D. 4 - Divine generation and divine predication

Division of the text

After he has proved by authorities, arguments, and likenesses the Trinity of persons in a unity of essence, here he begins to consider questions arising from these previous considerations. And this is divided into two parts. For because the Trinity of persons is distinguished through the procession of one person from another, first he lays out questions regarding this procession in reference to its supposit and terminus; second, he does the same in reference to its principle, at moreover, it is usual to ask whether the Father begot the Son by his own will or by necessity. (Sent. I, 6.1(18).1.) Now, one must be aware that, although the Master proposes these questions about the Son’s generation from the Father, nonetheless the same questions can be asked about the procession of the Holy Spirit, and they would be determined in a similar way.

The first part is divided into two. In the first, he asks whether the concrete names pertaining to the essence can be signified as the supposit of the act of generation, or as its terminus. In the second, he asks about the essential names that signify abstractly, at after these matters, it is asked whether it is to be granted that the Father generated the divine essence. (Sent. I, 5.1(15).1.) For there is no similar doubt about the personal names, having supposed the distinction of the persons through the notional acts.

The first is divided into two: in the first, he considers the question; in the second, he objects against things determined, at now let us return to the earlier question. (Sent. I, 4.2(14).4.)

As regards the first, he asks whether “God has begotten God” is true; and this is divided into two parts, insofar as he proceeds from this proposition by two paths. The second begins at but some garrulous rationalizers object, (Sent. I, 4.1(13).1.) and this is divided into two: in the first, he presents a reduction of the stated proposition to the impossible, and then resolves it. And because in his solution he supposes that a personal name can be predicated of an essential name—so that one might say, “God is the Father”—therefore in the second part he excludes an error of those contradicting it, using many authorities, at but some adversaries of the truth grant that the Father and Son and Holy Spirit, or the three persons, are one God and one substance, and yet they refuse to grant that the one God or substance is three persons. (Sent. I, 4.2(14).1.)*

To understand this part, two things are asked about: first, about the divine generation; and second, about the divine predication.

Question 1

Divine generation

As regards the first, three things are asked:

first, whether there is generation in the divine;

second, supposing that it is so, whether the following is true: “God has begotten God”;

third, the same question about the other expressions that are included in this text.

Article 1

Whether there is generation in God

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.27.2; SCG IV.10, 11; On the Power of God, q. 2, a. 1; On the Catholic Faith of the Greek Fathers (Contra errores Graecorum), pt. 1, ch. 1; Compendium theologiae, cc. 40, 43; Commentary on Colossians, ch. 1, lect. 4.) It seems that there is no generation in God.

Obj. 1: For generation is a species of change, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Physics 5.1, 224b8; 225a35.) But change is remote from God, according to James 1:17: with whom there is no variation or shadow due to change. Therefore neither is there generation.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, to the degree that created things are nobler, so much more do they approach a divine likeness. But generation is not found in the nobler creatures, like in angels and the heavenly bodies; rather, it is found only in the lower creatures. Therefore it seems that neither is it found in God.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, wherever there is generation, there must be something communicated from the generator to the one being generated. But what is communicated to it from the generator does not distinguish it from the generator. Therefore something else must be there whereby the one would be distinguished from the other, since everything generated is distinct from its generator. Therefore everything generated is composite, since one thing is there and so is something else. But there is no composition in God. Therefore neither is there generation.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, generation is a middle act between the one generating and the one generated. But between the Father and the Son there is no middle. Therefore it seems that no generation is there.

On the contrary, Isaiah 66:9 says, shall I who bring forth generation be sterile? (RSV: shall I bring to the birth and not cause to bring forth? . . . Shall I, who cause to bring forth, shut the womb?)

Furthermore, everything that communicates itself does so by reason of an act that is in itself, since a power neither acts on itself nor communicates itself. But the divine essence is the first and pure act. Therefore it seems that it communicates itself in the highest way. But it does not communicate itself in the highest way within created things, since this communication is not brought to completion at the same nature. Therefore it seems that it communicates itself through generation in a Son, for this is the greatest communication.

I answer that the fact that there is generation in the divine cannot be efficaciously confirmed by reason, as was said above, (Above, d. 3, q. 1, a. 4.) but is held by authority and faith. Whence it must simply be conceded that there is generation in the divine.

Nonetheless, one must note that, because every perfection is in God, and there is no imperfection in him, whatever is found to belong to perfection in a created thing can be said of God as regards what there is of perfection in it, with every imperfection removed. However, if a name is imposed from what belongs to imperfection, like “stone” or “lion,” then it is said of God merely symbolically or metaphorically. But if it is imposed from what belongs to perfection, then it is said properly, albeit according to a more eminent mode. However, a name is said to be imposed from what is, as it were, the reality’s constitutive difference, and not from the account of its genus. And therefore whenever something according to its genus signifies an imperfection, but according to its difference signifies a perfection, it is found in God according to the account of the difference, and not according to the account of the genus. For example, knowledge is not in God as regards the account of habit or quality, since then it has the account of an accident, but only as regards what completes the account of knowledge, that is, being cognitive of things with certainty.

Likewise, I say that if we take the genus of generation as it is found in lower things, it belongs to imperfection, for change, which is its genus, indicates a going forth from potency to act, and consequently indicates materiality in the one generated, and consequently a division of essence—none of which befit the divine generation. However, if it is considered in reference to its difference, whereby the account of generation is completed, then it indicates a certain perfection. For taken passively “generation” signifies the receiving of essence in a perfect likeness, and if taken actively it signifies the communication of this. And neither of these signifies an imperfection; for communication follows upon the account of act, whence every form as such is communicable, and therefore communication pertains to nobility. And with “generation” taken in this way, it is in God with priority, and every generation in created things descends from it, and imitates it to the degree it can, although it falls short. Whence Ephesians 3:15 says, from whom every fatherhood in heaven and on earth is named. (RSV reads family instead of fatherhood.) However, if “generation” is taken according to the customary account in the name, according to which we speak of generation in created things, then it does not befit God, except metaphorically, like other bodily names.

Reply Obj. 1: And thereby this solution is immediately clear, since generation according to its genus, which is change, is not found in the divine. Whence in God there is no change, but an activity of the divine nature, according to Damascene. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 8 (PG 94:814).) However, activity differs from motion, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.4, 1174b13‒1175a20; On the Soul 3.7, 431a6‒7; Physics 3.2, 201b34.) because action is the act of the perfect, but motion is the act of the imperfect, because it belongs to what exists in potency.

Reply Obj. 2: No creature is capable of generation without what belongs to imperfection in it. For since in every creature the essence differs from the existence, the essence cannot be communicated to another supposit unless according to another existence, which is the act of the essence. And therefore a created essence must be divided in communication, which belongs to imperfection, and therefore generation is not found in the most perfect creatures, but only in the ones that are more remote from the divine likeness.

Reply Obj. 3: In the divine generation there is nothing added to the essence in the one begotten whereby it differs from the begetter. Rather, from the very fact that it receives the essence from the begetter it is distinguished from it by the relation of a giver and a receiver. And these relations do not differ from the essence really, but only in account, as has been said. (Above, d. 11, q. 1, a. 5.) And therefore it does not follow that composition is present here. But this cannot be in other things, because in created things no relation is a substance according to reality. Whence everything generated must be composed, and in this way again it is clear that generation in created things cannot be without imperfection.

Reply Obj. 4: Generation is not really some middle between the Father and the Son, since real generation, taken passively, is the filiation itself, which is the property of the Son and is in the Son. But taken actively, it is the paternity itself, which is in the Father and is the Father himself. Yet it signifies the property through the mode of act, and such signification is founded in some way on the reality, in the receiving of one by another.

Article 2

Whether it is false to say that God begot God

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: below, d. 5, q. 1, a. 2; ST I.39.4.) It seems that the following is false: “God begot God.”

Obj. 1: For generation indicates a relation distinguishing the persons, as was said in the previous article. Therefore if it is granted that God begot God, one must grant that God is distinguished from God, and that God is someone other than God—which is not to be granted.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a term placed in the predicate does not draw the term placed in the subject outside its own signification; rather, it only restricts it by reason of the consignification of time, such that it stands for things present, past, and future. Indeed, the converse is more the case, according to Boethius: (Boethius, On the Trinity, bk. 1, ch. 5 (PL 64:1253).) the predicates are such as the subjects have permitted them to be. But the name “God” signifies the essence. Therefore it is not drawn to stand for the person by the word that is predicated of God; rather, it supposes the essence. However, the following is false: “the essence begot the essence,” as will be shown below. (Below, d. 5, q. 1, a. 1.) Therefore so is “God begot God.”

Obj. 3: Furthermore, if God begot God, then God is the generator and God is the one generated. Therefore whatever is said of the individual persons can be said of God. But the Father is said to be the generator, and the Son is said not to be the generator. Therefore one can say that God generates and God does not generate—which is false. Therefore the first claim is also false, that God begot God.

On the contrary, God begotten from God is said in the Creed. (Namely, the Nicene Creed.) But he is generated from God only as from a generator. Therefore God generates God.

Furthermore, “God” signifies one who possesses Godhead. Therefore whatever is said of one who possesses Godhead can be said of God. But one can say that one who possesses Godhead generates one who possesses Godhead. Therefore one can say that God generates God.

I answer that “God generates God” is simply speaking true and should be conceded. But there are two opinions about its truth. For some say that the name “God” signifies the essence and in itself stands for the essence; but on account of the indifference of the essence as regards the persons in the divine, by a notional addition it is drawn to standing for a person. Others say that the name “God” signifies the essence and in itself stands for a person, albeit indistinctly. Whence it can stand for only one person or for many—one when we say, “God begot God,” but many when we say, “God is a Trinity.”

And this latter opinion appears to be more true. For, as is said in the Book of Causes, (Proclus, Book of Causes (Liber de causis), prop. 6.) every name falls short of signifying the divine existence because no name signifies simultaneously something perfect and simple, since abstract names do not signify a being subsisting through itself, and concrete ones signify a composite being; nonetheless, setting aside what there is of imperfection, we use both such names in the divine—the abstract on account of his simplicity, and the concrete on account of his perfection. Whence this name “God” signifies through the mode of the perfect and subsisting through itself, like the name “man.” This is also why just as this name “man” in itself indicates not only the essence, but also the supposit, albeit indistinctly (otherwise it would not be predicated of the individuals), so too does this name “God.” And therefore from itself it has the ability to stand for a person, and it does not have that it stands for the essence from the name’s mode of signifying; rather, it does this only by reason of the divine simplicity, wherein the essence is the same thing in reality as the supposit.

Reply Obj. 1: To generate signifies a personal property through the mode of an act. Now, an act belongs only to supposits, for humanity does not generate, but a man does. And therefore when one says, “God generates God,” the expression is simply speaking true because an act can be referred only to a supposit. But being referred and distinguished signify acts only grammatically speaking, so they can be referred to the essence and the supposit. And therefore it should not be granted simply speaking that “God is distinguished from God,” lest the distinction be referred to the essence—and especially since this name “God” indicates an indistinct supposit, which is distinguished only by an added personal property, like paternity or filiation.

Reply Obj. 2: Although this name “God” signifies the essence, still in itself it stands for what possesses the essence and is a reality of the nature—even without the persons being understood, which our faith distinguishes. Whence it can stand for the person even if he is not restricted from another. And because it stands for a person indistinctly, still it can stand in the expression for any person whatsoever, and thereby the expression is rendered true. This is why, in the proposition “God generates God,” in the subject it stands for the Father, and in the predicate it stands for the Son.

Reply Obj. 3: This name “God” properly speaking is neither universal nor singular, but rather it has something of the account of the universal, in that it is predicated essentially of many supposits; and thereby the things that are predicated of singular supposits can be predicated of it too. But it also has something of the account of the singular, in that it is not multiplied according to the multitude of its supposits. For we say that the Father and Son are one God, but Socrates and Plato are many men. And on this side, with the name “God,” negation and affirmation said of him are opposed as contradictory, so just as “Socrates runs” and “Socrates does not run” cannot be simultaneously true, so too neither can “God generates” and “God does not generate.”

Article 3

Whether God begot himself or another God

To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that God begot either God himself, or he begot another God.

Obj. 1: For the same and the diverse universally divide being. But “himself” is a relative of identity and “another” indicates diversity. Therefore one must say that God begot either God himself or another God.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as has been said in the previous article, the name “God” is drawn to stand for a person through a notional addition. But “another” indicates a notional distinction. Therefore the word “another” makes the name “God” stand for a person. But this is true: “God begot another divine person.” Therefore so is this: “God begot another God.”

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it seems that “God begot himself as God” is true. For, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.9, 1018a6‒8; 5.10, 1018a35‒36; 5.15, 1021a10‒13.) the “same” is what is one in substance, just as “equal” is what is one in quantity. But just as there is one greatness, or magnitude, of the Father and the Son, so too there is one substance. Therefore one grants that God begot an equal God, so one should grant that God begot the same God. Whence likewise this too: “God begot himself as God,” since “himself” is a relative of identity.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, one asks about two other propositions: “he begot God who is God the Father,” or “he begot God who is not God the Father.” For it seems that this is false: “he begot God who is God the Father.” For “who,” since it is a relative pronoun, causes a secondary notion of the supposits, but the term “God,” to which it refers, stands for the person of the Son. Therefore also the relative pronoun “who” will stand for the person of the Son. But this is false: “The Son is God the Father.” Therefore so is this: “God begot God, who is the Father.”

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it seems that the negative is also false. For negation is in reference to a term that follows what is formal in the sentence. Therefore when one says, “God begot God who is not God the Father,” then by negation one removes from the Son, to which the relative pronoun refers, the word “God,” which is placed in the predicate. And this is so not only as regards the supposit of the word “God” but as regards the form. And thus, the divine essence will be removed from the Son, which is false.

I answer that in the text (Sent. I, 4.2(14).4.) the Master denies both of the aforesaid statements. For “another,” since it notes diversity, places its own form on the term to which it is joined, since it is an adjective, and thereby a diversity in the form of the divinity will be designated. Moreover, “himself,” since it is a relative pronoun of identity, refers to the same supposit, and thereby when I say, “he begot himself God,” a non-distinction of supposit is being asserted between the Father and the Son. And when one says, “he begot another God,” a diversity of nature is being asserted. And therefore both of these should be denied.

But there are some who distinguish “he begot another God.” For the word “another” can be taken substantively or adjectivally, and if adjectivally, then the expression will be false, since it asserts a diversity as regards the word “God.” But if it is taken substantively, then the construction will be an apposition, and the expression will be true, and the meaning will be “he begot another, who is God.” But because it is not found to be the case that the adjective in the masculine gender is used substantively, and especially when a substantive noun is joined to it, this distinction does not appear to be very helpful—unless perhaps the participle “being” is understood here, so that one might say, “another being, God.” But this will be very tortuous. So one should say, with the Master, that both are false.

Reply Obj. 1: “Same” and “diverse” do sufficiently divide created being, because wherever there is a diversity of supposits in created things, there is a diversity of essence. But in God there is one essence in the diverse supposits, and therefore identity is not fitting, on account of the diversity of the supposits, and neither is diversity, on account of the identity of the essence; rather, only unity is fitting.

Reply Obj. 2: “Another” indicates distinction commonly speaking, not more personal distinction than essential. And therefore when it is joined to a personal term, it indicates a personal distinction, and when it is joined to an essential term, it indicates a diversity of essence, according to the requirements of that term’s form. For terms, especially substantial terms, receive diversity and plurality on the side of their forms.

Reply Obj. 3: “Same” signifies unity in substance, and besides this, since it is a relative and has an implicit specification, it indicates the unity of supposit. And the pronoun “himself,” which is also a reflexive relative pronoun, which is not so in the name “equal,” does this even more so. And therefore what is induced as being similar is not.

Reply Obj. 4: The Master makes a distinction for each of those propositions. For if, when one says, “God begot God, who is God the Father,” the word “Father” is being taken as an apposition with the word “God,” the expression is false. For the word “God” is not restricted to stand for the person of the Father, and thereby the meaning will be: “he begot God, who is the Father himself.” And such an affirmation is false, and its denial is true. However, if they are not understood as an apposition, but those terms “God” and “Father” are being joined by an intermediate, then the meaning is: “he begot God, he who is God, and God is a Father.” And then the affirmation is true, and the denial false.

Nevertheless Prevostin (Gilbert Prevostin (Praepositinus or Prevostinus) of Cremona (c. 1135–1210 AD) was the chancellor of the University of Paris from around 1206 to 1209 AD. He was the teacher of William of Auxerre and a student of Peter Comestor, who was taught by Peter Lombard himself. See Praepostinus, Summa theologica, bk. 1, “On Divine Names.”) has said that both of these latter propositions are false, and neither are they contradictory, because of diverse suppositions of the relative pronoun “who.” For in affirmatives it refers only to the supposit of the antecedent, and since the antecedent stands for the person of the Son, it would refer to the person of the Son, of which it is not true to say that he is God the Father. But in a negative, a relative refers not only to the supposit but even to the essence, so it would have to be that the predicate “God the Father” is removed not only from the supposit of the Son, but even from his essence—and then it is false.

But even with this distinction made, the Master’s distinction still has a place, and especially in the affirmative. And further, because it does not seem necessary that in negative assertions the relative pronoun refers differently than in affirmatives, except perhaps on account of a negation in which one can confuse a term and make it be held simply speaking—and yet this confusion does not hold in reference to what comes before it, but only in reference to what comes after it. Therefore the Master’s path seems more efficient, and following him, one should grant that both can be true and false, and the solution to the fourth argument is clear from this distinction.

Reply Obj. 5: When two terms are drawn together through apposition, the apposite term is established as though it were the form of that to which it is attached. Whence if the last words in “he begot God who is not God the Father” is understood as an apposition, the denial will not remove from the Son the form of divinity, but only that of paternity.

Question 2

Divine predication

Next, one asks about divine predication. And two things are asked about this:

first, whether in the divine there can be predication through any proposition;

second, whether a person can be predicated of the essence.

Article 1

Whether in divine things any proposition can be formed

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 22, a. 2, ad 1; ST I.13.12; SCG I.36; On the Power of God, q. 7, a. 5, ad 2.) It seems that in the divine no proposition can be formed wherein something is predicated of him.

Obj. 1: For a sign’s truth consists in the sign’s conformity to what it signifies. But every predication is made through composition. Therefore, since there is no composition in God, it seems that no true predicative proposition can be formed about him.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Dionysius says, in God negations are true, whereas affirmations are incongruous. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 2, para. 3 (PG 3:142).) Now, that is called “incongruous” which is not ordered in the appropriate way, nor which is fitting. But such lack of order brings about falsity in propositions. Therefore it seems that the same is true as before.

On the contrary, what belongs to the faith cannot be subject to the false. But we state many affirmative propositions about God according to our faith, such as that God is three and one. Therefore it seems that a true proposition can be formed about God.

Furthermore, according to Boethius, (Boethius, Commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation, bk. 2, ch. 14.) no proposition is truer than when the same thing is predicated of itself. But whatever is present in the divine is the same as it is in reality, since in God the possessor and the possessed are the same; and so too that “which he is” and that “by which he is,” with the exception that one person is not another. Therefore it seems that the truest statements can be formed about God.

I answer that a statement follows on an apprehension, which is why we must state things insofar as we understand them. Now, apprehension arises according to the power of the one apprehending, and therefore our intellect states things that are simple through the mode of some composition, just as conversely God understands composite things in a simple mode. So it is that our intellect forms propositions about God according to the mode of composite realities, from which it naturally takes cognition.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as our intellect falls short of knowing the divine majesty, so too its statement falls short of perfect signification. Nonetheless it is true insofar as the intellect that forms the statement takes two things that are diverse according to mode and the same in reality. Whence according to the diversity of the accounts it forms the predicate and the subject, and according to their identity it composes them.

Reply Obj. 2: Affirmative propositions are said to be to some degree “incongruous” in the divine because none of the things that are predicated of God signify him through the mode in which he exists; rather, they signify him through the mode in which our intellect receives him, when it has been informed by created things. Whence such names predicated of God must be understood to be predicated with the modes wherein they are predicated of created things already removed. This is why Dionysius (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7, para. 1 (PG 3:866).) teaches one to expound all divine predications as follows: God is wise, and not wise, that is, not as others are wise, such that the wisdom in him is different from the one who is wise; rather, he is beyond wise, insofar as wisdom is in him in a nobler mode than is signified by the name.

Article 2

Whether a person can be predicated of the essence

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.39.6.) It seems that no person can be predicated of the essence.

Obj. 1: For a predicate has the account of form, whereas a person is a supposit of form or nature. Therefore a person does not have an account that would be predicated of the nature or essence.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a predicate is always signified as present in the subject. Now, a person is not signified as inhering in its essence, but rather vice versa. Therefore a person cannot be predicated of an essence.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is logically higher is through itself predicated of its inferior, like man of Socrates, whereas Socrates is predicated of man by accidental predication, since being Socrates is accidental to man. But just as Socrates is a supposit of human nature, so too is the Father a supposit of the divine nature. Therefore it seems that “God is the Father” is not true, except maybe accidentally.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, as has been said, (Above, q. 1, a. 2.) this name “God” as such stands for a person. But the following is false: “one person is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.” Therefore so is this: “one God is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.”

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it seems that “God is Trinity” is false. For nothing is predicated of man that is not predicated of any supposit of man. But “Trinity” is not predicated of the Father or of the Son or of the Holy Spirit. Therefore for the same reason it cannot be said that God is Trinity.

I answer that in the divine there is an absolute lack of difference between nature and supposit, and therefore there is neither universal nor particular there; and so, the essence is just as truly predicated of the person as is the converse. But it is true that, as regards the mode of signifying, a proposition wherein the essence is predicated has more propriety than one wherein a person is predicated, since a predicate stands in the place of form.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the person is the supposit, still on account of the lack of difference between the supposit and the nature, the person is of equal simplicity with the nature. And therefore they are predicated interchangeably of each other.

Reply Obj. 2: This is clear, because in God what possesses and what is possessed are the same in reality.

Reply Obj. 3: In the divine there is nothing accidental, nor is there universal and particular, and therefore nothing is said accidentally there, nor in a consequent way, as happens in created things. Rather, one finds there only this mode of signifying or another.

Reply Obj. 4: The name “God,” of itself, (ST I.39.4, ad 3: Aquinas states that the name “God” “supposits per se for the common nature, whereas its supposition is delimited to a person by something added to it,” per se supponit pro natura communi, sed ex adjuncta determinatur ejus suppositio ad personam.) even though it stands for a person, still does not stand for a certain person in a distinct way; rather, it does so indeterminately. Nor is the form signified by the name “God,” from which the name is imposed, a personal property; but rather, it is the common nature. And therefore the unity signified through the adjective “one” is referred to the form of the divinity, and not to the supposit. But the name “person” is imposed from the personal property, which is the form signified by the term, so “one person is the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit” is false. For one personhood would be signified of the three persons.

Reply Obj. 5: “Father” stands for a distinct person, just as do “Son” and “Holy Spirit,” but the name “God” stands for a person in an indeterminate way. And therefore, by reason of the lack of determination, something can be predicated of God that is predicated of none of the distinct persons, just as even of man it can be said that to no individual belongs being common, whether the species, or the like. However, the reason why several persons of men cannot simultaneously be predicated of the name “man” is that the several persons are not one man in the way the several persons are one God and Trinity. Therefore it is said fittingly that God is three persons or the Trinity.

Exposition of the text

God the Father generated himself as an other. (Sent. I, 4.2(14).4; the Silano translation, given here, avoids Aquinas’s puzzle by giving something of an interpretation of the Latin. The Latin appears to say, literally, “God the Father begot another self.”) The Master solves this in two ways. For the word “himself” can be in the ablative case, and then it would be simply true, and the meaning would be “generated an other than himself.” Or it can be in the accusative case, and then either it makes reference to the simple relation—and thus it too is true, for it indicates an identity of nature, but it will be improper—or it will make reference to the personal relation of the Father, and thus it is false, since it is referring to the same supposit. Nonetheless it can be said that even if it refers to the same supposit, in a certain way it will be true, but it will be an expression of emphasis, such that the meaning is: “he generated another self, that is, another like himself,” just as a poet says, may the gods make it so that ‘I’ dies not without me. (Mandonnet notes no source. The expression is deliberately grammatically unsound, as the poet wants to speak of his friend dying, but as though his friend is not other than himself, using the third-person form of the verb with the first-person pronoun: “I dies.” For a similar example, see also Augustine: et ideo forte mori metuebam, ne totus ille moreretur, quem multum amaveram, “but it may have been that I was afraid to die, lest he should then die wholly whom I had so greatly loved” (Augustine, Confessions, bk. 4, ch. 6 [CCSL 27; PL 32:698]).)