D. 15 - Sending of the Holy Spirit
Division of the first part of the text
Having shown that the Holy Spirit proceeds temporally and is given by the Father and the Son, here he inquires whether he is also given or sent by his very self. (The preposition ab, which is here (and in most instances) translated as “by,” might also be translated as “from.” “By” suggests an agent, whereas “from” suggests a location or point of origin (not necessarily an agent) and a departure from that origin. Because of the ambiguity of the Latin word, on occasion “from” is preferred to fit the sense better; see, for example, a. 1, obj. 2.) And this is divided into two parts: in the first he shows that the Holy Spirit is given and sent by his very self; in the second, he brings in a likeness with the sending of the Son, at but do not find it strange that the Holy Spirit is said to be sent or proceed from himself. (Sent. I, 15.1(48).4.)
However, in the first part, he shows in two ways that the Holy Spirit is given by himself, based on the authority of Augustine, and through two arguments. One of these is that whatever the Father and the Son are capable of, the Holy Spirit is capable of. But the Father and the Son can give the Holy Spirit. Therefore and so on. The other argument is that whatever the Father and the Son bring about, the Holy Spirit brings about, and so on like before. And these arguments have their efficacy on account of the effect connotated in the sending and giving of the Holy Spirit on the side of the creature. For action and power, relative to the creature, is common to all three persons.
But do not find it strange that the Holy Spirit is said to be sent or to proceed from himself. (Sent. I, 15.1(48).4.) Here he brings in the sending of the Son to make known the sending of the Holy Spirit. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he considers the sending of the Son in common; in the second, the same as regards its specific modes, at here it is asked whether the Son was sent only once, or is he sent often. (Sent. I, 15.6(53).1.)
The first is divided into two: in the first, he presents a question about the double sending of the Son, that is, how it is understood and from whom is he sent; in the second, he answers it, at and so we must investigate how the sending of the Son and of the Holy Spirit is to be understood. (Sent. I, 15.2(49).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 2, ch. 5 (CCSL 50; PL 42:848).)
And this latter is divided into two: in the first, he resolves this as regards the mode of the sending; in the second, he does so as regards the principle of the sending, at and the fact that the Son was sent by the Holy Spirit is confirmed by authoritative texts. (Sent. I, 15.3(50).1.)
And this latter is divided into two: in the first, he shows that the Son is sent not only by the Father, but also by the Holy Spirit; in the second, he shows that he is sent by his very self, at then he shows that the Son is given also by himself. (Sent. I, 15.4(51).1.)
And this latter is divided into two: in the first, he shows that the Son is given by his very self; in the second, he shows that the Son is sent by his very self, at Augustine . . . affirms that the Son is sent by himself. (Sent. I, 15.4(51).2.)
And about this latter he does three things. In the first, he shows the truth; in the second, he concludes his intention, at from the above, it is plainly shown that the Son was sent from the Father, the Holy Spirit, and his own self; (Sent. I, 15.4(51).3.) in the third, he eliminates an objection, at but an objection is made to this: if the Son is sent from himself, why then does he say: ‘I did not come from myself?’ (Sent. I, 15.5(52).1, citing John 7:28 and 8:42.)
In order to understand this part, three things are asked about:
first, about sending in itself; (Q. 1.)
second, about it on the side of the one sent; (Q. 2.)
third, about the same on the side of the one sending. (Q. 3.)
Question 1
The sending in itself
About the first, two things are asked:
first, whether sending or giving befit the divine persons;
second, what it signifies, the essence or a notion.
Article 1
Whether sending befits the divine persons
To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.43.1; SCG IV.23; On the Catholic Faith of the Greek Fathers (Contra errores Graecorum), pt. 1, ch. 14.) It seems that sending (Missio is usually translated by its cognate, “mission.” While this is helpful and resonant with contemporary uses of the word, “sending” is a more literal translation and fits better with its parallel “giving” (datio).) does not befit the divine persons.
Obj. 1: For sending appears to signify a certain change of place, insofar as we speak of messengers being sent to some place. But no change of place befits the divine persons, who are everywhere. Therefore neither does sending.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, commenting on Ezekiel 16:53, I will restore their fortunes, both the fortunes of Sodom and her daughters, and the fortunes of Samaria and her daughters, Jerome says, what has been joined and connected in one body cannot be sent away. (Jerome, Commentarii in Ezechielem, bk. 5, ch. 16 (CCSL 75; PL 25:157).) But one person is joined to another person by a union greater than any bodily connection. Therefore one person cannot be sent from another.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, nothing pertaining to inferiority can be said of one person relative to another, since there are no gradations in the Trinity; this is why Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 14 (PG 94:1042).) that Christ is obedient to the Father only insofar as he is a man. Now, sending and giving seem to bring in a certain inferiority in the one sent and given. Therefore neither can befit a divine person.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, it is certain that a divine person is of infinitely greater dignity than any angel. But the higher angels, who stand at God’s side, according to Dionysius (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 13, para. 2 (PG 3:299).) are not sent to us, on account of their dignity. Therefore much less are divine persons sent.
On the contrary, there are many authorities in the canon of Scripture, and in the writings of the saints, as are noted in the text. (Sent. I, 15.)
I answer that “sending” or “giving,” by reason of their signification, signify the going forth of something as sent by someone, as from a sender, and to some terminus. Now, among created things this going forth is in reference to a bodily distance of what is sent from its sender. And in relation to its terminus it asserts, in what is sent, an existence where it did not exist before. However, every imperfection should be removed from things that enter into divine predication. Therefore “sending” in the divine is understood not according to a spatial going forth pertaining to location, nor according to any newness belonging to the one sent, such that he is where he before was not. Rather, it should be understood according to a going forth of origination from something, as from a principle, and according to a newness belonging to the one to whom the sending occurs, such that in a new way the person sent is said to be in him.
From this it is clear that sending differs in its account from procession and giving. For “procession” as procession signifies a real distinction and reference to a principle from which one proceeds, and not to any terminus. However, “giving” does not indicate the distinction of what is given from the principle by which it is given, since the same thing can give its very self; rather, it indicates only a distinction from that to which it is given, as was said. (Above, d. 14, q. 2, a. 1.) But “sending” asserts a distinction in the one sent with respect to both its principle and terminus. And therefore when it is said, “the Holy Spirit is sent,” included in the signification of “sending” is each reference, that is, the temporal and the eternal—the eternal insofar as he proceeds from the Father and the Son, and the temporal insofar as he is signified in an orientation to the creature, which in a new way is orientated to him himself.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the Holy Spirit, who is everywhere, cannot be where he was not, if this is understood as a change of place in him, nonetheless he can be in a certain way in which before he was not, with the change being made in that in which he is said to be. And in this the account of sending is preserved.
Reply Obj. 2: Jerome’s gloss is understood of the sending of a creature, which occurs through a change of place, which can occur only in what is locally separated. However, for the divine sending the distinction of the persons in the unity of essence suffices.
Reply Obj. 3: Obedience is properly in reference to a command, which properly pertains to lordship. Whence it is clear that obedience brings in a gradation of dignity. This is why it cannot be said of the person of the Son or of the Holy Spirit according to their divinity. However, “to send” asserts not a gradation of dignity but the authority of a principle in the one with reference to the other who goes forth from it. And such an order is present in the divine persons.
Reply Obj. 4: “Sending” is not said of an angel and of a divine person in the same way. For the sent angel moves in location, since he is where before he was not, since when they are in the heavens, they are not on the earth. Whence such a sending asserts a certain gradation of less dignity or inferiority as regards the one sent. However, this is not so for the sending of a divine person, from which change of place is wholly excluded. And furthermore, that effect for the sake of which the sending of the divine person occurs is also immediately from that person—that is, the grace rendering him favored, as has been said. (Above, d. 14, q. 2, a. 2.) However, the effect of the higher angels is accomplished in us by the mediation of the lower angels, according to Dionysius. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 13, para. 3 (PG 3:299).) And therefore the higher angels are not themselves said to be sent to us, but only the lower ones, who immediately act on us; likewise, neither is the sending of a divine person according to those perfections that a creature receives from God done by the mediating agency of anything created.
Article 2
Whether “sending” signifies a notion
To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that “sending” signifies a notion.
Obj. 1: For in a homily Bede says (Venerable Bede, Homiliae, bk. 2, hom. 10, “In dominica post Ascensionem Domini” (PL 94:181).) that the sending of the Holy Spirit is his procession. But “procession” is notional. Therefore so is “sending.”
Obj. 2: Furthermore, whatever indicates origin in the divine is notional, since the divine essence is not originated, nor does it originate a person. Now, “sending,” as was said in the previous article, implies a going forth of origin from another as from a principle. Therefore it is notional.
On the contrary (3), according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 2, para. 1 (PG 3:635).) every name connoting any effect in the created, when said of God, pertains to the community of the essence. But “sending” indicates an effect in the created, as was said. Therefore it signifies the essence.
Furthermore (4), there is no personal notion common to the Son and the Holy Spirit. But “sending” is common to them, for each of them is recorded as having been sent, as is said in the text. (Sent. I, 15, but especially 1(48).4 and 3(50).1, quoting John 14:26, 16:7, and Galatians 4:4.) Therefore sending does not signify any notion.
I answer that in the divine there are certain names that signify only a person, like “Father” and “Son”; others that signify only the essence, like the name “essence”; and others that signify both, as has been said about the power of generating and spirating. (Above, d. 7, q. 1, a. 1.) And thus I say that “sending” is both essential and notional, but in different ways. For according to the reference that “sending” indicates toward its principle, it is notional, but according to the reference that it indicates toward its effect in the creature, it is essential.
But there are two opinions about this. For some say that it principally signifies the notion, and consequently the essence, according to the effect connoted. Others say the opposite. And this latter seems more true to me, when one considers the force of the words. For “sending,” according to the account of its name, does not speak of a going forth from someone as from a principle wherefrom the sending has its existence; rather, the authority of someone over the one sent is asserted only in its order to the effect of the sending. For a servant who is sent by a lord does not go out from him according to his existence, but as from a principle moving him by a command to this action. But because in the divine persons the authority over the one sent can only be according to the origin of being, therefore in a consequent way the relation of origin is indicated in “sending,” according to which “sending” is notional. And the order to the effect of the mission is principally indicated, according to which the word is essential.
But in the temporal procession the converse is the case. For “procession,” according to its notion, insofar as it is taken in the divine, speaks of a going forth from an originating principle; it does not speak of the order to the effect except in a consequent way, that is, with respect to the mode of the procession, as was said in the previous article. Therefore the temporal procession appears to be notional, and to signify the essence in a consequent way, by reason of the connoted effect. However, “giving” approaches even closer to the essence than does “sending,” as is clear from things said.
Reply Obj. 1–2, Sed Contra 3: The solution to the first three arguments is clear.
Reply Sed Contra 4: A notion can signify in the divine in two ways: either properly, as do “paternity” and “innascibility,” or commonly, as do “to be from another” and “that from which another is.” And the notion is signified in “sending” in this latter way. And therefore it is common to the two persons who are from another.
Question 2
The one being sent
Article 1
Whether being sent belongs to all the persons
Next, it is asked to whom “being sent” belongs. And it seems like it belongs to the entire Trinity.
Obj. 1: For, as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 2 (PG 94:791).) in the divine all things are one, outside of non-generation, generation, and procession. But sending is not one of these. Therefore it seems like it belongs to the entire Trinity.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the sending of the divine person is understood in reference to the fact that the person himself is manifested through the sending. Whence, Augustine says (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 20 (CCSL 50; PL 42:906).) that to have been sent is to be known to be from another. But the effect in the creature that comes through the sending manifests the entire Trinity as an effect manifests its cause. Therefore it seems that the entire Trinity is sent.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as the gifts appropriated to the Son and the Holy Spirit are communicable to the creature, namely wisdom and goodness, so it is with the gifts appropriated to the Father, namely power. But the Holy Spirit and the Son are said to be sent by reason of the gifts appropriated to them. Therefore for the same reason, so is the Father.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, wherever the Son or the Holy Spirit is, so is the Father. But the Holy Spirit or the Son are said to have been sent because in a new way they exist in a certain creature. Therefore it seems that at the same time the Father is sent with them, and thus, being sent belongs to the entire Trinity.
On the contrary (5), it seems that the Son alone is sent. For, just as Augustine says, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 20 (CCSL 50; PL 42:906).) to have been sent is to be known as from another. But knowledge is appropriated to the Son, who is the Word and the wisdom of the Father. Therefore only the Son appears to have been sent.
Furthermore (6), it seems that only the Holy Spirit is sent. For all spiritual gifts pertain to the manifestation of the Spirit, as is said in 1 Corinthians 12:7: to each is given the manifestation of the Spirit for the common good. But a divine person is manifested through a sending. Therefore it seems that only the Spirit is sent in all the gifts.
I answer that, as has been said, (Above, q. 1, a. 1.) in every sending there must be posited a certain authority of someone over the one who is sent. Now, in the divine persons the only authority is according to origin, and therefore to no divine person does being sent belong except to one who is from another, in reference to which authority can be designated in that other. And therefore the Holy Spirit and the Son are said to have been sent, but not the Father or the Trinity itself.
Reply Obj. 1: In “sending” is included implicitly the idea of procession and generation with respect to what is common in them—that is, being from another. However, this is not with respect to the proper account of generation or procession.
Reply Obj. 2: In sending there is not only the effect of the created gift bestowed on the creature, but there is also asserted, as was said in the body of the article, the authority of some principle relative to the very one sent. This is why, in the sending of a person, the person is known to be from another, according to Augustine. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 20 (CCSL 50; PL 42:906).) And because this does not befit the entire Trinity, nor the Father himself, neither the Father nor the Trinity can be said to have been sent. And furthermore, that effect is appropriated more to one person than to another, according to which one person is said to have been sent and not another.
Reply Obj. 3: Power, which is appropriated to the Father, does not have an account that indicates a return to the end. Rather, it pertains more to an exit from a principle, for “power” signifies the account of a principle. And therefore it does not pertain to sending, which occurs for the sake of calling the rational creature back to God. And furthermore, the Father, in whom is the first authority, cannot be designated as sent, since no one has authority over him.
Reply Obj. 4: Since the Father is in the Son, and the Son in the Father, and both are in the Holy Spirit, thus when the Son is sent, at the same time the Father and the Holy Spirit also come. This is the case whether this is understood about the Son’s coming in the flesh, since he himself says, it is not I alone that judge, but I and he who sent me (John 8:16), or about his coming into the mind, when he himself says, we will come to him and make our home with him (John 14:23). And therefore that coming or indwelling belongs to the entire Trinity, and this is said only by reason of the effect joining one to the Trinity itself; although that effect, by reason of appropriation, can lead one more to one person than to another. But “sending” adds, over and above this, the authority of someone in reference to whom the person is called “sent.” And therefore it can be fitting only to a person who is from another principle.
Reply Sed Contra 5: Although knowledge is appropriated to the Son, nonetheless that gift from which the experiential knowledge is drawn, which latter is necessary for sending, is not necessarily appropriated to the Son. Rather, sometimes it is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, as love.
Reply Sed Contra 6: In a gift there are two things to consider: the idea of a gift, and in this way every gift manifests the Holy Spirit, insofar as he has the account of the first gift, as he is love; or one can consider it according to the species of the gift, and in this way a certain gift manifests the Son himself, such as wisdom or knowledge.
Question 3
The one sending
Next, one asks about the sending in its relation to the one sending him. And about this two things are asked:
first, whether it befits any person that he send himself, or proceed from himself, or give himself;
second, whether the Son is sent by the Holy Spirit.
Article 1
Whether a person sends or gives himself
To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that no person gives himself or sends himself.
Obj. 1: For the one giving always seems to have authority over what is given. But no person has authority over his very self. Therefore it seems that no person gives himself.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, above the Master said (Sent. I, 14.3(47).3.) that men cannot give the Holy Spirit, since he does not proceed from them. But no person proceeds from his very self; otherwise he would be a principle of his very self. Therefore no person can give his very self.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, as has been said, (Above, q. 1, a. 2.) “sending” asserts a going forth of one sent from a sender. But to no person does it belong that he goes forth from himself. Therefore, to send himself belongs to no person.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, as was said, “procession” principally indicates the reference of a person to the principle from whom he is distinguished. But no divine person is distinguished from his very self. Therefore neither does he proceed from himself.
Obj. 5: Furthermore, this preposition “from” indicates the orientation of a principle. But nothing is the principle of its very self. Therefore, even if it be granted that a certain person sends himself, it should not be granted that he is sent from himself.
On the contrary, Augustine says, just as to be generated is to be the Son from the Father, so too for the Son to be known to be from the Father is for the Son to have been sent. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 20 (CCSL 50; PL 42:908).) But this knowledge can be caused by the Son. Therefore so too the sending of the Son can be from the Son.
Furthermore, this seems so from things said in the text. (Sent. I, 15.1(48).4.)
I answer that one must speak in diverse ways in this question, according to the difference between giving, sending, and procession, assigned earlier. (Above, q. 1, a. 1.) For if we take “giving,” from the account of giving there does not seem to be anything more than that what is freely given is possessed by the giver. However, this can occur in two ways: either as someone freely possesses his very self, or something that is in him, or as someone freely possesses his own possession, or that over which he has dominion, insofar as “to possess” is said in many ways. Whence it does not belong to the account of giving that any authority is asserted with respect to the very thing given—for out of love, someone can give even his very self to someone in friendship—unless the giving is specified according to a specific mode of possession, which is according to dominion, of which sort there is no such giving with respect to the divine.
And therefore the giving does not require any account of a principle with respect to the very thing given. Whence, to be given can befit the divine essence, insofar as we say that the Father gives his essence to the Son; and it can befit the Father, so that the Father is said to give his very self; and in the same way it can befit the Son and the Holy Spirit. Nor will any distinction of the giver as regards the gift be noted, except perhaps according to reason, as that of the intellect to what it understands. And thus we grant simply speaking that a person gives himself, and is given by himself.
But as regards “sending” there is great difficulty, to which the diversity of the opinions attests. For some say that all of the following statements are false: “the Holy Spirit sends himself” or “the Son sends himself.” And they say that the Master’s arguments are not valid, for, because “sending” includes a personal notion in itself, it is not necessary that the three persons share in common the power or activity of sending, just as neither do they share generation or the power of generation. And they also say that the Spirit’s sending is not like the sending in the flesh, according to which the Son is said to send his very self, since in that sending a created nature is assumed into a unity of the divine person, which does not happen in the other sendings. And if one finds an authority that says the Holy Spirit sends himself, it should be glossed as meaning that the effect is from the Holy Spirit, in which gift he is known as being from another.
But because the saints commonly use these ways of speaking, and especially Augustine and the Master concede this, therefore others have said that “sending” is sometimes taken properly, and sometimes improperly. When “sending” is taken properly, it indicates a distinction of the one sent from the one from whom the sending occurs. And therefore in this way it cannot be said that the Holy Spirit “sends himself.” However, “sending” is commonly and improperly taken for influence or giving, and in this way they say the Holy Spirit does send himself, since he gives himself, or because he breathes himself forth. And this is the opinion of Prevostin and William of Auxerre. (See William of Auxerre, Summa aurea, bk. 1, ch. 7. William of Auxerre (1140/50–1231 AD) taught at the University of Paris and was a student of Gilbert Prevostin of Cremona (Praepositinus), himself a student of Peter Comestor, who was taught by Peter Lombard himself.)
And because this opinion seems to draw back only a little from the first, therefore others have said that the Holy Spirit is properly said to send himself. And if the full force of the name is attended to, it seems one should agree with this. For “sending” (Above, q. 1, a. 1.) brings in two things: the one sent being from another, by reason of the authority that it indicates, and also the effect, according to which in a new way the Holy Spirit is said to be in some creature. Whence the meaning of “the Holy Spirit is sent” is that he is from someone, and comes to be in someone in a new way, yet without any change being made in him. (Above, q. 1, a. 1.)
However, one must note that an expression is true in different ways when something compound is being predicated of something according to existence, and when it is being predicated according to coming into existence. For when it is predicated according to existence, each of them must be said to be present. So if I say, “Socrates is a white man,” he must be a man, and he must be white—that is, unless one of them diminishes the account of the other, as when I say “dead man.” But when the compound is predicated according to coming into existence, it is enough that one of them be predicated in coming to be. So if I say, “Socrates has now become a white man,” it is enough for the truth of the statement that he has now become white, although he has not just now become a man.
Further, one should consider that when a composite is being predicated of something according to coming into existence, it stands in diverse ways in the doer and in the thing brought about. For on the side of what is done, each must be predicated according to existence, even if both are not predicated according to coming into existence. For example, if I say, “this one has become a white man,” he must be a man and be white, unless either of them is diminishing, whereas it is not necessary that he become a man, but it is enough that he become white. However, on the side of the doer (since the doer is referred to the thing brought about only insofar as it is brought about within himself) it is enough that the doer be said to bring about only one of them. So if I say, “the painter makes the wall white,” it is not necessary that he makes it be a wall and be white; rather, it is enough if he makes it only be white.
Therefore I say that “sending,” because it asserts that the one sent is in someone in a way that he was not before, and thus comes to be in that way, indicates a certain doing. I do not say it is a real doing, but one of reason only, which making is terminated at a relation of reason, not of reality, as when it is said that God has become our refuge. Therefore the meaning of “the Holy Spirit has been sent” is that a being from another has come to be existing in a creature through grace. Whence for one to be called “sent” he must both be from another and come to be in someone according to a new relationship. On account of this, the Father cannot be called “sent,” since he is not from anyone. However, if we take it on the side of the one doing the sending, then to send the Holy Spirit is nothing other than to make the Holy Spirit, being from another, be in someone according to the new relation. And therefore to whichever person it belongs to bring about either of these—that is, that he be in someone according to a new relation—he will be said to send the Holy Spirit, but not that he is the principle of the Holy Spirit insofar as he is from another. And because the entire Trinity makes the Holy Spirit be in someone according to the new relation, on account of the bestowed gift of the entire Trinity, therefore the entire Trinity is said to send the Holy Spirit; and he himself sends his very self, and he himself is sent by himself in the same sense.
Moreover, if we are speaking about procession, “the Holy Spirit proceeding from himself” will have less of what is proper, and will be said less properly, than “the Holy Spirit being sent from himself.” Nonetheless, because the temporal procession, as has been said, asserts a new relation to the creature to whom he proceeds, and all newness pertains to some making, therefore according to the temporal procession of the Holy Spirit, being from another is also existing in a new way in someone. And in this way, under the same sense it is granted that the Holy Spirit proceeds from himself temporally.
Reply Obj. 1: It does not belong to the account of giving that any authority is asserted to be present in reference to what is given, except when something is given that is possessed with dominion. And such a giving is not found in the divine, as was said in the body of the article.
Reply Obj. 2: Men bring about neither of these things that are indicated in the sending of the Holy Spirit, since they neither bestow grace nor does the Holy Spirit proceed from them. And therefore in no way can man send the Holy Spirit.
Reply Obj. 3: Sending asserts not only going forth, but along with this-something else: being in the creature according to a new relation. And although according to the first, the going forth, it is not referred to itself as to a principle, still according to both the compound is referred to itself as to a principle. For he himself makes himself, being from another, exist according to a new relation in someone, by reason of the perfection that he confers on him.
Reply Obj. 4: Although procession brings in only a reference to the person from which he has being, still the temporal procession, as was said, brings in reference to the creature to whom he proceeds. And for this reason he is said to proceed temporally from himself, just as he is said to be sent by himself.
Reply Obj. 5: The Holy Spirit himself, although he is not his own principle simply speaking, still he himself makes himself, being from another, be in someone according to a new relation; and in reference to this, the whole compound is referred to himself as to a principle by reason of the other aspect only, as is clear from things said before in this article.
Article 2
Whether the Holy Spirit sends or gives the Son
To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that the Holy Spirit does not give or send the Son.
Obj. 1: For Augustine says (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 2, ch. 5 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:849).) that the Son’s going forth from the Father and coming into the world is the Son’s being sent by the Father. But the Son does not go forth from the Holy Spirit. Therefore he is not sent by him.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as the Son stands to the Father, so does the Holy Spirit to the Son. But the Son in no way sends the Father. Therefore neither does the Holy Spirit send the Son.
On the contrary, Isaiah 48:16 says, now the Lord God has sent me, and his Spirit; and a Gloss interprets this as about the Son. (Glossa interlinearis, at Isaiah 48:16 (in Glossa ordinaria 4.399–400); cf. Augustine, Against Maximinus, bk. 2, ch. 20, para. 4 (PL 42:790).) Therefore he is sent by the Father and the Holy Spirit.
Furthermore, Ambrose says of the Holy Spirit, the Son is given by the Father, as Isaiah 9:6 says, ‘To us a son is given.’ He is also given (I dare to say) by the Holy Spirit, since he is sent by the Holy Spirit. (Ambrose, On the Holy Spirit, bk. 3, ch. 2, para. 9 (CSEL 79:153; PL 16:811).) Therefore and so on.
I answer that some distinguish a triple sending of the Son: one by which he is sent in the flesh; another by which he is sent in the mind; and a third by which he is sent to preach. And with respect to this last sending they say the Son is sent by the Holy Spirit, but not with respect to the first two, but only by the Father.
The reason for this is that, according to them, the sending for the sake of preaching can belong to Christ by reason of his human nature (which assumes the assumption of the latter); on the other hand, the first two sendings are referred to the very person of the Son. For the sending into the flesh belongs to the person himself according to himself, and not by reason of the human nature, whose assumption follows on the sending according to its idea, as an effect follows on its cause and a terminus follows a motion. Likewise he is not sent into the mind by reason of his human nature. And because the Holy Spirit does not have authority with respect to the person of the Son, but only with respect to his assumed nature, this is why they grant that the third sending of the Son is by the Holy Spirit, but not the first two.
But because, as was said, (Above, q. 1, a. 2.) it is not necessarily required that in the sending there be authority over the one sent, but only efficiency with respect to him, according to which the one sent is said to have been sent, therefore we concede that the Holy Spirit and the entire Trinity sent the Son with respect to every sending. And this is especially so since Augustine expressly says he is sent by the Holy Spirit. Speaking of his sending in the flesh, he says, he was not able to be sent by the Father without the Holy Spirit; for the Father is understood to have sent him when he made him from the woman, which he assuredly did not do without the Holy Spirit. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 2, ch. 5 (CCSL 50; PL 42:849).)
Reply Obj. 1: When the Father is said to send the Son, in the sending is understood authority relative to the one sent not insofar as he is the sender, but insofar as he is the Father. And therefore the Son’s being sent by the Father is his going forth from the Father. However, authority is not shown in the sender when the Son is said to send his very self, or when the Holy Spirit sends him. And therefore the Son’s being sent by himself or by the Holy Spirit is not his going forth from himself or from the Holy Spirit.
Reply Obj. 2: The Son cannot send the Father, because the Father cannot be sent, since he is not from another. If he were from another, he could be sent and the Son would send him.
Exposition of the first part of the text
For if the Holy Spirit cannot give himself, and the Father and the Son can give him, then the Father and Son can do something which the Holy Spirit cannot do. (Sent. I, 15.1(48).3.) Here the Master presents two arguments to show that the Holy Spirit gives himself: the first is drawn from the side of the power, the second from the side of the action—each of which is common to the three persons. But it seems that they are not valid, since we say that the Father can generate and does generate the Son, but the Son cannot and does not generate. Yet neither does any division of power or action follow, and it seems the same in the proposed matter.
But to this, one should say that, if to give and proceed temporally were only in reference to the relation of origin, the arguments would not be valid, just as they would not be as regards generation. But because this includes also efficient causality relative to certain effects in the creature, which effects are commonly from the entire Trinity, therefore the arguments conclude with necessity.
Division of the second part of the text
Here it is asked whether the Son was sent only once, or is he sent often. (Sent. I, 15.6(53).1.) Here he considers the sending of the Son in its specific modes. And it is divided into two parts: in the first, he determines the truth; in the second, he removes an objection, at here it is asked why the Father is not said to be sent like the Son, when he is known by someone in time. (Sent. I, 15.9(56).1.)
The first is divided into two: in the first, he distinguishes two modes of the Son’s sending; in the second, he designates their difference, at note that two ways of the Son’s being sent have been distinguished. (Sent. I, 15.8(53).1.)
The first is divided into two: in the first, he presents the question; in the second, he presents the solution, at with regard to this, we say that the Son is said to be sent in two ways. (Sent. I, 15.7(54).1.)
Note that two ways of the Son’s being sent have been distinguished. (Sent. I, 15.8(55).1.) Here he designates the difference between the two assigned modes. And it is divided into two parts, according to the two differences that he assigns; the second is at moreover, it is to be noted. (Sent. I, 15.8(55).2.)
Here it is asked why the Father is not said to be sent like the Son, when he is known by someone in time. (Sent. I, 15.9(56).1.) Here he excludes the objection. And as regards this he does three things: first, he presents the objection; second, he lays out its solution, at to which we say that in him is the authority of the beginning; (Sent. I, 15.9(56).1.) third, based on the solution, he disproves the error some make, which he first presents, at therefore some heretics have held that . . . the Father is greater and the Son and the Holy Spirit lesser, (Sent. I, 15.10(57).1.) and then disproves, at Augustine reproves this. (Sent. I, 15.10(57).1.)
To understand this part, one asks about two things:
first, about the Son’s invisible sending according to itself (for we will speak about his visible sending in Book III); (Q. 4.)
and second, about his sending in its relation to those to whom he is sent. (Q. 5.)
Question 4
The invisible sending of the Son
As regards the first, three things are asked:
first, whether an invisible sending befits the Son;
second, whether it occurs distinctly from the invisible sending of the Holy Spirit;
third, whether such a sending is eternal, just as his procession is eternal and temporal.
Article 1
Whether the Son is sent invisibly into the mind
To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that the Son is not invisibly sent into our minds.
Obj. 1: For the sending of a divine person requires that the very person coming forth be known—and especially in the sending of wisdom, at whose possession no one is ignorant. But with the coming of the Son his coming was not known: if he were to come to me, I will not understand; I will not see him, if he were to leave (Job 9:11). (RSV: lo, he passes by me, and I see him not; he moves on, but I do not perceive him.) Therefore it seems that the Son is not sent into the mind.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the sending is the same thing as the temporal procession, as was said. (Above, q. 1, a. 1.) But, as we have also said there, (Above, q. 1, a. 1.) a procession can be called temporal only according to a reference to that-into-which the procession occurs; and the Holy Spirit’s procession has this reference from his very mode of procession, insofar as he proceeds as love. Therefore, since the Son’s procession does not have, from its mode, a reference to that-into-which, but only a reference to that-from-which, it seems that a temporal procession does not befit the Son, and therefore neither a sending.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, a divine person is sent only in the gift of grace that renders one favored. But the gifts pertaining to the intellect that are appropriated to the Son are not ones that render one favored, since they are common to both the good and the evil; this is said in 1 Corinthians 13:2: if I have prophetic powers, and understand all mysteries and all knowledge, and if I have all faith, . . . but have not love, I am nothing. Therefore the Son is not said to have been sent invisibly in the gifts appropriated to him, and therefore he is not sent invisibly at all.
On the contrary, there is what is stated in Wisdom 9:10: send her, that is, wisdom, forth from the holy heavens, that is, your heavens, and from the throne of thy glory. Now, this is not speaking of wisdom taken essentially, because she is not sent, since she is not from another. Therefore it is speaking of begotten wisdom, who is the Son.
Furthermore, Augustine says, just as the Son’s being begotten is his being from the Father, so too the Son’s being sent is it being known that he is from the Father. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 20 (CCSL 50; PL 42:908).) Now, the former holds, and therefore the Son is also sent.
I answer that, just as in the coming forth of things from their principle the divine goodness is said “to proceed” into created things, insofar as that goodness is represented in the created thing through a likeness of the divine goodness received within it, so too in the leading back of the rational creature into God is understood the procession of the divine person, which is also called his “sending”; this latter happens insofar as the proper relation of the divine person himself is represented in the soul through a certain received likeness, which likeness is modeled on and takes its origin from the very property of the eternal relation. This is insofar as the proper mode by which the Holy Spirit is referred to the Father is love, and the proper mode of the Son’s being referred to the Father is because he is the Father’s Word making him manifest.
Whence, just as the Holy Spirit invisibly proceeds into the mind through the gift of love, so too does the Son through the gift of wisdom, in which is the manifestation of the Father himself, who is the last one to whom we hasten. And because according to the reception of these two gifts a likeness to the properties of these persons is brought about within us, therefore the divine persons are said to be in us according to a new mode of existing, insofar as a reality is in its likeness, according to which we become like them in a new way. And according to this, each procession is called a “sending.”
Moreover, just as the aforesaid gifts originate from their proper persons, so too they do not attain their effect, such that they are joined to the end, except by the power of the divine persons. For the power of the impressing agent is in the form impressed by the agent. Whence in the reception of such gifts the divine persons are possessed in a new way, as things leading us to the end and joining us to it. And therefore also each procession is called a “giving,” insofar as a new mode of possessing is there.
Reply Obj. 1: The account of sending does not require that there be any actual knowledge of the person himself, but only habitual knowledge, insofar as in the gift bestowed, which is a habit, what is proper to the divine person is represented, as in a likeness of him. And this is how it is said that what is sent is known as being from another, through the mode of a representation. This is just as something is said to manifest itself or to cause knowledge of itself, insofar as it represents itself in its likeness. But nonetheless my having the actual gift, wherein the divine person is given, I cannot know actually with certitude, on account of the likeness of natural acts with meritorious acts, although I can conjecture based on certain signs, unless this certitude arise through revelation. This is why Job says, if he were to come to me, I will not see him; if he were to leave, I will not understand (Job 9:11). For grace making one favored, wherein is the arrival of the divine person, cannot be known with certitude. However, the very gift received is, in itself, sufficiently able to lead one to knowledge of the arrival of the person.
Reply Obj. 2: The property of the Holy Spirit, which is love, can have reference to the creature in two ways: either insofar as it is his object, or insofar as the account of an exemplar principle is related to what is derived and modeled on it. But the property of the Son can have only one of the stated relations, that is, the relation according to the account of a principle. And this is enough for the temporal procession of the Son, although one can consider the temporal reference in the procession of the Holy Spirit according to many things. And so too sending can befit each of them.
Reply Obj. 3: When something is participated in not according to its perfect act, but according to some mode, it is not properly said to be “possessed.” For example, animals possess a certain mode of prudence, yet they are not said to have prudence, since they do not have the act of reason that is properly the act of prudence, namely, choice itself. Whence they more possess a certain likeness of prudence than prudence itself. However, we see two grades in knowledge: the first, according to which intellectual knowledge tends into one thing; and second, insofar as it receives the true as fitting and good. And unless there is a certain resistance, from such knowledge follow love and delight, since, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.12, 1153a12‒15.) delight follows on unimpeded completed action. This is why contemplative happiness is when someone reaches the ultimate activity of the intellect and exercises it without impediment.
However, it is certain that in the procession of the eternal Word there is perfect knowledge in every way, and therefore from such awareness love proceeds. This is why Augustine says, the Word that we intend to make known is awareness with love. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 9, ch. 10 (CCSL 50; PL 42:969).) Therefore whenever knowledge is possessed from which gratuitous love does not follow, the likeness of the Word is not possessed, but only something of him. Rather, the likeness of the Word is had only when one possesses such knowledge from which love proceeds, which latter joins him to the very one known according to an account of fittingness. And therefore one has the Son dwelling within himself only if he receives this knowledge. However, this cannot occur without the grace that renders one favored. Whence it is certain that, simply and properly speaking, the Son is neither given nor sent unless in the gift of grace rendering one favored. But in the other gifts that pertain to knowledge, something of the likeness of the Word is participated in.
Article 2
Whether the sending of the Son is distinct from the sending of the Holy Spirit
To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that the sending of the Son is distinct from the sending of Holy Spirit.
Obj. 1: For the sending is the temporal procession, as the Master said above. (Sent. I, 14.1(45).2.) But the account of the Son’s procession is different from the account of the Holy Spirit’s procession, since the Holy Spirit proceeds as love, and the Son as a word. Therefore the account of their sending is also different.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything that belongs to things according to priority and posteriority does not belong to them according to the same account. But because he has the account of first gift, giving belongs to the Holy Spirit with priority rather than to the Son. Therefore the account of giving is different in them. Therefore so is the account of sending, since sending is the giving itself.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the gifts wherein the Son and the Holy Spirit are given are diverse and not dependent on each other. But with things that are not dependent on each other, the one can be without the other. Therefore the sending of the Son can occur without the sending of the Holy Spirit, and vice versa. And thus, they are distinct even according to the time of the sending.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, we see with our senses that some simple folk are fervent in the divine love who are nonetheless rather dimwitted in knowledge of divine wisdom, and vice versa. Therefore, since the sending of the Son is according to the gift of wisdom, and the sending of the Holy Spirit is according to the gift of love, it seems that one sending can occur without the other.
On the contrary, the sending of the Holy Spirit is for the sake of sanctifying the creature, as the Master said above. (Sent. I, 14.1(45).1.) Therefore if the sending of the Son that also occurs in the grace that renders one favored, which sanctifies, were other than the sending of the Holy Spirit, there would be two sendings for the sanctification of the rational creature—and then one of them would be superfluous. And such is not found in divine actions. Therefore the one sending is not distinct from the other.
I answer that one can speak in three ways about the distinction between the sending of the Son and that of the Holy Spirit: either with reference to the real diversity of them themselves, or with reference to the account of sending, or with reference to the separation of the sendings.
If one is speaking in the first way, two things are considered in the sending: the going forth of the person sent from the other, and the effect according to which the divine person is said to be in the creature in a new way. And in both ways the sending of the Son is other than the sending of the Holy Spirit according to reality. For the generation by which the Son goes forth from the Father is other than the procession by which the Holy Spirit goes forth from each of them. Likewise, the gift that perfects the intellect, that is, wisdom, which the sending of the Son attends to, is other than the gift that perfects the affect or will, which the sending of the Holy Spirit attends to.
But if we speak about their distinction in the second way, this can be done in two ways: either according to the proper account of each, or according to their common account. If we do so according to the common account, then the account of the sending of the Son and that of the Holy Spirit is the same, since being from another is also common to them, as is being in the creature in a new way. But the account differs according to each proper account of sending, for the proper account of the Son’s procession is not the proper account of the Holy Spirit’s procession, as the latter proceeds as love, and the former as son or word. Likewise, the proper mode by which the Son is said to be in the creature is not the proper mode by which the Holy Spirit is, since the former is through wisdom, and the latter through love.
However, if we speak in the third way, then I say that one sending is never without the other. For love follows on knowledge, and perfected knowledge, according to which the sending of the Son occurs, always leads one into love. And therefore they are infused together and are augmented together.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the processions are other in reality, nonetheless they agree in something common as regards their account, which is to be from another.
Reply Obj. 2: As we have said before, in the divine there is no priority and posteriority. Nonetheless the going forth of the Holy Spirit presupposes the going forth of the Son, according to the order of nature. And on that side, if it is licit to speak this way, we can say that the sending of the Son, on the side of the going forth it indicates, is prior to the sending of the Holy Spirit. But this would be with respect to the proper account of each, and not with respect to the common account. However, if these two sendings be considered with respect to their effect in the creature, this is in two ways: either on the side of the one giving or sending them, or on the side of the very gifts wherein the sending occurs. If they are considered on the side of the gifts, then simply speaking knowledge naturally precedes love, and on that side the sending of the Son precedes that of the Holy Spirit. But this will be with respect to the consideration of the proper account and not of the common account, just as every species of motion equally agrees in the common account of motion, yet according to its proper being, local motion is prior to the other motions. However, if they be considered on the side of the giver, since the first mover and one inclining towards giving is love itself, thus the giving of the Holy Spirit is prior to the giving of the Son. But this is not in this way expressed in the account of sending.
Reply Obj. 3: The gifts wherein the Son and the Holy Spirit are sent follow upon each other with necessity, as was shown above in the body. And therefore that argument proceeds from false premises.
Reply Obj. 4: That knowledge from which love proceeds thrives in those fervent in divine love, by which they know the divine goodness insofar as it is the end, and inasmuch as it is abundantly pouring forth its benefits in them. And such knowledge they do not have perfectly who are not burning with love of him.
Reply Obj. 5: Each sending is ordered to the one ultimate end: to join us to God. But the effect of each sending is different according to the two powers that are found in the rational creature, by means of which it is joined to God: that is, the intellect and the affect. And neither of these is superfluous.
Article 3
Whether sending can be eternal
To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that sending can be eternal.
Obj. 1: For as Gregory says, (Gregory the Great, Homiliae in Evangelia, bk. 2, hom. 26, para. 2 (CCSL 141; PL 76:1198).) by this the Son is sent: by him being generated. But his generation is eternal. Therefore so is his sending.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as “sending” signifies a reference to that-from-which and to that-to-which, so does the procession of love, as was said. (Above, q. 1, a. 2.) But the procession of love is eternally from the Father to the Son. Therefore so too can the sending of the Holy Spirit be eternal.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as “sending” is spoken in reference to the creature, so is “gift.” But the gift of the Holy Spirit is said to be from eternity. Therefore so too its sending can be called “eternal.”
On the contrary, consider what Augustine says in the text: it is not by virtue of being born of the Father that the Son is said to be sent. (Sent. I, 15.7(54).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 20 (CCSL 50; PL 42:907).)
Furthermore, “sending” always asserts within someone a new mode of existing of the one sent. But nothing new is eternal. Therefore this is not eternal, but only temporal. And one should simply concede this. (No further respondeo is given in the text.)
Reply Obj. 1: Gregory’s words can be explained in three ways. In one way, he is speaking of the temporal generation of the Son himself, according to which he is said to be sent in the flesh. In a second way, such that the word “by this” (eo) is not adverbial, but of the ablative case, (Aquinas suggests that the eo, insofar as it is connected with verb mittitur (“sending”) may indicate a pure ablative of separation, such that it is as though the preposition ab (“from”) is present.) so that the meaning is “from him (ab eo) by whom he is generated he is also sent.” And this is true. In a third way, he can be understood as speaking not of the actual sending, but of its aptitude. For the Son is, if I might speak this way, “sendable” from the fact that he has come forth from the Father through his generation.
Reply Obj. 2: The procession of love, although it is directed into someone, nonetheless does not assert a new mode of existing in that one, and therefore it can be eternal. But “sending” does assert a newness of existing in someone, and therefore it cannot be eternal. And on account of this, although it can be granted in a certain way that the Holy Spirit proceeds as love from the Father to the Son from eternity, nonetheless it cannot be granted that he is sent by the Father to the Son from eternity.
Reply Obj. 3: “Sending” is verbal noun, so it indicates an actual relation to the creature. But “gift” is imposed from the aptitude for giving, and therefore it does not indicate an actual reference to the creature. On account of this, the Holy Spirit is called “the gift” from eternity, but not “sent,” just as he is not called “given” from eternity.
Question 5
The sending of the Son in relation to those to whom he is sent
Next, one asks about the sending of the Son in relation to those to whom he is sent. And three things are asked about this:
first, to whom is the Son or the Holy Spirit sent;
second, supposing that they are sent to all the saints, whether they are sent more fully after the Incarnation than before;
third, about the effect of an invisible sending, whether it makes those to whom he is sent be not in this world.
Article 1
Whether the sending is to non-rational created things; whether the Son or the Holy Spirit is said to be sent by reason of growth in grace; whether a sending of the Holy Spirit to the angels and the other blessed occurs; whether a sending to Christ can occur
Quaestiuncula 1
To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that his sending is even to non-rational created things.
Obj. 1: For the sending is for the sake of sanctifying what is created, as was said. (Above, d. 14, q. 2, a. 2.) But some non-rational created things are said to be sanctified, like a temple and a vessel. Therefore the sending is also to them.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, grace can be only in what sending is directed to. But grace is contained in the sacraments, and yet they are senseless creatures. Therefore the sending goes to them.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Son proceeds not only as the Word manifesting the Father through the mode of knowledge, but also as representing the Father according to a likeness of nature. But even all the senseless created things have a likeness with the generation of the Son, insofar as they proceed in a certain imitation of the divine nature, according to the participated attributes. For example, the rational creature participating in wisdom has a likeness with him insofar as he proceeds as a word. Therefore since by reason of this becoming like, the Son is said to be sent to the rational creatures insofar as he is the Word, for the same reason he should be said to be sent to the irrational ones insofar as he is the Son.
On the contrary (4), the sending of the divine person is only with respect to grace rendering one favored, as was said. Now, only rational creatures have the capacity for this. Therefore the sending is to them alone.
Quaestiuncula 2
Moreover, one asks whether the Son or the Holy Spirit is said to be sent to all the holy by reason of their growth in grace. And it seems not to be so.
Obj. 1: For “sending” indicates a new mode of the divine person’s existence in the creature. But God is not said to be in the holy through their growth in grace in a different way than before. Therefore the sending of a divine person does not happen to them.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the sending of a person occurs for the sake of calling back the rational creature, as the Master says. (Mandonnet notes that this assertion is not found expressly in the Master’s work, but it can be gathered from d. 17, para. 6.) But only those who go astray are called back. Therefore, since the holy are not astray, the sending is not made to them.
On the contrary, the Holy Spirit was sent to the apostles at Pentecost in a visible sending. But the visible sending demonstrates the invisible. Therefore he is also sent invisibly. But they had grace before this. Therefore it is said that the Son and the Holy Spirit are sent to them according to the increase of grace in the holy.
Quaestiuncula 3
Moreover, one asks whether a sending of the Holy Spirit to the angels and the other blessed occurs. It seems not.
Obj. 1: For sending is always with respect to some effect of grace in him to whom it is sent. But in the angels and the blessed who have reached the end of life no new grace is given, nor is it increased. Therefore no sending to them occurs.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, the messenger and the one to whom the sending is made are not the same. But in the sending of the Son and the Holy Spirit, the angels stand as messengers, since they protect and prompt us. Therefore it seems that no sending to them occurs, since then one would need to go to infinity.
On the contrary, it is said to be so in the text. (Sent. I, 15.8(55).1.)
Quaestiuncula 4
Moreover, one asks whether a sending to Christ insofar as he is a man can occur. And it seems not.
Obj. 1: For sending is always to what is distant. But the human nature in Christ was never distant from the divine; indeed, from the beginning of his conception he was joined to it through union and the fullness of every grace. Therefore it seems that no sending to him occurs.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, sending is for the sake of sanctifying the creature. But what is sanctified is what is not holy. Therefore, since Christ was never not holy, it seems that there could be no sending to him.
On the contrary (3), the sending of the Holy Spirit is the very giving of him. But the Holy Spirit was given to Christ, as it says in John 3:34: it is not by measure that he gives the Spirit. Therefore the sending is made to him.
Furthermore (4), the visible sending is the sign of the invisible. But a visible sending of the Holy Spirit to Christ occurred under the appearance of the dove, in Matthew 3:16. Therefore so did the invisible sending.
Response to Quaestiuncula 1
I answer that, since the sending of a divine person is only in the gifts of grace that render one favored, to them alone does the sending occur on whom these gifts can be bestowed. And therefore we concede that the sending can be made to all rational creatures, unless they are depraved through obstinacy in evil, like the demons and the damned, and not to irrational creatures.
Reply Obj. 1: “To be sanctified” is said in three ways: in one way, according to how the pure is called “holy,” insofar as sanctification is spoken of as a purification from sin through grace; in another way, according to how the firm is called “holy,” insofar as sanctification is spoken of as the confirmation in the good through the gift of grace or glory. And in these two ways sanctification occurs only in a rational creature, and the sending occurs only to them. In a third way, “sanctification” is said according to how something is accommodated to use in divine worship, which latter deserves every purity. And in this way a temple and a vessel are said to be “sanctified.”
Reply Obj. 2: Grace is not held in the sacraments as in the subject of grace, but as in an instrument in which grace is conferred. Nonetheless, we will treat this in Book IV. (In IV Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 1.) Whence the sanctification of the sacraments pertains to the third mode, (In the reply to obj. 1.) according to which no sending occurs.
Reply Obj. 3: Sending pertains to the creature’s return to his end, and therefore the sending can only occur with respect to those names that can signify a relation to the end. But the generation of the Son, as a son, is spoken of only in reference to a going forth from a principle, and therefore with respect to that account it does not pertain to sending; rather, it pertains more to creation, according to which things are brought forth into existence, insofar as it is said that through the Son all things have been made. But the account of a word and of love can stand toward both, and therefore the account of a word and of love pertains to creation and to sending. Furthermore, the imitation of the divine nature, which the Son perfectly receives, is also with respect to the first effects by which we subsist in the existence of nature; but this does not suffice for the account of the sort of joining that sending requires.
Reply Sed Contra 4: We concede the fourth argument.
Response to Quaestiuncula 2
I say to the second question that the Son and the Holy Spirit are said to have been sent to the holy in reference to their growing in grace. But growth in grace can occur in two ways: either according to an intensification of only the same virtue, and by reason of this growth no new sending is spoken of; or insofar as through the growth in grace it perfects one in a new use or new act of grace, and with respect to this the Holy Spirit and the Son are said to have been sent with a new sending. For example, that knowledge that is had of God such that love proceeds from it suffices for the account of the sending of the Son. However, when that knowledge is elevated, through an inspiration, such that one knows even the divine mysteries, then he is said to be given in the gift of prophesy. And it is similar with the Holy Spirit, since any love of charity whatsoever suffices for the sending of the Holy Spirit. But when the power of love grows, such that by reason of the love some other use of grace is conferred on one, such as to perform miracles, or to conquer every temptation without difficulty, or something like this, then there is said to be a new sending of the Spirit. Nevertheless, some say that in every growth of the grace rendering one favored there is a sending of the divine person, which can also be easily sustained.
Reply Obj. 1: Although it is not a different mode than receiving the general modes, still it is according to a specific mode, insofar as it, according to a specific use of grace, makes him to whom the sending occurs like the divine person. Or he is even in him in a fuller mode, and this suffices for a sending, according to the second opinion. (The two opinions seem to be those enumerated in q. 1, a. 2.)
Reply Obj. 2: To call back those who stray is incidental to sending, from the side of the one to whom the sending occurs, who is in sin. For sending determines the terminus-toward-which it occurs in such a way that grace is conferred through the sending—but the terminus-from-which is not determined from the account of sending, whether it be a state of sin, or a state of natural powers only, or even a state of lesser grace. Or it should be said that, although the divine person is not calling back one who has actually strayed, still the grace makes them not go astray, and this is a certain calling back from wandering.
Response to Quaestiuncula 3
To what is asked about the angels and the blessed, I say that the vision that is essential to beatitude, and charity, and things of this sort that pertain to the substantial reward, do not grow in those who have already been made blessed. But this does not prevent certain new revelations being brought about in them, since however much their knowledge is perfected, it is infinitely exceeded by God’s knowledge. And according to those new revelations they rise up to the love of God, not such that they would love him more, but such that their love is directed to God under another account.
Reply Obj. 1: The sending of the Son and the Holy Spirit is made to the angels in the very bestowal of grace or glory. Moreover, the sending of the Son and the Holy Spirit is also made to them after they are made blessed, according to new revelations and new ways of loving. And this makes the response to the first objection clear, for although the sending is not made to them according to grace intensively, yet it is made to them insofar as in a certain way their grace increases extensively, toward more things, based on those new revelations.
Reply Obj. 2: In the same sending the messenger and the one to whom the sending is made are not the same. But in diverse sendings it is not unfitting that they be the same. Therefore I say that in the sending of the divine persons to us, the angels or messengers are sent, not as though they themselves enter the mind, but as acting through an exterior ministry. But in the sending that comes to them, they are not themselves the messengers, unless perhaps insofar as higher angels cooperate with the divine persons in the illumination of the lower ones. Nonetheless this will not go to infinity, since one will come to the highest angles, who immediately receive the light of divine revelation.
Response to Quaestiuncula 4
To what is asked about Christ, I say that there is no doubt that the Son of God was sent to the human nature in Christ with the visible sending that is the sending into flesh. But there is a doubt about whether either person is sent to Christ insofar as he is a man—the Son invisibly, or the Holy Spirit visibly or invisibly.
For some say that no invisible sending happened to him. The reason they assign is that Christ, from the beginning of his conception, was full of every grace, so the grace in him was in no way increased. And therefore neither by reason of the bestowal of grace nor by reason of its growth could the invisible sending happen to him. But the visible sending of the Holy Spirit did happen to him to manifest his interior grace, and not to manifest some interior sending that would indicate some newness in grace.
Others say—and more truly, it seems—that the invisible sending happened to Christ’s soul in the bestowal of grace that he received at the beginning of his conception. But afterward, no sending happened to him, since no renewal of his grace was brought about.
Reply Obj. 1: Although the human nature did not exist before the union, still one can consider it, according to the intellect, in itself before being united. And therefore the sending of the Son happens to it through the grace of union, which is called the “sending into the flesh.” Likewise too, insofar as it is understood to be united to him, it is still distant from the divine nature according to the condition of its nature, although not according to the unity of the person. And therefore the sending into his mind, through the invisible grace, can happen to the human nature even as united to the Son, even though the nature does not come before grace in time.
Reply Obj. 2: To sanctify is to make holy. Now, to make something holy happens in two ways: either from what is not holy, or from what is holy. And the former also happens in two ways: either to what is not holy in a privative way, namely what first was naturally apt to have sanctity but does not have it—and in this way being sanctified does not befit Christ; or in a negative way, and in this way it does befit Christ to become holy with regard to his human nature from not being holy, as before it existed it was not holy. And that is enough for the account of sending. However, one becomes holy from being holy also in two ways: either when one becomes more holy from being less holy, and in such sanctification the account of sending is still preserved, but such sanctification or sending does not belong to Christ; or with respect to a continuation of sanctity, such that to be sanctified is to be made to continue in sanctity. But this latter is not said properly. Whence this sanctification does not suffice for the account of sending, since no newness is asserted here—although such sanctification does befit Christ, as he himself says in John 17:19: for their sake I consecrate myself.
Reply Sed Contra 3: According to the other opinion, (See q. 1, a. 2.) it can be said that not every giving is a sending, but only a giving that is made to something preexisting—although this has little reason supporting it.
Reply Sed Contra 4: The response is clear from things said in the body of the article.
Article 2
Whether the invisible sending is fuller after the Incarnation than before
To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that the invisible sending was not fuller after the Incarnation than before.
Obj. 1: For the sending occurs through a certain shining of the divine goodness within the gifts of grace making one favored. But the bodily sun, to which Dionysius likens the divine goodness, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, paras. 1, 4 (PG 3:694).) always shines equally. Therefore it seems that the sending occurs equally at all times.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says (Augustine, On the Good of Marriage, ch. 21, para. 26 (CSEL 41:2221; PL 40:391).) that John’s celibacy is not preferred to Abraham’s marriage, and thus it seems that the holy ones of the New Testament are not of greater merit than the holy ones of the Old Testament. But the fullness of one’s sending is measured according to the abundance of the grace received, which is the principle of meriting. Therefore it seems that it was not done more fully after the Incarnation than before. And it also seems that the holy ones of the Old Testament are proposed to us as examples of perfect virtue, as is clear in Hebrews 11, insofar as Job is proposed as an example of patience, Abraham as an example of faith, and so on with the others. (Job is not mentioned by name in Hebrews 11, though verses 8–18 are about Abraham in particular as an example of faith. The patience of Job is praised specifically in James 5:11.)
On the contrary, in expositing John 7:39, as yet the Spirit had not been given, because Jesus was not yet glorified, Augustine says, how is this to be understood except as meaning that that giving or sending of the Holy Spirit was going to occur in a way that it never was before? For it is not the case that before the Spirit was not sent, but it was not before sent in this way. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 20, para. 29 (CCSL 50; PL 42:908).) Therefore it seems that after the Incarnation it was fuller.
Furthermore, the time of the Incarnation is called the fullness of time (Gal 4:4); but this is only on account of the fullness of grace. Therefore it seems that grace would be bestowed more fully and the sending would happen in this time, rather than prior to this time.
I answer that we can speak of the sending in two ways. One way is on the side of the one sending him. And in this way, since there is no change within him, the sending is equal in all time—except perhaps according to a predetermination of his wisdom and foreknowledge, inasmuch as he preordains, without any change of his own, according to the diverse exigencies of times, to do something in one time and not in another. The other way is on the side of those to whom the sending happens. And in this way those who are more prepared for a thorough reception of grace attain a fuller grace.
Therefore one should say that, because through Christ’s coming the obstacle of the ancient condemnation has been removed, the entire human race is made more prepared for the thorough reception (Perceptio might also translated as “perception,” and this indeed seems to be how Aquinas translates it below, in the exposition of the text.) of grace than it was before. This is both on account of Christ’s payment of the price, and his victory over the devil, and also on account of his teaching, whereby divine things are made more clearly known to us. And therefore, speaking in a common way, the sending has become more full after the Incarnation than before, since from his fullness have we all received. (John 1:16.) But it is true that the fullest sending occurred for certain specific persons in the Old Testament, according to the perfection of virtue. And yet they themselves received from the fullness of Christ, inasmuch as they were saved in their faith in the Mediator, according to Augustine. (Augustine, De gratia Christi et de peccato originali, bk. 2, ch. 24, para. 28 (CSEL 42:187; PL 44:398‒99).)
Reply Obj. 1: That argument proceeds on the side of the one doing the sending, who in and of himself stands always equally toward the conferral of grace.
Reply Obj. 2: The holy of the Old Testament can be considered in two ways. In the first, they are considered with regard to their personal grace. And in this way through faith in the Mediator they attained a grace as full as do those who are in the New Testament, both more than many do, and less than many others do. In the second, they are considered with regard to the state of nature of that time. And in this way, since those obligated to divine judgment for the sin of the first parents were still held back by it, as the price had not yet been paid, there was within them a certain impediment. Thus to them the full sending could not occur, as occurs in the New Testament, and also through the transference into glory, wherein every imperfection (Reading imperfectio for perfectio, based on context.) of nature is cast off.
Article 3
Whether through the invisible sending we become not in this world
To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that through the invisible sending we become not in this world.
Obj. 1: For one who is in the heavens is not in this world. But the Apostle, in the person of all the holy, says, our commonwealth is in heaven (Phil 3:20). Therefore it seems that the holy ones to whom the sending happens are not in this world.
Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says (See Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, tract. 2, para. 11 (CCSL 36; PL 35:1393); this is said more explicitly by Bernard of Clairvaux, Liber de praecepto et dispensatione, para. 60 (PL 182:282).) that the soul is more truly where what it loves is than where it is itself. But to be in something essentially is the truest way of being in it. Therefore the saints are essentially in the heavens, which they love.
Obj. 3: Furthermore, since the soul is an incorporeal substance, it is not determined to a place, except incidentally. Therefore it will be essentially where it is incidentally. But the soul is in its object incidentally, as in its matter. Therefore it is essentially where its object is.
Obj. 4: Furthermore, we say that angels are in a certain place on account of the fact that that is where they act. But the soul’s act is on its object. Therefore the soul is essentially where its object is.
On the contrary, a form never exceeds that of which it is the form. But the soul is the essential form of the body. Therefore it is essentially only where the body is. Now, the body is never outside the world as long as we are alive. Therefore the invisible sending does not make us be not in this world.
I answer that our soul is related to two things: the body, to which it gives substantial existence and through which it also exists, for the existence of the soul is not other than that which it gives the body, as has been said above; (Above, d. 8, q. 5, a. 2.) and it is related to its object, from which it receives existence according to a second perfection, which is an incidental existence. And therefore the soul is essentially where its body is, to which it has its essential relation. However, it is not essentially where its object is, but only through a certain conformity, insofar as it is said that knowledge is the knower’s becoming like the thing known. And one should understand what is said in the text in this way, that when we grasp something eternal by our mind, we too are not in this world; (Sent. I, 15.8(55).2.) for our affections and intellect are not conformed to worldly and transitory things, but to heavenly and eternal things. And so too should one understand what the Apostle says: our community is in heaven (Phil 3:20). As is clear from the song of the Church: a community by thought and love is in that eternal fatherland. (See Philippians 3:20: our conversation [or, community] is in heaven; from whence also we look for the Saviour, our Lord Jesus Christ. See also Isaac of Stella, Sermons (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1967), vol. 1, sermon 12, para. 6, p. 254 (Sources Chrétiennes [SC] 130): haec sit igitur vobis vitae forma, fratres, haec sanctae conversationis vera est disciplina, cogitatione et aviditate in illa aeterna patria conversari cum Christo; “therefore, let this form of life be with you, brothers; this is the true teaching of holy community, by thought and desire to converse with Christ in that eternal fatherland.”)
Reply Obj. 1: The response to the first is clear.
Reply Obj. 2: Although the soul’s substantial existence is in its coupling with the body, still its entire nobility is insofar as it is joined to its own perfections through its noblest acts. And this is why Augustine says that the soul is more truly where what it loves is, since it is there according to its nobler existence, which regards its ultimate perfection.
Reply Obj. 3: Place does not belong to the soul except incidentally. Yet for it to be said to be in a place essentially, it must also be joined essentially to that by reason of which place is attributed to it. But the soul is not joined to its object essentially, but only insofar as a likeness of it is received within the soul. For the stone is not in the soul, but the species of the stone is, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.8, 431b29.) The soul is also joined to this species, or intention, but not as regards the soul’s first existence, which is substantial existence, but as regards its second, which is an incidental existence. And therefore the soul is not said to be essentially in place by reason of its object.
Reply Obj. 4: The action of an angel in bodily things is active, and therefore it is necessary that through its power, which is not separated from its essence, it be joined to the body on which it acts, just as a mover is joined to a mobile thing. But the action of the intellectual soul on the reality that it knows and loves is not active, but rather receptive. And therefore it is not necessary that it be joined to it essentially, but only that the intention of the object be received in the soul itself.
Exposition of the second part of the text
According to which also he may be said to be sent. (Sent. I, 15.7(54).1.) For from the very fact that the Son is from the Father, it is fitting that he be sent by him, so that “sending” is understood not according to the act of sending, but according to the aptitude for sending.
And he is sent to each when he is known . . . by each. (Sent. I, 15.7(54).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 20 (CCSL 50; PL 42:907).) This should be understood not only as about speculative knowledge, but also as about what is in a certain way experiential. What follows in the text shows this: and perceived by each; this demonstrates, properly speaking, the experience within the received and perceived (Percepto here might be translated as either “thoroughly received” or as “perceived”; insofar as both seem to be intended, we have given both. See the note above in a. 1.) gift. However, the rational soul progressing toward God, according to the state of the earthly path, is said to be perfected within God according to the state of the heavenly fatherland, where each sending will be completed, on account of the perfected knowledge and the perfected love.
In this way he is sent every day to the saints. (Sent. I, 15.8(55).1.) It is not that the sending happens daily to him who has grace; rather, this shows that there is no time determined for the sending of the Holy Spirit or the Son, according to which the divine liberality might be restricted.
For the Father is the beginning of the whole divinity. (Sent. I, 15.9(56).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 20 (CCSL 50; PL 42:907).) This can be interpreted in two ways.
First, it can be understood such that perfection is being signified in the “wholeness” of the Godhead—and in this way the Father is called the “beginning of the whole Godhead,” insofar as he is the beginning, or principle, (Principium has a range of meanings, from “beginning,” to “source,” to the cognate “principle.” Silano uses “beginning,” but because this word tends to be limited to a temporal source or origin, we have also translated it with the more abstract “principle.”) of the Son, in whom is perfect Godhead. But this is not compatible with Augustine’s intention, because in this way the Son would also be a beginning or principle of the whole divinity, since he is the principle of the Holy Spirit, who also has perfect divinity.
Whence this is better interpreted such that the wholeness of the divine persons is being signified as regards their number. In this way, “beginning of the whole divinity” is understood as meaning that in all the divine persons he is the principle—not that he is his own principle, but the way that the foundation is said to be the principle of the entire house, although it is not a principle of its very self. Therefore it is better to say that he is the principle “of the Godhead” than that “of the divinity,” since “divine” is denominated from “God.” Whence “divinity” indicates a participated Godhead, and not Godhead by essence, the way it is in God.
Chapter 16 of 186