D. 20 - Equality of the divine persons in power

Division of the text

After he has proved the equality of the persons in their magnitude, here he shows their equality in power. And this is divided into two parts: first, he proposes his intention; second, he proves what he proposes with arguments from Augustine*: he who said, ‘All that the Father has is also mine.’* (Sent. I, 20.2(85).1, quoting Augustine, Against Maximinus, bk. 2, ch. 14, para. 7 (CCSL 87A; PL 42:774); John 16:15.)

And this is divided into two: in the first, Augustine proves the proposition by an authority; in the second, he does so by an argument, at also, . . . he proves in another way that the Son is equal to the Father. (Sent. I, 20.3(86).4.)

As regards the first he does two things: first, he presents Augustine’s proof; second, he refutes the dual response of the heretics, at with regard to might, you feel that the Son is powerful, but that the Father is more powerful. (Sent. I, 20.3(86).1, quoting Augustine, Against Maximinus, bk. 2, ch. 12, para. 1 (PL 42:766).) The proof is as follows. If the Son has less power than the Father, he does not have all the Father has. But the Son does have all the Father has, as John 16:15 says. Therefore he does not have less than the Father in power, and thus is equal to the Father in power.

With regard to might, you feel that the Son is powerful, but that the Father is more powerful. (Sent. I, 20.3(86).1.) Here he refutes the responses of the heretic, and it is divided into two parts, according to their two responses. The second is at, but, you say, the Father did not receive might from anyone. (Sent. I, 19.3(86).2, quoting Augustine, Against Maximinus, bk. 2, ch. 12, para. 1 (PL 42:766‒67).) The heretic’s first response to the authority cited is as follows. It is true that whatever the Father has, the Son has, for example, goodness, wisdom, power, and the like; but he does not have as much of each of these as does the Father. For this does not appear to be held in the authority cited. Augustine refutes this in the following way. All things that the Father has, the Son has. But the Father has omnipotence. Therefore so does the Son, and so he has just as much power. The heretic’s second response is as follows. Although the Son has all the things that the Father has, still the very fact that he has given them to the Son shows that the Father is more powerful. Augustine refutes this as follows. It is true that the Father has given power to the Son, so either he gave him equal power or he did not; and if equal, then just as the Father is omnipotent, the Son is omnipotent; and if not equal, then the Son does not have all things that the Father has.

Also, . . . he proves in another way that the Son is equal to the Father. (Sent. I, 20.3(86).4.) Here he presents the second proof, through argument, and he does three things in reference to this: first, he presents the argument; second, he confirms it based on a likeness, at he shows that this is the case by a human analogy; (Sent. I, 20.3(86).6.) third, he refutes the heretic’s response, at but perhaps you will say: the Father is greater than the Son by the very fact that, being unbegotten of anyone, yet he begot his equal. (Sent. I, 20.3(86).7, quoting Augustine, Against Maximinus, bk. 2, ch. 18, para. 3 (PL 42:786).)

The proof is as follows. If the Father begot a Son less than himself in power, either he was able to beget an equal and he did not wish to, or he wished to but was not able. If he was able to do so, but did not wish to do so, he was envious; if he wished to do so, but was not able to do so, he was not omnipotent—and each of these is impossible. Therefore it is impossible for the Son not to be equal to the Father in power, and for that reason he brings in the likeness concerning human generation, as is clear in the text.

But perhaps you will say: the Father is greater than the Son by the very fact that, being unbegotten of anyone, yet he begot his equal. (Sent. I, 20.3(86).7, quoting Augustine, Against Maximinus, bk. 2, ch. 18, para. 3 (PL 42:786).) Here he refutes the heretic’s response. For someone could say that, from the very fact that the Son is from the Father, he is unequal to him. Augustine refutes this as follows. Equality and inequality are considered with reference to quantity, not with reference to relation. But the statement that the Son is from the Father designates only a relation of origin. Therefore this does not show any inequality of the Father relative to the Son.

Question 1

The equality of the divine persons in power

Here three things are asked:

first, whether the Son is omnipotent;

second, whether he is equal to the Father in omnipotence;

third, whether there is any order between the Father and the Son.

Article 1

Whether the Son is omnipotent

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that the Son is not omnipotent.

Obj. 1: For potency, as has been said, (Above, d. 7, q. 1, a. 1.) is spoken of according to a power for a work. But there is a certain action that pertains to the Father’s omnipotence of which the Son is not capable—namely, active generation; for the Son cannot generate, as was said in the same distinction. (Above, d. 7, q. 2, a. 2.) Therefore it seems that he is not omnipotent.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, God is said to be omnipotent because he can do all things that are simply speaking possible. But the greatest ability of the Father is shown in his generation of the Son, for it is infinitely greater to generate the Son than to create the heavens and the earth. Therefore, since that ability is withheld from the Son, it appears that he is not omnipotent.

Obj. 3: You might say that to be able to generate is not something, but relative to something, and although in this way the Son cannot generate, yet it does not follow that he cannot do all things.

On the contrary, when I say “all things” I include universally all beings. But relatives are contained among beings. Therefore the scope of “all” applies even to relatives.

Obj. 4: You might say that “omnipotent” is understood in reference to all created things, not in reference to the things that are in God, then.

On the contrary, according to this Augustine’s argument in the text (Sent. I, 20.3(86).3, quoting Augustine, Against Maximinus, bk. 2, ch. 12, para. 1 (PL 42:766).) is of no avail. For he argues that if the Father was not able to generate a Son equal to himself, then he was not omnipotent. Therefore it seems that the Father’s omnipotence extends even to the generation of the Son. But the Son cannot generate. Therefore he does not have omnipotence.

On the contrary, there is what is said in the Creed: omnipotent Father, omnipotent Son, omnipotent Holy Spirit. (Athanasian Creed (PG 28:1593).)

I answer that it should be granted without any doubt that the Son of God is just as omnipotent as is the Father, and that yet we say that the Son cannot generate. Whence, to understand this, one must see that God is called “omnipotent” because he is capable of all things, and that whatever is something, or a being, God is capable of it.

But one should note that relation is said to be something in a different way than other beings. For in other beings, each is said to exist in two ways: with respect to their existence, and with respect to the account of their “whatness.” For example, wisdom according to its own existence places something in its subject, and similarly, according to its account it places a certain nature in the genus of quality. But a relation is something according to its own existence, which it has in its subject, but according to its account it does not have it that it be something, but only that it is referred to something. This is why, according to its account, it does not place something in its subject, and on account of this Boethius says that relatives predicate nothing about that of which they are said. This is also why we find something related in which there is only a relation of reason, and nothing is placed there according to reality; for example, when the knowable is referred to knowledge.

And this is true both in the relations that are said of God and in the ones that are in created things, albeit in diverse ways. For a relation that has existence in something created has an existence other than the existence of its subject; whence it is something other than its subject. But in God there is nothing that has existence other than he himself; for the existence of his wisdom is the divine existence itself, and not something added to it. And the same is so for the existence of his paternity.

Whence the relation, with respect to its existence, according to which mode alone it must posit something, is the divine essence; but according to its account, through which it distinguishes one person from another, it need not predicate something, but it must predicate toward something. Therefore even though the Father has paternity, which the Son does not have, and paternity is something, nonetheless the Father does not have something that the Son does not have. And thus is the paternity the essence; nevertheless, it does not follow that the Father has some essence that the Son lacks. However, if the Father were to have wisdom, and the Son did not, the Father would have something that the Son would not have, since “wisdom” signifies something in the wise even according to its account.

Likewise, I say that, since in the divine to generate is a certain relation, and it is something, even though the Father can generate and the Son cannot, it does not follow that the Father can do something that the Son cannot do. But if the Father could understand and the Son could not, it would indeed follow that the Father could do something that the Son could not do. For example, the Father is the Father, and to be the Father is to be something, and yet, although the Son is not the Father, there is no being of the Father that is not the being of the Son, for every being in the divine is the being of the essence. And likewise, every toward-something is there according to the account of the essence, or according to the account of the attributes.

Reply Obj. 1: “Generation” signifies a relation through the mode of activity, and is also a certain activity of the divine nature, according to Damascene. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 8 (PG 94:814).) And although generation does not belong to the Son, nonetheless it does not follow that any activity belongs to the Father that does not belong to the Son. For by one and the same activity does the Father generate and the Son is born; but this activity is in the Father and the Son according to different relations.

Reply Obj. 2: No ability is withheld from the Son. But by the very same ability whereby the Father generates, so is the Son generated, as was said above in the body.

Reply Obj. 3: To be toward-something is included under “all things,” insofar as it has existence, for in this way toward-something is something among all things. But it is not so included insofar as it is referred to another, for in this way it is not something simply speaking.

Reply Obj. 4: God’s omnipotence can be compared to something either as to something brought about or as to the activity itself. As to the thing brought about, it is not being compared to something that is in God himself, for nothing within God is made; and in this way his omnipotence is related only to created things. But it is compared to the activity as to what is within him, especially since he has no activity that is outside his essence. Whence the omnipotence of the Father extends to generating, to understanding, to creating, and, in brief, to all things that belong to perfection. And therefore it is clear that Augustine’s argument is effective. (Above, d. 2, q. 1, a. 5.)

Nonetheless it does not follow that the Son is not omnipotent because he cannot generate a Son equal to himself, by the aforesaid argument. Yet it would follow for the Father. For the relation signified in active generation is not absent from the Father. This is why, if one were to deny him the perfection of generation, there would have to be a defect in the very activity insofar as it is an activity, and that would redound to a defect of his power. But active generation is removed from the Son only by reason of the relation it brings in. However, relation as such has no order to power, as is clear from things said. (Above, d. 2, a. 5.)

Article 2

Whether the Son is equal to the Father in omnipotence

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.42.6; SCG IV.7‒8.) It seems that the Son is not equal to the Father in omnipotence.

Obj. 1: For, as will be said below, (In I Sent., d. 31, q. 1, a. 2.) power is appropriated to the Father, but not to the Son. Therefore it seems that it belongs to the Father more than to the Son. And in this way they are not equal in power.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, between having something from another personally and essentially, and not having something from another either personally or essentially, the intermediate is to have something from another personally but not essentially. But not to have something from another either personally or essentially, which belongs to the Father, belongs to dignity and authority. On the other hand, to have something from someone personally and essentially, which belongs to the created, indicates the diminishment and defect of the created relative to its Creator. Therefore, since an intermediate savors of the nature of its extremes, it seems that to have something from another personally and not essentially belongs to the Son insofar as this has something of dignity, namely, that he does not have it from another essentially, and insofar as this indicates a defect and diminishment in having it from another personally. And in this way the Son is less than the Father.

Obj. 3: In this way we see in created things that nothing received from another is equal in power to that from which it is received, just as the light in the air is not equal in power with the light in the sun. But the power in the Son is received from the Father. Therefore it seems that the Son is not equal to the Father in power.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, what acts through another seems to be more powerful than that through which it acts. But the Father acts through the Son, not vice versa. Therefore the Father is more powerful than the Son.

On the contrary, the power is rooted in the essence. But the essence of the Father and the Son is numerically one. Therefore so is the power. Therefore there is no inequality of power, since every inequality asserts a diversity, for just as the one in quantity constitutes the equal, so the diverse in quantity constitutes the unequal, which we grant.

Reply Obj. 1: Power is appropriated to the Father not because it belongs to him more than to the Son, but because it has a greater likeness with what is proper to the Father than with what is proper to the Son. For power has the account of a principle, and the Father is the principle that is not from a principle.

Reply Obj. 2: To have something from another essentially and personally indicates a defect only as regards having from another essentially—that is, where there is a diversity of essence. For this causes an inequality of magnitude and power, since diversity is the cause of inequality, just as unity is a cause of equality, as was said in the “on the contrary” argument above. And in this respect, the Son is not an intermediate between the Father and the created; indeed, by an equal and the very same dignity, to not have something from another essentially belongs to the Son just as it does to the Father.

Reply Obj. 3: In lower things, sometimes something is received in the same power that is in that from which it is received—namely, when the receiver is proportionate to receiving the entire power of the giver. This is clear in every univocal generation, such as when a man generates a man, and a fire a fire. However, sometimes not the entire power is received, and this is due to a defect in a receiver not proportionate to receiving the whole that the agent can pour forth. For example, the lower bodies stand this way to the action of the sun. Or perhaps this happens due to a defect in the agent, the power of which is deficient as regards communicating its own likeness. For example, a small spark cannot heat up a piece of wood, even if it is well disposed. But in the divine there is no defect on the side of the giver or on the side of the receiver, since there is one and the same power in each. And therefore the Son receives just as much power from the Father as he has.

Reply Obj. 4: When one says that the Father acts through the Son, no gradation of power is being asserted. Rather, one is signifying the authority that is in the Father, as was said. (Above, d. 15, q. 1, a. 4.)

Article 3

Whether there is order in the divine persons; whether an order of nature is there

Quaestiuncula 1

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: above, d. 12, a. 1; ST I.42.3; On the Power of God, q. 10, a. 3; On the Catholic Faith of the Greek Fathers (Contra errores Graecorum)**, pt. 2, ch. 31.) It seems that in the divine persons there is no order.

Obj. 1: For as Augustine says, order is a disposition of equals and unequals, bestowing places on them and to each. (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 19, ch. 13 (PL 41:1249).) But no disposition of place befits the divine persons. Therefore it seems that neither would an order.

Obj. 2: Boethius says that a difference of the Godhead follows things that establish a gradation in the Trinity. (Boethius, On the Trinity, ch. 1 (PL 64:1249).) But wherever there is order, there is some gradation. Therefore if there is an order in the divine persons, it seems that a diversity of the Godhead would follow. But this is impossible, so the divine persons have no order.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, where there is the same eternity, simplicity, and dignity, it seems there is no order; for equal eternity excludes an order of time; equal simplicity, an order of cause to effect and part to whole; and equal dignity, an order of dignity. But in the Father and the Son there is numerically the same eternity, simplicity, and dignity. Therefore there is no order.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, whatever is in the divine signifies either the essence or an account. But order pertains neither to the divine essence, in which there is no distinction, nor to an account, since there is no account common to the three persons as an order. Therefore it seems that there is no order in the divine persons.

On the contrary (5), wherever there is a plurality without order, there is confusion. But in the divine persons there is plurality without confusion. Therefore an order is there.

Furthermore (6), it is also seen that the Holy Spirit is called the “third” person in the Trinity, and this signifies a certain order.

Quaestiuncula 2

Moreover, it is asked whether an order of nature is there, and it seems not to be so.

Obj. 1: For every order brings in a certain distinction. But in the divine nature there is no distinction. Therefore neither is there any order of the divine nature, so in the divine persons there is no order of nature.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the divine nature is the same as the essence. But no one would say that there is an order of essence in the divine persons. Therefore neither would one say that for an order of nature.

On the contrary, the text says otherwise. (Sent. I, 20.3(86).7, quoting Augustine, Against Maximinus, bk. 2, ch. 14, para. 8 (PL 42:775).)

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that, in its account, “order” includes three things.

First, it includes the account of the prior and the posterior; this is why with respect to all the ways something is said to be prior to another—according to place, according to time, and according to all things of this sort—there can be said to have an order.

It also includes distinction, since there is order only of things that are distinct from each other; but the name “order” presupposes this more than it signifies it.

And third, it even includes the account of the order due to which the order is specified; whence order with respect to place is one species of order, order with respect to dignity another, with respect to origin another, and so on. And that last species of order—the order of origin—belongs to the divine persons.

Whence I say that an order of origin is being signified when one says, “origin of nature,” insofar as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 5 (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.4, 1014b18.) that “nature” is that from which a sprout first springs forth. Whence the name “nature” brings in the account of origin, and in this way these two nouns, “order” and “of nature” are taken in the force of one noun, to signify the species of the order. This species is preserved in the divine persons as regards the account of its difference, that is, origin, but not as regards the account of its genus, that is, priority and posteriority, just as has been said about many other names. And this is clear from the definition that Augustine presents, that an order of nature is that by which someone is from someone else; here the difference of origin is being asserted, and not that one is prior to another, wherein the account of the genus is removed. Whence one should not grant that order is there simply speaking, but only an order of nature.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine’s definition there is given for an order of place, which is not appropriate to the divine persons.

Reply Obj. 2: Gradation indicates a certain species of order—namely, one according to dignity or perfection, or according to place. And none of these befits the divine persons, so neither does gradation.

Reply Obj. 3: That argument follows for order with reference to the account of the genus, insofar as is asserts the prior and posterior. And that order in no way belongs in the divine.

Reply Obj. 4: This name “order” signifies an account, but not a specific one, but something common that is made determinate according to diverse things joined to it. For example, when one speaks of the order of the Father to the Son, the account of paternity is being signified, and when one speaks of the order of the Son to the Father, the account of filiation is being signified; it is similarly clear with the others. It is also similar for the name “principle,” which signifies a different account when the Father is said to be the principle of the Son, and when he is said to be the principle of the Holy Spirit.

Reply Sed Contra 5: An order of origin is enough to prevent confusion from arising, and according to this order the Holy Spirit is called the “third” person.

Reply Sed Contra 6: Whence the reply to the sixth argument is clear.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To what is asked further, I say that an order of nature is there, yet not in such a way that the nature is ordered, or such that the Father is naturally prior to the Son. Rather, it is in such a way that it indicates an account of origin insofar as origin is brought in by “nature.” And although the divine nature is in reality the same as the essence, nonetheless the account of origin is not brought in by the name “essence” the way it is by the name “nature”; for they differ in account. And therefore an order of essence cannot be asserted, but an order of nature can.

Reply Obj. 1–2: And the replies to the objections are clear from this.

Exposition of the text

For if he has something less in might than the Father, then he does not have all the Father has. (Sent. I, 20.2(85).1, quoting Augustine, Against Maximinus, bk. 2, ch. 14, para. 7 (PL 42:774).) It appears that Augustine’s argument is not valid; rather, it changes a “what” into a “how much,” arguing that all that the Father has the Son also has, so the Son does not have a lesser power than does the Father. Nor does what he brings in later about omnipotence seem valid, that “omnipotence” names also a quantity of power. So there seems to be the same error in both. But one should say to this that, although the mode of arguing is not valid, still it is valid from the nature of the thing about which the argument is made. For it cannot be the case that what the Father has the Son also has, unless it be numerically unchanged. Whence as much as is in the Father, so much must also be in the Son.

But if you say that he would not, then you have called him envious. (Sent. I, 20.3(86).4, quoting Augustine, Against Maximinus, bk. 2, ch. 7 (PL 42:774).) This does not appear to follow, since through the same manner it could be proved that he was not able to make any created thing better than he has made. But to this one should say that these are not alike, since if one denies a thing what is owed to it, this is envy, but not if one does not give a thing what is not owed to it. Now, the equality with his begetter is owed to the Son from the nature of his Godhead, so if it were withheld, it would be envy. However, to no created thing is owed, according to its nature, a fuller perfection than what follows on the principles of its nature. This is why, if something is added to the rational nature, it is imputed to grace; and so too it could be withheld even without envy.

But the question of equality is: of what quality and how great is he. (Sent. I, 20.3(86).7, quoting Augustine, Against Maximinus, bk. 2, ch. 18, para. 3 (PL 42:775); the Silano translation translates qualis as “what” instead of as “of what quality,” as we have rendered it here to make clearer the objection to which Aquinas responds.) This appears to be false, since unity of quality does not cause equality, but rather likeness, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.15, 1021a10‒13.) But one should say that, in the divine, equality should be viewed only in reference to quantity of power. Now, this quantity is founded on quality, and this is why it is said that equality is viewed according to quality.