D. 9 - Generation of the Son

Division of the text

Having considered things that pertain to the unity of the essence, here he considers what pertains to the distinction of the persons. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he considers the distinct persons; in the second, he considers the names by which both the distinction of the persons and the unity of the essence are designated, at after the above, it seems to us that we must discuss the diversity of names. (Sent. I, 22.1(90).1.)

The first is divided into two: in the first, he considers the persons in reference to their distinction; in the second, he considers them in reference to their equality: after having indicated, in accordance with the littleness of our power, the coeternity of the three persons, now it remains that we say something about the equality of the same. (Sent. I, 19.1(72).1.)

The first is divided into two: in the first, he considers the generation of the Son, through which he is distinguished from the Father; in the second, the procession of the Holy Spirit, through which he is distinguished from each of them: after our discussion of the Son’s eternity, ‘let us now treat of the Holy Spirit.’ (Sent. I, 10.1(34).1; Martin of León, Sermons, sermon 34, “On the Feast of the Holy Trinity”, para. 24 (PL 208:1288).)

The first is divided into two: in the first, he states the truth; in the second, he excludes an error, at but a heretic speaks against this. (Sent. I, 9.2(30).2.) Now, this is the error of Arius, who asserted that the Son’s generation is not from eternity, whence it followed that the Son is distinguished essentially from the Father through it.

But a heretic speaks against this. (Sent. I, 9.2(30).2.) This part is divided into two. In the first, he states the error and the argument for the error, which is as follows: everything that is born did not at some time exist, for it is born so that it might exist. But the Son is born of the Father. Therefore at some time he did not exist, and so is not coeternal with the Father. In the second, he excludes it, at he who says this, ‘does not understand that even to have been born is eternal in God.’ (Sent. I, 9.2(30).3, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 6, ch. 1 (CCSL 50; PL 42:923).)

And this latter is divided into three parts: in the first, he meets it with Augustine’s argument; second, with Ambrose’s arguments, at Ambrose responds in the following manner to the same Arian question; (Sent. I, 9.2(30).5, referring to Ambrose, De fide libri V, bk. 1, ch. 11 (CSEL 78; PL 16:544).) third, with Hilary’s arguments, at and as Hilary says, in On the Trinity*, book 12, ‘it is one thing to be forever eternal, without author, and another to be coeternal with the Father.’* (Sent. I, 9.4(32).8, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 12, ch. 21 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:416).)

As regards the first, he does two things: first, Augustine resolves the argument; and second, he disproves the position, at also, Augustine says, ‘if the Son of God is the power and wisdom of God, and God has never been without his power and wisdom, the Son is coeternal with God the Father.’ (Sent. I, 9.2(30).4, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 6, ch. 1 (CCSL 50; PL 42:923).) Moreover, he resolves the argument by destroying the premise that “everything that is born at some time did not exist”; he shows this by a likeness in bodily things, since when brilliance shines from a fire, the fire is not prior in time to the brilliance. Moreover, he disproves the position with the following argument: Christ is God’s power and wisdom, according to 1 Corinthians 1:24, but God the Father was never without his power and wisdom, so God the Father was never without the Son.

Ambrose responds in the following manner to the same Arian question. (Sent. I, 9.2(30).5, referring to Ambrose, De fide libri V, bk. 1, ch. 11 (CSEL 78; PL 16:544).) Here he excludes the error indicated, through Ambrose’s words. And it is divided into two: in the first, in excluding the error, he builds up the eternity of the divine generation; in the second, he looks into by what words eternity might be more congruently designated, at it may now be asked whether we ought to say: the Son is forever generated, or was forever generated, or will forever be generated. (Sent. I, 9.4(32).1.)

The first is divided into two: in the first, he proves his position; second, he responds to the argument, at Ambrose says, ‘but if you ask of me how, if he be the Son, he does not have the Father exist before him?’ (Sent. I, 9.3(31).1, quoting Ambrose, De fide libri V, bk. 1, ch. 10 (CSEL 78; PL 16:543).)

He disproves the position in two ways. The first is by authority, from Isaiah 43:10: before me no God was formed, nor shall there be any after me; and this is clear in the text. The second is by argument, at so, tell me, heretic, was there ever a time when the all-powerful God was not the Father, and yet was God? (Sent. I, 9.2(30).7, quoting Ambrose, De fide libri V, bk. 1, ch. 9 (CSEL 78; PL 16:541).) The argument is as follows: whenever there is a father, there is a son, so if the Son did not always exist, the omnipotent God was not always the Father, and at some time he became the Father. Now, this cannot occur without him changing. Therefore he has changed—which the heretic would not grant.

Ambrose says: ‘but if you ask of me how, if he be the Son, he does not have the Father exist before him?’ (Sent. I, 9.3(31).1, quoting Ambrose, De fide libri V, bk. 1, ch. 10 (CSEL 78; PL 16:541).) Here he resolves the objection, and in this regard he does two things: first, he refutes it by manifesting the incomprehensibility of the divine generation; in the second, the Master argues that those attempting to comprehend it are being presumptuous, and responds to the authority that they bring in on their own behalf, at but there are some who, with excessive trust in their own intelligence, say that that generation can be understood. (Sent. I, 9.3(31).2; the authority is Jerome’s comment on Scripture’s idioms when asking questions beginning with “who shall” (Commentarii in Ecclesiasten, ch. 3, v. 21 [CCSL 72; PL 23:1041]); the heretic applies this to Isaiah 53:8, which (following the Vulgate) reads, who shall recount his generation?) Ambrose’s refutation has this mode: a proof has no power if it holds no more on one assumption than on the other. But the heretic’s argument supported man’s inability to find the mode of the divine generation, if it is asserted to be from eternity. But the same doubt remains if it is asserted not to be from eternity, since that generation is still unspeakable and incomprehensible. Therefore the heretic’s objection proves nothing.

It may now be asked whether we ought to say: the Son is forever generated, or was forever generated, or will forever be generated. (Sent. I, 9.4(32).1.) Here he shows with what words the eternity of the generation should be designated. And about this he does four things: first, he proves, by the authority of Gregory and Augustine, that it should be signified by words of past tense, on account of its perfection; second, he brings in the contrary through the words of Origen, at but Origen, commenting on Jeremias, says; (Sent. I, 9.4(32).4.) third, he resolves this, at but lest such great authors should appear to contradict each other on such a great matter, let us interpret those words of Gregory with benignity; (Sent. I, 9.4(32).8.) fourth, he confirms his solution through Hilary’s words, at Hilary too says that the Son is born from the Father; (Sent. I, 9.4(32).7.) and lastly, he concludes with the truth of the question, at and so let us say that the Son was born from the Father before all time. (Sent. I, 9.4(32).8.)

And as Hilary says, in On the Trinity*, book 12, ‘it is one thing to be forever eternal, without author, and another to be coeternal with the Father.’* (Sent. I, 9.4(32).8, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 12, ch. 21 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:446).) Here he excludes the error through Hilary’s words, and he does two things: first, he disproves the position; second, he resolves an objection, at but the heretic will say. (Sent. I, 9.5(33).1, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 12, ch. 22 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:446).) Now, he disproves it in the following way: just as a father stands to generation, so does the eternal Father stand to an eternal generation. But God is the eternal Father, as the heretics grant. Therefore also the generation by which he generates always was, and is from eternity. But to generate from eternity is to be born eternally. Therefore also the Son was born from eternity. And through this he also answers their argument by making a distinction about the following: “everything that is born begins to be.” If this is understood of what is born from one who is not always begetting, as happens in created things, then it is true; but if it is understood of what is born from what is always begetting, it is false.

About this part, two things are asked:

first, the Son’s distinction from the Father; (Q. 1.)

second, his coeternity. (Q. 2.)

Question 1

Distinction of the Son from the Father

As regards the first, two things are asked:

first, whether, on account of their distinction, the Son can be said to be other than the Father;

second, whether the Father and the Son, on account of the same distinction, can be said to be many eternals.

Article 1

Whether the Son is other than the Father

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: below, d. 19, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2; d. 24, q. 2, a. 1; ST I.31.2; On the Power of God, q. 9, a. 8.) It seems that the Son is not other than the Father.

Obj. 1: For “other” (alius), according to Priscian, (Priscian, Tractatus de arte grammatica, bk. 2, “De pronomine.”) is a relative pronoun indicating a diversity of substance. But the Father and the Son are of one substance. Therefore the Son cannot be said to be other than the Father.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, unity of substance impedes the Son from being able to be called an other thing than the Father, due to the diversity signified in the word “another thing” (aliud). But “other” (alius) and “other thing” (aliud) differ only in mode of signification, since “other” signifies in the masculine and “other thing” signifies in the neuter. (The pronouns alius and aliud both signify “other” or “another,” but the former has a grammatically masculine gender that limits its use to signifying males, whereas the neuter gender of the latter limits its use to non-persons: in other words, “whos” versus “whats.” Thus, aliud will be translated as “another thing” whereas alius will be translated as “another” or “another one.”) Therefore, since the mode of signifying does not vary signification, it seems that neither can he be said to be “other” than the Father.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, if the Son is said to be other than the Father, this is only because the Son is from the Father. But the Father is from his very self. Therefore the Father will be other than his very self. And this is absurd.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to Porphyry, (Porphyry, Isagoge, ch. 3.) a property does not cause otherness, but more difference. Now, the Father is distinguished from the Son only through the property of relation. Therefore the Father cannot be said to be other than the Son, but only different.

On the contrary, whatever things are really distinguished, one of them is a reality other than the other. But the Father and the Son, as was said above, (Above, d. 2, q. 1, a. 5.) are really distinguished. Therefore the Father is a reality other than the Son, and in the same way he can be said to be other than the Son. And the same thing seems to be said in Augustine’s words in the text. (Sent. I, 9.1(29).1, where the Master believes he is quoting Augustine, though actually, it is Fulgentius of Ruspe, On the Faith, to Peter the Deacon, ch. 1 (CCSL 91A; PL 40:753).)

I answer that in the divine we find three things: essence, person, and property, and to them are applied the three grammatical genders. The neuter gender is applied to essence because it is common and indistinct; and the neuter, being without formation, does not indicate a distinction of sex. The masculine gender is applied to person, which is distinct, and is signified as something existing in the divine nature, for the masculine is a distinct gender, but not the feminine on account of its imperfection. However, the feminine gender is applied to property, which is signified through the mode of form; and in this way it can even be applied to essence, insofar as essence is signified as a form. And therefore, on account of the unity of the essence it cannot be said that the Father is another thing than the Son, but on account of the distinction of person, he can be said to be another one.

However, this seems like an adaptation of speech more than an expression of proper speech. Whence one should speak otherwise, and say that this happens because the neuter gender is used substantively, and this is why it indicates a diversity simply speaking and absolutely, which is a diversity of essence. On the other hand, the masculine and feminine genders are taken adjectivally, and this is why they assert a diversity as regards personal terms that are placed in the speech, when one says, “the Son is other than the Father.” This will be explained in the responses to the arguments.

Reply Obj. 1: “Other” always signifies a diversity of substance. But “substance” is spoken about in two ways: for sometimes it is taken for the essence, as is the case in the usage among the Latins; but sometimes it is taken for the supposit of the essence, or for a thing of the nature of the first category, which the Greeks call a “hypostasis.” And in this second way the substance of the Father and the Son is not the same, since in this way “substance” signifies the person. And for the same reason he can be called “other.”

Reply Obj. 2: The neuter gender is properly used as a substantive, the masculine is not. Now, a substantive has its own absolute signification, whereas an adjective asserts its signification about the substantive. However, when something is said absolutely, it is understood that it is so simply speaking; for example, “being,” when said absolutely, signifies substance. And therefore, because otherness of essence is otherness simply speaking, therefore a neuter gender substantive indicates an otherness of essence. But the masculine gender, since it is held adjectivally, asserts an otherness about its subject, so if it is a personal term, its substantive designates a distinction of persons. And therefore this is true: “the Father is other than the Son.” However, if the adjective’s substantive is an essential term, it designates a diversity of substance, and therefore this is false: “the Father is a God other than the Son.” Likewise, the neuter taken adjectivally, when it is joined to a personal term, indicates an otherness of person, as when one says, “the Father is a supposit other than the Son.” Whence this does not occur due to a varied signification, but due to an otherness signified in the masculine and neuter not being referred to the same thing.

Reply Obj. 3: “The Father is from his very self” is improper, and it should be interpreted by a negation: that is, he is not from another. However, “the Son is from the Father” is proper. Whence these are not similar cases.

Reply Obj. 4: In the divine, a property is not merely a property, but is also subsistent. For the paternity is the Father himself. And therefore a property makes another more properly than it makes it different. But we will speak about this more fully below. (Below, d. 26, q. 2, a. 2.)

Article 2

Whether the Father and the Son can be called many eternals

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: below, d. 33, a. 4; ST I.39.3.) It seems that the Father and the Son cannot be called many eternals.

Obj. 1: For in the creed of Athanasius it is held that and yet there are not three eternals. (Athanasian Creed, “Quicumque vult” (PG 28:1582).)

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says, whatever is said in the divine in respect to itself is predicated in the singular for the three, and not in the plural. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 8 (CCSL 50; PL 42:916).) But “eternal” is said in reference to itself, since it is not relative. Therefore it is said of the three in the singular, and not in the plural.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as there is one Godhead for the three persons, so also there is one eternity, since eternity is the divine substance itself. But it cannot be said that the Father and the Son are gods, on account of the unity of their divinity. Therefore neither can it be said that the Father and the Son are many eternals, on account of the unity of their eternity.

Obj. 4: You might say that this is because “God” is substantive, but “eternal” is adjectival, and therefore “eternal” takes a plural number, following the number of supposits.

On the contrary, an adjective is signified in the mode of an accident, whereas in God there can be no accident—for, as Boethius says, (Boethius, On the Trinity, ch. 4 (PL 64:1252).) the other categories, when they entered into the divine predication, they are changed into substance. Therefore there can be no adjective here.

On the contrary, it is held in the creed of Athanasius (Athanasian Creed, “Quicumque vult” (PG 28:1582).) that the three persons are coeternal with each other.

Furthermore, an adjective draws its number from the substantive. But “eternal” is an adjective. Therefore, since the Father and the Son are a multitude, it seems they should be called “eternals.”

I answer that this is the difference between adjectives and substantives: substantives signify through the mode of a substance, and therefore signify its reality absolutely, and therefore a substantive is not said in the numerical plural unless its formation is numbered; on the other hand, an adjective signifies through the mode of an accident, which latter does not have an absolute existence or unity, but its existence and unity depend on that in which it inheres. Whence also it is not multiplied in number through a division of something of which it is a part, the way that the species of substances are multiplied by the individuals of it, according to the division of the matter. Rather, an accident is multiplied according to a division of the subject in which it exists; this is why this whiteness is other than that whiteness insofar as this one belongs to this, and that one belongs to that. And therefore an adjective has plural number only on the side of the supposits.

Therefore one should say that all essential terms signifying substance through the mode of a substance, like substantives, are not predicated in the plural of the three persons, in that the form being signified, that is, the divine essence itself, is not being divided. But terms signifying substance adjectivally, through the mode of inherence in, or following on substance, as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 9 (PG 94:834).) are predicated in the plural of the three persons, on account of the plurality of the supposits.

Nonetheless among such terms that signify the substance adjectivally there is an order. For some signify as inhering, but not signifying the substance according to the mode of signifying that grammarians consider when they say that a name signifies “substance with quality”; examples are verbs and participles. And such terms should in no way be predicated in the singular, since they signify through the mode of act, which latter is not signified except as inhering. But some signify the substance according to the mode considered by grammarians, like adjectival names; for every name signifies substance and quality, but they signify a form, which is a quality, as inhering, and such can be predicated more in the singular, and especially because they can be used substantively; examples are “eternal” and the like. Yet when one adds to such adjectives, through composition, some preposition denoting the bearing of one person to another person, they are more drawn to the supposit; and then they should never be predicated in the singular, but only in the plural; an example is “coeternal.”

Reply Obj. 1: Therefore I say that if “eternal” is taken substantively, then it is predicated of the three in the singular; this is how Athanasius takes it. If it is taken adjectivally, then it is predicated in the plural. But “coeternal” should always be predicated in the plural, because of the bearing of person to person that it indicates.

Reply Obj. 2: As was said in the body of the article, adjectives do not have a number from their very selves, but from their supposits. And therefore “eternal,” even though it is not numbered from itself, as it is absolute, still is predicated in the plural because of the plurality of the supposits, which are relative.

Reply Obj. 3: Thereby this solution is clear, since “God” is not an adjective, such that it would receive its number from another, as “eternal” does. Whence it could only be predicated in the plural on account of the plurality of its form, which plurality one does not assert in God.

Reply Obj. 4: Although according to the reality, there is no accident in the divine, nonetheless with regard to the mode of signifying, something can be signified as attached to or following on substance. And in this way there are adjectives in the divine.

Question 2

Coeternity of the Son with the Father

Next, one asks about the Son’s coeternity with the Father, and two things are asked about:

first, whether the Father is in some way prior to the Son;

second, if not, but the generation is eternal, by what verbs should it be signified.

Article 1

Whether the Father is prior to the Son

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that the Father is prior to the Son.

Obj. 1: For as destruction stands to ceasing, so does generation to beginning. But everything that is destroyed ceases to exist. Therefore everything that is generated begins to exist through that generation. Therefore the Son began to exist and so is posterior to the Father.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, nothing receives a thing unless it does not have it. But everything generated receives existence from its generator. Therefore everything generated did not have existence before its generation; and so, the same thing follows as before.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a principle is naturally prior to that of which it is a principle. But the Father is the principle of the Son. Therefore he is prior to him, at least in nature, although not in time.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, to give existence is a certain dignity. But the Father gives his own existence to the Son. Therefore at least in dignity the Father is prior to the Son.

On the contrary, everything to which there is something prior is not the first, simply speaking. Therefore if the Father were prior to the Son, the Son would not be simply speaking first. But all say God is the first principle, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.2, 983a10.) Therefore the Son would not be God, which the Arians grant.

I answer that the Father is in no way prior to the Son, not in duration, nor in nature, nor in understanding, nor in dignity. For in the Father and the Son there are but two things to consider. On the one hand, there is what is absolute; and this is common to each of them, so one does not have priority over the other due to this, since the divine essence is not divisible, as was shown above. (Above, q. 1, a. 1.) On the other hand, there is what is toward-something. But it belongs to relatives to exist simultaneously in nature, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Categories 7, 7b15‒34.) and even simultaneously in time, since when posited they posit each other, and when eliminated they eliminate each other; this is true even in understanding, since one is defined through the other, for although in men the one who is a father is prior to the one who is his son, like Socrates to Plato, still these two relatives, (Namely, father and son.) insofar as they are relatives, are simultaneous in all the aforesaid ways. Whence it is clear that the Father can in no way be prior to the Son, neither in reference to what is absolute, nor in reference to what is toward-something.

Reply Obj. 1: The generation that is opposed to destruction is a change, and to such a generation there is always joined a beginning. But generation as found in the divine is not a change, as was said above; (Above, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1.) rather, it is the activity of the divine nature as in the Father. And because a natural activity always follows that to which it belongs, since the divine nature in the Father is eternal, his generation will be eternal.

Reply Obj. 2: What receives something does not have that thing from itself, but it does not follow that it does not have it simply speaking. For it is possible that it receives what it never began to receive. And in this way the Son receives existence from the Father; nor does he have existence from himself, but from eternity he receives existence from the Father.

Reply Obj. 3: A principle can be considered in two ways: either the thing that is a principle—and this is naturally prior to that of which it is the principle; or according to the relation of principle—and in this way it is naturally simultaneous with that of which it is the principle. Therefore if something possessed from the same source the fact that it is something and the fact that it is toward-something, it would be wholly naturally simultaneous with that relative to which it is spoken. And because in the divine the Father has from the same source that he is something and that he is Father, by nature he is simultaneous with the Son, not only insofar as he is Father, but simply speaking.

Reply Obj. 4: The property by which the Father gives existence is his dignity. But because dignity is among things that are absolute, therefore the same dignity is in the Father and the Son; and the same dignity that is in the Father is his paternity and in the Son is his filiation. This is just as the paternity in the Father is the divine essence or divine goodness, and numerically the same essence or goodness is the filiation in the Son.

Article 2

Whether the divine generation should be signified through the present tense

To the second we proceed as follows. (See In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 3.) It seems that the divine generation should be signified through the present tense.

Obj. 1: For the present most of all fits eternity as it has no succession. But the divine generation is eternal. Therefore it should be signified through the present tense.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Avicenna distinguishes (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 6, ch. 2.) two sorts of agent: a certain sort is the cause only of coming to be—and such exerts its influence in the thing only while it is coming to be; whereas another sort is the principle of existing—and this agent does not cease exerting its influence in its effect as long as the effect has existence. Now, it is certain that the Father is not the principle of the Son as a principle of his coming to be, since the Son is not made; (Nicene Creed: genitum, non factum.) rather, he is the principle of his being, since he gives him existence. Therefore as long as the Son has existence, the Father gives him existence, which giving is the generation. Therefore, since the Son is most truly said to exist always, and more so than to have existed, it would be truer to say he is always being born than to say he was always born.

On the contrary, what is always in becoming is imperfect. But what is always being born is signified as always in becoming. Therefore it is signified as imperfect. Therefore the Son is not properly speaking said to be always being born, since all imperfection is separated from him.

Furthermore, everything that follows on a generation, according to its mode of understanding, is, as it were, the terminus of the generation. But the relation of filiation follows on generation according to its mode of understanding. Therefore it stands on the side of the terminus of generation. But the terminus of the generation is not signified through the present, but through the past. Therefore the Son is more truly called “born” than “being born.”

I answer that, as was said above, (Above, d. 8, q. 2, a. 3.) no verb of any tense perfectly represents eternity. Whence, since the generation of the Son is eternal, as was also said, (Above, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1.) it is not sufficiently expressed through a verb of any tense. This is why it can be signified through verbs of diverse tenses, insofar as whatever there is of perfection in any time is attributed to the divine generation, and every imperfection is excluded. Therefore, in every lower generation, or in any coming to be, the existence itself is imperfect, for things of this sort exist only in coming to be; therefore also their perfection is only when the coming to be is ended, and at that point the generation of what is created does not hold on to existence, just as even in the terminus of a motion there is no motion. Yet in the divine generation there is found simultaneously both perfection and existence.

Whence, to signify the being of the divine generation, which never passes away, we can use a verb of the present tense, so that we might say, “the Son is generated by the Father”; or to signify the perfection of the generation, we might use a verb of the past tense, so that we might call the Son “born.” Moreover, so that we might conclude to each at the same time, that is, the perfection and the being of the generation, he is most fittingly called “always born,” so that both the unfailing being of the generation might be signified through its perpetuity, and its perfection might be signified through the past tense. However, if we were to say, “he is always being born,” only the unfailing being of the generation would be signified, and not its perfection. Therefore it is better to say “always born” than to say “always being born.” However, in the other divine things that are not signified as in coming to be, we more fittingly use the present tense.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the present most fits with eternity, since it asserts existence in act, still in those names that signify through the mode of coming to be, it indicates an imperfection. For such things, as long as they have existence, are imperfect. And therefore in such things we more fittingly use the past tense, especially if one adds something to designate that it never fails.

Reply Obj. 2: Through that argument it is proved that the existence of the divine generation never passes away, and this is signified through the present tense. Still, a certain imperfection is indicated by its mode of signifying, since it is signified through the mode of coming to be. And therefore one must use the past tense. And this is what the subsequent arguments conclude to.

Exposition of the text

But the Apostle says that ‘Christ’ is ‘the power of God and the wisdom of God.’ (Sent. I, 9.2(30).4, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 6, ch. 1 (CCSL 50; PL 42:923), himself quoting 1 Corinthians 1:24.) On the contrary: he is speaking of either the essential wisdom or of the begotten wisdom: if the essential, it is certain that would be in the Father, even if there were no Son, as is true of the essence; whereas if it is the begotten wisdom, above Augustine had said (Sent. I, 5.1(15).4, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 1 (CCSL 50; PL 42:931).) that the Father is not wise by the wisdom that he begot. Therefore even if the Son did not exist, it would not follow that the Father would not be wise. Then it seems that Augustine’s argument is invalid.

To this one should say that the Apostle is speaking of the essential wisdom insofar as it is appropriated to the Son. Now, in what is appropriated, as such, the account of the proper is understood; this is how Augustine is proceeding. Or it can be said, and better, that he is speaking about the begotten wisdom. For he does not say that the Father is wise through that wisdom, but that he possesses that wisdom. However, it is incongruous to say that God now has any wisdom that he did not have before, since this would assert a change in him.

But then, how is God unchangeable? (Sent. I, 9.2(30).7, quoting Ambrose, De fide libri V, bk. 1, ch. 9 (CSEL 78; PL 16:542).) It seems that this does not follow since, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Physics 5.2, 225b11.) there is no motion in the category of toward-something, so no changeability can be inferred from the onset of a relation. Furthermore, God is called “Creator” because he gives existence to what is created, and “Father” because he gives existence to the Son, but it does not follow that he is changeable even though he is now the Creator and was not so from eternity. Therefore so too it would not follow that he is changeable if he was not always the Father.

To the first, one should say that, even though there is no motion in toward-something as in what through itself terminates a motion, as quantity and quality are through themselves termini of motion, nonetheless new relations cannot be born really in something except through a motion. For although relation is not through itself a terminus of motion, still it follows on motion, just as equality follows on increase. To the second one should say that, as was said above, (Above, d. 7, q. 2, a. 1.) the relation by which God is spoken of as relative to what is created is not really in God himself, but in the created thing itself, which does change. However, paternity is really in God himself, since it is a property that constitutes a person. Whence he could not newly be the Father without a change in him.

The voice is silent, and not only mine, but also that of angels. (Sent. I, 9.3(31).1, quoting Ambrose, De fide libri V, bk. 1, ch. 10 (CSEL 78; PL 16:543).) He is calling the “voice of the angels” what they bodily express in their assumed bodies, or else he means their spiritual speech itself, insofar as they order their own conceptions to make something known. Nonetheless this will be looked into elsewhere, in Book II. (In II Sent., d. 11, q. 2, aa. 2–3.)

It is not lawful to search the highest mysteries, (Sent. I, 9.3(31).1, quoting Ambrose, De fide libri V, bk. 1, ch. 10 (CSEL 78; PL 16:543).) such that someone might want to transcend the limits of faith about the temporal generation in the Incarnation, which is indeed ineffable insofar as it ends at the union in the person of God. Yet in a certain way it is effable, on the side of the very body assumed, which was drawn from the Virgin.

As often as the light arises from which the splendor emanates, so often does also the splendor of brilliance arise. (Sent. I, 9.4(32).4, quoting Origen, In Ieremiam, hom. 9, para. 4 (PG 13:341‒42).) This likeness should be understood as related to the eternal generation not according to the act’s discontinuity, which in the rising of the bodily light makes a number of sunrises (for the reason that the bodily sun is not always present), but only according to its continuity.

He is the living God and the power of the eternal nature is of the living God. (Sent. I, 9.4(32).7, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity*, bk. 7, ch. 27 (CCSL 62; PL 10:223).)* In these words Hilary intends to conclude that the Son begotten of the Father is alive, thus: in everything alive one can find a power that is owed to the living. But God is alive. So in him, one finds a power that is owed him as living. Now, this is that he would bring forth something living from himself. Therefore the Son, who is brought forth from him, is alive.

Therefore the major premise of the first syllogism is not explicit, but he states the minor at he is the living God, and so on. The conclusion, which is the major premise in the second syllogism, he touches on when he says, the power of the eternal nature is of the living God, that is, the power of the living is of an eternal divine nature, that is, it is owed to the living. He is silent about the minor premise of the second syllogism, but he states the conclusion at whatever is born from him with the mystery of his knowledge could not be other than living, (Sent. I, 9.4(32).7, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 27 (CCSL 62; PL 10:223).) that is, the Son who is born of the Father, the secret knowledge of whose birth only the Father holds in comprehension. He could not be other than living. (Sent. I, 9.4(32).7, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 27 (CCSL 62; PL 10:223).) And here “mystery” (sacramentum) is being taken insofar as it indicates a sacred secret.

He gives testimony that all that lives in him is from the living God, (Sent. I, 9.4(32).7, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 27 (CCSL 62; PL 10:223).) that is, all the attributes, each of which lives in the Son.

His birth was complete, (Sent. I, 9.4(32).7, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 27 (CCSL 62; PL 10:223).) that is, it has the complete account and name of birth.

For there is nothing new when a living God is generated by a living God. (Sent. I, 9.4(32).7, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 27 (CCSL 62; PL 10:223).) For in things that are generated through a complete change, even though generation that comes from the living ends at something alive, still at the beginning of the generation what is generated is not alive. But the Son of God is always alive. Therefore he is begotten not through a separation or a change. And thus the life itself of the Father is numerically the same as that in the Son. And on account of this he adds he must necessarily live in the living God, that is, the Son in the Father, insofar as the Son is the Father’s life, which lives in the Father. And in the same way he has life living within himself, that is, the essence of the Father, who is a living life.

By the mystery of his birth, the Father imparts to him the image of his own unbegottenness, (Sent. I, 9.4(32).7, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 9, ch. 54 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:325).) that is, his own innascibility. For the Son does not imitate the Father in innascibility.

For if begetting pertains to the begetter endlessly, then to be begotten also pertains to the one who is begotten endlessly. (Sent. I, 9.4(32).8, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 12, ch. 21 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:446).) “Endlessly” here is taken negatively, not privatively, for neither the passive nor the active generation is bound or comprehended by an end. Yet one should not say that it is infinite in the mode of quantity, the way time or motion is, since then it would never be complete.