D. 2 - Unity of the divine essence

Division of the text

After having inquired about the things to be treated in this work, here he undertakes his intention. And it is divided into two parts. For because, as was said above in our prologue, (In I Sent., prol.) the intention of sacred doctrine is about divine things, but “divine” is taken according to a relation to God, insofar as he is either the principle or the end—according to Revelation 22:13, I am the Alpha and the Omega—the consideration of this doctrine will be about realities insofar as they go forth from God as from their principle, and insofar as they are carried back to him as to their end. Whence in the first part he considers divine realities insofar as they go forth from the principle in Books I and II, and in the second, insofar as they return to their end, and this is in the beginning of Book III. It can be divided in another way, according to the intention of the Master, (Sent. I, 1.3.11.) such that in the first part he considers things in Books I–III, and in the second he considers signs, and this latter occurs in Book IV.

Furthermore, the first is divided into three parts: in the first he treats the things that can be enjoyed in Book I; in the second, of things that can be used in Book II; and in the third, of things that order the useful to the enjoyable, which are also partly useful and partly enjoyable in Book III.

According to the first division, the first part is divided into two: in the first, he considers divine things according to a going forth from the principle within the unity of the essence in Book I; in the second, divine things according to a going forth in a diversity of essence in Book II.

The first book, however, is divided into two parts. For the going forth of the persons within the unity of the essence is the cause of the going forth of created things within a diversity of essence; this is why in the first part, Distinctions 2–34, he considers the Trinity of persons in the unity of essence, which is distinguished according to the going forth of one person from another. But in the second part, Distinctions 35–48, he considers certain attributes due to whose accounts the causality within the divine persons, in reference to the production of created things, is completed, below, in Distinction 35: although we have discussed above and said many things concerning those things which are predicated jointly of God according to substance, yet some of them require special treatment. Now we must treat these. (Sent. I, 35.1(150).1.)

The first is divided, into two parts: for first he inquires into the Trinity of persons in the unity of essence, which is his intention; in the second, he undertakes the determination of the unity and Trinity so discovered, below, in Distinction 8: now we must turn to the truth, or property, and the unchangeability and simplicity of the divine nature, or substance, or essence. (Sent. I, 8.1(21).1.)

The first is divided into two: in the first, he manifests the truth; in the second, he excludes a doubt, in Distinction 4: here arises a very necessary question. (Sent. I, 4.1(13).1.) The first is further divided into two: in the first, he studies the mode of investigating the Trinity in unity; in the second, he presents the Trinity of persons in the unity of essence, at let us now set forth the authorities of the Old and New Testament. (Sent. I, 2.4(7).1.)

However, he presents the mode of investigation in three respects: first, in reference to the condition of those undertaking the inquiry; second, in reference to the intention, at all those Catholic authors who have treated of the Trinity . . . intended to teach the following: that, in accordance with the Scriptures; (Sent. I, 2.2(5).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 1, ch. 4 (CCSL 50; PL 42:824).) third, in reference to the order of inquiry, at as Augustine teaches in On the Trinity*, book 1: ‘first, we must demonstrate in accordance with the authorities of the Holy Scriptures whether the faith holds as we say.’* (Sent. I, 2.3(6).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 1, ch. 2 (CCSL 50; PL 42:822).)

However, in the first part he describes the condition of those undertaking the inquiry in three ways: first, in reference to their purity, which is necessary for the contemplation of so great a truth; second, in reference to their reverence and attention, at therefore this highest and most excellent of topics is to be approached with modesty and fear; (Sent. I, 2.1(4).3.) third, in reference to mutual charity, since one stands in need of the help of another, on account of the difficulty of the matter, at and so let each person who hears . . . see to it that he imitates and keeps what the venerable teacher Augustine says concerning himself. (Sent. I, 2.1(4).3.)*

All those Catholic authors who treated of the Trinity . . . intended to teach the following: that, in accordance with the Scriptures, the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are one substance. (Sent. I, 2.2(5).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 1, ch. 4 (CCSL 50; PL 42:824).) Here he manifests the intention of those undertaking the inquiry about the Trinity. And first he shows what the teachers intend to teach; second, he concludes to what we must hold, at let us hold that the Father and Son and Holy Spirit are naturally one God. (Sent. I, 2.2(5).3; Lombard believes he is quoting Augustine, but in fact he is quoting Fulgentius, On the Faith, to Peter the Deacon, ch. 5 (CCSL 91A; PL 40:769).)

Let us now set forth the authorities of the Old and New Testament. (Sent. I, 2.4(7).1.) Here he manifests the Trinity of persons in the unity of essence, and first through authorities, and second, through reasons, at for the Apostle says that the invisible things of God, as also his eternal power and divinity, are perceived by a creature of the world, having been understood through the things which are made. (Sent. I, 3.1(9).1.)

The first is divided into two: first, he shows what was proposed through the authorities of the Old Testament; and second, through the authorities of the New Testament, at after the testimonies of the Old Testament concerning our faith in the holy Trinity and unity, let us now approach the authorities of the New Testament. (Sent. I, 2.5(8).1.)

The first is divided into three parts: first, he manifests specifically the unity of essence; second, he manifests the unity and Trinity generally, doing so first through the authority of the law, second, through that of the prophets, at in Genesis, the Lord shows at once the plurality of persons and the unity of nature; (Sent. I, 2.4(7).2.) and third, he manifests specifically the distinction of the persons, at also, David plainly indicates the eternal begetting of the Son, (Sent. I, 2.4(7).8.) first, according to the procession of the Son from the Father, and second, according to the procession of the Spirit from both.

Question 1

The unity of the divine essence

In order to make more evident the things said here, five things are asked about:

first, the unity of the divine essence;

second, whether in that unity one finds a diversity of attributes;

third, whether the plurality of accounts according to which the attributes differ is in some way in God, or only in the intellect of one reasoning about them;

fourth, whether that unity is compatible with a plurality of persons;

fifth, if it is so compatible, whether that plurality is a real plurality, or one of reason only.

Article 1

Whether God is only one

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: below, d. 24, a. 1; In II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 1; ST I.11.3; 103.3; SCG I.42; On the Power of God, q. 3, a. 6; Compendium theologiae, ch. 15; Commentary on Dionysius’s On the Divine Names, ch. 13, lect. 2, 3; Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 8, lect. 12; bk. 12, lect. 10.) It appears that it is not necessary to assert that God is one.

Obj. 1: For only one thing proceeds from the first and simple one, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Physics 8.6, 259a10‒20; 260a19‒23; Metaphysics 8.6, 1045b1‒8.) But created things are found to participate in many goodnesses, such as wisdom, goodness, peace, and the like. Therefore it seems that they proceed from many first principles, and thus one is to assert that there are many gods. And this seems to have been the error of the gentiles, as Dionysius says; (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 11, para. 6 (PG 3:954).) this is evident also from the fact that they assert that there is one god for wisdom, another who is the goddess “Peace,” and so on for the others.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as is said in Metaphysics 5, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.16, 1021b12‒18; Meteorology 3.3, 380b11‒19.) each thing is perfect when it can produce something like itself in nature. But the divine essence is the most perfect. Therefore it seems that it can produce another essence like itself, such that there would be many divine essences.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, first matter, which is pure potency, is one, and to the degree that forms are closer to it, they are found to be fewer in number. For first it is perfected through the four elementary forms, and then through the many forms of composite bodies. Therefore at the furthest removal from matter one should find the greatest plurality. And thus it seems that, since God is remote from matter most of all, the divine nature is also the most multiplied. And thus there are many gods.

On the contrary, every nature that is found in many things according to priority and posteriority must descend from one first thing, in which the nature is possessed perfectly. For the unity of what is derived from a principle attests to the unity of its principle, just as every heat originates from one hottest thing, which is fire. But entity is found in many things according to priority and posteriority. Therefore there must be one first most perfect being, from which all beings have existence, and this is God. Therefore God is one.

Furthermore, if there were many gods distinct in essence, their essences would have to be divided from each other by an essential difference, as with things that differ in species, or genus, or just differ in number. However, if they differ in genus or species, they must differ by some difference. Now, that difference either pertains to goodness or not. If not, then the god in whom was this difference does not possess purely goodness, and so is not pure good. But if it does pertain to goodness, and that difference is not found in another god, then that god in whom it is not found will not be perfect in goodness. However, it is necessary that God, being the highest good, be both pure and perfect in goodness. Therefore it is impossible that there be many gods.

Furthermore, one might say that that difference is the same in species for both gods, but differs only in number.

On the contrary, whatever is of the same species is divided in number only according to a division of matter, or of some potentiality. Therefore if that difference is the same in species, but differs in number, it will therefore have to be the case that in God there is something potential, and thus a diminished being, and one dependent on another—which is against the account of the first being.

Furthermore, for a thing wherein its existence and its whatness are not different, its whatness or essence cannot be participated in unless its existence is also participated in. But whenever a thing’s essence is divided by participation, the same essence is participated in according to its account, and not according to the same existence. Therefore it is impossible for that whose essence and existence do not differ to be divided and multiplied by a participation of essence. And God is such a thing; otherwise his existence would have been acquired from something. Therefore it is impossible that the divinity be multiplied or divided, and thus there will be only one God.

I answer that since every multitude proceeds from some unity, as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 13, para. 2 (PG 3:978).) the multitude of the universe must be traced back to one first principle of all beings, which is God. For the faith also supposes this, and reason demonstrates it.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the participated goodnesses in created things are different in account, still they have an order to each other, and one includes another, and one is founded on another. For example, living is included in understanding, and being is included in living. And therefore they are not traced back to diverse principles, but to one. And even if they did not have an order, the unity of the first principle is not thereby excluded; for what is united in the principle is multiplied in the effects. For something is always nobler in the cause than it is in the thing caused. (Mandonnet claims that, in some of the codices, this axiom is rejected at the end of the response.) Whence in the first principle, although it is one and simple in reality, nevertheless there are many accounts of perfections, such as wisdom, life, and the like, according to which are caused, in created things, diverse perfections that differ in reality.

Reply Obj. 2: The perfection of the divine essence is such that another essence cannot be like it or equal to it. For if a like or equal essence were to be from it, its existence would have to be dependent on it, and thereby potentiality would fall into that essence; and thereby it would be distinguished from the divine essence, which is pure act. However, it is not necessary that whatever belongs to the nobility of a created thing belongs to the nobility of the Creator, which latter disproportionately exceeds the former; for example, to be prone to rage belongs to the nobility of a dog, but this would be a lack of nobility in man, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 25 (PG 3:727).)

Reply Obj. 3: A simple principle has the account of unity, and because matter is only potency, this is why it is numerically one—not through one form that it has, but through the removal of all distinguishing forms. And for the same reason, the pure and first act is one and incapable of multiplication the way matter is multiplied through the arrival of forms, but rather it is altogether incapable of diversity.

Article 2

Whether there is a plurality of attributes in God

As regards the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: below, d. 22, q. 3, a. 1.) It seems that in the divine essence there is no plurality of attributes.

Obj. 1: For that is most one which is wholly removed from plurality. For, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Topics 3.5, 119a28.) that is whiter which is less mixed with black. But the divine essence is supremely one, that which is the principle of the whole of unity. Therefore no plurality of attributes can fall within it.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, of one simplicity there is one activity. But the divine essence is one and simple. Therefore it has only one activity. Now, of diverse attributes there are diverse activities, just as of knowledge there is knowing, and of will, willing, and so on. Therefore no diversity of attributes is found in God.

On the contrary, as Augustine says, (Rather: Anselm, Proslogion, ch. 5 (PL 158:229).) everything that it is simply better to be than not be ought to be attributed to God. But the existence of wisdom, goodness, and the like are simply better than their non existence. Therefore they are in God.

Furthermore, everything that is said to be so in a certain respect originates from what is so simply and absolutely. But we find some things to be perfect not absolutely, but with respect to their own nature, some more so and some less so. Therefore there must be something absolutely and simply perfect due to which all the others are perfected. But, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.16, 1021b15‒18.) the simply perfect is that wherein are found all the nobilities belonging to all genera, and the Commentator says this in the same place, (Averroes (Ibn Rushd, 1126‒1198 AD), Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 5, text. 21.) and this is God. Therefore in God one finds power, goodness, and whatever else belongs to nobility in any reality.

I answer that whatever there is of being and goodness in created things, the whole of it is from the Creator, whereas imperfection is not from him, but arises on the part of the things created, insofar as they are from nothing. Now, the cause of a thing has that effect in a more excellent and more noble way. Whence all nobilities of all created things must be found in God in the noblest manner and without any imperfection. And therefore what in created things are diverse, in God are one, on account of his supreme simplicity. In this way, then, one should say that in God there is wisdom, goodness, and the like, each of which is the divine essence itself, and thus all of them are one in reality.

And because each of them is in God according to its truest account, and the account of wisdom is not the account of goodness, as such, it remains that they are diverse in account, and not only on the side of the one so reasoning, but due to a property of the reality itself. And this is why he is not a wholly equivocal cause of things, since according to his own form he produces like effects—not univocally like, but analogically; for example, from his own wisdom is derived every wisdom, and so on for the other attributes, following the teaching of Dionysius. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7 (PG 3:866).) Whence he himself is the exemplar form of realities, not only with respect to the things that are within his own wisdom, that is, according to their ideal accounts, but even with respect to the things that exist within their own nature, that is, the attributes.

However, some say that such attributes do not differ from each other except as made known in created things. But this cannot be so, first, because a cause does not have anything from its effect, but rather the converse, so God is not called “wise” because wisdom comes from him; rather, created things are called “wise” insofar as they imitate the divine wisdom; and second, because created things did not exist from eternity, even if they were never going to exist it was true to say that he is wise, good, and the like. Nor is altogether the same thing signified through the one and the other, the way that the same thing is signified through synonymous names.

Reply Obj. 1: The plurality of attributes is in no way prejudicial to the supreme unity, since things that in others are many, are one in him. And there remains only a plurality according to account, which is not opposed to a supreme unity in reality; rather, it necessarily follows on it, if perfection is present in him simultaneously.

Reply Obj. 2: God’s activity is his own essence. Whence, just as his essence is one, so is his activity in reality, but it is made many through the diverse accounts. This is like how it also is on the side of the essence: although it is one, nonetheless many accounts of attributes are contemplated in it.

Article 3

Whether the plurality of accounts, according to which the attributes differ, is only in the intellect or also in God

As regards the third, we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: below, d. 22, a. 3; ST I.13.4; SCG I.35; On the Power of God, q. 7, a. 6; Compendium theologiae, ch. 25.) It seems that the plurality of accounts, according to which the attributes differ, is in no way in God, but is only in the intellect of the one reasoning about them.

Obj. 1: For Dionysius says, you will find every hymn of the holy theologians to be processions according to the goods of the thearchy, each hymn dividing the names of God with manifestation and praise. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 1, para. 4 (PG 3:590).) And the meaning is that the names that the saints take up for the divine praise are divided according to the diverse processions of the divinity, whereby God himself is manifested. Therefore this plurality is not on the side of God, but on the side of his diverse effects, from which our intellect knows and names God in diverse ways.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Dionysius says, if someone seeing God were to understand what he saw, he saw not him himself, but something of the things that belong to him. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Epistle 1, “To Caius” (PG 3:1066).) If, then, the aforesaid names differ according to the diverse accounts that we understand of them, nothing that is in God corresponds to these accounts; rather, what corresponds to the accounts is in the things that belong to God—that is, in created things.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Commentator, in speaking of names of this sort, (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 11, text. 39, 51.) says that the multiplicity that such names pretend to is in God according to the understanding, and in no way according to reality. Therefore it seems that the plurality of these accounts is only according to our understanding.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, whatever is in God is God. Therefore if such accounts according to which the attributes differ are in God, then they are God. But God is one and simple. Therefore these accounts, insofar as they are in God, are not many.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, that which is in itself one in all ways is not the root of any multitude existing in it. But the divine essence is one in all ways, since it is supremely one. Therefore it cannot be the root of some multitude existing in it. Therefore the plurality of the aforesaid accounts is not rooted in the divine essence, but only in the understanding.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 2 (PG 94:791).) that in God all things outside the non-generation, the generation, and the procession are one. Therefore if wisdom, goodness, and the like are attributes in God, insofar as they are in him they do not have any plurality. Therefore the plurality of the accounts that the names signify is not within God, but only in our understanding.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 13, para. 1 (PG 3:978).) that God is called perfect as embracing all things within his very self; and the Philosopher and the Commentator say this too, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.16, 1021b13‒16, b32‒35; Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 5, text. 21.) that God is said to be perfect because all perfections that are in all the genera of realities are within him. However, this perfection by which God is perfect is with respect to reality, and not only with respect to understanding. Therefore such attributes that demonstrate this perfection are not only in the understanding, but even in the reality that is God.

Furthermore, Dionysius says (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 9, para. 6 (PG 3:914).) that created things are said to be like God insofar as they imitate God, who is not perfectly imitable by what is created. However, this imitation is with respect to participation in the attributes. Therefore created things are like God in respect to wisdom, goodness, and the like. But this would not be unless the aforesaid things were in God according to their own proper accounts. Therefore the accounts of wisdom and goodness are properly speaking in God, and thus accounts of this sort are not only on the part of our intellect.

Furthermore, “wisdom” is not said equivocally of God and creature; otherwise created wisdom would not lead one to the knowledge of uncreated wisdom; and the like is true for power, goodness, and others like this. But things that are predicated of many according to accounts that are wholly diverse are predicated equivocally. Therefore in some way the account of wisdom, insofar as it is said of God and created things, is one, and not through univocal speech, but through analogy; and the like is true for the other accounts. But the account of wisdom insofar as it is said of created things is not the same as the account of goodness, and that of power. Therefore also insofar as they are said of God they are not the same accounts, but diverse.

Furthermore, just as God is truly Father, so he is also truly wise. But because God is truly Father, one cannot say that the account of paternity is merely in the understanding. Therefore because God is truly wise, neither can one say that the account of wisdom is only in the understanding. But the account of paternity, which is really in God, is not the same as the account of divinity. Whence neither by the paternity is he God, nor by the divinity is he Father; and yet such plurality of accounts does not take away the divine simplicity, on account of the fact that the essence and the paternity are the same in reality. Therefore, likewise, if we assert that the wisdom and the essence are altogether the same in reality, and their accounts diverse, the simplicity of the divine essence is not thereby taken away. Rather, the simplicity of the divine essence is the entire cause why these attributes do not differ in God. Therefore it is not unfitting to assert that the account of wisdom and that of goodness is in God, and yet the one is not the other, if the reality is asserted to be altogether one.

Furthermore, one might say that there is no likeness between the personal relations and the essential attributes, since in God there are only two categories, that is, substance and relation. Whence the account of relation is other than the account of substance, yet the account of wisdom and that of the other absolute attributes is other than substance.

On the contrary, a relation in the divine has two orientations, one to its correlative, with respect to which it is said to be toward-something, (“Toward-something” (Latin: ad aliquid; Greek: πρός τι) is the name Aristotle gives to the logical category of relation (in Categories, ch. 7). A father, therefore, is “toward” his son.) and the other to the essence, with respect to which it is really the same as it. But the way in which something is the same as another does not constitute a number with it. Therefore the fact that the relations pertain to a category other than the category of substance is by way of its orientation to its correlative. Therefore the orientation of wisdom and paternity to the essence still remains the same.

I answer that, as was said in the body of the preceding article, wisdom and goodness and all such are wholly one reality in God, but they differ in account. And this account is not only on the side of the one reasoning, but also due to a property of the reality itself. To make this reality evident, such that it might be diligently explained—since on this hangs almost the entire understanding of the things that are said in Book I—one must see four things: first, what is the account in reference to which we say “the attributes differ in account”; second, how a certain account is said to be, or not be, in a certain reality; third, whether such diverse accounts of attributes are in God or not; fourth, whether the plurality of these accounts is only on the side of our understanding, or is in some way on the side of the reality.

One should note that it pertains to the first that an account, as it is being taken here, is nothing other than what the intellect apprehends of the signification of some name. And in things that have definition, this is the very definition of the thing, with respect to which the Philosopher says, the definition is the account that the name signifies. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.7, 1012a23.) But some things that are not defined are also said to have an account (spoken of this way), like quantity, quality, and so on, which are not defined because they are the most general genera. And yet the account of quality is what is signified by the name “quality,” and this is that from which a quality has it that it be a quality. Whence it does not matter whether the things that are said to have an account also have or do not have a definition. And thereby it is clear that the account of wisdom, which is said of God, is what is conceived of the signification of this name, even though the divine wisdom itself cannot be defined. Yet neither does this name “account” signify the conception itself, since this is signified through the name “wisdom” or through another name of a reality; rather, “account” signifies the intention of this conception, as does even this name “definition,” and so too other names of second imposition.

And from this the second item—how an account is said to be in a real thing—becomes clear. For this is not said as if the very intention that the name “account” signifies is in the reality, or even that the very conception, to which such an intention belongs, is in the reality outside the soul, since it is in the soul as in its subject. Rather, it is said to be in the reality insofar as in the reality outside the soul there is something that corresponds to the conception of the soul, as the signified corresponds to its sign. Whence one must notice that the very conception of the intellect is related in three ways to the reality outside the soul.

For sometimes what the intellect conceives is a likeness of the reality existing outside the soul, for example, what is conceived of this reality with the name “man”; and such a conception of the intellect has a foundation in the reality immediately, insofar as the reality itself, due to its conformity with the intellect, makes the understanding true, and makes the name signifying that understanding properly to be said of the reality.

But sometimes what a name signifies is not a likeness of a reality existing outside the soul; rather, it is something that follows from the mode of understanding the reality that is outside the soul. Of this sort are the intentions that our intellect comes to; for example, what is signified by the name “genus” is not a likeness of some reality existing outside the soul; but rather, from the fact that the intellect understands animal as within many species, it attributes to it the intention of genus. And although the proximate foundation of intentions of this sort is not in the reality but in the intellect, still the remote foundation is the reality itself. Whence the intellect that comes to these intentions is not false. And it is the same way for all the other things that follow from the mode of understanding, as is the abstraction of mathematical objects and the like.

And sometimes what is signified through the name has neither a proximate nor a remote foundation in the reality, such as the conception of a chimera. For it is neither the likeness of any reality outside the soul, nor does it follow from the mode of truly understanding any reality. And thus, such a conception is false. Thereby becomes clear the second item—that an account is said to be in a reality insofar as what is signified by its name, to which the account belongs, is in the reality. And this occurs properly when the conception of the intellect is a likeness of the reality.

As regards the third item—whether the accounts of the attributes are in God—one should note that there appear to be two opinions about this. For some, like Avicenna and Rabbi Moses, (Avicenna, Liber de intelligentiis, ch. 1; Moses Maimonides (1135‒1205 AD), Guide for the Perplexed, part 1, cc. 7, 8. De intelligentiis is thought to be not actually written by Avicenna and has been attributed to Dominic Gundisalvi (Gundissalinus), though it clearly contains Avicennian influence. See Étienne Gilson, “Avicenne en Occident au Moyen Age,” Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age 36 (1969), 89–121.) say that that reality that is God is a certain subsistent existence, nor is there anything else in God except existence. Whence they say that he is existence without essence. However, all the other things that are attributed to God are true of God in two ways, according to them: either through the mode of negation, or through the mode of causality. This is done through the mode of negation in two ways: either for the sake of removing a privation or opposite defect, such that we call God “wise” in order to remove the defect in those who lack wisdom; or insofar as something follows on a negation, as is the case with the name “one,” as he is one from the very fact that he is not divided; likewise, from the very fact that he is immaterial, he is also intelligent. Whence, according to them, all such names have been invented to remove—rather than to assert—something in God. Furthermore, it is done through the mode of causality in two ways: either insofar as he produces such things in what is created, such that God is called “good” because he pours goodness into created things, and so on for other names; or insofar as he relates to us according to the mode of a created thing, such that God is called “willing” or “holy” insofar as he relates to us in the mode of one who wills or is holy in his manner of producing an effect, just as he is called “angry” because he relates to us in the mode of someone who is angry.

And according to this opinion it follows that all the names that are said of God and created things are said equivocally, and that there is no likeness between the created and the Creator arising from the fact that a created thing is good or wise or the like. And Rabbi Moses says this explicitly. According to this, what is conceived from the names of the attributes is not referred to God such that it is a likeness of something in him. Whence it follows that the accounts of these names are not in God as having their proximate foundation in him, but as having a remote one, just as we ourselves say about relations said of God in reference to time. For such relations are not in God according to reality; rather, they follow the mode of understanding, just as was said of intentions. And thus, according to this opinion, the accounts of these attributes are only in the intellect, and not in the reality that is God, and the intellect comes to them from a consideration of created things either through negation or through causality, as was said.

Others, like Dionysius and Anselm, say that whatever there is of perfection in created things is in God preeminently. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 13, para. 1 (PG 3:978); Anselm, Monologion, ch. 3 (PL 158:147).) And this eminence is noted in three respects: with respect to universality, since although all perfections are not gathered together in any one creature, they are so united in God; with respect to fullness, since wisdom is there without any defect, and the same is true of the other attributes, which is not the case in created things; and with respect to unity, for things that are divided in created things are one in God. And because in that one he has all, thus according to that one he causes all, knows all, and makes them all like him through analogy. Therefore, according to this opinion, the conceptions that our intellect conceives from the names of the attributes are truly likenesses of the reality that is God, although they are deficient and not full, just as is the case for other realities that are like God. Whence such accounts are not merely in the intellect, since they have their proximate foundation in the reality that is God. And from this it arises that whatever follows upon wisdom, as such, rightly and properly speaking belongs to God.

However, these opinions, although they appear diverse on the surface, nonetheless are not contrary, if one takes the accounts of the claims from the causes for saying them. For the first group considered the created realities themselves, on which the names of the attributes are imposed; for example, the name “wisdom” is imposed on a certain quality, and the name “essence” is imposed on some reality that does not subsist—and these things are a long ways from God. And therefore they say that God is existence without essence, and that wisdom according to itself is not in him. But the others considered the modes of perfection, from which the aforesaid names are taken. And because God is perfect in all ways according to one simple existence, which modes of perfection are indicated through these names, therefore they said that such names belong to God in a positive way. Thus it is clear that neither of these opinions denies what the other says, since the first ones do not say that some mode of perfection is absent from God, and the second ones do not assert the presence of a quality or a non-subsisting reality in God.

Therefore in this way the third item—that the accounts of the attributes are truly in God—becomes clear. For the account of a name stands on the side of that due to which the name is imposed more than on the side of that on which it is imposed.

As regards the fourth item—whether the plurality of these accounts is only on the side of our intellect, or is also in some way on the side of the real thing—one should note that such plurality of accounts arises from the fact that the reality that is God surpasses our intellect. For our intellect cannot receive diverse modes of perfection by means of one conception. For we receive knowledge from created things, wherein the diverse modes of perfections exist according to their diverse forms. This is also because what in God is one and simple becomes manifold in our understanding—even if we were to receive it immediately from God—just as the procession of his goodness is multiplied in the different creatures. Whence, since God is perfect in all ways according to one and the same reality, one cannot apprehend his perfection in an integral way by a single conception, and consequently neither can one so name him. And therefore one must have diverse conceptions of him, which are the diverse accounts, and one must impose diverse names signifying those accounts. Whence those names are not synonyms, inasmuch as they signify diverse accounts.

If, however, our intellect were to see God through his very self, it would be able to impose one name on that thing. And this will happen in the heavenly fatherland; therefore Zachariah 14:9 says, on that day the Lord will be one and his name one. However, that one name would signify not only goodness, or only wisdom, or the like; rather, it would include all the things that are signified in all such names. Nevertheless if an intellect seeing God through his essence were to impose a name on the reality that it sees, and were to name it by the mediation of the conception that it has of it, it would still have to impose many names. For it is impossible for the conception of a created intellect to represent the entire perfection of the divine essence. Whence it would form diverse conceptions when the one reality has been seen, and it would impose diverse names; for example, Chrysostom also says (Source unknown. Migne lists this as John Chrysostom’s Exposition on Psalms 148 and 112, with PG numbers; however, the page numbers it gives do not correspond to this doctrine, and neither his exposition of the Psalms, nor the spurious extension of them get this far into the Psalms.) that the angels praise God, some as majesty, others as goodness, and so on, as a sign that they do not see him with a vision that comprehends him. Rather, the conception that perfectly represents him is the uncreated Word, and therefore it is only one.

In this way, then, it is clear that the plurality of the names comes from the fact that God himself exceeds our intellect. However, the fact that God exceeds our intellect is due both to God himself, on account of the fullness of his perfection, and to our intellect, which stands in a deficient way as regards comprehending him. Whence it is clear that the plurality of these accounts is not only on the side of our intellect, but also on the side of God himself, insofar as his perfection surpasses every conception of our intellect. And therefore something in the reality that is God corresponds to the plurality of these accounts—though this is not a plurality of the reality, but rather the full perfection, from which it arises that all such conceptions are conformed to him.

Therefore those who say that such plurality is only on the side of our intellect or on the side of his effects in a way speak the truth, and in a way do not. For if this is referred to the cause of the multiplication, they speak the truth that it is in a certain way on the side of our intellect and the effects, because our intellect cannot conceive the divine perfection with one conception, but only with many; one reason for this is that it is accommodated to created things. However, if this is referred to the mode by which such accounts are attributed to God, they speak falsely. For he is not good from the fact that he does good things, or because he relates to us according to the mode of good things; rather, he does good things because he is good, and other things by participating in his goodness relate to us according to his mode. Whence even if he had not created, and were not going to create, he would in himself be such that he could truly be considered according to all these conceptions that our intellect now has in considering him.

And thereby the fourth item is clear, that the plurality of these names is not only on the side of our intellect forming the diverse conceptions about God, which are called the “diverse accounts,” as is clear from things said in the previous article. Rather, it is also on the side of God himself, insofar as there is something in God corresponding to all these conceptions, that is, his full and total perfection, according to which it arises that each of the names signifying these conceptions is said truly and properly of God. However, this is not in such a way that any diversity or multiplicity is placed in the reality that is God by reason of such attributes.

Reply Obj. 1: Having seen these things, it is easy to respond to the objections. To the first we say that Dionysius’s intention is to say that God is named, manifested, and praised according to the diverse goodnesses that he pours into created things. But he does not mean this in such a way that the accounts of these goodnesses are true of him because he pours them into created things, but rather vice versa, as was said in the body. For although the condition of the cause is known from the conditions of the effects, still the condition of the cause is not true on account of the conditions of the effects, but rather vice versa.

Reply Obj. 2: Our intellect does not refer to God what it conceives about goodness or wisdom as though it were in him in the way in which he conceives it, since this would be to comprehend his wisdom or goodness. Rather, he understands the divine goodness itself—which what our intellect conceives is in some way like—to be above what is conceived of it. This is why God himself is not seen through such conceptions as he is in himself; rather, he is understood to be above understanding. And this is what Dionysius intends to say in that authority. (“Authority” (auctoritas) here means not so much a person or that person’s expertise or just claim to speak decisively about a truth—as the expression is more often used in English—but rather, a text or a passage in a text that has such expertise or just claim; in this context, note that the Latin word also means “source.” Augustine is not an authority, but a line from one of his works is. Perhaps a more precise translation would be “authoritative passage,” but for simplicity, we will translate this word as “authority.”)

Reply Obj. 3: Such multiplicity of the attributes is in no way placed in God as though he were manifold according to reality. But nonetheless he himself, according to his simple perfection, corresponds to the multitude of these attributes, such that they are said of God truly. And this is what the Commentator intends.

Reply Obj. 4: The account of man is not said to be in a man as though it were some real thing in him; rather, it is in him as in a subject within his intellect, and it is in a man as in what provides the support for the account’s truth. In the same way, so too the account of the divine goodness is in the intellect as in a subject, but it is in God as in that to which it corresponds through a certain likeness with that account, making its truth. Whence it is clear that the argument proceeds from a misunderstanding of what is being said.

Reply Obj. 5: Something is said to be “founded upon” or “rooted in” something else metaphorically as that due to which it has stability. Now, understood accounts have a double stability: the stability of their existence—and this they have due to the intellect, as do other accidents due to their subjects—and the stability of their truth—and this they have due to the reality to which they conform. For speech and the understanding have their truth or falsity due to the fact that a reality is or is not. Therefore the accounts of the attributes are founded on or rooted in the understanding as regards the stability of their existence, since, as was said in the previous article, the intellect is their subject. But they are founded on or rooted in the divine essence as regards the stability of their truth, and this is in no way repugnant to the divine simplicity.

Reply Obj. 6: In God all things are one in reality, aside from non-generation, generation, and procession, which constitute the really distinct persons. However, it is not necessary that whatever is said of God aside from these is one in account. And in the same way one should understand what Boethius says (Boethius, On the Trinity, ch. 6 (PG 64:1254).)—that only relation multiplies the Trinity, that is, with a real plurality. For something is one in reality but manifold in account when one reality corresponds to diverse conceptions and names, such that they are true of it. For example, a point, although it is one reality, truly corresponds to diverse conceptions made of it, whether as thought of in itself, or as thought of as a center, or as thought of as the beginning of lines. And these accounts or conceptions are in the intellect as in a subject, and in the point itself as in the foundation of the truth of these conceptions. But this example is not altogether fitting, just as neither are others that are introduced in divine matters.

Article 4

Whether there is a plurality of persons in the divine essence

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 23, a. 4; ST I.30.1; On the Power of God, q. 9, a. 5; Compendium theologiae, cc. 50, 55; Quodl. VII, q. 3, a. 1.) It appears that there is no plurality of persons within the unity of the divine essence.

Obj. 1: For in all created things it is the case that from the multiplication of supposits (A suppositum is an individual instance of a nature (for example, Socrates is a supposit of man), the name “suppositum” is derived from the logical relation of the particular being “placed-under” (sub-positum) its universal species.) follows a numerical multiplication of the essence; for example, the humanity in Socrates and that in Plato are numerically different. But created things have their exemplar in God. Therefore, since it is impossible that the divine essence be multiplied, as was shown above, (See a. 1.) it seems impossible that a plurality of supposits, or persons, be there.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, of things that are the same thing, if one is multiplied or communicated, so is the other. But in God that whereby he exists and that which he is—that is, the essence and the supposit—are the same thing. Therefore if his essence is not multiplied, then neither is his supposit. Therefore and so on.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the nature of a species is multiplied in many individuals for the sake of this: because it cannot have its entire perfection in one, because the individual is corruptible whereas the species is incorruptible. Whence in incorruptible things there is only one individual in one species, like the sun. But the divine nature has every perfection in one supposit. Therefore a plurality of supposits would be pointless, and that cannot be in God.

On the contrary, as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 1 (PG 3:694).) the good is communicative of itself. But God is supremely good. Therefore he will supremely communicate himself. But he does not supremely communicate himself in created things, since they are not receptive of his entire goodness. Therefore there must be a perfect communication, namely, one such that he would communicate his entire goodness to another. Now, this cannot be in a diversity of essence. Therefore there must be many distinct things within the unity of the divine essence. This same thing is argued from the perfection of the divine beatitude, which asserts the highest joy, which cannot be possessed without companionship. And this same thing is argued from the perfection of the divine charity. For perfect charity is a gratuitous love that stretches toward another. But it will not be the supreme love unless he loves supremely, and he does not supremely love a created thing, since it should not be loved supremely. Therefore in the creating essence itself there must be one loving supremely and one loved supremely, the two being distinct in the unity of the essence.

I answer that one should grant, without any ambiguity, that there is within God a plurality of supposits, or persons, in a unity of essence—not on account of the reasons introduced above, which do not conclude with necessity, but on account of the truth of the faith.

Reply Obj. 1: In a creature the thing’s essence and its existence differ, nor does its essence have existence except on account of a relation to something having the essence. And therefore when a created essence is communicated, it is communicated only according to its account, and not according to its existence, since according to that existence it is in only the one possessing it. The divine essence, however, is the same as its existence, and therefore when his essence is communicated, his existence is also communicated. Whence the essence is not only one in account, but one in existence, and on account of this it can be numerically one in several supposits. However, although created things have God as exemplar, nonetheless they fall short of representing him.

Reply Obj. 2: In God the essence and the supposit are the same in reality, yet they differ in account, as was said of the attributes above in the preceding article. Whence the Commentator says (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 2, text. 39.) that life and living do not signify the same thing in God, like synonymous names. And therefore it is against the account of a supposit that it be communicated, but not against the account of an essence. Therefore one essence is communicated to many supposits.

Reply Obj. 3: The necessity of an end is a conditioned necessity, and one based on a supposition. Whence it is not sought in things that are necessary absolutely, and much less in things that are necessary through themselves, things not having their necessity from another. Whence I say that the plurality of supposits in the divine essence is not on account of some end; rather, it is necessary on account of its very self, since God himself is the end of all things. Whence it cannot be concluded that a plurality of supposits in God is pointless, since something is pointless when what is ordered to an end does not attain it.

Article 5

Whether the plurality of persons really differ or is only something of reason

To the fifth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 26, q. 2, a. 1; d. 33, a. 1; d. 34, q. 1, a. 1; In III Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2; ST I.3.3; 28.2, 3; 39.1; SCG IV.14; On the Power of God, q. 8, a. 1; Compendium theologiae, ch. 53; Commentary on John, ch. 16, lect. 4.) It seems that the plurality of supposits in the divine is not real, but only something of reason.

Obj. 1: For as Damascene says, the three persons are the same in reality, but they are distinguished by reason and cognition. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 2 (PG 94:791).) Therefore it seems that the plurality there is not real.

Obj. 2: Augustine says (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 8 (CCSL 50; PL 42:916).) that the three persons are distinguished by nothing absolute, but only by things that are toward-something. (As noted above in a. 3, “toward-something” (ad aliquid, pros ti) is the name Aristotle gives to the logical category of relation (in Categories, ch. 7).) Now, a real thing is not toward-something; rather, it is absolute. Therefore it seems that the three persons are not three realities, and thus there is no real distinction there.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the persons are distinguished through their properties. Now, those properties do not add to the essence according to reality, but only according to reason. Therefore it seems that the distinction of persons that they make is only a distinction of reason.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as paternity and essence differ in account, so do wisdom and essence. Therefore if the former is enough for a real distinction of supposits, it seems that the supposits would also be really distinct according to the diverse attributes—and thus there are as many persons as there are attributes, which is incongruous. Therefore the properties do not make a real distinction of supposits.

On the contrary, Augustine says, the realities one should enjoy are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 5 (CCSL 32; PL 34:21).) Therefore the three persons are several realities. Therefore their plurality is a real plurality.

Furthermore, a distinction of reason is not enough for a distinction of supposits, since one and the same man can have diverse accounts in himself, and since “supposit” signifies something real. If, therefore, in the divine there is only the distinction of reason, there will not be a true plurality of persons there, which is heretical.

I answer that to say that the persons are distinguished only by reason is to state the Sabellian heresy, and therefore one must say, simply speaking, that the plurality of persons is real. However, one must see how this can be so. Therefore one must know that a personal property—that is, a distinguishing relation—is the same in reality as the divine essence, but it differs from it in account, as was also said of the attributes. However, the account of relation is so that it is referred to another. Therefore relation can be considered in two ways in the divine: either through its comparison to the essence, and thus it is only an account, or through its comparison to what it refers to, and in this latter way the relation is really distinguished from that thing, through the proper account of relation. But the persons are distinguished through the relation’s comparison to its opposite correlative, and not through the relation’s comparison to the essence. Therefore the plurality of the persons is real and not merely something of reason.

Reply Obj. 1: That authority of Damascene should be understood such that “by reason” means “by relation.” He calls a relation “reason” through its comparison to the essence, as was said in the body.

Reply Obj. 2: The real is among transcendent things, (By “transcendent,” Aquinas means what transcends, or “goes-across,” the different categories of being (such as substance, quantity, relation, and so on). Being, one, and true are other examples of transcendent things.) and therefore it applies to the absolute and relative in common. Therefore there is an essential reality, according to which the persons do not differ, and there is a relative, or personal, reality, according to which the persons are distinguished.

Reply Obj. 3: Although a relation through its comparison to the essence is only a account, nonetheless through its comparison to its correlative it is a reality, and something really distinguishing it from that very correlative.

Reply Obj. 4: Although wisdom does differ from the other attributes according to its account, still it is not opposed to any other attribute. For wisdom is compatible with goodness, life, and the other attributes in the same subject. And therefore it does not have the character of distinguishing supposits of the divine nature, which opposite relations do have. But just as divine wisdom really makes the effect of wisdom on account of the truth of its account, which remains in God, so too a relation makes a true distinction on account of the true account of relation, which is preserved in God.

Exposition of the text

The Trinity is said . . . to be of one and the same substance, or essence. (Sent. I, 2.1(4).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 1, ch. 2 (CCSL 50; PL 42:822).) He says both because substance is not said properly here, as will be explained below, in Distinction 8. (Sent. I, 8.4.)

Believed, and understood. (Sent. I, 2.1(4).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 1, ch. 2 (CCSL 50; PL 42:822).) These are ordered according to how faith in the believer is acquired. For first there is the word of the preacher, as is said in Romans 10:14: how are they to believe in him of whom they have never heard? And how are they to hear without a preacher? Second, there is the assent of faith in the very one who believes; and lastly, through faith one comes to understanding: if you will not believe, you will not understand (Isa 7:9). (RSV: if you will not believe, surely you shall not be established.)

The Trinity . . . is the highest good discerned by the most purified minds. (Sent. I, 2.1(4).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 1, ch. 2 (CCSL 50; PL 42:822).) But this discernment of the highest good occurs in different ways. For the mind must be purified from sensible and imaginable things for it to be seen by natural knowledge, but for it to be discerned through faith, the mind must be purified from errors and natural reasonings, and for it to be seen through its essence the mind must be purified from every fault and misery.

For the weak sharpness of the human mind is not fixed in this highest light. (Sent. I, 2.1(4).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 1, ch. 2 (CCSL 50; PL 42:822).) He is speaking of the gaze of the mind according to a likeness with bodily sight. For just as we cannot fasten our eyes on an extremely luminous thing, so too our mind cannot be held on the excellence of the divine light, such that it might determinately know anything, except through faith. Whence even the philosophers fell into diverse errors, and therefore the Philosopher says, as the eye of the bat is related to the light of the sun, so too our intellect is related to things most manifest by nature. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.1, 993b10.)

Without being cleansed through the justice of faith. (Sent. I, 2.1(4).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 1, ch. 2 (CCSL 50; PL 42:822).) “Justice” here is being taken for general justice, which is the rectitude of the soul in its relation to God and neighbor, and of one power to another. And it is called the “justice of faith” because in becoming just the first motion is that of faith, as is said in Hebrews 11:6: whoever would draw near to God must believe.

I do not approve what I said in a prayer: ‘God, who willed that none but the pure should know the truth.’ (Sent. I, 2.1(4).2, quoting Augustine, Retractions, bk. 1, ch. 4 (CCSL 57; PL 32:589).) This little note is appended to exclude a false understanding that one could have of things he said previously, namely, that God could in no way be known by sinners.

With regard to no other matter is error more dangerous. (Sent. I, 2.1(4).3, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 1, ch. 3 (CCSL 50; PL 42:822).) For this is the foundation of our entire faith, by whose destruction the entire edifice collapses. Whence even the Philosopher says that a small error in the beginning is greatest in the end. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.5, 271b8.)

Or discovery more fruitful. (Sent. I, 2.1(4).3, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 1, ch. 3 (CCSL 50; PL 42:822).) For knowledge of the Trinity in unity is the fruit and end of our entire life.

Where I said of the Father and the Son: ‘The one who begets and the one who is begotten is one,’ I ought to have said, ‘they are one.’ (Sent. I, 2.2(5).2, quoting Augustine, Retractions, bk. 1, ch. 4 (CCSL 57; PL 32:589).) This little note is appended to correct what he asserted in a text (Augustine, The Soliloquies, bk. 1, ch. 4 (CSEL 89; PL 32:874).) regarding the word “am/are/is” being predicated in the singular of the three persons. The reason why he said it was because it signifies substance, which is one for the three persons. But later he retracted this because, although it signifies substance, nonetheless it signifies it through the mode of act, and acts are numbered according to supposits. Whence it should be predicated of the three persons in the plural.

First, here are the very first words of the law, (Sent. I, 2.4(7).1.) that is, where the precepts of the law first begin to be stated, at Exodus 20 and Deuteronomy 6.

As Ambrose says . . . : ‘for God and Lord is a name of nature and power.’ (Sent. I, 2.4(7).1, quoting Ambrose, De fide libri V, bk. 1, ch. 1 (CSEL 78; PL 16:530‒31).) It seems that “God” is not the name of a nature, because of the derivatives of this name (Theos) that Damascene points out. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 9, n. 1 (PG 94:835).) For he says that Theos, (Greek: ὁ Θεός.) which is “God,” is said from ethin, (Greek: αἴθειν.) which is to burn, for the Lord your God is a devouring fire (Deut 4:24). It is also said from theaste, (Greek: θεᾶσθαι.) which is to contemplate or see, since he sees all things, or from thein, (Greek: θέειν.) which is to run, or nourish, because he goes through all things, preserving and holding all things together—all of which indicate an activity, therefore and so on. Furthermore, “Lord” is a relative term according to existence, so it does not signify power, but rather relation. To the first argument, then, I say that this name “God” can be considered in two ways: either with respect to what the name is imposed from, which is, as it were, the quality of the name, and in this way it is the name of an activity, following Damascene; or with respect to what it is imposed on, which is the substance signified by the name, and in this way it is the name of a nature, because it is imposed to signify the divine nature. To the second, I say that relations are founded on something that is their cause within the subject, like equality being founded on quantity, and lordship on power. Whence Boethius says (Boethius, On the Trinity, ch. 5 (PL 64:1254).) that lordship is the power of coercing those subject to it, and Dionysius says (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 12, para. 2 (PG 3:970).) that lordship is not only being above those worse than oneself, that is, of subjects, but it is also the total and perfect possession of good and beautiful things, and a true and infallible strength. This is because for someone to be a lord he must have riches and power, and the relation of lordship is founded on these two things.

In Genesis, the Lord shows at once the plurality of persons and the unity of nature. (Sent. I, 2.4(7).2.) Note that Augustine and Hilary—based on this authority, let us make man in our image, and after our likeness (Gen 1:26)—try to show the unity of the essence and the plurality of the persons from the four words present there, but in different ways. (The Augustine mentioned here is in fact Fulgentius of Ruspe, On the Faith, to Peter the Deacon, ch. 5 (CCSL 91A; PL 40:769); Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 3, ch. 23 (CCSL 62; PL 10:92).) For Augustine considers only the consignification of number in them, so through let us make and our he shows the Trinity, but through the words image and likeness he shows the unity of the essence. However, Hilary intends to show each of these things from each of these four, as follows. For likeness signifies a relation caused by a unity of quality, which relation requires distinct supposits, since likeness is the same quality of different things. Whence by reason of the fact that he causes a likeness, he shows the unity of the essence, which is the same goodness and wisdom, or whatever else is signified in the manner of a quality. Nor can a numerical diversity of goodness be there, as has been proved; rather, the distinction of the supposits is designated on the side of relation. And the account of the name image is the same, for it signifies the imitation of one thing by another in reference to some one thing. And this is touched upon where it says, Hilary too . . . says that by these words signify that in the Trinity there is neither diversity, nor singularity, nor solitude, but likeness and plurality. (Sent. I, 2.4(7).3.) Likewise also he takes both from the side of the two expressions let us make and our: he takes the plurality of persons by reason of the plural number, but the unity of the essence by reason of the companionship, which is designated in each. For companionship must be in something one, and because in the divine there cannot be something one in species but diverse in number, it must be one in number. And he touches on this, at the same Hilary, in book 4: ‘he wished this expression to be understood more absolutely not to be referred to himself alone.’ (Sent. I, 2.4(7).3, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 17 (CCSL 62; PL 10:110).) They also differ as regards something else, since Augustine appears to take the likeness and image as being only of man relative to God, but Hilary takes the likeness and image as being of one person to another, and says that man approaches this likeness as far as he can. Hilary says there is no diversity, on account of a division of essence; no singularity, on account of the incommunicability of the divine nature; no solitude, lest one take away the fellowship of the persons, which exists through the union of love; but there is likeness, as opposed to diversity, and plurality, as opposed to singularity, and distinction, as opposed to solitude.

Hilary speaks of the identification of a maker, (Sent. I, 2.4(7).3, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 18 (CCSL 62; PL 10:111).) in reference to its saying, let us make, and the work of making (Sent. I, 2.4(7).3, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 18 (CCSL 62; PL 10:111).) in reference to the work itself.

The Master says David is the greatest prophet (Sent. I, 2.4(7).6.) as regards the mode his revelation, which occurs through an intellectual vision, and as regards the privilege of the promised seed.

The Lord possessed me at the beginning of his ways. (Sent. I, 2.4(7).8, quoting Proverbs 8:22. RSV: the Lord created me at the beginning of his work, the first of his acts of old.) This is speaking about the Son, insofar as wisdom is appropriated to him. However, God is said to possess wisdom because he alone has it perfectly. For what is possessed is had at a nod, whence the Philosopher says that the divine science is a divine, not a human possession. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.2, 982b32, 983a5‒10.) Of his ways, (Proverbs 8:22.) that is, of created things, through which one goes to the Lord.

From eternity I was ordained, (Sent. I, 2.4(7).8, Proverbs 8:23; RSV: ages ago I was set up, at the first, before the beginning of the earth.) according to the order of nature, which is that of the Son to the Father, and according to the order of the cause, which is that of the idea to what it is an idea of. I was already conceived; (Proverbs 8:24. RSV: when there were no depths I was brought forth, when there were no springs abounding with water.) he is said to have been conceived because he is contained in the unity of the essence of the Father. I was brought forth, (Proverbs 8:25.) insofar as he went forth from the Father through the distinction of persons.

By the hinges upon which the earth would rest (Proverbs 8:27.) is meant the extremities of the earth, according to Isidore, (Isidore of Seville, The Etymologies, bk. 3, ch. 38 (PL 82:172).) or the causes on which the lands and the things on the lands, as it were, turn and are conserved. And delighting, as a companion of the paternal glory, in each day, (Proverbs 8:30‒31; RSV: I was daily his delight, rejoicing before him always, rejoicing in his inhabited world and delighting in the sons of men.) insofar as the accounts of created things within God are light, although created things in themselves are shadows, as I played, on account of the leisure of wisdom’s contemplation. (Sent. I, 2.4(7).8, quoting Proverbs 8:30.) For just as the activities of play are not desired for the sake of something else, but possess their delight within their very selves, so too is the contemplation of wisdom.

Truth can be known ‘in the midst of two animals.’ (Sent. I, 2.5(8).1.) This is taken from Habakkuk 3:2, according to a different text. (As Aquinas notes, there is more than one version of this verse. RSV: in the midst of the years.) And by the two animals are signified the two Testaments.

‘With tongs’ can be taken ‘from the altar the coal’ with which the mouths of the faithful may be touched. (Sent. I, 2.5(8).1, quoting Isaiah 6:6.) This is said based on Isaiah 6, and by tongs, which have two arms, the two Testaments are signified, and by the coal is signified the truth of Sacred Scripture. Whence Psalm 119 [118]:140 says, your eloquence was burned vehemently. (RSV: thy promise is well tried.)