D. 8 - The divine essence

Division of the first part of the text

Having manifested the Trinity of persons in the unity of essence, here he begins to go through his consideration of things that pertain to each of them. Now, in the divine there are three aspects: the common essence, the distinct person, and the distinguishing property. Therefore this part is divided into two: in the first, he considers them according to themselves; in the second, he considers how they are related to each other, at after what has been said above, it is necessary to consider more deeply and inquire. (Sent. I, 33.1(143).1.)

The first part is divided into three. In the first, he considers the essence; in the second, he considers the persons, at now let us proceed to the distinction of persons; (Sent. I, 9.1(29).1.) in the third, he considers the properties, at it is now necessary that we say something about the properties of the persons. (Sent. I, 26.1(105).1.)

The first of these is also divided into three, according to the three attributes of the essence that he treats. For first he considers the unity of the essence; second, its unchangeableness, at the essence of the one God is also properly called unchangeable; (Sent. I, 8.2(22).1.) third, its simplicity, at the same substance alone is properly and truly simple. (Sent. I, 8.3(23).1.)

As regards the first, he does two things: first, he shows the truth of the divine essence; second, he removes a doubt, at here we must diligently consider how Jerome’s words are to be understood. (Sent. I, 8.1(21).4.)

As regards the first part of the distinction, wherein he treats what is proper to the divine existence, two things are asked about:

first, about the divine existence itself; (Q. 1.)

second, about its measure, which is eternity. (Q. 2.)

Question 1

Divine existence

Three things are asked about in the first:

first, whether existence properly belongs to God;

second, whether his existence is the existence of every created thing;

third, about the order of the name “he who is” relative to the other divine names.

Article 1

Whether “to exist” is said properly of God

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that “to exist” is not properly said of God.

Obj. 1: For that is proper to something that belongs to it alone. But to exist belongs not only to God but also to created things. Therefore it seems that to exist does not properly belong to God.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, we can name God only insofar as we know him; this is why Damascene says, a word is an angel, that is, a messenger, of the intellect. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 13 (PG 94:858).) But we cannot know God immediately in the state of the earthy path, but only from created things. Therefore neither do we name him except from created things. Therefore, since “he who is” does not indicate any reference to created things, it seems that it does not properly name God.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as created wisdom falls short of uncreated wisdom, so too created existence falls short of uncreated existence. But the name “wisdom” is said to fall short of the perfect signification of divine wisdom because we have imposed it in reference to an apprehension of created wisdom. Therefore it seems that for the same reason neither does this name “he who is” properly signify that God exists; and thus it should not be said that this name is more proper than the others.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 9 (PG 94:835).) that “he who is” does not signify what God is, but a certain infinite sea of substance. But the infinite is not comprehensible, and consequently it is not nameable, but rather remains unknown. Therefore it seems that “he who is” is not a divine name.

On the contrary, in Exodus 3:14, the Lord said to Moses, if they ask . . . ‘What is his name?’ say this to the people of Israel, ‘He-who-is has sent me to you.’ (RSV reads I am instead of He-who-is.) This seems to be the same as what Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 9 (PG 94:835).) that “he who is” is the most proper name of God, and what Rabbi Moses says, (Moses Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, part 1, cc. 61‒62.) that this is God’s unspeakable name, the one that was held with the greatest dignity.

I answer that among all the other names of God, “he who is” is most of all his proper name. And there can be four reasons for this. The first is taken from the text, (Sent. I, 8.1(21).3, quoting Jerome, Epistulae, letter 15, “To Damasus,” para. 4 (CSEL 54:65; PL 22:357).) based on the words of Jerome in reference to the perfection of the divine existence. For that of which there is nothing outside itself is perfect, whereas our existence has something outside itself, since it lacks something that has already passed away about it, and also something that is going to be. But in the divine existence nothing has passed away and nothing is to come, and therefore he holds his entire existence as perfect. And on account of this, in comparison to other things, existence belongs to him properly.

The second reason is taken from the words of Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 9 (PG 94:834‒35).) who says that “he who is” signifies existence without determination, and not what he is. And in the state of the earthly path we know of him only this: that he is, and not what he is, except through negation, and we can name things only insofar as we know them. Therefore he is properly named, “he who is” by us.

The third reason is taken from the words of Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, cc. 2‒4 (PG 3:587‒94).) who says that to exist, among all the other participations of divine goodness, such as to live, to understand, and such, is the first and, as it were, the principle of the others, as possessing in advance within itself all the aforesaid, united according to a certain mode. And in this way too God is the divine principle, and all things are one in him.

The fourth reason is taken from the words of Avicenna, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 8, ch. 1.) in the following way. Since in everything that exists one can consider its “whatness,” (Quidditas is frequently either translated as “essence” or merely transliterated as “quiddity.” Although both are defensible, here and throughout this translation we have translated it with the awkward but resonant word “whatness” in order to translate quidditas more precisely and to retain the fundamental connection with the answer to the question, “what is it?” (quid est?), which provokes an inquiry into a thing’s essence.) through which it subsists in a determinate nature, and its existence, through which one says that it exists in act, therefore the name “real thing” is imposed on a thing from its “whatness,” according to Avicenna, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 2, ch. 1.) but the name “that which is,” or “a being,” is imposed from its very act of existing. Now, since this is why in every created reality its essence differs from its existence, that reality is properly denominated from its “whatness,” and not from its act of existing, like a man from his humanity. But in God his very existence is his “whatness,” so the name taken from existence properly names him, and is his proper name, just as the proper name of man is taken from his “whatness.”

Reply Obj. 1: When something is said to belong properly to anything, this can be understood in two ways. In one way, through its properness everything extraneous to the nature of the subject is being excluded, as when it is said that it is proper to man to be risible, for it belongs to nothing outside the nature of man. And in this way “to exist” cannot be called proper to God, because it belongs also to created things. In the other way, insofar as everything extraneous to the nature of the predicate is being excluded, as when one says, “this is properly gold,” because it has no mixture of any other metal. And in this way “existence” is called proper to God, since the divine existence has no admixture of any privation or potentiality, as does the existence of what is created. And therefore for the same existence the text takes “property and truth”; (Sent. I, 8.1(21).1.) for we say that is “true gold” that has nothing extraneous mixed with it.

Reply Obj. 2: It is possible to name God from created things in three ways. One way is when the name itself actually connotes an effect in what is created, on account of the relation to the created thing implied in the name, such as “Creator” and “Lord.” Another way is when the name itself names according to its own account the principle of some divine act in created things, such as “wisdom,” “power,” and “will.” Another way is when the name itself signifies something represented in creatures, such as “living”; for every life is based on the divine life as its exemplar. And similarly, this name “he who is” names God through the existence found in created things, which is drawn from him as from their exemplar.

Reply Obj. 3: A created thing’s existence imperfectly represents the divine existence, and this name “he who is” imperfectly signifies it, because it signifies through the mode of a certain concretion and composition. However, it is still more imperfectly signified by the other names, since when I say, “God is wise,” then, since existence is included in this expression, two imperfections are signified there: one that is from the side of the concrete existence itself, like in the name “he who is,” and another added from the proper account of wisdom, for created wisdom itself falls short of the account of divine wisdom. And therefore there is a greater imperfection in the other names than there is in the name “he who is,” and therefore this one is of greater dignity and more proper to God.

Reply Obj. 4: All the other names signify existence according to some determinate account, just as “wise” says being something, but the name “he who is” signifies absolute being, being undetermined by something added to it. This is why Damascene says that it does not signify what God is; rather, it signifies a certain infinite and, as it were, undetermined sea of substance. Whence when we approach God through the path of removal, we first deny bodily things of him, and second even intellectual things insofar as they are found in created things, such as goodness and wisdom. And then there remains in our understanding only that he exists, and nothing more. Thereby he exists as in a certain confusion. Moreover, at the end, we remove even existence itself, insofar as it is found in created things; and then one remains in a certain darkness of ignorance. According to this ignorance, as far as pertains to the state of the earthly path, we are joined to God best, as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 8, para. 3 (PG 3:870); Mystical Theology, ch. 1 (PG 3:998); Epistle 5, “To Dorotheus” (PG 3:1074).) and this is a certain fog wherein God is said to dwell.

Article 2

Whether God is the existence of all things

To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that God is the existence of all things.

Obj. 1: This seems so because of what Dionysius says in the Heavenly Hierarchy that the existence of all things is the above-existence of the divinity. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 4, para. 1 (PG 3:178).) He also says this in On the Divine Names: God himself is the existence for all existing things. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 5, para. 4 (PG 3:818).)

Obj. 2: Furthermore, nothing created exists through itself, but rather through another. Now, its existence is not through another, since if its existence were through another, the same question would arise for that other—and thus one would proceed to infinity. And so it seems that existence is not something caused, and so it is God.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, things that exist and are in no way different are the same. But God and a thing’s existence exist and are in no way different. Therefore they are the same thing. Proof of the middle premise: that they exist is manifest, but that they are not different is seen as follows. For all things that differ, differ by some difference. But all things that differ by a difference have within themselves that difference, and thus are composite; for example, a man has within himself rationality. Therefore, since existence is simple, and so is God, it seems that they do not differ.

On the contrary, nothing in a thing is more united to it than its own existence. But God is not united to things, as is also clear from the Philosopher in the Book of Causes: the first cause rules all realities, even though it is not mixed with them. (Rather: Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 20. Note that here and throughout this first book of the Sentences commentary, Aquinas refers to this work as authored by Aristotle (“the Philosopher”). However, in the other books of the Sentences commentary, he seems to reserve judgment about the identity of the author of this work. Likewise, in later works (and especially in his commentary on the Book of Causes), Aquinas consistently rejects the ascription of it to Aristotle and attributes it (correctly) to Proclus, based on its content.) Therefore God is not the existence of all things.

Furthermore, nothing has existence except insofar as it participates in the divine existence, for it itself is the first being; this is why it is the cause of every being. But everything participated within a thing is in it through the mode of the participant, since nothing can receive beyond its own measure. Therefore since the mode of every created thing is finite, every created thing receives a finite existence, and one inferior to the divine existence, which is the most perfect. Therefore it is certain that the existence of a created thing, by which it formally exists, is not the divine existence.

I answer that, as Bernard says, (Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermones super Cantica Canticorum, serm. 4, para. 4 (PL 183:798).) God is not the essential existence of all things, but their causal existence. This is clear as follows.

For we find three modes of agent cause.

First, there is the cause acting equivocally, and this is when the effect does not agree with the cause either in name or in account; for example, the sun causes heat but is not hot.

Second, there is a cause acting univocally, when the effect agrees in both name and account with the cause; for example, a man generates a man, and something hot makes heat. In neither of these modes does God act—neither univocally, because nothing univocally agrees with him, nor equivocally, since with God the effect and the cause in some way agree in name and account, although according to the prior and the posterior. For example, God by his own wisdom makes us wise, yet such that our wisdom always falls short of the account of his wisdom, just as an accident falls short of the account of being insofar as it is in substance.

Whence there is a third mode of cause, acting analogically. So it is clear that the divine existence produces the existence of what is created in its imperfect likeness, and therefore the divine existence is said to be the “existence of all realities,” from which as from an agent and an exemplar every created existence emanates.

Reply Obj. 1: The solution to Dionysius’s claim is that it should be understood that way, as is clear from his saying “above-existence”; for if God were essentially the existence of what is created, he would not be above existence.

Reply Obj. 2: Created existence does not exist through something else, if the word “through” indicates an intrinsic formal cause; indeed, what is created exists by itself formally. However, if it indicates a formal cause outside the thing, or an efficient cause, then it does exist through the divine existence, and not through itself.

Reply Obj. 3: First things are diverse only through their very selves, but things that are derived from the first things differ through the diversity of first things. For example, man and donkey differ by the diverse differences “rational” and “irrational,” which are not themselves diversified by other differences, but by their very selves. So too God and created existence do not differ by certain differences added to them, but from their very selves. This is why they are not properly said to differ but to be diverse; for the diverse is absolute, whereas the different is related, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 10. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.3, 1054b23‒1055a2.) For everything different differs by something, but not everything diverse is diverse by something.

Article 3

Whether the name “he who is” is the first among the divine names

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.13.11; On the Power of God, q. 2, a. 1; q. 7, a. 5; q. 10, a. 1, ad 9; Commentary on Dionysius’s On the Divine Names, ch. 5, lect. 1.) For it seems that the name “he who is” is not the first among the divine names.

Obj. 1: For one should treat prior things prior. But Dionysius treats the good before the existent in On the Divine Names. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, cc. 4, 5 (PG 3:694, 3:815).) Therefore it seems that “good” is prior to “being.”

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what is more common seems to be prior. But the good is more common than being, since the divine existence extends only to beings that participate in existence, but the good extends even to non-beings, which he even calls into existence. For “good” (bonum) is derived from “to cry out” (boare), which is to call out, as the Commentator says in On the Book of the Divine Names. (Albert the Great attributes the claim to Dionysius and the “Commentum.” See Albert the Great, Commentary on Sentences I, in Opera Omnia 25 (Paris: Ludovicus Vivès, 1893), d. 2D, a. 14, para. 3, p. 70. See Dionysius, On Divine Names, ch. 4; Remigius of Auxerre, Commentum Einsidlense in Donati Artem minorem (recensio brevis), ch. 23, p. 15.) Therefore the good is prior to being.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, whenever things have equal simplicity, one is not prior to another. But being, true, good, and one have equal simplicity; this is clear from the fact that they are convertible. Therefore one is not prior to another.

On the contrary, according to Dionysius (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 1, para. 4 (PG 3:590).) the divine attributes are not made known to us except from their participations, whereby they are participated in by created things. But among all the other participations, existence is the first, as is said in On the Divine Names, in these words: existence is placed before the other participations of him, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 5, para. 6 (PG 3:819).) that is, of God. The statement of the Philosopher, in the Book of Causes, is also consonant with this: the first of created things is existence. (Rather: Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 4.) Therefore it seems that, according to the account of understanding, in God existence is before the other attributes, and “he who is” is the first of all the names.

Furthermore, what is the last in resolution is the first in existence. But being is the last thing in the resolution of the intellect, since when everything else has been removed, being is the last thing remaining. Therefore it is the first thing naturally.

I answer that these names “being” and “good,” “one” and “true,” simply speaking according to the account of understanding precede the other divine names. This is clear from their commonness.

However, if we compare them to each other, this can be done in two ways: either in reference to the supposit, and in this way they are convertible with each other, and are the same in supposit, nor do they ever desert each other; or in reference to their intentions, and in this way simply and absolutely speaking being is prior to the others. The reason for this is that being is included in their understanding, but not vice versa. For the first thing that falls within the imagination of the intellect is being, without which the intellect cannot apprehend anything. For example, the first things that fall within the credence of the intellect are the axioms, and especially this one: that contradictories cannot be true simultaneously. This is why all the others in some way are included in being, in a united and distinct way, as in a principle. Due to this too there is a certain appropriateness that this divine name be the most proper one.

The other names we have spoken of, that is, the “good,” the “true,” and the “one,” add something over and above being—not of course any nature, but an account. “One” adds the account of non-division, and this is why it is the closest to “being,” since it adds only a negation. But “true” and “good” add a certain relation: “good” adds a relation to the end, “true” a relation to the exemplar form, for anything is called “true” from the fact that it imitates the divine exemplar. Or “true” adds a relation to a cognitive power, for we call something “true gold” from the fact that it has the form of gold that it shows, and thereby a true judgment is being made of it.

However, if they are considered according to the account of causality, then the good is prior. For the good has the account of the final cause, whereas existence has the account of only the exemplar and efficient cause in God. However, the end is the first cause in the account of causality.

Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius is treating the divine names insofar as they have the account of causality, that is, insofar as they are manifested in the participation of created things. And therefore he considers the good before the existing.

Reply Obj. 2: The good is not more common according to the scope of predication, for this is the way it is convertible with being; rather, it is more common according to the account of causality. For the efficient causality of the exemplar extends only to things that actually participate in the form of their exemplar cause. And therefore the causality of “being,” insofar as it is a divine name, extends only to beings, and that of “life” only to living things, but the causality of the end extends even to things that do not yet participate in the form. For even imperfect things desire and stretch toward the end. For Dionysius calls matter “non-being” on account of the privation joined to it; whence also he says (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 3 (PG 3:698).) that what is non-existing itself desires the good.

Reply Obj. 3: They are convertible when considered in reference to their supposits. Yet in reference to their intention, being is simpler and prior to the others, as has been said.

Question 2

Eternity

Next, one asks about the measure of the divine existence, which is eternity. Three things are asked about this:

first, what eternity is;

second, to whom does it belong;

third, whether words of diverse tenses can be predicated of the eternal.

Article 1

Whether Boethius’s definition of eternity is fitting

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.10.1; Commentary on the Book of Causes, lect. 2.)

Obj. 1: In the Consolation of Philosophy, Boethius asserts as the definition of eternity: eternity is the simultaneously whole and perfect possession of boundless life. (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 5, prose 6 (PG 63:858).) But this definition seems to be assigned unfittingly. This seems so because “boundless” signifies a negation. But no negation makes one certain about anything. Therefore it seems that it should not be placed in the definition of eternity.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the first measure corresponds to the first thing measured. But the first among things measured is existence. Therefore it seems that eternity, which is the first measure, should not be defined through life, but through existence.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the simple has no measure; indeed, by the simplest thing all other things are measured, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.1, 1052b30‒1053b8.) But the divine life is the simplest thing there is. Therefore there is nothing that would stand in the account of a measure for it; rather, the divine life itself has the account of a measure. And thus eternity, which indicates the account of a measure, does not itself have a measure.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a whole is spoken of in relation to its parts. But it belongs to the account of duration that its parts not be simultaneous, for it is impossible for two durations to be simultaneously unless one includes another, as Augustine says. (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 11, ch. 6 (CCSL 48; PL 41:321).) Therefore it seems to say two opposite things when it says, simultaneously whole.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, “whole” includes perfection within itself, so it seems that perfect is superfluous.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, eternity has the account of duration. But possession says nothing pertaining to duration. Therefore it seems that it should not be placed in the definition of eternity, at least directly, and as a genus. For what is placed in a thing’s definition in this way ought to say what the defined thing is.

I answer that eternity is said to be, as it were, the being beyond boundaries. Now, an existence can be said to be bounded in three ways: either according to its whole duration, and in this way what has a beginning and an end is called “bounded”; or by reason of the parts of its duration, and in this way that is called “bounded” of which any part taken is bounded, whether before it or after it, as one can take in a motion; or by reason of the supposit in which existence is received, for existence is received in a thing according to its mode, and thereby it is bounded. This is like every other form, which of itself is common; and according to how it is received in something, so it is bounded at that. And in this way alone is the divine existence not bounded, since it is not received in something that is diverse from it.

I say, therefore, that boundless life is placed in the definition to exclude the first boundaries, which are the boundaries of the beginning and the end of the whole duration. And thereby the eternal is divided from things that are generated and corrupted. However, simultaneously whole is added to exclude the second boundaries, that of the parts of duration; for through this is excluded a succession of parts of duration, relative to which each finite part exists and traverses. And through this the eternal is divided from motion and time, even if they always were and will be, as some have asserted. Perfect is added to exclude the third sort of boundaries, which are on the side of the receiver. For that wherein the existence is not absolute, but bounded by its receiver, does not have perfect existence; only what is its own existence does. And through this, eternal existence is divided from the received existence of unchangeable creatures, which have a participated existence, like spiritual creatures.

Reply Obj. 1: Simple things, and especially the divine, are in no way better manifested than through removal, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7, para. 3 (PG 3:870).) The reason for this is that the intellect cannot perfectly comprehend their existence, and therefore from the negations of things that are removed from it, the intellect is led by the hand to know them in some way. This is also why a point is defined by negation. (Euclid defines a point as “that which has no part” (Elements, bk. 1, definition 1); a point is being taken here as an example of something simple.) Moreover, in the account of eternity there is a certain negation, insofar as eternity is a unity, and unity is non-division, and such things cannot be defined without negation.

Reply Obj. 2: “Life” here is being taken broadly for every existence, as even Augustine says that every change of a created thing is a certain death of it. (Augustine, Against Maximinus, bk. 2, ch. 12 (CCSL 87A; PL 42:768), quoted in Sent. I, 8.2(2).3.) Or it should be said that “living” is used here because in that which alone has eternity, to be and to live are wholly the same thing. Therefore by reason of the act wherein is eternity Boethius asserted that eternity is the measure of life.

Reply Obj. 3: To live and to be are spoken of through the mode of act. And because to every act there corresponds its own measure, therefore to the divine existence and divine life one must understand eternity to be added, as its measure; however, it is not really other than the divine existence. And because living has more of the account of act even than that of being, this is perhaps why he defines eternity through life rather than through existence.

Reply Obj. 4: In successive things the imperfection is of two sorts: one by reason of their division, the other by reason of their succession, since one part cannot be with another part, so such things do not have existence except in virtue of some part of themselves. Now, in order to exclude all imperfection from the divine existence, one must understand it to be perfect without any division of parts. And the word “whole” says this, for it does not indicate the account of parts. Moreover, one must understand the divine existence to lack succession, and this is marked by the adverb “simultaneously.”

Reply Obj. 5: The imperfection of existence can be considered in two ways. In one way, as regards its duration, and in this way an existence is said to be imperfect when it lacks any extent of duration appropriate to it; for example, we say that the life of a man who dies in youth was an imperfect life. And this imperfection is being taken away by the word “whole.” There is also a certain imperfection as regards the mode of having existence, as every created thing has an imperfect existence. And this imperfection is being taken away by the word “perfect”; whence this is not superfluous.

Reply Obj. 6: From the account of the name, “duration” indicates a certain distension. And because there should be no such distension in the divine existence, Boethius did not put “duration” in the definition, but instead “possession,” speaking metaphorically to signify the divine existence’s rest. For we say we “possess” a thing that we hold restfully and fully. And in this way God is said to possess his life, since it is not bothered by any lack of rest.

Article 2

Whether eternity belongs to God alone

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 3; ST I.10.3; Quodl. X, q. 2; Commentary on Dionysius’s On the Divine Names, ch. 10, lect. 3; Commentary on the Book of Causes, lect. 2.) It seems that eternity does not belong to God alone.

Obj. 1: For eternity is nobler than goodness. But goodness is communicated to created things, such that a created thing is good due to God being good. Therefore it seems that so is eternity, so that other things are eternal due to him.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Daniel 12:3 says, those who turn many to righteousness will be like the stars in their perpetual eternities. (RSV reads forever and ever instead of in their perpetual eternities.) But multiple eternities do not belong to one eternal thing. Therefore it seems that there are many eternal things, and not God alone.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a Psalm says, you are wonderfully luminous from the eternal mountains (Ps 76:4 [75:5]). (RSV: glorious art thou, more majestic than the everlasting mountains.) But the mountains are created things. Therefore even created things are eternal.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, even the fire of hell is called eternal, in Matthew 25:41: depart from me, you cursed, into the eternal fire. Therefore and so on.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the Philosopher says (Aristotle, On Interpretation 1.13, 23a21; Metaphysics 5.5, 1015a35, 1015b13‒15; Aquinas, On Interpretation, bk. 2, lect. 12, n. 342.) that everything necessary is eternal. But many things are necessary. Therefore and so on. And this agrees with Augustine’s saying that truth is eternal. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 18 (CCSL 50; PL 42:904).)

On the contrary, the eternal is a boundless existence, as was said in the previous article. But God alone is such. Therefore and so on.

I answer that, as is clear from the aforesaid definition, eternity can belong only to God simply and absolutely, according to the perfect account of eternity. But insofar as certain things participate in the boundlessness of eternity, in a certain way they are called eternal by participation. But what in no way participates in boundlessness is in no way called eternal, such as the temporal, which begins and is ended.

I say, therefore, that boundlessness is communicated to certain things insofar as it excludes boundary of duration on the side of what comes after; and in this way the fire of hell is called eternal, because it will never end. However, whether something can be eternal that has no beginning of duration will be asked about in the beginning of Book II. (In II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 5.) Moreover, boundlessness is communicated to some created things insofar as it excludes the bounds that arise from a succession of parts; and such are spiritual creatures, the existence of which is simultaneously whole. But the boundlessness that excludes every imperfection is not communicated to any created thing, since no created things can be perfect simply speaking. Rather, a certain perfection is communicated to a created thing, that is, one that is natural for a created thing to attain, such that it is perfect according to its own nature. And in this way angels and beatified souls are perfect, because they have that of which their nature is capable. This is why the blessed angels are considered to exist more by their participation of eternity than by merely their natural powers.

From this one can gather the difference between eternity, aeviternity, and time. For what has no power to receive its whole act simultaneously is measured by time; for such things have an existence bounded both as regards the mode of participating in it, since their existence is received in some potency, and it is not absolute as regards the parts of the duration, because it has before and after. Now, what has a potency that is different from its act, but which receives that whole act simultaneously, is measured by aeviternity; for this has only one mode of boundary, that is, because its existence is received in something other than itself, as has been said. (Above, q. 1, a. 1.) However, what has no potency different from existence is measured by eternity; for an existence of this sort is unbounded in every way. Whence it is also clear that aeviternity is nothing but a certain participated eternity.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the divine goodness is communicable, still it is not so according to its highest mode, as it is in God. This is why the highest goodness is not communicated. And because eternity indicates existence according to its highest mode, who is God, therefore it is not communicated. Rather, existence, taken absolutely, is communicated, as is also the good.

Reply Obj. 2: Daniel there is talking about the participated eternities in the blessed, which will be many according to the many blessed.

Reply Obj. 3: The “eternal mountains” can be said to be the angels themselves, who are called “eternal” by participation, as was said in the body of the article. Or it should be said that this can also be understood literally of the bodily mountains; they are called “eternal” on account of the longevity of their duration.

Reply Obj. 4: The fire of hell is also called “eternal” insofar as it participates in a certain condition of eternity, that is, that of not having an end.

Reply Obj. 5: Necessary things are eternal only in the divine mind, just as also the truths of statements were in God from eternity, and not otherwise, unless created things be asserted to be from eternity as philosophers have asserted.

Article 3

Whether temporal words can be said of God

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: above, d. 4, q. 2, a. 2.) It appears that temporal words cannot be said of God.

Obj. 1: For to each thing there corresponds a proper measure. But time is the proper measure of motion. Therefore, since in God there is no motion, it seems that nothing temporal can be said of God.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, whenever something bearing some bodily condition is said of God, it is being said metaphorically and symbolically. But time is a condition consequent on bodies themselves, since it follows motion, and motion follows magnitude, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Physics 4.11, 219a15‒20.) Therefore it seems that whenever any temporal verb is said of God, it is said metaphorically.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it appears that only the present tense should be said of God. For eternity, which is the measure of the divine existence according to the account of understanding, lacks every succession. But only the present does not include succession, for the past and the future are spoken of through their relation to the present, and not vice versa; and that relation is in the order of succession. Therefore only the present should be said of God.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, it seems that the past tense can be said of him. For the divine existence is perfect. But among the tenses the past sounds more like a perfection. Therefore it most of all should be said of God.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it appears that the imperfect past tense can be said of him. For John, in the beginning of his Gospel, has spoken of God in the highest way. But he there uses verbs of the imperfect past tense to designate the divine eternity, saying, in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God (John 1:1). Therefore it appears that these verbs are most suitable to signify the divine eternity.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, it seems that the future tense can be said of him. For the divine existence is most distant from failing. Therefore, since among the tenses, the future is least capable of failing, it seems that it is most suitable in the divine.

I answer that a statement cannot be made about something except insofar as it falls within one’s knowledge. Now, every knower knows according to his own mode, as Boethius says. (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 5, prose 2 (CCSL 94; PL 63:837).) And because our reason, according to the state of the earthly path, connaturally has to receive knowledge with time, on account of its knowledge taking its origin from sensible things, which are in time, therefore it cannot form statements except through temporal words. Whence one making a proposition about God is forced to use temporal words, even though he understands him to be above time. Nonetheless, such ways of speaking are not thereby false. For the divine existence, as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 5, para. 4 (PG 3:818).) possesses in advance within itself, as a cause, every existence as regards what there is of perfection in all things. And therefore we make statements about him using words of all tenses, on account of the fact that he is not absent from any time, and whatever there is of perfection in all times he himself possesses.

Reply Obj. 1: When temporal words are said of God, our intellect does not attribute to the divine existence what there is of imperfection in the individual tenses, but what there is of perfection in all of them. For eternity includes in itself in a simple way every perfection that is divided in temporal things. For time imitates the perfection of eternity to the extent that it can.

Reply Obj. 2: A certain expression can bring in a bodily condition in two ways: either with respect to the reality principally signified in the name, and such a thing is said of God only symbolically, like “lion,” “lamb,” “anger,” and the like; or with respect to the mode of signifying, and not with respect to the reality signified, and such are properly said of God, even though they do not perfectly represent him. Otherwise all names said of God would be symbolic, since the mode of signifying them is according to how they are said about the created things. And of these latter sort are the verbs “was” and “will be”; they signify the essence through the mode of act, and they consignify time.

Reply Obj. 3: Insofar as the present does not imply succession and does not have something of non-being included in it, among the other tenses it more properly befits God. Nonetheless, verbs of the other tenses are said of God according to what there is of perfection in them, and not by reason of the succession or some failure.

Reply Obj. 4: A past-perfect verb is said of God, and because he is not new, insofar as he was not absent from the past. Nonetheless it should be understood that sometimes perfection is better designated by the present than by the past. For there are some things whose being is within becoming, and their perfection occurs only when they come to their terminus, and their perfection is better signified through the past tense; examples of this are motions and successive things of this sort. However, there are some things whose being consists in enduring, and the perfection of such things is better designated through the present than through the past. For by the fact that they exist they have perfection, whereas the past is spoken of in reference to a withdrawal from existence. Whence also in the divine, things that are said through the mode of an enduring reality are more truly signified through the present tense; for example, God is good, and such. However, things that are signified through the mode of an act are more truly signified through the past tense, as Gregory says, below, that we more properly call the Son born, rather than being born. (Below, d. 9, q. 2, a. 2; Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 29, ch. 1 (CCSL 143B; PL 75:477).)

Reply Obj. 5: In a certain respect the past-imperfect tense is more properly said of God himself than is the past-perfect, because it does not include a boundary, as does a past-perfect verb. This is why, in things that are signified through the mode of an act, the past-perfect is said of God more truly, for their perfection cannot be signified except from a boundary. However, such things that are not signified through the mode of action are more truly signified of God through the past-imperfect. For their perfection does not depend on a boundary.

Reply Obj. 6: The future tense is most remote from divine predication, because it does not yet exist, except in potency. Nonetheless, in reference to what there is of perfection in it—that is, insofar as it stands further away from failing—it is said of God, but with its imperfection removed from it.

Exposition of the first part of the text

Now we must turn to the truth, or property, and the unchangeability and simplicity of the divine nature, or substance, or essence. (Sent. I, 8.1(21).1.) It is asked, since there are many essential attributes, why does he make mention only of these three? And one should say that the Master intends to touch only on those that pertain to the perfection of the divine existence insofar as it is perfect existence. Now, the perfection of existence can be attended to in three ways: either insofar as privation or non-existence is excluded, and such perfection is touched on by “truth” or “property,” which are being taken as the same thing, as was said in the previous article; or insofar as potentiality is excluded, and “unchangeability” is placed here for this; or as regards the integrity of the existence itself, and “simplicity” is placed here for this. For whatever is in a simple thing is its very existence.

Nature, or substance, or essence. (Sent. I, 8.1(21).1.) Note that these three are being taken for the same thing. For “nature” is not being taken here insofar as it names the principle of any act, but insofar as it indicates the form following on the whole, just as humanity is the nature of a man. Likewise, “substance” is not being taken here for the individual subsisting in the genus of substance, but insofar as it names the existence of the first predicate, insofar as it is divided against accident. And this is the same as an essence not existing in something as in a subject.

For just as wisdom is so called from being wise, . . . so essence is so called from being. (Sent. I, 8.1(21).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 2 (CCSL 50; PL 42:912).) It seems that the contrary should be said, that being wise comes from wisdom. To this one should say that he is not speaking according to the order of the reality, but according to the order of our knowledge, which comes to habits from acts.

And who is more than he who said to his servant Moses: I am who am? (Sent. I, 8.1(21).2, quoting Exodus 3:14.) This seems to be said in an unfitting way, since being does not admit of more and less. To this one should say that something can be said more or less so in two ways. In one way, this is in reference to the participated nature itself, which nature in virtue of itself is intensified or diminished, according to a thing’s approach toward or withdrawal from its terminus. And this happens only in accidents. Or there can be more or less so as regards the mode of participating, and in this way even in essential things there is said to be more or less so, according to diverse modes of participating. For example, an angel is said to be more intellectual than is a man.

God alone, on the other hand, is, who does not know ‘used to be’ or ‘will be.’ (Sent. I, 8.1(21).3, quoting Jerome, Epistulae, letter 15: “To Damasus,” para. 4 (CSEL 54:65; PL 22:357).) This refers to experiential knowledge, such that he would experience successive times in his existence.

In relation to whose essence, our being is as if it is not. (Sent. I, 8.1(21).3, quoting Jerome, Epistulae, letter 15: “To Damasus,” para. 14 (CSEL 54:65; PL 22:357); the Silano translation reads by comparison instead of in relation; the latter fits better with the objection and Aquinas’s response.) This seems false, because our existence is nothing except by its relation to God himself. For according to Gregory, all things would fall into nothing if not for the hand of the Omnipotent holding them up. (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 16, ch. 37 (CCSL 143A; PL 75:1143).) To this one should say that our existence can be related to God in two ways: either as to the principle from which it exists, and in this way our existence exists only through the fact that it is related to God; or according to a relation of proportion or equivalence, and in this way our existence, when related to the divine, is as though nothing, since it is infinitely distant from it.

To be is not an accident in God. (Sent. I, 8.1(21).7, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 11 (CCSL 62; PL 10:208).) It seems that it is not an accident even to any created thing, since nothing is more essential to a thing than its own existence. To this one should say that “accident” is here being said of what is not found within the idea of a thing, as rational is said to be accidental to animal. And thus, existence is accidental to every created “whatness”; for humanity can be understood and yet one can remain in doubt about whether man has existence.

But the divine existence is a subsisting truth, and a permanent cause, and an inherent and natural property of his nature. (Sent. I, 8.1(21).7, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 11 (CCSL 62; PL 10:208).) Hilary is excluding three sorts of imperfection from the divine existence. For the existence of a created thing is not something subsisting through itself—indeed, it is the act of what subsists—but in God his existence is the subsisting God himself. And this is why he says that he is “a subsisting truth.”

Further, a created thing’s existence is acquired from another and has potentiality and changeability in and of itself, but the divine existence is the cause of all existence, enduring unchangeably. And this is why he says it is “a permanent cause.” And further, a created thing’s existence differs from what it is, which is why a man is not placed in the human genus through his existence, but through his “whatness.” But the divine existence is its own “whatness,” and therefore God is placed in the divine kind through his existence. And this is why he says that it is “a property” of his natural kind.

Question 3

Divine unchangeability

The essence of the one God is also properly called unchangeable. (Sent. I, 8.2(22).1.) Here he treats of the second attribute, that is, his immutability, showing that God alone is unchangeable, whereas all created things are changeable in some way. About this three things are asked:

first, whether God is altogether unchangeable;

second, whether every created thing is changeable;

third, about the modes of change that Augustine assigns in the text. (Sent. I, 8.2(22).2; Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 8, ch. 20 (CSEL 28.1:388; PL 34:388).)

Article 1

Whether God is in any way changeable

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.9.1; SCG I.13‒14; II.25; On the Power of God, q. 8, a. 1, ad 9; Compendium theologiae, ch. 4; Commentary on Boethius’s On the Trinity, q. 5, a. 4, ad 2.) It appears that God is changeable in a certain way.

Obj. 1: For Wisdom 7:24 says, wisdom is more mobile than any motion. But the divine wisdom, of which it is speaking, is God himself. Therefore and so on.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, whatever moves itself is moved by its very self. But as Augustine says in the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, the Creator Spirit moves itself neither through time nor through place. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 8, ch. 20 (CSEL 28.1:259; PL 34:388).) Therefore it seems that he moves.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, everything that is through another is traced back to that which is through itself. But we find many things that are moved by other movers. Therefore there must be something that is moved by its very self. But every created thing is moved by another, since it is moved by God. Therefore God moves by himself.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, everything that goes from rest to act in some way moves, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Physics 3.4, 203a32‒b10.) since every action done by an unmoved agent always exists. But God does at a certain time actually create, at least he infuses grace, since he did not do this before. Therefore it seems that at least the change from a habit to an act occurs in him.

On the contrary, Malachi 3:6 says, I the Lord do not change; and James 1:17 says, with whom there is no variation or shadow due to change.

Furthermore, as the Philosopher proves, (Aristotle, Physics 7.1, 241b24‒242a20; 8.4, 255b31‒256a22.) everything that is moving is moved by another. Therefore if that by which the mobile itself is moved is also moving, it must be moved by some mover. But it is impossible to go back into infinity. Therefore one must find a first mover that moves and is in no way moving. And this is God. Therefore he is wholly unchangeable.

I answer that every motion or change, in whatever way it is spoken of, follows a certain possibility; for motion is the act of what exists in potency. (Aristotle, Physics 3.1, 201a9, 27.) Therefore, since God is pure act, having nothing of potency mixed with him, there cannot be any change in him.

Reply Obj. 1: The divine wisdom is not called “mobile” because it might move in itself, but insofar as it goes forth into its effects. And this going forth is not properly a motion; rather, it has a certain likeness of motion. For in progressive local motion, what is in one place later comes to be in another, and then in another, and so on until the motion is completed. However, in a similar way the divine wisdom, which is the exemplar of realities, makes its likeness in creation according to an order: for first the higher creatures are brought about in a participation of the divine likeness, and later the lower creatures. Whence the divine wisdom’s going forth has a likeness with motion in that the divine wisdom itself is brought about in creation according to its own likeness.

However, in two ways it falls short of the account of motion: first, because what is in this thing and in that is not numerically the same thing, but only a likeness of the same thing; and second, because an order of time is not there insofar as it goes forth into diverse created things. Rather, only an order of nature is present, since nobler creatures are naturally in participation of the divine goodness in a prior way, even if not in time. And this is also how one understands Dionysius when he says, but also with the moving father of lights, near the beginning of the Heavenly Hierarchy, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 1, para. 1 (PG 3:119), commenting on James 1:17: every good endowment and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights with whom there is no variation or shadow due to change.) and when he frequently says that the divine goodness or wisdom goes forth into created things.

Reply Obj. 2: Augustine takes “moving” broadly, insofar as understanding and willing are themselves certain motions, which properly speaking are not motions, but are comparatively. For in this Plato’s saying in the Parmenides becomes true, when he says, God moves himself, (Plato, Parmenides, 138b–c, 156b–e, 162d–e, 166b–c; Laws, bk. 10, 894b–c.) and so too the Commentator speaks, when he says that God understands himself and wills himself, (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 12, ch. 2.) and as we too say that the end moves the efficient cause. Or it should be said that he moves himself in the bringing forth of created things, as has been said. (Above, q. 1, a. 1.)

Reply Obj. 3: It is impossible for something to move its very self except as regards its diverse parts, such that one part is the mover and the others are moved; for example, even in an animal the soul is the mover and the body the thing moved. The reason for this is that nothing moves something except insofar as it is in act, nor is it moved except insofar as it is in potency, and these two cannot be simultaneously in the same thing in the same respect. And because God is simple, it cannot be that he moves himself, properly speaking. Therefore what is objected—that everything mobile through another is traced back to something mobile through itself—is true of a tracing back that is to the first within that genus. Whence according to the philosophers all mobiles are traced back to a first mobile, which they used to say is moved by itself, (Aristotle, Physics 8.6, 259a30‒b15.) since it is composed of a mover and what is moved. But one must trace this back further into some first simple thing that is altogether immobile.

Reply Obj. 4: In all things wherein the action differs from the substance, there must be some mode of motion from the fact that it newly goes forth into action. For it now acquires an action that was not there before. However, in God his action is his substance. Whence just as his substance is eternal, so too is his action. But it does not follow that the action be brought about from eternity; rather, it must be brought about according to the order of wisdom, which is the principle of the action.

Article 2

Whether every created thing is changeable

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: below, d. 19, q. 5, a. 3; In II Sent., d. 7, q. 1, a. 1; ST I.9.2; III.57.1, ad 1; Disputed Questions on Evil, q. 16, a. 2, ad 6; Quodl. X, q. 2.) It appears that not every created thing is changeable.

Obj. 1: For every change is a generation or a corruption or a motion, as is said in Physics 5. (Aristotle, Physics 5.1, 224a34‒35.) But there are some things in which are found none of these, like angels and the like, which are separated from matter and motion, according to the philosophers. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.8, 1073b18‒1074a20; 12.9, 1075a1‒5.) Therefore not everything created is changeable.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, whatever is changeable pertains to the consideration of one who studies nature, to whom it belongs to consider motion. But substances separated from matter are not considered by one who studies nature. Therefore they are not changeable.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, whatever changes is subject to change. But simple forms cannot be subjects, as Boethius says. (Boethius, On the Trinity, ch. 2 (PL 64:1250).) Therefore they cannot change.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, as is said in the text, (Sent. I, 8.2(22).2.) every created thing moves through time and place. But some created things have no place and time, such as the universal, which, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.31, 87b33.) is everywhere and always, and also the first matter, about which Augustine says (Augustine, Confessions, bk. 12, ch. 19 (CCSL 27; PL 32:836).) it does not have a succession of times. Therefore not every created thing changes.

On the contrary, the Psalm says, you will change them, and they will change (Ps 102 [101]:28). (RSV: thou changest them like raiment, and they pass away.)

Furthermore, Damascene says, everything that is from nothing can be turned back into nothing, for what began from a change must be subject to change. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 3 (PG 94:795).) But every created thing is such. Therefore and so on.

I answer that, as has been said, (Above, a. 1.) motion, in whatever way it is spoken of, follows potency. Therefore, since every created thing has something of potency, because God alone is pure act, all created things are changeable.

However, there are two sorts of possibility to consider: one according to what the created thing has, the other according to what it is naturally apt to have. The first follows the created thing insofar as it has existence from another; for everything that has its existence from another is not a necessary being through itself, as Avicenna proves. (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 8, ch. 54.) This is why in and of itself it is possible, and such possibility indicates its dependency on that from which it exists. Moreover, this possibility is of two sorts. A certain possibility is according to the dependence of its entire existence on that from which the reality exists as regards its entire existence, and that is God. And a certain changeability follows this dependence or possibility, a changeability that can be turned to nothing, according to Damascene. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 3 (PG 94:795).) Yet this is not properly changeability, nor is a created thing changeable in this respect, properly speaking; and this is why Augustine makes no mention of this in the text.

There are two reasons for this. For in everything changeable one can find something that is spread under what is removed by a change, and in reference to this, it is said to be able to change. But if we take the entire existence of a creature, which depends on God, we will not find any substrate in reference to which one can say it is able to change. The other reason is that nothing is called “possible” the contrary of which is necessary, or which cannot exist unless one posits something impossible. However, the existence of a creature cannot wholly fail unless the inflowing of the divine goodness in created things were to be withdrawn; and this is impossible, because of the unchangeability of the divine will, and it is a necessary contrary. And therefore due to this, a created thing cannot be said to be simply corruptible or changeable, but only under a condition, if it be left to itself. And this is what Gregory says, that all things would fall into nothingness if the hand of the Omnipotent were not to hold them up. (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 16, ch. 37 (CCSL 143A; PL 75:1143).)

There is also a certain dependence or possibility of a thing in reference to its part, that is, its form, presupposing matter or what stands in the place of matter. And the change of variability follows this possibility from the fact that what it has from another it can lose, in and of itself—unless perhaps it be impeded by the unchangeableness of the cause, as was said in the previous article. And in this way the saints in glory are unchangeable in the existence of glory, on account of the unchangeableness of the divine will.

The second possibility follows a created thing insofar as it is not perfect simply speaking. For according to this it is always possible as regards reception. Whence in this respect also every created thing is said to be changeable, taking “change” in a broad sense, insofar as every receiving is said to be a certain undergoing and moving; as the Philosopher says in On the Soul 3: understanding is a certain undergoing. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.5, 417b2‒18; 3.4, 429a23.)

Reply Obj. 1: The philosophers considered only that change that is according to the variation of substantial or accidental form, the cause of which is not unchangeable, and they divided this into generation, corruption, and motion. However, such change is not possible in angels as regards what is in their nature.

Reply Obj. 2: This solution is clear because one who studies nature considers only the change described.

Reply Obj. 3: The Master and Augustine are speaking here about creatures that have perfect being, but forms do not have perfect being, since they do not subsist in themselves, but in another. Or it should be said that something is changeable in two ways: either because it is subject to change, and in this way only what is in potency changes; or as what is removed or withdrawn in a change, and in this way forms, which are acts, are changeable. Nevertheless, this does not appear to be Augustine’s intention.

Reply Obj. 4: Likewise, first matter and the universal do not have in themselves complete existence; rather, their existence is in the particular composites. And therefore their respective existences do not change through themselves, but only incidentally, as is the case with forms.

Article 3

Whether the modes of change in created things is fittingly assigned by Augustine

To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that Augustine has not fittingly assigned the modes of change in created things. (Augustine’s division is summarized in Sent. I, 8.2(22).2: God does not move through places or times, but the creature moves through both. To move through times is to change according to affections. But God cannot change according to place or affection. This summary is based on Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 8, ch. 20 (CSEL 28.1:388; PL 34:388).)

Obj. 1: For according to this, change is where one finds motion, as according to quantity or according to quality. But there is no motion in “when,” as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Physics 5.1, 225b9‒12.) Therefore it seems that created things “moving through times” says nothing.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in a division no member should be contained by another. But every motion through place is also through time. Therefore change seems unfittingly divided into change of place and change of time.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Physics 5.1, 225b9.) motion is in three genera: quantity, quality, and location; moreover, in substance there is generation and corruption simply speaking, and in all the genera there is generation and corruption in a qualified sense; and all of these are found in bodily creatures. Therefore it appears that Augustine prematurely limits the assignment of changes of bodily creatures only to location, that is, place.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, time is the measure of the first mobile. (In Aristotelian cosmology, the first mobile is the outer sphere of the cosmos (also called the “first heaven”), which perpetually rotates on its axis, and is therefore the primary subject of time. See Aristotle, Physics 4.14, 223b12‒25; 8.1, 251b14‒19.) Therefore what has no order to the motion of the first mobile has no relation to time. But the affections of souls are not ordered to the motion of the heavens, nor are they subject to it. Therefore it is not fittingly said that to move through time is to change in affections. (Sent. I, 8.2(22).2; see the first note in obj. 1.)

I answer that one can discern two elements in motion, properly taken: continuity and succession. Insofar as it has continuity it is thereby properly measured through place, since the continuity of a motion is due to the continuity of magnitude. But insofar as it has succession it is thereby properly measured through time; this is why time is said to be the number of motion according to the before and after. (Aristotle, Physics 4.11, 219b1.) However, some motions are found to possess continuity and succession, whereas others have succession and not continuity, like the motion of the affections, and even that of thoughts, when the soul goes from one thought to another; for between these two intentions that are thought there is no continuity. This is why Augustine divides the change of a created thing through place and time.

Reply Obj. 1: There is no motion in the genus of “when” as in a terminus of motion; for no motion ends at a “when,” as it ends at a location. Nonetheless, there is motion in “when” as in what measures it.

Reply Obj. 2: The division should be understood as made with precision, so that it is understood to mean that some change is through place and time, but some through time alone. This is clear from things that have been said.

Reply Obj. 3: Although in bodily things there are many motions, still all are ordered to the local motion of the heavens, which is the cause of every bodily motion; therefore all of them are touched on by the reference to local motion. Or it can be said that the motions other than local motion are touched on through the change that is through time, since, as the Commentator proves, (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 8, text. 53.) no other motion is simply continuous but local motion. And Augustine himself says in the text (This claim is not made explicitly in any passage from Augustine quoted in Sent. I, 8, but it can be gathered from 8.2(22).2, 4.) that God moves the bodily creature through both time and through place.

Reply Obj. 4: Time is spoken of in two ways. In one way, it is the number of the before and after of things found in the motion of the heavens. And such time has its continuity from the motion, and the motion from magnitude, and by this time are measured all things that have an order to the motion of the heavens—whether through themselves, like bodily motions, or incidentally, like certain activities of the soul, insofar as they have some relation to the body. And it is taken only in this way by the philosophers. In another way, (Aristotle, Physics 4.11, 219a30–b3.) time is, more universally, the number of what has in any way a before and after. And in this way we say time is what measures the simple conceptions of the intellect, which succeed each other. And such time need not have continuity, since that according to which the motion is considered is not continuous. And in this way time is being taken here, and is frequently so taken by theologians.

Division of the second part of the text

The same substance alone is properly and truly simple. (Sent. I, 8.3(23).1.) This is the third part of the distinction, wherein the Master considers the divine simplicity. And it is divided into two parts: in the first, he proposes what he intends; in the second, he shows what he proposed, at in order to understand how that substance is simple, as Augustine teaches you. (Sent. I, 8.3(23).1.) And this latter is divided into two: in the first, he manifests the multiplicity of what is created; in the second, the divine simplicity, at but God, although he is called in many ways, yet is truly and most highly simple. (Sent. I, 8.4(24).3, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 6, ch. 7 (CCSL 50; PL 42:928).)

The first is divided into two: in the first of these he excludes simplicity from the bodily creature; in the second, he excludes it from the spiritual creature, at as for the spiritual creature, such as the soul, it is simple in comparison to the body; but if it is not compared to the body, then it is manifold and not simple. (Sent. I, 8.4(24).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 6, ch. 6 (CCSL 50; PL 42:928).)

But God, although he is called in many ways, yet is truly and most highly simple. (Sent. I, 8.4(24).3, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 6, ch. 7 (CCSL 50; PL 42:928).) Here he shows the divine simplicity, and it is divided into two parts. In the first, he shows its simplicity, and in the second, he excludes every composition from him, at Augustine shows that in the nature of the Godhead there is no diversity of accidents. (Sent. I, 8.6(26).1.)

The first is divided in two: in the first, he shows the truth; in the second, he excludes a doubt, at here it is to be diligently noted why. (Sent. I, 8.5(25).1.)

Augustine shows that in the nature of the Godhead there is no diversity of accidents and no changeableness whatever, but a perfect simplicity. (Sent. I, 8.6(26).1.) Here he excludes from God every composition and multiplicity. And he does two things as regards this: first, he shows specifically that in God there is no composition of accident and subject; second, he shows that in him there is no composition universally, at the simplicity and purity of this essence is such that there is nothing in it which is not itself. (Sent. I, 8.8(28).1.)

As regards the first, he does two things: first, he excludes from God the predication of accidents; second, he concludes that not even substance is predicated of him properly, at hence, God is not properly called a substance. (Sent. I, 8.7(27).1.)

To understand this part, there are two questions:

the first, about the divine simplicity; (Q. 4.)

and the second, about the simplicity of a created thing. (Q. 5.)

Question 4

Divine simplicity

As regards the first, three things are asked:

first, whether in God is every manner of simplicity;

second, whether he is contained in the category of substance;

third, whether the other categories can be said of him.

Article 1

Whether God is altogether simple

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.3.7; SCG I.16 & 18; On the Power of God, q. 7, a. 1; Compendium theologiae, ch. 9; Commentary on the Book of Causes, lect. 21.) It seems that God is not wholly simple.

Obj. 1: For the being to which no addition is made is the common, or universal, being predicated of all things, about which nothing can be truly denied. But God is not such. Therefore to his existence something can be added. Therefore he is not simple.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Boethius says, everything that exists participates in existence, such that it might be; but it participates in another such that it might be something. (Boethius, Hebdomads, rule 5 (PL 64:1311).) But God is most truly a being and is something, since he is good, wise, and the like. Therefore God has his own existence by which he exists, and above this he has something else by which he is something. Therefore he is not simple.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, if something is predicated of something that is not of the latter’s substance, the former is not simple. But whatever is predicated of something after it was not so predicated is not of the latter’s substance; for nothing’s substance newly accrues to it. Therefore, since something is predicated of God after it was not so predicated of him—such as being Lord and Creator, which are said of him due to time—it seems that he is not simple.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, whenever there are many realities in one, some mode of composition must be there. But in the divine nature there are three persons, really distinct from each other, but agreeing in one essence. Therefore some mode of composition is there.

On the contrary, everything composed is posterior to its components, since the simpler is prior in itself to anything added to it to compose some third thing. But nothing is prior to what is simply first. Therefore, since God is the first principle, he is not composed.

Furthermore, the first thing giving existence to all things has an existence that does not depend on another; for that whose existence does depend on another has existence from another, and the first thing that gives existence is no such thing. But God is the first giver of existence to all things. Therefore his existence does not depend on another. But the existence of every composite depends on its components, and with their removal the composite’s existence is taken away, both in its reality and in its idea. Therefore God is not composite.

Furthermore, the first principle of existing has existence in the noblest way, since something is always nobler in the cause than in the effect. But the noblest way of having existence is that whereby something is its own existence. Therefore God is his own existence. But no composite whole is its own existence, since its existence follows the components, which are not existence itself. Therefore God is not composed. And this should simply be conceded.

Reply Obj. 1: Something is said “to be without addition” in two ways.

Either it belongs to its account that nothing is added to it—and in this way this is said of God, for there must be perfect existence in himself, from which he does not receive any addition. Nor can this be the universal being, since everything universal is preserved in what is proper, where an addition is made to it.

Or a thing “to be without addition” is such that it does not belong to its account that addition is made to it, but neither does being without addition belong to its account. For in the idea of being, the condition “without addition” is not included; otherwise addition could never be made to it, since it would be against its account. And therefore it is universal, because in its account it does not indicate any addition, but addition can be made to it, so that it might be determined to what is proper.

For example, even the universal “animal” is said to be without reason, since having reason does not belong to the idea of it, but neither does not having reason; on the other hand, a donkey is said to be without reason because within the idea of it is included the negation of reason, and thereby it is determined according to its proper difference. In this way, so too is the divine existence determined in itself and divided from all other things, through the fact that no addition can be made to him. Whence it is clear that negations said of God do not designate any composition in him.

Reply Obj. 2: In created things, there are three ways in which a thing becomes determinate such that it might be something: either through the addition of some difference that was potentially in the genus; or from the fact that the common nature is received in something, and it becomes a “this something”; (Hereafter, the translation of hoc aliquid will be hyphenated as “this-something”; it is a technical term given to an individual subsisting thing or what Aristotle calls, in the Categories, “primary substance.”) or from the fact that something accidental is added, whereby a thing is said to be either a knower or white. None of these modes can be in God. For he is not some universal, since it belongs to the idea of him that nothing is added to him; nor is his nature received in something, since he is pure act; nor also does he receive something outside his essence, since his essence contains every perfection. However, it remains that he is something determinate, through the condition of negating from him every addition, and thereby everything that is capable of receiving addition is removed from him. Whence through his absolute existence he not only is, but is something. Nor are that whereby he is and is something different in him, except in their mode of signifying, or in account, as has been said. (Above, d. 2, q. 1, a. 2.) But Boethius’s statement is understood to be in reference to things that participate in existence, and not to God, who is essentially his own existence. And from this is clear that the attributes make no composition in him. For wisdom, according to its account, makes no composition, except according to its own existence insofar as it is in a subject that is really different from it; but this qualification is not present in God, as was said. (Above, q. 1, a. 1.)

Reply Obj. 3: Relations of the sort that are said of God due to time do not place anything in him really; rather, they place something only in the created thing. For it happens, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.15, 1021a28‒35.) that something might be spoken of relatively, though not such that the thing itself is being referred to something, but because something is being referred back to it. This is the case in all things wherein one thing depends on another but not vice versa, just as the knowable is relative only because knowledge is referred to it, for the knowable does not depend on knowledge, but vice versa. But because our intellect cannot receive the relation of one of the relatives without understanding in it that to which it is referred, therefore it places a certain relation as regards the knowable, and it signifies it itself relatively. Whence that relation signified in the knowable is not really in it, but is only a relation according to reason, whereas it is really in the knowledge. So too the relation brought in by the name “God,” or “Creator,” when said of God, does not place something in God, except according to understanding, but only in the created thing. From this it is clear that the diversity of God’s relations does not place any composition in him.

Reply Obj. 4: As has been said, (Above, d. 2, q. 1, a. 5.) a personal property, when compared to the essence, does not really differ from it, and therefore does not make a composition with it. But when compared to its own correlative, a personal property does make a real distinction, but on this side there is no unification, and therefore neither is there composition. Whence it is admitted that three realities are there, and yet there is no composition. From this it is clear that the personal names signify no composition in God.

Article 2

Whether God is in the category of substance

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: below, d. 19, q. 4, a. 2; ST I.3.5; SCG I.25; On the Power of God, q. 7. a. 3; Compendium theologiae, ch. 12; On Being and Essence, ch. 6.) It seems that God is in the category of substance.

Obj. 1: For everything that exists is either substance or accident. But God is not an accident, so he is a substance. Therefore, since substance is predicated of him as a substantial predicate and not vice versa, since not every substance is God, it seems that it is predicated of him as a genus, so God is in the genus of substance.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, substance is what is not in a subject but is a being through itself. Therefore, since this befits God most of all, it seems that he is in the genus of substance.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.1, 1052b15‒1053a10.) each thing is measured by the least thing of its genus, and the Commentator here says (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 10, text. 3.) that that relative to which all substances are measured is the first mover, who, according to him, is God. Therefore God is in the genus of substance.

On the contrary, whatever is in a genus either is there as the most general thing or as contained under it. But God is not in the genus of substance either as the most general thing—since then he would be predicated of all substances—nor besides is he in the genus of substance as contained under it—since then something would be added beyond the genus, and thus the divine essence would not be the simplest. Therefore God is not in the genus of substance.

Furthermore, whatever is in a genus has its existence determined to that genus. But the divine existence is in no way determined to any genus; indeed, it comprehends in itself the nobilities of all genera, as the Philosopher and the Commentator say. (Perhaps Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.16, 1022a1; Averroes, Commentary on Metaphysics, bk. 5, text. 21.) Therefore God is not in the genus of substance, and this should simply be granted.

The reason for this is assigned in four ways. The first is presented in the text, (Sent. I, 8.7(27).1.) taken from the name. For the name “substance” is derived from standing-under, whereas God stands under nothing. The second is taken from the account of what is in a genus, for everything of this sort adds something over and above the genus, so what is in the highest way simple cannot be in a genus. The third is the more subtle argument of Avicenna. (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 5, ch. 4; bk. 9, ch. 1.) For everything that is in a genus has what it is different from its existence, like in a man; for actual existence is not owed to humanity from the fact that it is humanity, since humanity can be thought about and yet one can still not know whether any man exists.

The reason for this is that what is common and predicated of things in a genus predicates a “whatness,” since genus and species are predicated as what something is. However, existence is owed to that “whatness” only through its being received in this or that. And therefore the “whatness” of the genus or species is not communicated as one existence for all, but only as one common account. Whence it is certain that its existence is not its “whatness.” However, in God his existence is his “whatness”—otherwise it would be accidental to his “whatness,” and then it would be acquired from something, and he would not have existence through his own essence. Therefore God cannot be in any genus.

The fourth reason is derived from the perfection of the divine existence, which gathers together all the nobilities of all genera. Whence it is determined to no genus, as was objected.

Reply Obj. 1: God is simply speaking not an accident, and yet neither can he be altogether properly called a substance. This is both because the name “substance” is derived from “standing under,” and because substance names a “whatness” that is other than its existence. Whence that division belongs to created being. Yet if the word’s full force is not taken, in a broad way he can be called a “substance”—yet one that is understood to be above every created substance—as far as there is something of perfection in substance, such that it does not exist in another and things of this sort. And thereby the same thing is in the predicate and in the subject, as is the case with all things that are predicated of God. And therefore it does not follow that everything that is a substance is God, since nothing other than he receives the predication of substance so taken, the way it is said of him. And thus, on account of the diverse mode of predication, “substance” is not said of God and creatures univocally, but analogically. And this can be another reason why God is not in any genus: because nothing is predicated univocally of him and other things.

Reply Obj. 2: According to Avicenna, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 2, ch. 1; bk. 3, ch. 8.) the following cannot be the definition of substance: “substance is what is not in a subject.” For being is not a genus, but this negation “not in a subject” asserts nothing; whence, when I say, “being that is not in a subject,” it does not indicate any genus. For in every genus one must signify some “whatness,” as was said before, the idea of which does not include existence, whereas “being” does not say what a thing is, but only the act of existing, since it is itself a principle. And therefore “it is not in a subject, so it is in the genus of substance” does not follow. But it should be added: “it is something that has a whatness, from which it follows that its existence is not in a subject, and so it is in the genus of substance.” But this does not befit God, as was said.

Reply Obj. 3: “Measure” is spoken of properly in quantities, for that through which a thing’s quantity is made known is called its “measure”; and this is the least thing in the genus of quantity—either simply speaking, as in numbers, which are measured by the unit, which is the least simply speaking, or it is least according to our positing it, as in continuous things, wherein there is no least simply speaking; whence we posit a hand-length as the smallest unit of measure in order to measure cloth, or a stade (That is, 125 paces, the typical footrace track of a stadium.) to measure a road.

Starting from there, the name “measure” has been extended to all genera, such that what is first in every genus and simplest and most perfect is called the “measure” of all things that are in that genus. For each thing is known to have more or less of the truth of the genus insofar as it approaches or recedes from it, like white in the genus of colors. So too in the genus of substance, what has the most perfect and simplest existence is said to be the measure of all substances, as is God. Whence it is not necessary that he be in the genus of substance as contained by it, but only as its principle, having within himself every perfection of the genus. This is like how the unit is in the genus of numbers, but nevertheless in a different way; for only numbers are measured by the unit, whereas God is the measure not only of substantial perfections, but of all those that are in all the genera, as of wisdom, of power, and the like. And therefore the unit is contained in one determinate genus as its principle, but God is not.

Article 3

Whether the other categories are said of God

To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that the other categories are also said of God.

Obj. 1: For of whatever the species is predicated, so is the genus. But knowledge, which is a species of quality, is found in God, as is magnitude, or greatness, which is a species of quantity. Therefore both quantity and quality are said of him.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Philosopher says, the one in substance makes sameness; the one in quantity, equality; the one in quality, likeness. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.15, 1021a10‒12; 10.2, 1054a5‒20.) But “equality” and “likeness” can truly be said in God. Therefore something in the mode of quality and quantity, like knowledge and greatness, must be said of him.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the nature of the genus is most properly found in that wherein it is primarily. But God is the first agent. Therefore action is especially found in him.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, to the degree that something exists in a weaker way, so far is it more opposed to the highest perfection. But among all the other beings, relation has the weakest existence, as the Commentator says; (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 11, text. 11.) this is why it is also founded on all the other beings, for example, equality on quantity, and so on. Therefore, since relation is found in the divine, much more so are the other categories.

On the contrary, Augustine says, everything that is said of God is said either according to substance or according to relation. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 8 (CCSL 50; PL 42:916).) And thus, the other categories will not exist in the divine. And this is also held from the authority of Augustine in the text. (Sent. I, 8.6(26).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 1 (CCSL 50; PL 42:912).)

I answer that whatever one finds in created things that is predicated of God is so predicated in a more eminent way, as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7, para. 3 (PG 3:870).) as is also the case in all other causes and their effects. Whence every imperfection must be removed from what enters into the divine predication. But in each of the nine categories I find two things: the account of accident, and the proper account of that genus, like that of quantity or quality. Now, the account of an accident contains imperfection, since the existence of an accident is to exist-in and to depend, and consequently to make a composition with its subject. This is why nothing can be predicated of God according to the account of an accident.

Moreover, if we consider the proper account of every genus, all of the other genera, with the exception of “toward-something,” bring in an imperfection. For quantity has its proper account in relation to a subject, for quantity is the measure of a substance; and quality is the disposition of substance; and so on in all the others. Whence they are removed from divine predication according to the account of the genus for the same reason that they are removed by the account of accident.

But if we consider their species, then some of them, according to differences that complete them, bring in something of perfection, for example, knowledge, power, and such. And therefore these are predicated of God according to the proper account of their species, and not according to the account of their genus.

However, “toward-something,” or relation, does not bring in any dependence on its subject, even according to the account of its genus. Indeed, it is referred to something outside it. And therefore even according to the account of the genus it is found in the divine. And on account of this, only these two modes of predicating remain in the divine: according to substance and according to relation. For a mode of predicating is owed not to the species contained in the genus, but to the genus itself.

Reply Obj. 1: As was said in the body, knowledge is not predicated of God according to the account of its genus, but according to its proper difference, which completes its account. Whence it is not predicated univocally of God and the others, but according to the prior and the posterior.

Reply Obj. 2: In the divine some things are said to have the mode of quantity or quality, but not because they would be predicated of God according to that mode. Rather, according to the mode in which they are found in created things, as names that are imposed by us, they have the mode of quality and quantity. This is also like Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 12 (PG 94:834).) that some things are said of God as things following on his substance, while nevertheless as he is in himself nothing follows on him.

Reply Obj. 3: Action as a category indicates something flowing from an agent, and with motion, but in God there is in reality nothing intermediate between him and his activity. Therefore he is not called an agent by the action that is the category; rather, his action is his substance. Nevertheless, we will speak more fully about this in the beginning of Book II. (In II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 2.)

Reply Obj. 4: The weakness of the existence of relation is considered according to its inherence in its subject; for it does not place something absolute in the subject, but only something through reference to another. Whence thereby it comes more into divine predication, since to the degree that it adds less, so much less is it repugnant to God’s simplicity.

Question 5

Simplicity of a created thing

Next we ask about simplicity on the side of what is created. And three things are asked about this:

first, whether any created thing is simple;

second, whether the soul is simple, since this holds a specific difficulty;

third, whether the soul is wholly in every part of the body.

Article 1

Whether anything created is simple

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that something created is simple.

Obj. 1: For a form is what arises in a composition, consisting in a simple and invariable essence. But form is a created thing. Therefore and so on.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the resolution of the intellect does not stop when it finds composition, whether or not the parts are separable in reality; for many things are separated by the intellect that are not separated in act, as Boethius says. (Boethius, Hebdomads, solution (PL 64:1311).) Therefore that at which the intellect’s resolution stops is the wholly simple. But common being is like this. Therefore and so on.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, if every created thing is composed, it is certain that it is composed only of created things. Therefore even its components will be composed. Therefore either this proceeds to infinity—which nature and intellect do not tolerate—or else one will come to first simple components that are nevertheless created things. Therefore and so on.

Obj. 4: One might say that those components cannot be simple, because they have an additional relation that they be from another.

On the contrary, what is extrinsic to a reality does not make a composition with that very reality. But the agent is extrinsic to the reality. Therefore the fact that the reality is from some agent does not imply that there is any composition in it.

On the contrary, Boethius says, in everything other than the first thing, that which it is and that by which it is are different. (Boethius, On the Trinity, ch. 2 (PL 64:1250).) But every created thing is other than the first. Therefore it is composed of existence and that which it is.

Furthermore, everything created has a finite existence. But an existence that is not received in something is not finite, but rather absolute. Therefore every created thing has existence received in something, and thus it must have at least two elements: existence and what receives the existence.

I answer that everything that comes forth from God in a diversity of essence falls short of his simplicity. Now, from the mere fact that it falls short of simplicity it is not necessary that it falls into composition, just as merely from the fact that it falls short of the highest goodness it is not necessary that any wickedness falls into it.

Therefore I say a created thing is of two sorts. For some have a complete existence in themselves, such as a man and the like, and such a creature falls short of the divine simplicity in such a way that it falls into composition. For because in God alone is his existence what he is, it is necessary that in everything created, whether bodily or spiritual, one finds its “whatness” or nature and its existence, which is acquired for it by God, whose essence is his existence. And thereby it is composed from existence, by which it exists, and that which it is. There is also a certain created thing that does not have existence in itself, but only in another, such as first matter, such as every form, such as the universal, for it is not the being of anything except of a particular subsisting in the nature. And such a created thing does not fall short of simplicity in such a way that it is composite. For if one says it is composed from its very nature and its relations by which it is referred to God or to something with which it is composed, one again can ask whether those relations are realities or not, and if they are realities, then they themselves are not related by other relations, but by their very selves, for what is a relation through itself is not referred through another relation. Whence one will have to come to something that is not composed, but yet falls short of the simplicity of the first thing. And such falling short will hang on two things: either because it is potentially or incidentally divisible, as is the case with first matter, form, and the universal, or because it can be composed with another—which the divine simplicity does not allow for.

Reply Obj. 1–4: Thereby the solution to the objections is clear. For the first arguments were based on created things that do not have complete existence, which are not composed of other things as of parts. But the other two were based on created things that have complete existence.

Article 2

Whether the soul is simple

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 17, q. 1, a. 2; ST I.75.5; SCG II.50; Quodl. III, q. 8; IX, q. 4, a. 1; Disputed Question on Spiritual Creatures, a. 1; a. 9, ad 9; Disputed Questions on the Soul, a. 6. Note that it becomes clear in the response that the soul Aquinas has in mind is the human soul.) It seems that the soul is simple.

Obj. 1: For the soul is the form of the body, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.1, 412a21.) But he says in the same place (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.1, 412a7‒9.) that neither form nor matter is composed. Therefore the soul is not composed.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything composed has existence from its components. Therefore if the soul is composed, then it holds within itself some existence, and that existence would never be removed from it. But from the joining of soul and body results a certain existence that is the existence of a man. Therefore, in man there is a twofold existence: the existence of the soul and the existence of the composite—and that cannot be, since of one reality there is a single existence.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every composition that accrues to a thing after its complete existence is incidental to it. Therefore, if the soul is composed of its own principles, while possessing in itself a perfect existence, its composition with the body will be incidental to it. But an incidental composition ends with something that is one incidentally. Therefore from the soul and body are brought about only what is incidentally one, and thus a man is not a being through itself, but incidentally, which is absurd.

On the contrary (4), Boethius says, no simple form can be a subject. (Boethius, On the Trinity, ch. 2 (PL 64:1250).) But the soul is a subject of powers, habits, and intelligible species. Therefore it is not a simple form.

Furthermore (5), a simple form does not have existence through itself, as was said in the previous article. But what has existence only through the fact that it is in another cannot remain after that other ceases to be, nor can it even be a mover, though it can be a principle of motion, since a mover is a being perfect in itself; this is why the form of a fire is not a mover, as is said in Physics 8. (Aristotle, Physics 8.4, 255a32‒256a3.) Now, the soul remains after the body ceases to be, and is the body’s mover. Therefore it is not a simple form.

Furthermore (6), no simple form has within itself that whence it is individuated, since every form of itself is common. Therefore if the soul is a simple form, it will not have in itself that whence it is individuated; rather, it will be individuated only through the body. However, when one removes the cause of individuation, the individuation is taken away. Thus, when one removes the body, souls will no longer remain diverse as individuals, and thus there will remain only one soul, which will be the very nature of the soul, which is absurd.

I answer that there are two opinions about this. For some say that the soul is composed of matter and form, and of these some even say that the same thing is the matter of the soul and that of other bodily and spiritual things.

But this seems not to be true, since no form becomes intelligible except through its being separated from matter and from the trappings of matter. Now, this is not so insofar as bodily matter is perfected by corporeity, since the very form of corporeity is intelligible through separation from matter. Whence those substances that are intelligible by nature do not seem to be material; otherwise the species of things in themselves would not exist according to intelligible being. Whence Avicenna says (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 3, ch. 8.) that something is said to be intellectual because it is unstained by matter. And on account of this, first matter, insofar as it is considered naked of every form, has no diversity, nor does it become diverse through any accidents before the arrival of substantial form, since accidental existence does not come before substantial. Now, to one perfectible thing is owed one perfection. Therefore the first substantial form must perfect the whole matter. But the first form that is received in matter is corporeity, from which it is never stripped, as the Commentator says. (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 1, text. com. 63.) Therefore the form of corporeity is in the whole matter, and thus matter will be only in bodies.

For if you say that the “whatness” of a substance would be the first form received in matter, this still leads back to the same conclusion. For matter does not have division from the “whatness” of substance, but rather from corporeity, upon which follow the actual dimensions of quantity; and after this, through the division of the matter, insofar as it is disposed with diverse positions, diverse forms are acquired within it. For the order of nobility in bodies appears to be according to their order of position, just as fire is higher than air. And therefore it does not seem that the soul has matter, unless “matter” be taken equivocally.

Others say that the soul is composed from that “by which it exists” and that “which exists”—which the latter is different from matter, since “that which exists” indicates the very supposit possessing existence, but matter does not have existence. Rather, the composite of matter and form does. Whence matter is not “that which exists”; the composite is. Whence in all those things wherein is composition of matter and form, there is also a composition of that “by which it exists” and that “which exists.”

However, in things composed of matter and form, “that by which it exists” can be spoken of in three ways. For one can call “that by which it exists” the very form of the part, what gives existence to matter. One can also call “that by which it exists” the very act of existing, that is, existence, just as “that by which one runs” is the act of running. And one can call “that by which it exists” the very nature that results by the joining of form and matter, such as humanity, especially according to those like Avicenna (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 5, ch. 3.) who assert that the form that is the whole, which is called the “whatness,” is not the form of the part.

Now, since it does not belong to the account of “whatness,” or essence, to be composed or a composite, consequently one will be able to find and understand a certain simple “whatness,” one not consequent upon the composition of form and matter. Now, if we find some “whatness” that is not composed of matter and form, that “whatness” either is its own existence or not. If that “whatness” is its existence, then it will be the essence of God himself, who is his own existence, and it will be altogether simple. But if it is not existence itself, it must have its existence acquired from another, just like every created “whatness.”

And because this latter proposed “whatness” does not subsist in matter, existence would not be acquired for it in another, as in composite “whatnesses.” Rather, existence would be acquired for it within itself. And in this way the “whatness” itself will be that which exists, and its existence itself will be that by which it exists. And since everything that does not have something from itself is possible relative to that thing, a “whatness” of this sort, because it has existence from another, will be possible relative to that existence, and relative to that from which it has existence, in which latter there falls no potency. And thus, in such a “whatness” one will find potency and act, insofar as the “whatness” itself is possible, and its existence is its act.

And in this way I understand the composition of potency and act in angels, both of that “by which it exists” and that “which exists”—and in the soul in a similar way. Whence an angel or the soul can be called a “whatness,” or nature, or simple form, insofar as their “whatness” is not composed of diverse things; but nevertheless, a composition of these two accrues there, that is, the composition of “whatness” and existence.

Reply Obj. 1: The soul is not composed of certain things that are parts of its “whatness,” just as neither is any other form. Rather, because the soul is an absolute form—one not dependent on matter—which belongs to it on account of its likeness and proximity to God, it itself has existence through itself, unlike other bodily forms. Whence in the soul one finds the composition of existence and that which exists, but not in other bodily forms; for existence itself does not belong to bodily forms absolutely, as to things that exist, but to the composite.

Reply Obj. 2: The soul without a doubt has complete existence in itself, even though this existence does not result from parts composing its “whatness.” Nor through the soul’s joining the body is some other existence brought about there; rather, this very existence that belongs to the soul through itself becomes the existence of the two joined together. For the existence of the two joined is only the existence of the form itself. But it is true that other material forms, on account of their imperfection, do not subsist through that existence; rather, they are only principles of existing.

Reply Obj. 3: Thereby this too is clear, since a composition that comes to the soul after its complete existence, according to the mode of understanding, does not make a different existence. For without a doubt, that existence would be incidental. And therefore it does not follow that a man is an incidental being.

Reply Sed Contra 4: If Boethius is speaking of a subject relative to any accidents whatsoever, then his statement is true of a form that is so simple that it is also its own existence, as is God; and such simplicity is found in neither the soul nor an angel. But if he is speaking of a subject relative to accidents that have a stable existence in nature, and which are accidents of the individual, then his statement is true even of a simple form whose “whatness” is not composed of parts. For there are some accidents that do not truly have existence, but are only the intentions of natural realities; and of this sort are the species of realities, which are in the soul. So too with certain species of accidents that have the existence of nature follow upon the nature of the individual, that is, its matter, through which the nature is individuated, like white and black in a man; whence also they do not follow upon the entire species. And the soul cannot be the subject of such accidents.

However, some things have the existence of nature but follow from the principles of the species, as are the properties consequent on the species. And such a simple form can be the subject of such accidents. Nevertheless, such a form is not its own existence, by reason of the possibility that is in its “whatness,” as has been said in the body. And such accidents are powers of the soul. For in this way do a point and a unit have their own properties.

Reply Sed Contra 5: Every form is a certain likeness of the first principle, which is pure act. Whence, to the degree that a form approaches closer to likeness with it, so does it participate more of its perfections. However, among the forms of bodies the rational soul approaches closer to a likeness with God. And therefore it participates in the nobilities of God, such as the fact that it understands, can move things, and has existence through its self. And the sentient soul does this less so, and the vegetative even less so, and so on. Therefore I say that to move things, or to have an absolute existence, does not belong to the soul as form, but insofar as it is a likeness of God.

Reply Sed Contra 6: According to the aforesaid, in the soul there is not something by which it itself is individuated; those who have denied that it is a this-something, and that it does not have an absolute existence through itself, have understood this. And I say that it is individuated only due to the body. This is why the error of those asserting that souls were created first and later embodied is impossible. For they do not become many except insofar as they are infused to many bodies.

But although the individuation of souls depends on the body as regards its beginning, nonetheless this is not the case as regards their end, such that when their bodies cease to be, the individuation of the souls would cease as well. The reason for this is that, because every perfection is infused into matter according to its capacity, the nature of the soul is not so infused into diverse bodies according to the same nobility and purity. Whence in every body the existence will have a boundary according to the body’s measure. Now, the soul’s bounded existence, even though it is acquired in the body, yet is not from the body, nor is it dependent on the body. This is why, when the bodies are set aside, there will still remain for each soul its existence bounded by affections and dispositions that it attained insofar as it was the perfection of such a body. And this is Avicenna’s solution, (Avicenna, Liber de anima, pt. 5, ch. 3.) and it can be manifested by a sensible example. For if something one that does not retain shape, like water, is distinguished by different vessels, when the vessels are set aside, the shapes will not properly speaking remain distinct; rather, only one water will remain. So it is for material forms, which do not retain existence through themselves. However, if there is something that retains shape, but which is distinguished according to diverse shapes through diverse instruments, then even with the latter set aside, the distinction of shapes will remain, as is clear in wax. And this is how it is with the soul, which retains its existence after the destruction of the body, such that even the very individuated and distinct existence remains in it.

Article 3

Whether the whole soul is in every part of the body

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.76.8; SCG II.72; On Spiritual Creatures, a. 4; Disputed Questions on the Soul, a. 10.) It seems that the whole soul is not in every part of the body.

Obj. 1: For because the soul is a simple form, its wholeness is considered in reference to its powers. But not all the powers of the soul are in every part of the body. Therefore the whole is not in every part of the body.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, an animal is composed of soul and body. Therefore, if the whole soul were in every part of the body, every part of the body would be an animal, just as every part of a fire is fire. Therefore and so on.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is certain that the soul suffuses the body with life. Therefore if the whole soul were in every part of the body, every part of the body would receive life immediately from the soul; and thus the life of one part would not depend on another. And that seems false, since the life of the whole body depends on the heart. Therefore and so on.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the body has diverse distinct parts. Therefore if the soul were wholly in every part of the body, the whole would be in many places simultaneously. But this appears to belong only to God. Therefore and so on.

On the contrary, a substantial form is present in every part of its matter, for it perfects not only the whole but also the individual parts. But the soul is the substantial form of the ensouled body. Therefore it is wholly in every part of it.

Furthermore, we see that the soul is sensitive to a wound in any part of the body equally. Now, this would not be unless the soul were present in every part. Therefore the soul is a whole in every part of the body.

I answer that some have asserted that the soul can be considered in two ways: either according to its essence, or insofar as it is a certain potential whole. If it be considered in the first way, they say that it is not in the whole body, but in a certain part of it, the heart, and through the heart it vivifies the whole body through the vital spirits (This is “spirit” in the archaic sense of a “breath” or as we would now say, a “gas”; such gases were thought to circulate through the blood vessels of an animal, issuing from the heart.) coming from the heart. If it be considered in the second way, then the soul is considered as a certain power integrated from all the particular powers. And in this way the whole soul is in the whole body, and not wholly in every part of the body; rather, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.1, 412b18‒24.) the parts of the soul stand to the parts of the body as the whole soul stands to the whole body, so if the pupil were an animal, sight would be its soul. However, the cause of this position was a doubly false imagination: one because they imagined the soul to be in the body as in a place, as if it were only a mover, not a form, like a sailor in a ship; the other because they imagined the simplicity of the soul to be after the manner of a point, such that it would be something indivisible possessing an indivisible position. And both of these imaginations are foolish.

And therefore we should say, with Augustine, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 6 (CCSL 50; PL 42:928).) that the soul considered according to its essence is a whole in every part of the body. (See Albert the Great, De quatuor coaeviis (Summa de creaturis), ch. 8.) Yet this is not so if “whole” is taken according to a wholeness of powers, for in this way the whole is merely in the whole animal. The reason for this is that place belongs to no simple substance except according to the relation it has to a body. Now, the soul is related to the body as its form, from which the whole body and every part of it has existence, as from a substantial form.

But nonetheless, not all the parts of the body participate in its powers. Indeed, there are some powers by which it is not possible for something bodily to be perfected, such as intellectual powers. Moreover, there are other powers that can be perfections of bodies, but the soul does not infuse all these powers into every part of the body, since not every part of the body is of the same balance and blend of elements, and something is received in something only according to the proportion of the recipient. Therefore the ear and the eye do not receive the same perfection from the soul, although every part still receives existence from it.

Whence, if the soul is considered insofar as it is a form and essence, it is a whole in every part of the body. But if it is considered insofar as it is a mover, according to its powers, then it is a whole in the whole, and is in the diverse parts according to the diverse powers.

Reply Obj. 1: When we say that the whole soul is in every part of the body, we understand by “whole” the perfection of its nature, and not any wholeness of parts. For the whole and the perfect are the same thing, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Physics 3.6, 207a13.)

Reply Obj. 2: What is perfectible should be proportionate to its perfection. Now, the soul, even though it is a simple form, is nonetheless manifold in virtue, insofar as diverse powers arise from its essence. And therefore the body proportionate to it must have distinct parts for receiving the distinct powers; this is also why the soul is said to be the act of the organized body. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.1, 412a28.) And because not every part of the animal has such a distinction of its parts, the part cannot be called an animal. But less noble souls, which have only a little diversity in their powers, perfect even a body that is, as it were, uniform in the whole and parts. And therefore actually diverse souls are brought about in the parts upon a division of those parts, as happens even in segmented animals and plants. Nonetheless before this division of such animals, each part is said to be an animal only potentially, as a part of nothing continuous is a whole except potentially. This is why neither is part of a fire something in act, except after its division.

Reply Obj. 3: In an animal, “living” is spoken of in two ways. In the first way, living is the very existence of a living thing, as the Philosopher says: for living things, to live is to be. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 415b9‒14.) And in this way the soul immediately makes each part of the body live, insofar as it is its form. In the other way, “living” signifies the activity of the soul, which it effects in the heart insofar as it is a mover. And such is the life that is transmitted through the vital spirits, and such life it infuses first into the heart and after into all the other parts. And this is why when the heart is damaged the activity of the soul in all the parts of the body perishes, and consequently so does the existence of those very parts, which is preserved through the activity of the soul.

Reply Obj. 4: The soul is not in the body or in the parts of the body as in a place, but as a form is in matter. And therefore it does not follow that it is in several places.

Exposition of the second part of the text

Desire is one thing, fear another, joy another, sadness another. (Sent. I, 8.4(24).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 6, ch. 6 (CCSL 50; PL 42:928).) This seems not to designate a composition of the soul, since these things, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.1, 403a3‒25.) are passions of the composite. And to this one should say that love, fear, and all such are spoken of in two ways: either according to the bodily passion, and in this sense they are passions of the composite, nor do they remain in the separated soul; or insofar as they consist in an apprehension and intellectual affection, and in this sense they befall the soul itself according to itself, and are in it even after separation from the body. Whence the Philosopher also asserts (Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.7, 1072b18; Nicomachean Ethics 7.14, 1154b26.) that there is delight even in the divine nature.

God . . . is a Creator without need. (Sent. I, 8.6(26).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 6, ch. 4 (CCSL 50; PL 42:927).) He says this because all agents other than he act for the sake of an end other than themselves, and therefore they stand in need by the acquisition of their end. God himself, however, does all things for the sake of his very self, as is said in Proverbs 16:4: the Lord has made the universe for the sake of his very self; (RSV: the Lord has made everything for its purpose.) and therefore he acts without need.

Containing all things without habit. (Sent. I, 8.6(26).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 6, ch. 4 (CCSL 50; PL 42:927); instead of habit, Silano reads grasp.) He says this because a habit is something adjacent to a body, in which in a way the body itself is, as it is in its clothing. But “containment” is said of bodily things in a different way than of spiritual things, since with bodily things, what is in a thing is contained by that in which it is, like water in a vessel, whereas with spiritual things, what is in a thing contains what it is in, like the soul contains the body. Because of that, God, who is in things as containing them, is not said to be in them as one who has a habit is in the habit, such that he would be surrounded by it; for he is within all things but not surrounded by them. And therefore, although he is in all things as containing all things, nonetheless all things do not stand to him in the mode of a habit.

God, who is life, is not composed of many parts. (Sent. I, 8.8(28).1, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 27 (CCSL 62; PL 10:223).) To understand this text one must note that when something is substantially composed from parts, it is the perfection of the composite itself, not of a certain one of its parts, just as form does not have existence, nor does matter, but the whole composite does. Now, in God perfection is found both with respect to being and with respect to well-being.

As regards being, this is because it is life; this is why, if the divine life belonged to something as a composite, it would be necessary that the things from which it is composed would not be alive. And because life does not have anything mixed with it that is not life, just as being does not either, as Boethius says, (Boethius, Hebdomads, rule 3 (PL 64:1311).) therefore it cannot be that God, who not only lives through his life, but himself is life, be from things composed with each other to constitute some third thing.

And as regards well-being, the divine perfection is considered in three respects. The first regards power, and thereby God himself is said to be power, and not merely to be in possession of power; whence it cannot be that he is composed of anything, since that power would not be in the components, and thus he would be composed from weak elements—that is, things lacking the power that is in the whole. Now, power does not have anything mixed with it, any more than being does, but one who has power can have an admixture of weakness. The second regards beauty, and this is how God is said to be light. Now, if such light would follow from a certain composition, the components would not themselves be luminous, just as we see that due to its contraction a transparent body can become luminous, like a crystal, though if its parts were expanded, they would lose the prior luminosity. However, nothing can be dark in God, who is light, just as neither can non-being be in being. The third regards the subtlety of his nature, for he is said to be spirit essentially. Whence his formality or “whatness” is not derived from disparate things, that is from things standing in unlike ways as regards formality, like humanity from soul and body, through which a man formally exists.

The same life permeating the whole, (Sent. I, 8.8(28).1, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 27 (CCSL 62; PL 10:223).) for there is nothing in him but life.