantity to a greater. But sometimes the increase occurs without a motion in the very thing that is said to increase; whence it is not the case that its every part increases, the way every part of a moving thing moves, through itself. And this happens when a quantity becomes a greater quantity through the addition of a quantity, as when a piece of wood is added to a piece of wood, or a line to a line, so that there is an increase, but not a motion of increase.

Now, it happens in two ways that something moves to a greater quantity: either in such a way that the greater quantity is through itself the terminus of a motion, or in such a way that it follows upon the terminus of a motion.

Whenever quantity is through itself the terminus of a motion, there must be an addition there to the whole as well as to its every part, such that the whole and every part of it will be increased, as one sees in the growth of animals and plants; and in such a case there is the motion of increase, properly speaking. Hence, the motion of increase belongs only to things that have the nutritive power.

On the other hand, a quantity follows upon the terminus of a motion when the motion is toward some form upon which a certain quantity follows, for a determinate quantity is owed to any and every material form. And since a motion does not derive its species except from what is through itself the terminus of the motion, such a motion is therefore not called, through itself, a motion of increase. Rather, it is called either generation, if the form is substantial, as when air becomes fire; or alteration, when the form is accidental, as is evident in the rarefaction of air.

Reply Obj. 1: Charity does not have dimensive quantity either through itself or incidentally, because not even its subject is quantified. Nevertheless it has a quantity of power within it, by reason of which it is said to increase, just as whiteness and heat are.

Reply Obj. 2: Quantity of power may be looked at in two ways: either with respect to the number of its objects, and this is in the mode of discrete quantity; or with respect to the intensity of its act on the same object, and this is like continuous quantity. And it is in the latter way that the virtue (Or “power.”) of charity grows.

Reply Obj. 3: Charity is not said to increase as though it were the subject of increase, since it is an accident, but rather because increase is considered in reference to it, just as a quantity is also said to increase, and the whiteness is said to change when something is changed by its whiteness. Nor is it necessary that the former charity would be destroyed, if it essentially increases. For something is said to move “according to its essence” in two ways: either because the essence is through itself the terminus of the motion, and in this way to be moved in essence is to lose its essence and to be corrupted; or because the motion occurs in reference to something joined to the essence that through itself is the terminus of the motion. For example, something moving from one place to another is said to be moving essentially, since according to its essence it is in a place.

And in this way, an increase that occurs in reference to the quantity following upon the essence, while the essence remains one and the same under a different quantity, is called an “essential increase.” This is the case whether the quantity is the thing’s very essence, as a power’s quantity is the same as the power itself, and yet it nonetheless moves, speaking essentially in reference to quantity, according to a greater and lesser perfection of the power—nor does it then move through itself according to essence, seeing that it retains its own existence; or the quantity is other than the essence, as is evident in bodily increase. Nor must everything that is moving be a body, unless “motion” is understood in terms of physical motion; and the motion of the soul is not of this sort.

Reply Obj. 4: Although the efficient cause of charity is unchangeable in himself, he can nonetheless bestow a greater charity upon someone by the good pleasure of his will, according to the order of his wisdom, and according to the different ways in which someone—who also in some sense stands to charity as a material cause receiving it—prepares himself for charity; a variation in the effect also follows on such a diversity.

Reply Obj. 5: Since passive alteration includes passion in its very concept, just as passion is of two sorts, so is alteration. For in one way, every reception is called, in a common way, a “passion,” (Or a “being-affected.”) insofar as even to come to understand is spoken of as to be affected. And in this way, in reference to such passion, even alteration consists in any variation whatsoever concerning the reception of some quality; and in this way, there can be alteration even in purely intellectual substances. And it is in this way that alteration can take place in charity. In another way, passion (Or “being-affected.”) is spoken of properly whenever something is lost from a substance, owing to the action of a contrary bringing about a change in the subject. And in reference to such a passion, nothing is called an alteration unless it through itself has to do with sensible things and the sensitive part of the soul; and if it has to do with the intellect, it is said to be an alteration incidentally, with respect to those qualities that arise from the senses in the intellectual part, like all of our acquired habits. And charity is not among these.

Article 2

Whether charity increases by way of addition

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.52.2; II-II.24.5; On the Virtues, q. 1, a. 11.) It seems that charity increases by way of addition.

Obj. 1: For the Philosopher says, increase is something added to a preexisting quantity. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.5, 320b26‒34.) Therefore, if charity increases, this increase requires that another charity be added to the preexisting charity.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, nothing can cause an increase in charity except God, who has given it. But God does not newly effect anything in the soul except by means of a new influx from himself. However, a new influx can be understood only if something is newly infused. Therefore it seems that charity increases in this way: another charity, newly infused, is added to the present charity.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, if charity does not increase by the addition of new charity from God, the only other way it would seem capable of increasing is by drawing back from what is contrary to charity.

But on the contrary, an increase of charity can occur in those in whom there is nothing contrary to charity, as in an angel, or man in the state of innocence. Therefore it seems that charity does not increase in that manner, but in the aforesaid manner.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to this, that an increase of charity occurs by one’s drawing back from its contrary, it seems that God is not the cause of the increase of charity; rather, the man is, by holding himself back from what is contrary to charity, for example, from concupiscence. And this is unfitting. Therefore it seems that it increases only by way of addition.

On the contrary, when something simple is added to something simple, nothing greater is produced, as the Philosopher proves. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.2, 316a30‒35.) But charity is something simple. Therefore a greater charity is not produced by the addition of charity to charity.

Furthermore, according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 5, para. 6 (PG 3:819).) so great is the distance between God’s very participations and the participants, that the participation is nobler to the extent that it is simpler, whereas the participant is nobler to the extent that he has a greater composition of participated gifts. For example, to exist is nobler than to live, and to live than to understand, if one be understood in isolation from the other, for existence would be preferred to all of them, yet that which has more of these is better. But charity is a certain participation of divine goodness. Therefore, to the extent that charity is more composite owing to the addition of charity to charity, it will be less powerful. Hence, if charity is increased by addition, then to the extent that it increases, it will be less worthy of choice. However, this is ridiculous. Therefore it is not increased by way of addition.

I answer that, among those who hold that charity is essentially increased, what is said about this comes down to two opinions. One is that it is increased by an addition of charity to charity; the other, that it is increased in intensification according to an approach to the terminus. And what certain others say—that charity is increased by its multiplication in the soul just as light is increased by its multiplication in the air—also comes down to this latter opinion, for light, like other qualities, is only increased by intensification.

Now, I am not able to understand the first position, because in every addition one must understand that there are two different things, one of which is added to the other. However, if one conceives of two charities, they are conceived as different either in species or in number. But it is certain that they are not different in species, since all charities belong to the same species of virtue. On the other hand, difference in number is due to difference of matter; for example, this whiteness differs in number from that one because it is in a different subject. Hence, quality cannot be added to quality except by one subject being added to another subject. But the charity that supposedly can be added was never in another subject before being in this one; and insofar as it is in this one, it does not differ in number from the other charity existing in the same subject, as has been proved. (Above, q. 1, a. 1.) Hence, there is no way to conceive of addition happening there. But such a view arises from a false imagination, because the increase of charity is imagined to occur after the manner of bodily increase, wherein occurs an addition of quantity to quantity.

And therefore I say that when charity is increased, nothing is added there; for just as the Philosopher explains in Physics 4, (Aristotle, Physics 4.9, 217a27‒b19.) something is made whiter or hotter not by the addition of some other whiteness or hotness, but rather because the same quality which was in it before is intensified according to its proximity to its terminus.

Now, this intensification happens in different ways in simple qualities and in composite ones, in primary qualities and in secondary ones. For composite or secondary qualities are intensified according to the intensification of primary qualities; for example, taste, health, and others of this sort are intensified according to an intensification of its hotness and coldness, wetness and dryness. However, primary and simple qualities are intensified from their own immediate causes, namely from the agent and from the recipient. For an agent intends to lead a patient from the potency to the actuality of its own likeness, to the extent that it can. Now, just as the non-hot is hot in potency, so the less hot is in potency with respect to the hotter. Hence, just as what is non-hot is made hot through the power of what is actually hot, not because any hotness is placed there, but rather because the hotness that is in potency in the non-hot is brought into actuality, so too the less hot becomes hotter through the action of what is hot, insofar as the hotness which was already in the former in an imperfect act is brought into a greater perfection and a greater likeness to the agent. And this occurs to the extent that the potency subject to actuality—a potency which, in terms of what is in it, stands open to many things—reaches its terminus more and more under that actuality, either because the power of the agent is increased, as from the combination of many lights the illumination is intensified, or on the part of matter itself, insofar as it is made more receptive of that act, as air, when more rarefied, is made more receptive of light.

Now, an intensification of charity does not occur because the power of the agent is strengthened, but only because the receiving nature—which, in and of itself has a certain disposition according to which it is in potency to many things—is more and more prepared for the reception of grace, insofar as it is drawn together from the aforesaid multitude, that is, the confusion of potentiality, into one, through actions whereby one is prepared for receiving charity, as was said before. (Above, a. 1.) And this is why Dionysius always describes the perfection of holiness as a rising up from a divided life into a united one. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 5, para. 6 (PG 3:819).)

And thus it is evident that the increase of charity is similar to the increase of natural qualities, although its origin differs from their origin. The reason for this difference is that natural qualities, certain beginnings of which God imparted to matter in the work of creation, are brought out from matter’s potency; and therefore when they proceed into actuality, there is a going-out from the imperfect to the perfect. However, the gratuitous gifts are not led forth as if from the potency of nature, because nothing that cannot be brought out by a natural agent is within a natural potency. And therefore grace has its origin through a new infusion, whereas its increase occurs when an already infused actuality is brought from imperfection to perfection.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher’s statement, since he proposes it in this material, is to be understood as concerning bodily increase, which always comes about by the addition of a quantity.

Reply Obj. 2: In all things that exist God acts by one and the same action, although perhaps that action differs only according to account, insofar as it goes forth from the account of his diverse attributes, or diverse ideas. Hence, I say that by one and the same action grace is both infused and increased; nor is there any difference except on the recipient’s part, because he receives more or less from that action insofar as he is differently prepared for it—just as by the same rays of the sun the air is made clear and still clearer when foggy clouds that impede the reception of light are blown away, so that there need not be two different clarities there.

Further, even if there were two actions, they need not have their termini in two things that differ in substance; rather, the first would have its terminus in the being of imperfect charity, and the second, in the same charity according to perfection, insofar as something one and the same is brought from imperfection to perfection.

Reply Obj. 3: It does not belong to the account of any quality’s intensification that it occurs through a departure from its contrary; rather, this may just happen to a quality, insofar as it is in a subject that participates in the contrary. What does belong of necessity to intensification is that the quality be brought from imperfect to perfect, as is evident in the case of the transparent, in which there is no contrary to light, where the light can be intensified according to an increase of the light source’s power. Now, this imperfection is due to the potentiality of the very nature that is subject to perfection and actuality. For, since every potency stands receptive to many, it is—precisely because of that multitude in it—dissimilar to the acting principle, which has its terminus in one act. And insofar as that confusion of potentiality is more subjected to actuality, the act is perfected as even more perfect, and the perfected is itself made still more one, and becomes even more like the acting principle. However, this confusion of potentiality exists in every created nature whatsoever insofar as it is not yet perfected by actuality. Hence, too, in this way Dionysius asserts (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 3 (PG 3:163).) there is a purification in the angels—namely, insofar as they are removed from the confusion of unlikeness.

Reply Obj. 4: We are the cause of an increase of grace in the same way that we are the cause of grace itself, namely, only in the manner of a disposition. But the efficient cause of both is on the side of God himself, as is evident from what was said above in the body of the article.

Article 3

Whether charity is increased by any act of charity

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 27, a. 5, ad 2; ST I-II.52.3; 114.8, ad 3; II-II.24.6.) It seems that charity may be increased by any act of charity.

Obj. 1: For where the cause is the same, the effect is also the same. But all acts of charity belong to the same species with respect to their moral existence, just as all acts of fortitude belong to the same species. Therefore, since a certain act of charity increases charity, it seems that any act would do so as well.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what can do something greater can also do something lesser. But someone merits eternal life by any act of charity. Therefore so too can he merit an increase of charity.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as regards the existence of grace, any act of charity is much more powerful than acts that come only from natural abilities. But by acts that come only from natural abilities a man is prepared, in the manner of a disposition, for receiving grace. Therefore much more is he disposed toward an increase of charity by any act of charity.

On the contrary (4), something is increased owing to the same principles as those from which it was born. But one act is not enough to dispose someone in such a way that charity would be infused into him. Therefore neither is it enough to dispose him such that it would be increased. Proof of the middle premise: an act of ours has a greater causality as regards acquired virtue than it has as regards infused virtue. But one act is not enough for the generation of an acquired virtue; rather, a man becomes good from acting well frequently, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.1, 1103a27‒b25.) Therefore much less is one act enough to dispose someone to charity.

Furthermore (5), to the extent that charity is increased, so is the substantial reward. But the substantial reward is not increased by every act of charity whatsoever; for it is commonly said that by many actions done in charity, a man does not merit more, as regards an increase of the substantial reward, than he merits from one act from an equal charity. Therefore charity is not increased by every act of charity whatsoever.

I answer that the way an act informed by charity stands in relation to an increase of charity is not the same as the way an act preceding charity stands to the possession of charity. For an act that comes from charity is ordered to an increase of charity both in the manner of a disposition and in the manner of merit, whereas an act preceding the possession of charity is ordered to the obtaining of charity only in the manner of a disposition, as was said in the preceding article, and not in the manner of merit. For nothing can be meritorious before one has charity. However, neither act is ordered to the possession or increase of charity in the manner of any efficient cause, the way that an act of ours stands toward possessing the acquired habits.

Therefore one must note that, of acts that precede the possession of charity, sometimes one act alone does dispose someone with the last disposition required for the infusion of charity, according to the unchangeableness of the divine goodness, by which gifts are bestowed on each one insofar as he is prepared to receive them. But sometimes one act disposes someone to the infusion of grace only by a remote disposition, and a subsequent act disposes him still more, and so on, so that the last disposition is attained out of many good acts, insofar as a subsequent act always acts with the power of all the preceding ones. This is evident in drops of water hollowing out a stone, where it is not each and every drop that takes away something from the stone; rather, all the preceding ones dispose it, and one last drop, acting in the power of all the preceding ones, that is, insofar as it finds a matter disposed through the preceding drops, completes the hollowing out.

Now, this happens because man is lord of his own acts. Hence, he is able to act either according to the whole power of his nature, or according to part of it; this does not happen in things that act from the necessity of their nature, for such things always act by their whole power. Therefore when it so happens that a man who does not have charity is moved to charity from the whole power of the natural goodness imparted to him, then this one act disposes him with the last disposition required for charity to be given him. When, on the contrary, a man is prepared for receiving charity not according to his whole power, but only according to some part of it, then the act he does is not as the last disposition, but as a remote one, and it is through many such acts that he will be able to arrive at the last disposition.

Similarly, I say in response to the other side of the question that when an act of charity proceeds from its possessor’s whole power—with respect to both the power of his nature and the power of the infused habit—then this one act disposes, as well as merits, an increase of charity immediately coming to be. However, when that act does not proceed according to the possessor’s whole power, then it is as a remote disposition, and it is through many such acts that he will then be able to arrive at an increase of charity. Nevertheless, it will not happen of necessity, because man, no matter how he is disposed, is able not to act in accordance with the account of that disposition; that does not happen in non-voluntary dispositions, for the reason already given above.

Reply Obj. 1: Not every act of charity is done in the same manner, because one act can be more intense than another, and even just one act can be dispositive with the cumulative power of many preceding ones, as was said in the body; and therefore the same effect does not follow.

Reply Obj. 2: The substantial reward of eternal life is ordained, as an end, to the act of charity, and the one is commensurate with the other, not as equivalent but as proportionate. Thus, the substantial reward is owed to an act of charity, and a greater reward to an act of greater charity. Whence, any act of charity, insofar as it is informed by such a habit, is ordered to the substantial reward—not, however, to an increase of reward, as neither to an increase of charity, inasmuch as charity remains the first principle of meriting, but only inasmuch as an increase of charity pertains to the perfecting of the reward.

Reply Obj. 3: This is now evident from what was said, since an act of charity surpasses an act preceding the possession of charity in the fact that the former has the power of meriting, and thus it comes closer to the causality of charity than does an act that comes before charity.

Reply Sed Contra 4: In order for some perfection to be introduced, two things are required. One is on the part of the one introducing it, namely, that his action be commensurate in terms of equality with the perfection to be introduced; for the heat of fire is not induced by a meager heating, but from a heating that has power equal, at least in its source, to the heat of fire. The other is on the part of the recipient, namely, that his disposition should be proportioned in the same way to the perfection that is to be induced. Now, it happens sometimes, as in actions of the soul, that something is disposed and receives perfection from its very self, as is evident in the case of science and virtue. Hence, to be perfectly disposed in such cases, it is enough that the soul act according to a power proportioned to the perfection that is to be induced. And since the whole capacity of the soul is hardly enough to receive a perfection as great as charity is unless God supply of his liberality whatever is wanting, therefore so that the last disposition for receiving charity be in the soul, there is required an act done according to the soul’s whole power, and that is enough, as regards what it is in us. But an act less than this is not enough for such a disposition.

Further, in those perfections in which, by the soul’s own act, there is not only a disposition but also the perfection itself, it is required that that act of the soul itself should be proportionate and equal in power to the very perfection to be introduced. Now, it belongs to the account of every habit that it be difficult to change, that is, that it have a certain firmness. Hence, when a single action of the soul has the firmness, of itself it induces a habit, as it is evident that one demonstration, owing to its certitude and firmness, produces a habit of knowledge. However, when a single act does not have this firmness, the one act is not enough, but there must be many acts; hence, an opinion is not generated from one dialectical argument, but from many gathered together. In the same way, too, because an act of the human will does not have firmness, since the will stands indeterminately to many things, the habits of political virtues, which are acquired through acts of the will, cannot be acquired by one act alone; rather, many such acts must come together. However, the habit of charity does not get its firmness from any act of the soul, but from its cause, which is God; and therefore one act of the will can be enough for charity to be infused, and likewise for it to be increased.

Reply Sed Contra 5: When an act of charity is of the sort required for an increase of charity, then the substantial reward owed to the greater charity that follows upon the act is also increased, though it is not owed to the charity that is the root of the act. But not all acts of charity are of this sort, as was said above; (Above, ad 2.) and therefore an increase of the substantial reward does not follow of necessity upon a multitude of acts of charity.

Article 4

Whether charity’s increase has a limit

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In III Sent., d. 29, a. 8, qa. 1, ad 2; ST II-II.24.7; On the Virtues, q. 2, a. 10, ad sed contra 3.) It seems that there is some limit to the increase of charity.

Obj. 1: For a perfection does not exceed the capacity of the perfectible. But the soul’s capacity is finite. Therefore it can receive only a finite perfection. But every motion toward something finite is finite. Therefore the increase of charity, which is a motion toward the soul’s perfection, is finite.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, nothing moves in an orderly way to what it cannot reach, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Physics 6.7, 238b10; 6.10, 241b2‒8.) just as he who cannot be in Egypt is not moving toward there in an orderly way. But no one can cross an infinite distance, since no motion can be according to an infinite distance. Therefore no motion is infinite. But the increase of charity is a certain motion. Therefore it comes to a definite terminus.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as the Master says below, (See In III Sent., d. 13, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 2.) not even God can make something greater than the grace of Christ. But if the increase of charity and grace could go without limit, there could be a charity greater than any charity whatsoever. Therefore such increase is not without limit. And one can say something similar of the Blessed Virgin, about whom Anselm says (Anselm, On the Virginal Conception, ch. 18 (PL 158:451).) that by her purity she shone so brightly that a greater purity, beneath God, could not be conceived; and so it is as well of the blessed, whose charity cannot be increased. Through all of these arguments it seems that the increase of charity comes to some terminus, beyond which it cannot be increased.

On the contrary, increase of charity takes place according to a greater likening to God. But howsoever much one approaches likeness with God, one always stands infinitely distant from him. Therefore one can always approach more. And so it seems that the increase of charity is not finite. (Reading finitum for infinitum; note that the double negative in Latin is sometimes intensive.)

Furthermore, when an act of charity proceeds from a greater charity, it has greater power for meriting. But an act of imperfect charity merits an increase of charity. Therefore so much the more will it merit when charity shall have been brought to a greater perfection; and so, the increase of charity will never come to a stand-still.

I answer that we can speak of a limit to charity’s increase in two ways: either in regard to that which is, or in regard to that which can be. This is like how we also say that there is not a highest evil than which there cannot be anything worse, yet there is some highest evil than which nothing is worse. In like manner, I say that charity’s increase comes to a terminus in each man beyond which it does not increase, yet it does not come to some limit beyond which it cannot increase.

The reason for this is taken both from the side of that which moves according to this increase and on the side of that to which it moves. Now, that to which the soul moves in an increase of charity is the likeness of divine charity, which the soul becomes like; and this, being infinite, can be approached infinitely more and more, and it will never be perfectly equaled. However, on the side of what is moving, the reason is that the soul itself, to the extent that it receives more of the divine goodness and the very light of its grace, is made all the more capable of receiving these; and therefore the more it receives, the more it is able to receive. The reason for this is that, while material powers are limited and finite owing to the requirements of matter, and thus can receive only according to the proportion of the matter, immaterial powers are not limited by matter, but more in reference to the amount of divine goodness received into them. Hence, to the degree that more goodness is added, so much more is the power for receiving, as is evident in the Philosopher’s example about sense and intellect; (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429a29‒b5.) for he says that the senses are corrupted by powerful sensibles, and their capacity is not thereby increased, because they are material powers, whereas the intellect, to the extent that it understands difficult things better, is rendered that much more able to understand. So, too, the more charity the spiritual nature receives, the more it is able to receive.

Now, some have said, comparing the capacity of a spiritual substance to the capacity of a material substance, that in charity’s increase there is a limit according to the capacity of the nature—namely, when it receives just so much charity as fills up the first capacity that was from its nature, it cannot receive any more. And they give the example of air, which has a limit to its subtleness, a limit it does not surpass; hence light can be intensified in it, insofar as it is more and more purified from mixed vapors, but when the purity of its own nature is reached, it cannot be still more purified, nor more illuminated by the same source of illumination. But there is no parallel between the capacity of a material substance and that of a spirit, as was said. (Above, q. 1, a. 3.)

Reply Obj. 1: Although the soul’s capacity is actually finite, it can nonetheless be stretched more and more into something finite, insofar as it receives more and more. Nevertheless, it will never be infinite, nor will it receive an infinite perfection, as is also clear in adding numbers to numbers, which can go to infinity, even though there is never some actually infinite number. For as the Commentator says in Physics 3, (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 3, text. 68.) the potential of numerical addition is not a single potential; instead, a distinct potential is fulfilled in a number insofar as a new species of number is made by each new addition. Hence, while each potential can go into actuality, it is impossible that all should go into actuality, because in each actuality a potential is also added; and so it is here with the soul’s capacity as well.

Reply Obj. 2: Any increase of charity whatsoever has a terminus, and is toward a terminus that a man can reach; yet this terminus, since it is not pure act, is mixed with potency. Hence, there can still be a further increase that is numerically other than an increase that has already occurred, and thus increase can succeed increase into infinity. In this way can be understood the “limitless increase of charity.”

Reply Obj. 3: The grace of Christ, although it is finite according to its essence, was nevertheless infinite in a certain respect—namely, insofar as it was a disposition of congruity to the union to the divine person, and insofar as it concurred in Christ’s activity, which was of infinite power owing to the fact that he was a divine person, and in other ways, too, as will be said in Book III; (In III Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 3.) and from this comes the Master’s position that his grace could not be increased.

As to what was objected about the Blessed Virgin, it should be said that increase of charity differs from increase of purity. For an increase of purity is according to a withdrawal from its contrary; and because in the Blessed Virgin there was purification from all sin, therefore she came to the summit of purity. Still, it was beneath God’s purity, for in him there is no potential for falling away, which is in every creature as such.

However, increase of charity happens by means of approaching the divine goodness; and therefore the Blessed Virgin did not have the highest charity than which a greater could not be conceived, since she too advanced in charity and grace. As to what was objected concerning the blessed, it should be said that charity is not increased in them on account of the condition of their state, because they are no longer on the earthly path but have arrived at the end of the path. Hence a reward is given to them insofar as the charity in the state of the earthly path grew in them.

Article 5

Whether charity admits of decrease

To the fifth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST II-II.24.10; On Evil, q. 7, a. 2.) It seems that charity admits of decrease.

Obj. 1: For contraries are naturally apt to happen to the same thing. But increase and decrease are contraries. Therefore, since charity may increase, it seems that it may also decrease.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says, where there is great cupidity, there is small charity; (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, cc. 31‒32 (CCSL 46; PL 40:288).) and elsewhere, he loves you less, who loves something else with you which he does not love for your sake. (Augustine, Confessions, bk. 10, ch. 29 (CCSL 27; PL 32:796); the final clause here in the English, which Aquinas omits but perhaps implies, in the Latin reads: quod non propter te amat.) But cupidity can increase. Therefore so too can charity decrease.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, venial sin is an evil of fault. But every evil takes away some good opposed to it. Therefore, because the good of grace, or charity, is opposed to the evil of fault, venial sin will take away the good of charity. But it does not take away the whole of it, because it would then exclude one from the kingdom, for it is by charity alone that sons of the kingdom are divided from sons of damnation, according to Augustine, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 15, ch. 18 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1082).) and were that the case, it would be mortal sin. Therefore it takes away something of charity, and thus it diminishes it.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, insofar as someone disposes himself to charity and grace, so too does God infuse this into him; for, according to Augustine, (See Alcher of Clairvaux, The Spirit and the Soul, ch. 17 (PL 40:792), though Mandonnet notes that this claim is not made there explicitly.) the light of divine grace is present to all, but the fact that some do not receive it is because they turn themselves away from it, like one who closes his eyes to the light of the sun. But someone can dispose himself less to charity than he had done before. Therefore he will participate less in the light of grace and charity.

On the contrary, any created charity is finite. But according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Physics 3.6, 206b10; 6.7, 238a12‒32.) anything finite is exhausted by subtraction, if something be taken away again and again. Therefore, if a venial sin did diminish some of one’s charity, a subsequent one would diminish it as well, and in this manner one’s entire charity will be taken away by the multiplication of venial sins. But charity is taken away only by mortal sin. Therefore many venial sins will become one mortal sin—which no one asserts.

Furthermore, you might say that this taking away of charity by venial sin happens like the division of what is continuous, which goes to infinity as long as the division is made according to the same proportion and not according to the same quantity.

On the contrary, when there is division according to the same proportion, what is taken away afterwards is always less than what was taken away before. For example, if at first a third part of a line is taken away, and afterwards, a third of what remains of that, and so on, what is taken afterwards will always be less in quantity. But it can happen that a subsequent venial sin does not have less power than the first. Therefore, it takes away as much charity as the first sin did; and in this fashion, one’s charity will be eventually consumed by this taking away.

I answer that charity cannot essentially decrease, except perhaps by succession—namely, in such a way that the charity that was in someone is destroyed through mortal sin, and afterwards a lesser charity is infused owing to a lesser preparation to receive it.

And the reason for this is that the cause of the decrease of charity cannot be drawn from the side of God, since no defect can be traced back, as to a cause, to him who is complete actuality. Therefore, if charity were to decrease, the cause of the decrease would have to be drawn from our side. Now, defect happens on our side either due to a cessation of an act, or due to a disorder of it. According to what it is in itself, charity cannot be weakened by cessation of action, as can occur with the habits of acquired virtues. For the firmness of charity itself does not come from our act, but from the source that infuses the habit, as was said before. (Above, a. 2.) Hence, even with the cessation of our acts, there remains nonetheless the same strength of charity. Still, it is true that by frequent acts of charity all the powers of the soul are disposed to such acts, and the members of the body are brought into the service of charity, wherein consists one’s fervor, as was said; and therefore due to laziness charity’s fervor grows cold. However, the habits of the acquired virtue have their strength and firmness from our own actions; this is why, with the cessation of our actions, the virtue’s strength is weakened, even in itself.

However, an act’s disorder regards either its end or the things directed toward the end. If it regards the end—namely, such that the end is taken away—then charity, insofar as it adheres to the end, is taken away, and this comes about through mortal sin. If, on the other hand, the disorder regards things directed toward the end—namely, such that, while the end remains, a man gives inordinate attention or affection to things ordered to the end—then such a disorder, which is that of a venial sin, does not touch one’s charity, which regards one’s adherence to the end; and therefore it diminishes nothing of one’s charity. Still, it is true that just as things directed toward the end dispose one to the end, so correspondingly a disorder in them disposes one to a disorder towards the end; for this reason we say that a venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. Hence, by venial sins of this kind, someone is disposed to the loss of charity. And this is why charity is said to be diminished not with respect to its essence, but with respect to its rootedness and fervor: with respect to rootedness, insofar as a disposition to the contrary arises, so that the firm adherence of charity is diminished; with respect to fervor, insofar as the obedience of one’s lower powers to higher ones is impeded, from which obedience the aforementioned fervor was being caused.

Reply Obj. 1: Contraries by their nature do happen to the same thing, unless one of them is naturally in that thing. And it is said to be “naturally in the thing” when it follows upon its causes. Hence I say that the ability to increase is naturally in charity, but not an ability to decrease, because, both on the side of the receiver and on the side of the one infusing it, there can be some cause of increase, but not of diminishment, as was said in the body of the article.

Reply Obj. 2: The inverse proportionality between cupidity and charity can be understood in two ways: either with respect to charity’s coming-to-be, or with respect to its being. If understood with respect to its coming-to-be, then it is true that one is less disposed to receiving charity, or an increase thereof, to the degree that, through his disordered acts, cupidity gains a greater dominion within him; and this is so because our acts dispose us to possessing charity, or advancing in it. But if it is understood with respect to charity’s being, then, seeing that our acts are not the cause of the being of charity itself, the disorder of one’s acts caused by cupidity takes away nothing from charity with respect to its being, but only with respect to its fervor, insofar as the lower parts are habituated against obedience to charity.

Reply Obj. 3: Venial sin cannot deprive charity of anything, since it does not touch that part of the soul where charity is. For just as the superior part of intellect consists in the consideration of principles of things known through themselves, through which the other things are known, so that regardless of how much doubt might arise about conclusions, nothing of the certitude of the principles is diminished; so too, the superior part of one’s affect consists in adherence to the end on account of which all things are loved. Hence, whatsoever disorder happens in regard to things directed toward the end, the very adherence to the end that comes about through charity is not diminished, unless a contrary end should be posited. Thus, precisely because it does not posit an undue end, venial sin does not touch that highest affection where charity is. But just as venial sin is not sin simply speaking, but only insofar as it is a disposition to mortal sin, so too it deprives one of the good that stands as a disposition to charity, that is, fervor, which occurs in the facility of an act, owing to the loving obedience or subjection of one’s lower powers to the higher part of affection, where charity is.

Reply Obj. 4: The disposition to receiving charity is in reference to the acts of the lower powers inasmuch as they operate about things directed toward the end, just as one reaches an end through things directed to the end. But once the end is possessed, one no longer needs things directed to the end. Hence, whatever disorder arises in their regard does not redound to a disorder of the end, except in the manner of a disposition to such a loss, just as the knowledge of first principles is determined in us through the senses, and yet the certainty of principles would not be diminished even if the senses were destroyed, because this certainty is not acquired but is naturally implanted in us; and it is similar with infused charity.

Exposition of the second part of the text

Just as God is said to be magnified and exalted in us, (Sent. I, 17.5(64).3.) that is, insofar as he makes us great and lofty in himself; this can only happen according to a fuller reception of his goodness. And therefore one must return to this point: that something created by God is placed within us.

Yet there are many who do not have him. (Sent. I, 17.5(64).4.) For only those for whom he is as their inheritance are said to possess him—those who enjoy him either in hope or in vision.

It is clear that without the Holy Spirit we cannot love Christ and keep his commandments. (Sent. I, 17.5(64).5, quoting Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, tract. 74, para. 2 (CCSL 36; PL 35:1828).) This can be understood in two ways: either such that, through the gift of charity, we cannot fulfill God’s commandments or love Christ without our possessing the Holy Spirit through charity—and this is true as regards doing things meritoriously; or that we cannot do these things without the Holy Spirit acting in some way at all in things—and so taken, it is true that neither man nor any created thing can have any action at all without the Holy Spirit. But this latter interpretation is not Augustine’s meaning in the text.

Let the Spirit who is in you be in me in a double measure. (Sent. I, 17.5(64).5, quoting Elisha in 2 Kings 2:9.) This quotation seems irrelevant to the proposed topic, because, as a note explains, this is interpreted to mean that Elisha begged for the double gift, namely, of prophecy and of miracles, that was in Elijah, and it does not mean that he begged to have the Holy Spirit more than Elijah had him. But it should be said that, even if we let that interpretation stand, Augustine’s intention is supported: for if everyone receives the Holy Spirit equally, then if Elisha already had the Holy Spirit, he would not have begged for the Holy Spirit to come into him. And if he did not have, or did not know he had, the Holy Spirit, he would simply have begged for the Holy Spirit. Hence the very fact that he begged to have the Holy Spirit as he was in Elijah shows that Elijah had the Holy Spirit more excellently than did Elisha.

The Holy Spirit is given . . . until the proper measure is filled. (Sent. I, 17.5(64).7, quoting Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, tract. 74, para. 3 (CCSL 36; PL 35:1828).) There is said to be a proper measure of each thing both on the part of God, as much as he has predestined to each, and on the part of him who receives, considering both the capacity of his natural powers and his effort.

It was said above that the Holy Spirit is the charity of Father and Son. (Sent. I, 17.6(65).1.) Note that the authorities that are brought against the Master say three things. For the ones who are brought forward first say that the charity by which God loves is other than that by which we love. This the Master interprets to mean “other” in account, or in the manner of understanding, and not in the thing itself.

Other authorities brought forward second say that love is from the Holy Spirit; and thus, since the Holy Spirit is not from himself, the charity given to us will not be the Holy Spirit. But the Master responds that although the Holy Spirit is not from himself, nevertheless he is given by himself; and in this way charity is said to be from the Holy Spirit. But this response is insufficient, because it is said not only that charity is given by the Holy Spirit, but also that it is from him, which cannot be conceded about the Holy Spirit.

Other authorities brought forward third say that charity is a motion or affection of the mind, which does not fit the Holy Spirit. But to this the Master responds that this predication is causal, because charity is the cause of that motion or affection of the mind, which is loving. And this explanation is true, although it is not in accordance with what the Master intends. For charity is the cause of affection as a habit eliciting an act, and not only as moving the soul to the act of love, which is what he intends. This is why he consequently raises the question: since the Holy Spirit, whom he says is charity, moves the soul to all the acts of the virtues, why is he especially said to move the soul to the act of love? And his response in the text is clear, but he does not assign a cause for what he takes for granted in his solution, namely, that the Holy Spirit causes this act, which is loving, without the mediation of any habit; hence, the mediation still remains unresolved.

For individuals do not each have all the gifts, but some have some, and others have others. (Sent. I, 18.1.(66).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 15, ch. 19 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1084).) Note that not only is the uncreated gift common to the saints, but so are the gifts pertaining to the grace that renders one pleasing to God, which are infused together and without which the Holy Spirit is not possessed. But the gifts given gratuitously are given more to manifest the Spirit already received than to join one to the Spirit; and this is done for the sake of their utility to others (1 Cor 12:7), and they are distributed to different persons as suits what is useful to the Church.