D. 1 - Enjoyment and use

Division of the text

Having concluded the prologue, this is the beginning of the present work wherein the Master intends to hand on to us the doctrine of divine things, for the inquiry of truth and the destruction of error. This is also why in the entire work he proceeds in an argumentative way, and principally uses arguments from authority. Now, the text is divided into two parts: in the first, he inquires about those things to be dealt with and the order in which they should be treated; in the second, he carries out his intention. And this is divided into two parts, the second part beginning at here we must consider whether the virtues are to be used or enjoyed. (Sent. I, 1.3.7.)

However, those things that one should consider in this doctrine fall within this doctrine’s consideration insofar as they are referred to one thing—namely, to God, from whom and to whom they are. And therefore, he divides the things to be treated into absolute and relative; hence, it is divided into two parts. In the first, he presents the division of things to be treated into absolute and relative according to knowledge, in the second, according to desire, at in the case of things, we must consider. (Sent. I, 1.2.1, quoting Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 2 (CCSL 32; PL 34:20).)

Concerning the first point he does two things.

First, he lays out the division of things to be treated into realities and signs, which latter lead to knowledge of the realities;

second, he concludes with their order, at and whenever the studious and modest speculation of theologians attend to these matters, it will note that divine Scripture observes the aforementioned form in its teaching. (Sent. I, 1.1.2.)

In the first, he does three things: first, he lays out the division; second, he proves it by authority, at for as the renowned teacher Augustine says; (Sent. I, 1.1.1.) third, he presents the exposition of the division of the members, at ‘things’ here properly designates whatever is not used to designate something, (Sent. I, 1.1.1.) where first he expounds what a thing is, and then what a sign is, at but ‘signs’ designates whatever is used in signifying; (Sent. I, 1.1.1.) third, he presents a comparison of the two, at it follows that every sign is also a thing. (Sent. I, 1.1.1, quoting Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 2 (CCSL 32; PL 34:19).)

In the case of things, we must consider. (Sent. I, 1.2.1, quoting Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 2 (CCSL 32; PL 34:20).) Here, setting aside signs, real things are subdivided into absolute and relative on the side of desire—that is, into enjoyable things, which are things desired for their own sakes, and useful things, the desire for which is referred to something else. And this is divided into two parts: first, he presents the division; second, he summarizes and concludes the intention and the order, at of all that has been said since we began our discussion of things, this is the summation. (Sent. I, 1.3.11, quoting Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 35 (CCSL 32; PL 34:34).)

The first part is divided into three: first, he presents the division; second, he presents a manifestation of its parts, at those things which are to be enjoyed make us blessed; (Sent. I, 1.2.1.) third, he presents doubts, at since human beings, who enjoy and use other things, are things of some sort, the question arises ‘whether they are to enjoy or to use themselves, or both.’ (Sent. I, 1.3.4.) In the second, he does two things: first, he manifests the division; second, he presents a problem and resolves it, at but it is to be noted that the same Augustine . . . says as follows. (Sent. I, 1.3.1.)

Regarding the first point he does two things: first, he manifests the parts of the subdivision by means of definitions; second, he does so in reference to the supposits, at the things which are to be enjoyed are the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. (Sent. I, 1.2.4.)

About the first point he does four things: first, he defines enjoyable things by means of their effect; second, he defines usable things, at those things which are to be used help and, as it were support us in our effects toward blessedness; (Sent. I, 1.2.1.) third, he defines the things that use and enjoy, at we are the things that enjoy and use; (Sent. I, 1.2.2.) fourth, he defines “to use” and “to enjoy” in order to prove the whole thing: to enjoy is to adhere in love to something for its own sake. (Sent. I, 1.2.3.) And with the same order, he proceeds to manifest them according to the supposits.

But note that the same Augustine . . . taking use and enjoyment in another sense from the above, says as follows. (Sent. I, 1.3.1.) Here he presents an objection regarding these three things: first, he assigns different meanings to “to use” and “to enjoy”; second, he concludes to the opposition of the things said, at and note that Augustine seems to say that only they enjoy who rejoice in the thing; (Sent. I, 1.3.1.) third, he presents a solution, at we determine this apparent contradiction. (Sent. I, 1.3.2.) And first he resolves it by division, second, by elimination, at it may also be said that one who already enjoys in this life not only has the joy of hope, but also of the thing itself. (Sent. I, 1.3.2.)

Since human beings, who enjoy and use other things, are things of some sort, the question arises ‘whether they are to enjoy or to use themselves, or both.’ (Sent. I, 1.3.4.) Here he presents objections about the relation of the parts to one another. And first he asks about those who use and those who enjoy, whether they themselves are useful or enjoyable; second, about enjoyable things—that is, about God, whether he uses us or enjoys us, at since God loves us, . . . Augustine asks how God loves us, whether by use or by enjoyment; (Sent. I, 1.3.6.) third, as regards useful things, whether they can also be enjoyed, at here we must consider whether the virtues are to be used or enjoyed. (Sent. I, 1.3.7.) Each of these parts is divided into question and solution.

Here, three questions are posed:

first, about using and enjoying; (Q. 1.)

second, about the things that can be used and things that can be enjoyed; (Qq. 2–3.)

third, about those who use and enjoy. (Q. 4.)

Question 1

What enjoyment and use are

Concerning the first, two things are asked:

first, what is enjoyment according to reality;

second, what is use.

Article 1

Whether to enjoy is an act of the intellect

Proceeding to the first, it seems that to enjoy is an act of the intellect. (Parallel text: ST I-II.11.1–2.)

Obj. 1: For the noblest act belongs to the noblest power. But the highest power in man is his intellect. Therefore, since to enjoy is the most perfect of man’s acts, because it places man in his last end, it seems to be an act of the intellect.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as Augustine (As found in The Spirit and the Soul, ch. 9 (PL 40:785); the work is more commonly attributed to Alcher of Clairvaux, among others. Aquinas recognized the inauthenticity of this work in his later writings; for example, in the Disputed Questions on the Soul (see especially q. 12, ad 1), Aquinas says the work is not by Augustine but is said to have been written by a Cisterian monk, and in ST I.82.5, ad 2, Aquinas says it is not necessary to have faith in the words of this book.) says, vision is the whole reward. (Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalm 90, sermon 2, para. 13 (CCSL 39; PL 36:1170).) But the reward of all merit consists in enjoyment of God. Therefore enjoyment is essentially a vision. But vision is an act of the intellect; therefore so is enjoyment.

Obj. 3: But it seems that it is an act of will. For an act is determined by its object. But the object of enjoyment is the enjoyable, which is the ultimate end. Now an end, since it has the account of the good, is an object of will. Therefore, too, enjoying is an act of will.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, Augustine defines enjoyment in reference to the will, saying, we enjoy the things we know if the delighted will is at rest in them for their own sake. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 10, para. 13 (CCSL 50; PL 42:981).) Therefore it seems to be more of an act of the will than an act of the intellect.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it seems that it is the act of all its powers. For reward corresponds to merit. But a man merits by means of all his powers. Therefore he shall also be rewarded in all his powers. But the reward is the enjoyment itself; therefore enjoyment belongs to all our powers.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, Augustine (Alcher of Clairvaux, The Spirit and the Soul, ch. 9 (PL 40:785).) says that a man will find inner pastures in the Savior’s divinity, and outer pastures in the Savior’s humanity. Therefore it seems that man will enjoy both with his outer powers and with his inner ones.

Obj. 7: But it seems that it is the act of no power at all. For every act is named from the power to which it belongs, just as understanding (intelligere) is named after the intellect (intellectus). But to enjoy is not named from any power. Therefore and so on.

Obj. 8: Hence it is further asked, to which habit does this act belong? And it seems that it is an act of charity alone. For as is said in 1 Corinthians 13:13, charity is a perfect virtue. But according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.7, 1098a16; 13, 1102a5.) happiness is the activity of perfect virtue. Therefore enjoyment, in which our whole happiness consists, is an act of charity.

Obj. 9: The same appears to be the case from the definition Augustine brought forward in the text: to enjoy is to adhere in love to some thing for its own sake. (Sent. I, 1.2.3, quoting Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 4 (CCSL 32; PL 34:20).)

Obj. 10: But it seems that it is not merely an act of charity**. For three things come together in enjoyment: perfect vision, full embracing, and the clinging of consummated love. Therefore it seems that it is also the act of the successors of faith and hope.

Obj. 11: Furthermore, it is by enjoyment that we are joined to God. But every virtue joins us to God, since virtue is a disposition of the perfect to the best thing, as is said in Physics 7. (Aristotle, Physics 7.3, 246b28.) Therefore enjoyment is an act according to every virtue.

I answer that enjoyment consists in man’s best activity, since enjoyment is man’s ultimate happiness. Now, happiness does not consist in a habit but in activity, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.8, 1098b30‒1099a7.) However, man’s best activity is the activity of his highest power, namely intellect, in regard to the noblest object, which is God. Hence the very vision of the Godhead is set down as the entire substance of our beatitude: this is eternal life, that they know thee the only true God (John 17:3).

However, due to the vision, the very thing seen, since it is not seen through a likeness but through its essence, is in a certain way made to be within the seer; and that is the embracing that succeeds hope, following upon the vision that succeeds faith, just as hope is, in a way, generated by faith. But owing to the fact that the very one seen is received into the seer, he unites the very seer to himself, such that there may take place a sort of mutual penetration through love. Thus it says in 1 John 4:16, he who abides in love abides in God, and God abides in him. Now, upon this union of what is maximally fitting follows the highest delight; and in this our happiness is complete—which “enjoyment” names more from the side of its completion than from its beginning, since enjoyment includes in itself a certain delight. And therefore we say that it is an act of will, and according to the habit of charity, although it follows an order to preceding powers and habits.

Reply Obj. 1: Appetite always follows upon knowledge. Hence, just as the soul’s lower part has sense and appetite, which latter is divided into the irascible and concupiscible parts, so does the higher part have intellect and will, of which the intellect is higher as the origin, and the will is higher as the perfection. And a like order is found in habits, and also in acts—namely, acts of vision and of love. However, “enjoyment” names the activity that is highest with respect to its perfection.

Reply Obj. 2: The solution here is clear because vision has the perfect account of happiness only insofar as it is an activity perfected by the things that follow upon it. For delight perfects activity as beauty does youth, as is said in Ethics 10. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.4, 1174b35.)

Reply Obj. 3–4: These two we concede.

Reply Obj. 5: Enjoyment, properly speaking, cannot belong to the lower powers, for they do not have their activity in reference to the last end, which they do not apprehend, since they are material powers. But just as now the intellect is perfected by receiving from lower powers, so too in the heavenly fatherland will the opposite be the case—the perfection and joy of the higher part will overflow into the lower powers. Hence Augustine says, sensation will be turned into reason, (Alcher of Clairvaux, The Spirit and the Soul, ch. 12 (PL 40:788).) inasmuch as its reward and joy will emanate from reason.

Reply Obj. 6: Christ’s humanity is not our last end, so there will not be enjoyment, properly speaking, in the vision of it, but rather a certain incidental joy, and not the substance of beatitude.

Reply Obj. 7: When some act belongs to some power absolutely, it is named from it, just as understanding is named after the intellect. But when the act of one power exists in an order with another, it is named after neither, just as knowing is an act of reason with an order to understanding, inasmuch as it deduces conclusions from principles. Likewise to enjoy is an act of will following upon an act of intellect, that is, the open vision of God.

Reply Obj. 8–10: The solution to these is clear from what has already been said, since although three things come together to constitute enjoyment, still enjoyment is perfected in love, as was said in the body of the article.

Reply Obj. 11: Other virtues join one to God by way of merit and disposition, but charity alone does so by way of perfect union.

Article 2

Whether to use is an act of reason

As regards the second, we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I-II.16.1.) It appears that to use is an act of reason.

Obj. 1: For to order one thing to another belongs to a connecting power, and reason is such. But “to use” signifies an order to an end. Therefore it is an act of reason.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.8, 1141b27‒29; 6.11, 1143a25‒35.) both the ordination of things that are for the end and the discovery of the end pertain to prudence. Now, prudence is a habit of reason. Therefore to use, which signifies such ordination, is an act of reason.

On the contrary, it seems that it is an act of the will, since the will is placed in its definition. For to use something is to take it up into the capacity of the will. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 11 (CCSL 50; PL 42:982).)

Furthermore, that which is ordered to the end attains the end. But to enjoy, he says, signifies the attainment of the end, whereas to use signifies the order to the end; therefore to use and to enjoy belong to the same thing; but to enjoy is an act of the will, as was said in the preceding article. Therefore, so too is to use.

I answer that “to use” is said in many ways. For sometimes it names any activity at all, according to which we say the use of something is good or evil; and it appears to be defined by Augustine in reference to this, as to use something is to take it up into the capacity of the will, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 11 (CCSL 50; PL 42:982).) that is, such that we might act concerning what we use at a nod from the will. But sometimes “use” signifies the frequency of an activity, according to which a use is the same thing as what is customary; and this is how Victorinus defines it: use is an act frequently elicited from a power. (Mandonnet asserts that it is not known who this Victorinus is; nor is any claim like this found in Hugh of Saint Victor.) But in both of these ways it is the act of any power whatsoever.

“To use” is also sometimes meant in reference to things that are ordered to some end. And this is how “to use” is meant here, in reference to the first definition that is laid down. Now, what is for an end is employed for its end in three activities. The first is the activity of reason establishing the end and ordering and directing things to it. The second is the activity of the will commanding it. And the third is the activity of the motive power of executing it. However, “to use” names the execution of what is ordered to the end, not according to the proper act of any of the motive powers, but universally, presupposing their ordination to the end. Whence it is an act of the will, which is the universal mover of one’s powers according to their order to reason.

Reply Obj. 1: Use presupposes an order, but its substance consists more in the execution of the will.

Reply Obj. 2: Prudence is a perfection of practical reason insofar as it is rectified. Now, its rectitude is also its truth, as is said in Ethics 6, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.2, 1139a25‒31; 6.3, 1139b15‒16.) according to its congruence with a rectified appetite. Whence prudence perfects one not only as regards that act that belongs to reason itself, but even as regards the act of the will, which is ruled by reason, just as to choose—although it is an act of the will or free decision—is nevertheless an act of prudence.

Question 2

The objects of enjoyment

Concerning the objects of the aforesaid acts,

first, we ask about things that can be enjoyed; (Q. 2.)

second, we will ask about things that can be used. (Q. 3.)

As regards the first, two questions are asked:

first, whether one should enjoy God alone;

second, whether there is only one enjoyment or are there many.

Article 1

Whether God alone should be enjoyed

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.11.3; Commentary on Philemon, lect. 2.) It appears that not only God should be enjoyed.

Obj. 1: For, as is said in the text, (Sent. I, 1.2.1, quoting Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 3 (CCSL 32; PL 34:20).) one should enjoy those things that make us blessed. Now, a created beatitude does make us blessed. Therefore it should be enjoyed, and not, therefore, God.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, man’s ultimate end is his happiness. Now, his happiness is his most perfect activity. Therefore, since one should enjoy one’s ultimate end, he should enjoy his most perfect activity. This also appears true based on the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.7, 1097a22‒b21.) who says that happiness is not sought for the sake of anything else, and on Boethius, who says that beatitude is a state perfected by the gathering of all good things. (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 3, prose 2, para. 3 (CCSL 94; PL 63:724).)

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Cicero says that the noble is what draws us by its own strength, and attracts us by its own dignity. (Cicero, On Duties (De officiis), bk. 1, cc. 4, 5.) But what attracts us through itself is loved for the sake of itself. Therefore one should enjoy everything noble, and thus all the virtues. Therefore the enjoyable is not limited to God.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the Apostle says, yes, brother, I want to enjoy you in the Lord (Phlm 20). (RSV renders this text as I want some benefit from you in the Lord.) Therefore we can also enjoy a man in God, and consequently any man—who is according to the image of God—and any created thing, wherein is a vestige of God.

On the contrary, the account of love is goodness. But every goodness is traced back to God’s goodness, from which it flows and whose likeness it bears. Therefore nothing should be loved except in its order to God. Therefore God alone should be enjoyed.

Furthermore, Proverbs 16:4 says, God has made everything for the sake of himself. (RSV: the Lord has made everything for its purpose.) Therefore he himself is the end of all things. Therefore all things should be loved for the sake of him, and thus the same thing follows.

I answer that “to enjoy” (Or “to be fulfilled by.”) is spoken of in three ways. It is spoken of either as by an object—and in this way one should enjoy (Or “be fulfilled by.”) God alone, since the entire goodness of the universe is ordered to the goodness of God himself, just as the good of the entire army is ordered to the general’s good, as is said in Metaphysics 12. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.10, 1075a14‒16.) It is also spoken of in another way, as the habit that elicits the act of enjoyment—and in this way one should enjoy created beatitude and charity. In a third way, we enjoy something as an instrument of enjoyment—and in this way we enjoy a power, the fulfillment of which is its act.

Reply Obj. 1: Something renders one blessed in two ways: either as what effects it, as is God—and one should enjoy this alone as the object of enjoyment—or formally, the way that whiteness makes a thing white. And one should enjoy this latter formally speaking, and in this way beatitude makes one blessed.

Reply Obj. 2: The object of an activity is its terminus and it perfects it, and it is its end. This is why it is impossible for an activity to have the account of the ultimate end. But because we attain the object only through the activity, the appetite for the activity and for the object is the same appetite. Whence, if we enjoy in any way the enjoyment itself, this will be insofar as the enjoyment joins us to God, and by the same enjoyment we will enjoy the end and the activity whose object is the ultimate end. This is just as how I understand the intelligible thing and I understand myself understanding it by the same activity.

Reply Obj. 3: “For its own sake” is spoken of in two ways. In one way, it is opposed to what is for the “sake of something else”; and in this way the virtues and the noble are not loved for their own sake, since they are also referred to something else. In another way, a thing is “for its own sake” insofar as it is opposed to the “incidental”; and in this way a thing is said to be loved for its own sake if it has in its own nature something that moves one to love it. And in this way the virtues are loved for their own sake, since they have within themselves something whereby they are sought, even if nothing else comes from them. Yet it is not unfitting that a thing be loved and still ordered to something else, as is said in Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.6, 1096b15‒20.) However, there are things that are desired, not for the sake of something that they have in themselves, but only insofar as they are ordered to another, as effective of the latter; for example, bitter medicine is loved, not for the sake of something that is in it by itself, but because it makes one healthy. And in this respect, they are in no way loved for their own sake, whether “for their own sake” signifies a formal cause, as virtue is said to be loved for its own sake, or a final cause, like God.

Reply Obj. 4: One should not enjoy the just man simply speaking, but in God, such that the object of enjoyment is God, and the holy man is representative of him as the very object through a likeness of grace, in which God dwells. Nonetheless, it does not follow that one should enjoy, in God, a man who is sinful, because grace, which causes God to dwell within one, is not present in him, and grace is the expressed exemplar of that highest goodness that one should enjoy. And much less does this follow about an irrational creature, for the likeness of being an image or vestige is insufficient for this, whereas the likeness of grace is enough.

Article 2

Whether we enjoy God by one enjoyment

To the second we proceed as follows. It appears that we do not enjoy God by one enjoyment.

Obj. 1: For acts are distinguished according to their objects. But the objects of enjoyment are three realities distinct by personal properties: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Therefore there are three enjoyments.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, an activity of the soul that rests in what is common is not complete unless it descends to things that are proper, just as knowledge of the genus is completed through a knowledge of a difference, and even more so desire and love are completed in the particular. But enjoyment is a complete activity. Therefore we enjoy not only the essence common to the three persons, but also the individual persons and their properties. And in this way it seems that there is not only one enjoyment.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, whatever the Son has, it is customary to trace back to the Father, from whom he has it, as is said in John 7:16, my teaching is not mine, but his who sent me. But the Son receives goodness from the Father by his birth, just as he receives the essence. Therefore also one should trace the enjoyment of the Son’s goodness to the enjoyment of the Father. Therefore one should not enjoy the three persons equally, much less by the same enjoyment.

On the contrary, just as the Trinity God is one principle of all things, so too it is one end of all things. But the same activity is common to the entire Trinity, insofar as it is one principle. Therefore the enjoyment of the Three is the same enjoyment, insofar as it is one end.

Furthermore, the activity of happiness is with respect to the noblest object, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.7, 1177a15‒25; 1177b16‒1178a7.) Now, the noblest thing is only one, since what is said to be over all belongs to one alone. Therefore, since enjoyment is the activity of ultimate happiness, it is referred to only one object. And therefore we enjoy the three persons insofar as they are one, and therefore insofar as they are one object.

I answer that by one enjoyment (Or “fulfillment” or “fruition.”) we enjoy the three persons. There are two reasons for this, the first of which is on the side of the divine essence. For the object of enjoyment is the highest goodness; this is why enjoyment looks to each person insofar as it is the highest good. Whence, since the goodness of the three persons is numerically the same goodness, the enjoyment will also be the same. The other reason is drawn from the side of the persons’ properties. For as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Categories 7, 8a36‒b15.) he who knows one relative also knows the other; and thus, since the entirety of enjoyment takes its origin from the vision, as was said before, he who enjoys one relative, as such, also enjoys the other. Now, the three persons are distinguished only according to the relations. Therefore within the enjoyment of one is included the enjoyment of the other, and thus the enjoyment of the Three is the same enjoyment. But the first reason, which touches on the account of the object, from which an act has its unity, is the better argument.

Reply Obj. 1: The solution is clear, because the three persons are not distinguished insofar as they are the object of enjoyment—indeed, they are united in that, that is, in the highest goodness.

Reply Obj. 2: We do enjoy the property of each person, such as the Father’s paternity. Yet “paternity” does not indicate the reason for the enjoyment; whence we enjoy the paternity insofar as the paternity is the same reality as the highest goodness, differing from it only in account.

Reply Obj. 3: That tracing back of the Son’s goodness to the Father does not assert a gradation of goodness in the Father and the Son, but only an order of the nature. Therefore the equality and unity of the enjoyment is not taken away.

Question 3

The objects of use

Article 1

Whether one should use all things other than God

Next we ask about the things that can be used, whether one should use all things other than God. And it seems that one should not.

Obj. 1: For to use something is to take it up into the employment of the will. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 11 (CCSL 50; PL 42:982).) But what is taken up in this way is only a thing subject to our activity. However, not all created things are this way, for example, the heavens and the angels, which cannot be made or acted upon by us. Therefore we cannot use all things.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, we use what is helpful to those striving for beatitude. But we are often impeded by created things, as is said in Wisdom 14:11: though part of what God created, they . . . became traps for the souls of men and a snare to the feet of the foolish. Therefore we cannot use all things.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, if we are bound to using all things besides God, then we sin whenever we do not refer a thing back to God, but we merit whenever we do refer a thing back to God. Therefore every act is meritorious, and no act will be indifferent.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, it follows that no sin is venial, since if a thing is referred back to the ultimate end, then there is no sin, but if something else is established as the ultimate end, and not related to another, then this is a mortal sin. Therefore, since every act of reason is for some end, that end either must be the ultimate end, and then this is not a sin, or that other end is not related to the ultimate end, and then it will be a mortal sin. Therefore there is no venial sin.

On the contrary, whether you eat or drink, . . . do all to the glory of God (1 Cor 10:31). Therefore it appears that all things should be used.

Furthermore, just as God has perfect power, so he has perfect goodness. But it pertains to the perfection of his power that nothing has existence except as produced by him. Therefore also it pertains to the divine goodness that nothing be loved except what is in order to him.

I answer that whatever things are good have their goodness only insofar as they approach a likeness to the divine goodness. Whence, since goodness is the reason for love and desire, all things must be loved in their order to the first goodness. Now, everything that is good is from God; this is why things that are not from him should neither be sought nor used. And therefore one should make use of no sin, because sin is not from God. Punishment, however, is from God, and therefore one should make use of punishment, and order it to the end, insofar as it promotes a man’s merit, leading him into a consideration of his own weakness, and insofar as it purifies him from his sins. Likewise too the things of the world are from him, and should be used, either insofar as things showing God’s greatness carry one to the knowledge of him, or insofar as they provide support for our life as ordered to God. Likewise, our own activities, the ones that are not evil, are from him, and should be done for his sake—not that every activity must always be actually referred to God, but it is enough that they habitually establish the end of one’s will in God.

Reply Obj. 1: We do not use those created things as things to be brought about by us, but as things leading us to the knowledge of God.

Reply Obj. 2: Created things as such do not impede us from attaining beatitude; rather, the impediment is on our part, insofar as we misuse them by resting in them as in the end.

Reply Obj. 3: According to the theologian, no act proceeding from a deliberating will is indifferent. For if it is referred to God, presupposing grace, it is meritorious. However, if it is not so referable, it is a sin; and if it is so referable and is not referred, it is in vain; moreover, idleness is counted among sins, according to the theologian.

Reply Obj. 4: Although he who sins venially does not refer his work to God, still he habitually has God as his end. Whence he does not place a created thing as his ultimate end when he loves it next to God. But he sins because of the fact that he is excessive in his love, like one who lingers on a path for too long, though he does not deviate from the path.

Question 4

Those who enjoy and use

Next, we ask about those who enjoy and use;

and first, about those who enjoy;

and second, about those who use.

Article 1

Whether it befits all things to enjoy

We proceed to the first as follows.

Obj. 1: “Enjoyment” signifies a desire brought to rest in its end. But every created thing, even one that can sense, naturally desires its own end. Therefore, when it happens that it reaches its end and rests in it, it seems that enjoyment belongs to something created that cannot sense.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, enjoyment is of what is sought through itself, not as related to something else. But beasts seek things in which they delight, and they do not refer them to something else, since they lack reason, which orders things. Therefore beasts have enjoyment.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is possible for someone to love God over all things by a natural love, since he is naturally known to be the highest good, and thus to be loved for his own sake. But we enjoy what we love for its own sake. Therefore it is possible for a man in possession of only natural faculties to enjoy God.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, it is possible for someone in a state of mortal sin to establish God as the ultimate end of any of his actions, not referring them to something else. However, this is to enjoy God. Therefore even a sinner can enjoy God.

On the contrary (5), it appears that not even the just man enjoys God on the earthly path. For to enjoy something is for the delighted will to rest in things known for their own sake. But as long as someone is on the earthly path, he does not rest. Therefore as long as someone is on the earthly path, he does not enjoy God.

Furthermore (6), it appears that not even the blessed enjoy God. For as it says in the text, (Sent. I, 1.3.6.) everyone that enjoys something needs that thing. But whatever needs something lacks that thing. Therefore, since the blessed do not lack God, it appears that they do not enjoy him.

Furthermore (7), from this one also concludes that neither does God enjoy himself, since he does not stand in need of himself.

I answer that, as was said above, (Sent. I, 1.1.1.) “enjoyment” asserts a certain delight in the end. Now, delight can occur only in a knower, on account of which Plato has said that delight is a sensible generation into its nature, that is, what is sensed as befitting the nature. (Plato, Philebus 31d‒32b; Laws I, II, IX, and XI; see also Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.11, 1152b13‒15, although here it is not associated with Plato.) And therefore, since created things that do not sense do not know, they neither delight nor enjoy. Furthermore, enjoyment properly speaking is only of the ultimate end, and beasts do not apprehend the ultimate end, nor can they order their proximate end to the ultimate end, since they lack reason, to which it belongs to order. Whence neither do they, properly speaking, enjoy anything. Likewise, a sinner places his ultimate end in what is not the ultimate end; whence, since he does not have the true end, he does not truly enjoy anything. Moreover, because “enjoyment” even more so signifies delight in the end, perfect enjoyment can occur only if the delight is perfect, and this cannot occur before the attainment of the end. And therefore the just man does not enjoy perfectly. But the blessed, who have attained the end, enjoy truly, and perfectly, and properly.

Reply Obj. 1: Although every desire follows upon knowledge, still the desire in a created thing without senses does not arise from any knowledge present in it itself, but rather from the knowledge of the first mover, whoever that be, that orders each thing to its end. And therefore they have neither enjoyment nor delight without knowledge.

Reply Obj. 2: Although cattle do delight in their end, still that end is not the ultimate end; and in fact, it is an end related to another, one not coming from them, but from the first mover ordering all things to his very self. And therefore, since they do not delight in the ultimate end, simply speaking, but in the ultimate end apprehended by them, in a certain way they are said to enjoy that, albeit improperly.

Reply Obj. 3: Delight follows upon a perfected activity. But an activity that proceeds from a habit is perfect. Now habits, whether acquired or natural, do not sufficiently and proximately perfect one for the ultimate beatitude of the heavenly fatherland, as was said above. (See above, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3.) So without a gratuitous habit there is no such delight sufficient for enjoyment. Or it should be said that “natural love” (Although the Latin says “delight” (delectatio), the context and the meaning suggest that Aquinas means “love” (dilectio).) does not assert any actual activity, but only a certain natural inclination, which is led to act through the habit of charity.

Reply Obj. 4: Being in a state of mortal sin, he loves something habitually above God, even if not always actually. Therefore he enjoys not God, but rather that thing to which he orders everything.

Reply Sed Contra 5: Rest is of two sorts: the rest of desire and the rest of motion. The rest of desire occurs when the desire stops in something for the sake of which it does and seeks all things, and does not desire anything further. And in this way the will of the just man rests in God while on the earthly path. However, the rest of motion is when one reaches the goal sought; and this rest will occur in the heavenly fatherland. Moreover, this rest causes a perfect enjoyment, whereas the latter only an imperfect enjoyment.

Reply Sed Contra 6: Something needs something else in two ways. Either it needs it as that on which it depends for its existence—and in this way all things need God, since, according to Gregory, (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 16, ch. 37 (CCSL 143A; PL 75:1143).) all things would tend into nothingness unless they were held up by the hand of their Creator; for he is a cause not only of the coming to be of things, but also of their being. And in this way even the blessed need God. In the other way, one is said to need something that he does not yet have; and in this way they do not need him.

Reply Sed Contra 7: This should be understood to be the case whenever the one enjoying and the one he enjoys are diverse in essence, which is not the case in the divine enjoyment. And therefore he himself perfectly enjoys his very self. This is why, commenting on Job 40:5, be glorious, and put on beautiful garments, Gregory says, he himself is glorious who, while he enjoys his very self, stands in no need of seeking praise. (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 32, ch. 6 (CCSL 143B; PL 75:639).)

Article 2

Whether in the heavenly fatherland use will still occur

We proceed to the second as follows. It seems that in the heavenly fatherland no one will be using anything.

Obj. 1: For the path is not necessary to one in possession of the end; this is why Bernard says, what need is there of steps for one already in possession of the throne? (Bernard of Clairvaux, On Consideration, bk. 5, para. 1 (PL 182:788).) But use is of things that are for the sake of an end, which things stand in the manner of a path. Therefore in the blessed, who have attained the end, there will be no use.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, to use something is to refer it to something else. But this can occur only if one thing is thought about after another. And it does not seem that this occurs in the heavenly fatherland, according to Augustine, since there thoughts do not fly from one thing to another. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 15, ch. 16 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1079); the text of Augustine says, volubiles non erunt nostrate cogitationes ab aliis ad alia euntes et redeuntes.) Therefore it appears that there is no use there.

On the contrary, it is certain that in the heavenly fatherland the love of God and neighbor remains, since charity never passes away (1 Cor 13:8). But one’s neighbor will never be loved for his own sake, but rather for God’s sake. Therefore there will always be the love of use there.

I answer that use is of things that are for the sake of the end. But some things that are for the end include the end and things that come with it, and such are things that are not repugnant to the perfection of the end, just as the dispositions of matter remain with their substantial form. And there will be use of such things in the heavenly fatherland, for example, natural perfections, the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, and other things that from their accounts do not indicate an imperfection. However, there are some things that are for the sake of the end as distant from the end, for example, motion and the like; and such things, because of their imperfection, are not compatible with the end. Whence of such things—such as punishment, the acts of faith and hope, and food, and the like—there will be no use in the heavenly fatherland.

Reply Obj. 1: We find in the progression of knowing that someone comes to the knowledge of principles through things derived from the principles, yet when the former are possessed, he knows them better than the things derived from principles.

And in the same way, one does not need the things derived from the principles for the knowledge of principles that he already knows through themselves, and yet neither does he lose the knowledge of the things derived from the principles—indeed, that knowledge is perfected through the principles.

And so it is in the progress of a man toward God, who comes to God through created things. When God has been possessed, he does not need the created things for the sake of possessing him; rather, through him he comes to the perfect use of all other things. So it is also in the progression of nature that form is acquired through dispositions such that, when the form is possessed, it is the principle of all the accidents. And so one finds it to be the case in all other things.

Reply Obj. 2: That is properly called “flying thought” that occurs through the running about of one’s reason, to which what is sought is not presented at once. This is why it is necessary that reason discovers by progressing from one thing to another. However, there in the fatherland whatever might be sought occurs to us in the divine light at once without any difficulty. This is why then men too will understand by a God-formed intellect, the way the angels do as well. However, a succession of thoughts is not excluded in the heavenly fatherland, and much less an order of one thing to another, which also can exist without succession.

Reply Sed Contra: We grant the other side.

Exposition of the text

As regards the text, there is a question about what is said at it has become clear to us that the study of the sacred page is principally concerned with things or with signs. (Sent. I, 1.1.1.) For this division seems inappropriate, insofar as the same thing can be a sign and a real thing; for example, the true Body of Christ is both, as is the character in baptism. Furthermore, he himself says that every sign is a reality, (Sent. I, 1.1.1, quoting Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 2 (CCSL 32).) and so it appears that this is not a division of opposites. Moreover, all created things are a sign of the divine goodness, and thus it seems that nearly all the things treated in this doctrine are signs. To this, one should say that such a division is not made through opposed realities, but through opposed accounts, according to the absolute and the relative. For a sign is what is instituted for signifying something, but a reality is what has an absolute signification, one not related to another. Whence it is not unfitting that the same thing be a sign and a reality in respect to diverse things, just as the same man is a father and a son. Whence the solution to the first objection is clear. But to the second, it is said that “real thing” is taken in two ways in the procedure of this statement. For it is taken commonly for every being—and in this way every sign is a real thing—and it is also taken strictly for what is only a real thing and not a sign. And in this latter way it is divided from “sign.” To the third, I say that although created things are a sign of something, still they have not been principally instituted for the sake of this, and therefore they are not contained under signs, except in a certain respect.

Next, one might ask about what is said at and we will first discuss things, and afterwards signs. (Sent. I, 1.1.3, quoting Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 2, para. 2 (CCSL 32; PL 34:20).) For it seems that in the Sentences he should first treat signs, since real things are learned about through signs, as it says in the text. (Sent. I, 1.1.1.) So we come to the knowledge of realities through the knowledge of their signs. To this one should say that it follows that one should consider the signs before the realities that are signified through those signs if the signs and realities are of the same order. However, sacramental signs [treated in Book IV] are not related in this way to the things that are treated in Books I–III. Or one should say that the order to be followed in receiving knowledge is other than that in imparting it. For one receiving knowledge proceeds from signs to the things signified by what is, as it were, a mode of resolution, since signs are more known to him; but someone imparting the knowledge of signs must manifest the realities before signs, in that signs are taken from a likeness with the realities, so one must first know the realities in order to know their signs, according to whose likeness they are taken.

Next, one might ask about what he says at we . . . are . . . placed, as it were, between the two other types of things. (Sent. I, 1.2.2, quoting Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 3, para. 3 (CCSL 32; PL 34:20).) For it seems from this that man is intermediate between things that can be used and things that can be enjoyed—the contrary of which seems the case from the fact that virtue is contained among things that can be used. But virtue is among the greatest goods, according to Augustine, (Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will, bk. 2, ch. 19 (CCSL 29; PL 32:1268).) the things that no one uses badly. Moreover, natural powers are intermediate goods, which are the things that someone can use badly or well. And thus it seems that the virtues are higher than man. To this one should say that the order of goods can be considered in two ways. It can be considered through a comparison to the rectitude of life; and in this way virtue, which is through itself the cause of such rectitude, is the greatest good; however, a natural power, which is as material for such rectitude, is intermediate; and other realities that are exterior little helps are the least goods. And the order of goods can also be considered according to one’s progression into beatitude; and in this way the very thing beatifying one will be the greatest good, and one participating in beatitude will be the intermediate, and what disposes him to it will be the least.

Moreover, one might ask about this: there are some things which are to be enjoyed, others which are to be used, and yet others which enjoy and use. (Sent. I, 1.2.1, quoting Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 3 (CCSL 32; PL 34:20).) For everything that is, is either an end or for the sake of the end. But what can be enjoyed has the account of an end, whereas what can be used has the account of things that are for the sake of the end. Therefore the useable and the enjoyable sufficiently divide things, so a third member of the division is superfluous, especially when he himself later says that men, who both use and enjoy, are themselves to be used. To this one should say that something is ordered to an end in two ways, either as one making progress toward the end—and in this way, the one enjoying and using is for the sake of the end—or as the path to the end—and in this way, the useable is for the sake of the end. Whence the useable does not embrace all things that are for the end, unless it be taken very broadly. Nor is it unfitting if the same thing be contained under two members, since the division is based on opposed accounts, not on opposed realities.

Moreover, one asks about this: to use is to apply whatever comes into use in order to obtain that which is to be used. (Sent. I, 1.2.3, quoting Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 4 (CCSL 32; PL 34:20‒21). The Silano translation is here modified so as to capture more precisely the objection; where the Latin says, “comes into use,” Silano says, “comes into one’s hand.”) It seems that this explains use badly, since “use” is not more known than “to use,” so it seems that this definition is not given through things that are more known. To this one should say that the entire expression “whatever comes into use” is put here in place of the one expression, and is a circumlocution of what I call the “useable,” which is the object of the act of using. But an act is fittingly defined through its object.

One further asks about this: it is not easy to find a name that suitably fits such an excellence, (Sent. I, 1.2.4, quoting Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 5 (CCSL 32; PL 34:21).) namely, for what cause is this said? To this one should say that we impose names on things insofar as they come into our knowledge, and because we receive knowledge from created things, we impose names according to the mode of created things. Now, things that are in created things are not in the same way in God, but rather in a more excellent way, so the names that we impose are not sufficient to signify God, just as it is clear that names signifying in the abstract signify an imperfect thing that does not subsist through itself, such as “humanity” or “whiteness,” whereas concrete names signify something composed—neither of which befits the divine nobility.

One further asks about this: the more tolerably do we endure our pilgrimage, and the more ardently we desire to come to its end. (Sent. I, 1.3.2, quoting Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 30 (CCSL 32; PL 34:30‒31).) For the contrary seems to be the case, based on what is said in Proverbs 13:12: hope deferred makes the heart sick, and also from the fact that we know in a mirror and we desire his presence, we endure his absence less tolerably. To this one should say that insofar as hope is for a thing desired that is absent, this is a cause of affliction, but insofar as the reality desired becomes in some way present through hope and imperfect knowledge, this offers a certain delight.

Next, one asks about what is said here: it is to be noted that this same Augustine . . . taking use and enjoyment in another sense from the above, says. (Sent. I, 1.3.1.) For of a single thing there is a single definition, just as there is a single being, so one should not give multiple definitions of “use” and “enjoyment.” To this one should say that if one finds a definition that might signify the being of a reality according to its relation to all its proper causes, it would be the most perfect, and the only one; but one finds many definitions that make known the being of a reality according to diverse causes. This is why one definition is given through the final cause, another through the formal, and so on. There are also found other definitions that make it known based on properties consequent on the being of the reality, and such also can be many.

One should therefore say that, as regards the present case, the first definition of “enjoyment”—namely, to enjoy is to adhere in love to some thing for its own sake (Sent. I, 1.2.3, quoting Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 4 (CCSL 32; PL 34:20).)—is given through relation to its object and the habit eliciting the act, but the second—namely, we enjoy the things that we know, in which the will finds delight for their own sake and comes to rest (Sent. I, 1.2.5, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 10, para. 13 (CCSL 50; PL 42:981).)—is given through its relation to the power of which it is the act according to its order to a preceding power, that is, the cognitive power; the third—that is, to enjoy is to use with the joy, no longer of hope, but of the thing itself (Sent. I, 1.3.1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 11 (CCSL 50; PL 42:982).)—is given through a property consequent on the act, insofar as it is perfected: namely, the joy over the thing possessed. Likewise one should say of the definition of “use”—namely, to use is to apply whatever comes into use in order to obtain which is to be enjoyed (Sent. I, 1.2.3, quoting Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 4 (CCSL 32; PL 34:20‒21).)—that it is given through a relation to its object and to the end of using, properly so said. The other, however—namely, to use is to place something in the power of the will (Sent. I, 1.3.1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 10, ch. 11 (CCSL 50; PL 42:982).)—is given of “use” taken commonly, through its relation to one’s active and universally moving power.

Next, as regards him saying, neither does he use us in the same manner in which we use other things, (Sent. I, 1.3.6.) note that he is showing the difference between our use and the divine use in two respects. For he refers his use, wherein he uses things, to his own goodness, but we refer our use not to our own goodness, but to his. Furthermore, we refer our use, by which we act as regards things, to our own utility, whereas he refers his use not to his own utility, but to ours. And he shows this first in his works of mercy, and that is clear, and second in his works of creation. For he made us on account of his own goodness, and therefore Augustine says, because he is good, we exist, (Sent. I, 1.3.6, quoting Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 32 (CCSL 32; PL 34:32).) and from the fact that we exist, we have goodness, and this benefits us. Hence he says, inasmuch as we exist, we are good. (Sent. I, 1.3.6, quoting Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 32 (CCSL 32; PL 34:32).) And thus it is clear that this work is for our utility. Third, he shows it in his work of justice, for he punishes us on account of his own goodness; and therefore he says, because God is also just, we are not evil with impunity, (Sent. I, 1.3.6, quoting Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 32 (CCSL 32; PL 34:32).) since his justice is his goodness. And this too goes to our utility, since we are punished for our evil so that we might withdraw from evil, and thus from non-being; this is why he says, insofar as we are evil, so much also is our existence lessened, (Sent. I, 1.3.6, quoting Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 32 (CCSL 32; PL 34:32).) since to the degree that we are more evil, we exist less, since evil is a privation. Whence, to the degree that evil is multiplied in us, so much further distant do we become from perfect being.

Next, one asks about what he says here: because God is good, we exist. (Sent. I, 1.3.6, quoting Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 32 (CCSL 32; PL 34:32).) For this seems false, since, as Boethius says, (Boethius, Hebdomads, question (PL 64:1312).) if goodness is removed from God by our intellect, many other beings will still remain, but not good ones. Therefore we do not exist because he is good.

I answer that the divine works can be related to the divine attributes as to an exemplar efficient cause, and in this way the wisdom of the creature is from the wisdom of God, and the being of a created thing is from the divine being, and its goodness from his goodness; this is how Boethius is speaking. But since goodness has the account of the end, and the end is the cause of all the causes, therefore all such processions of perfections in created things are attributed, by Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, paras. 1–2 (PG 3:694).) to the divine goodness as well, even though they are exemplified by diverse attributes.

Furthermore, one asks about what he says here: insofar as we exist, we are good. (Sent. I, 1.3.6, quoting Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 32 (CCSL 32; PL 34:32).) For the account of the good and that of being are different, and so it seems false to say this. I answer that although good and being differ according to their intentions, since the account of the good and that of being are different, still they are convertible according to their supposits. For every existence is from the good and for the good. Whence “insofar as” does not indicate an identity of intention, but an equality of the supposits of the good and of being.