D. 7 - The commonness of the power of generation

Division of the text

After having manifested the proper principle of the divine generation, which is the nature and not the will, here he looks into the commonness of the principle—that is, whether the power for generating is common to the Father and the Son. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he looks into the commonness of the generative power, taken concretely; in the second, he looks into its commonness taken in the abstract, at also, it is asked by some whether the Father by nature has the power to beget the Son, and whether this is a power which is in the Son. (Sent. I, 7.2(20).1.)

The first part is divided into three: first, he answers the question; second, he presents a doubt, at but we are strongly shaken by what Augustine says; (Sent. I, 7.1(19).2.) and third, he presents a solution, at and so how shall that phrase be taken which is set out above? (Sent. I, 7.1(19).4.)

As regards the first, he does three things: first, he lays out the question; second, he lays out the answer, at we respond to this subtlety with ease; (Sent. I, 7.1(19).1.) third, he confirms it through a likeness, at we can also see this from an analogy. (Sent. I, 7.1(19).1.)

But we are strongly shaken by what Augustine says. (Sent. I, 7.1(19).2.) Here he lays out the doubt: and first he presents Augustine on one side; second, for the contrary side he brings in an argument that some give, at but it does not seem to some that this can stand. (Sent. I, 7.1(19).3.)

And so how shall that phrase be taken which is set out above? (Sent. I, 7.1(19).4.) Here he solves it, and first he makes known the difficulty of resolving this, and then he presents his solution, at therefore, . . . it may be understood as follows. (Sent. I, 7.1(19).5.)

Here two things are asked:

first, about the power of generating in God; (Q. 1.)

and second, about its commonness. (Q. 2.)

Question 1

The power of generation in God

As regards the first, three things are asked:

first, whether in God there is a power for generating;

second, what that power is, something absolute or something toward-something; (That is, something absolute or something relative.)

third, its relation to the power of creating.

Article 1

Whether there is a generative power in God

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that there is no power to generate in God. (Parallel texts: ST I.41.4; On the Power of God, q. 2, a. 1.)

Obj. 1: For whatever goes forth from a power, whether it be the power of an agent or one of matter, is in potency before it is in act. But the generation of the Son from the Father is not like this, since it is eternal. Therefore it does not go forth from any power. Therefore in God there is no power to generate.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what belongs to a nature through itself does not go forth from it by the mediation of any power, just as the soul gives such existence to the body without anything mediating. But generation is a work of the nature through itself, as Damascene says. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 8 (PG 94:814).) Therefore it is not the work of a power, so the same thing follows.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every power is either active or passive. But in the Father there is no passive power for generating the Son, since then he would more be called a mother than a father. Nor is there an active power in him, since, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.15, 1021a15‒27; 9.1, 1046a10‒14.) an active power is a principle of change in another, so an active power requires matter in which it acts. However, the Son’s generation is not from matter. Therefore it seems that in God there is no power to generate.

On the contrary, Augustine argues, if the Father was not able to generate a Son equal and coeternal with himself, he was lacking in power. (Augustine, Against Maximinus, bk. 2, ch. 7 (CCSL 87A; PL 42:761).) Therefore from this it seems that the divine power extends even to the generation of the Son.

Furthermore, every action demonstrates the power of the one acting. But the act of divine generation infinitely transcends the production of created things, which latter nonetheless manifests the divine omnipotence. Therefore it seems that much more strongly does the generation of the Son manifest the divine power, and only as its act. Therefore it seems that in God there is the power of generation.

I answer that in created things something is brought forth through a natural power, and such is brought forth as a likeness of the nature of the very one bringing it forth, as when a man generates a man. But something is also brought forth through a rational power, and such is brought forth as a likeness of the one bringing it forth as regards a species—not a species of nature, but a species of existing in his reason. For every agent makes something in some way like itself, just as the house is produced by the artisan, and it receives a likeness of the species that the artisan has in mind.

And according to these two modes, something is brought forth by God. For something proceeds from God in the likeness of his nature, receiving his entire nature; nor are they the same only in species—rather, they are numerically the same. And in this way the Son proceeds from the Father through the act of generation. Whence in God there is a power of generating like a natural power. But something also proceeds from God as a likeness of the idea existing in the divine mind, something that does not receive the divine nature, such as created things. Whence the power of acting in created things is as the rational power in God, and according to this power one views the omnipotence in God. For a divine person who proceeds through a power that is, as it were, natural is not something counted with all things. Whence the power of generation is not contained under his omnipotence, as is the power to create; but this is better explained below. (Sent. I, 20.)

Reply Obj. 1: That claim is true when the act really differs from the power from which it goes forth. For then it must be in potency before it is in act, either in time or in nature. But in God the essence, power, and activity are wholly the same in reality, but they differ only in account. Therefore the argument is not valid in the divine.

Or one could say that in the divine persons there is only an order of nature whereby, according to Augustine, (Augustine, Against Maximinus, bk. 2, ch. 14 (CCSL 87A; PL 42:770).) one is from the other, but not prior to the other. This is why one cannot conclude to any priority from the fact that the Son is generated from the Father’s power.

Reply Obj. 2: Nature or essence is related to two things: to the one who has it, and to that of which the nature is the principle. Therefore no middle power falls between the essence and what has the essence, as regards the act of the essence itself in its possessor, which is to exist. But the essence itself gives existence to what has it, and this act is, as it were, the first act. Another act also goes forth from the essence, which is also the act of the possessor of the essence as the act of an agent, and the act of the essence as of the principle of action. And this is the second act, and it is called “activity.” And between the essence and this activity there does fall a middle power that is different from both—in created things also really different, but in God different in account only. And such an act is generating. And therefore according to the mode of understanding, the nature is not its principle except by a mediating power.

Reply Obj. 3: The divine power is in no way passive, nor is it even truly active; rather, it is above act. For its action is not through the mode of motion, but through the mode of activity, which differs from motion, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Physics 3.3, 202a13‒23; Nicomachean Ethics 10.3, 1173a28‒b4.) as the perfect from the imperfect. And therefore it does not require matter on which to act, which cannot occur in an action that exists with motion, since every motion exists through a departure from potency into act. And therefore it is not necessary that creation occur from matter, and much less that the divine generation do so. This is why Avicenna says (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 10, ch. 9.) that the divine agent differs from the natural, for the natural agent is a cause of motion, but a divine agent is what gives the entire existence, as the world’s Creator.

Article 2

Whether the power of generating is relative

We proceed to the second as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.41.5; On the Power of God, q. 2, a. 2.) It seems that the power of generating is toward-something, or relative. (As noted above in d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, although ad aliquid is usually translated as “relation,” it is here rendered with the more literal “toward-something.” As awkward as it sounds, “toward-something” is more concrete than “relation” and emphasizes the character of relation as an orientation of a subject, whereas “relation” can sound more abstract and perhaps as something existing “between” the things related. (Additionally, “relation” in English tends to be restricted to persons and especially to persons genetically linked.) A further reason for this translation is that Aquinas will sometimes explain what a relatio is by saying that it is ad aliquid; so the phrases apparently do not express exactly the same account in his mind.)

Obj. 1: For when the understanding of the distinct persons is removed from the divine, there still remains the understanding of all the things that are said of him absolutely, like goodness, wisdom, and the like. But when the understanding of the persons is removed, the power of generating does not remain. For with the persons removed, the generation is removed, and with the generation removed, the power to generate is removed. For in the divine there can be nothing in potency that is not in act; otherwise God would be changeable. Therefore it is not one of the absolutes, but one of those spoken of as toward-something.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, powers are distinguished through acts. But in the divine “to generate” is spoken of as toward-something, since generation is itself a relative property, as has been said. (Above, d. 4, q. 1, a. 2.) Therefore so too is the power of generation.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every activity proper to some reality goes forth from the form proper to the same reality, just as to burn goes forth from the form of fire. But to generate the Son in the divine is the proper activity of the Father. Therefore its principle will be the proper form of the Father. Now, this is paternity, which is a certain relation. Therefore, since the principle of an activity is a power, it seems that the power of generation is toward-something.

On the contrary, what an act belongs to is what the power belongs to, according to the Philosopher. (See Aristotle, On Sense and the Sensed 3, 439a6‒8; 7, 449a5‒12.) But according to Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 8 (PG 94:814).) generation is the act of the nature. Therefore the power of generating belongs to the nature itself. But nature is said in an absolute way. Therefore so is the power of generating.

Furthermore, in every univocal generation the principle of the generation is the same as that of the terminus, just as a man generates a man. But the terminus of the generation in the divine is the essence, which is communicated through the generation, as has been said. (Above, d. 5, q. 1, a. 1.) Therefore the essence is also the principle of the generation, and thus it seems that the power of generating is essential.

I answer that some have said that the power of generating is simply speaking toward-something not only on the side of the act, but also on the side of the power itself; for a power indicates the relation of a principle.

But this argument is null. For a power is not relative according to its own existence, but only according to speech; indeed, “power” signifies not merely a principle’s relation, but also that which is a principle. For it is in this way that we are asking here about the power of generating. Now, the principle of every divine activity, as has been said, (Above, d. 4, q. 1, a. 1.) is the divine essence. But a certain act goes forth from the essence insofar as the essence is wisdom, and another act insofar as it is will, and so on for the other attributes. Likewise, I say that, because the personal property is really the essence, the essence insofar as it is paternity itself is the principle of the act that is generation—not a principle as an agent, but rather as that by which he acts. This is why the principle of the generation is essential under the account of a relation, and whence it is, as it were, a middle between the essential and the personal. For from the side by which it is a power, which is an intermediate between an essence and an activity, it is rooted in the essence, and is absolute. But from the side by which it is joined to the activity, it is relative.

Reply Obj. 1: Having removed the understanding of the persons, there remains things that are purely absolute. But the power of generating is of this sort, as was said in the body. And therefore it does not remain when the persons are taken away.

Reply Obj. 2: Although powers are made known through acts, still it is not necessary that powers and acts be placed in the same genus, especially for active powers. Whence although to generate is something toward-something, still it is not necessary that the power of generating is toward-something. But it is true that to be able to generate is to be able as regards something in the accusative case.

Reply Obj. 3: A common nature acts in each thing according to the condition of each. Whence the sensitive soul in diverse animals, and even in diverse organs of sensation, has diverse activities. And this is because the common nature is made determinate and contracted in each of them according to the properties found in it. Now, the divine nature is not contracted or made determinate by the properties of the supposits. Nevertheless, the divine nature in the Father is the property of the Father, and in the Son is the property of the Son, but it is not thereby contracted; for the property is not other than the nature itself, such that former might come to the latter as a contracting disposition. Therefore it is not made determinate or distinguished, since a relation is not distinguished according to that which it is—according to this it is compared only to the essence, with which it is the same in reality—but a relation is distinguished according to what is toward-another. And in this way it looks to a person, and distinguishes it. And therefore in the Father it is the principle of the activity according to the Father’s property, and it is in the Son according to the Son’s property.

Whence the same activity belongs to both the common nature and the proper form of the Father himself. And therefore the power of generating, as was said, is an intermediate between the absolute and the related. And this is what some intended to say when they said that the power of generating is absolute, if the power is considered as remote or indisposed, but toward-another, if the power is considered as disposed. But they have spoken of this improperly, since a property does not dispose the essence, but rather the supposit.

Reply Sed Contra: And thereby the solution to the things that followed is also clear.

Article 3

Whether the power to generate and the power to create are univocally called “powers”

To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that “power” is not said univocally of the power to generate and the power to create.

Obj. 1: For powers are distinguished through their acts, and the acts through their objects. But the Son of God and created things are not spoken of univocally in anything. Therefore neither are generation and creation, and so neither is the power to generate and to create.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the power to create is, simply speaking, absolute, but the power to generate is in a certain respect toward-something. Therefore, because nothing univocal is said about the absolute and the related, since they are in diverse categories, it seems that “power” is not said univocally of them both.

On the contrary (3), as was said in the previous article, the power to generate is the divine essence itself, and so too is the power to create. For God is the first agent and his every action is through his essence. Therefore it seems that both are one power.

Obj. 4: And supposing that “power” is said of them in some way according to priority and posteriority, it is asked which of these powers is prior. And it seems that the power to create is. For the common is before the proper, and the essential before the personal, according to the account of understanding. But the power to create is common to the three persons, whereas the power to generate seems to pertain properly to the person of the Father. Therefore it seems that the power to create is prior.

On the contrary (5), the order of powers is according to the order of their acts. But the generation is prior to creation as the eternal to the temporal. Therefore the power of generation is also prior.

I answer that a power is an intermediate, according to the mode of understanding, between the essence and the nature’s activity. Therefore the power of creation and the power of generation can be considered insofar as they are rooted in the divine essence. And in this way there is numerically one power, which is more than “one” said univocally. They can also be considered on the side wherein they are joined to their activity. And according to this “power” is not said of them univocally, but according to the prior and the posterior, and the power to generate will be prior, according to the account of understanding, to the power to create, just as the generation of the Son is prior to creation.

Reply Obj. 1: The solution is clear, as this objection is about a power as compared to its act.

Reply Obj. 2: So too here, since the power to generate is not toward-something except on the side wherein it is joined to its act.

Reply Sed Contra 3: So too here, since this argument, which was on the contrary, proceeds from power insofar as it stands on the side of the essence.

Reply Obj. 4: In response to the fourth argument, it should be said that the common in the divine is before the proper when the common is taken through itself, according to the account of understanding. But when the common is taken in reference to created things, by reason of an added respect, it is posterior to what is proper to any person, according to the account of understanding.

Reply Sed Contra 5: We grant the fifth argument.

Question 2

The commonness of the power of generation

Next one asks about the commonness of this power, and two things are asked about it:

first, whether the power of generating is in the Son;

second, whether the Son can generate.

Article 1

Whether the power of generating is in the Son

To the first we proceed as follows.

Obj. 1: As was said, (Above, q. 1, a. 2.) the power of generating includes in itself the account of paternity. But paternity is not in the Son. Therefore neither is the power of generating.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, since “power” signifies the account of a principle, the “power of generating” signifies the principle of generation. But being the principle of generation in no way belongs to the Son, for then he would be a principle of his very self. Therefore in no way is the power of generating in the Son.

On the contrary (3), as has been said, (Above, q. 1, a. 2.) the power of generating is the divine essence itself. But the entire essence of the Father is in the Son. Therefore it seems that the power of generating is also in the Son.

Furthermore (4), no knowledge or will belongs to the Father that does not belong to the Son. Therefore neither does any power, since power is divided alongside the other two. But the power of generating is in the Father. Therefore it is also in the Son.

I answer that the “power of generating” is spoken of in three ways: insofar as “of generating” can be a gerund of an impersonal verb, or that of a personal active verb, or that of a personal passive verb.

If it is a gerund of an impersonal verb, then the power of generating is the power by which one is generated by someone; and in this way the power of generating is in the Son, that is, that by which he is generated by the Father.

If it is a gerund of a personal active verb, then the “power of generating” is called a power such that one might generate; and in this way it is not in the Son.

If it is a gerund of a personal passive verb, then the “power of generating” is called a power such that he might be generated; and in this way it is in the Son, since the same power that is in the Father such that he might generate is in the Son such that he might be generated.

And this distinction is founded on what has been said, (Above, q. 1, a. 2.) that the power of generating is the divine essence, due to which, insofar as it is the paternity in the Father, there is an active generation; and insofar as it is the filiation in the Son, there will also be a passive generation.

Reply Obj. 1: The power of generating, on the side by which it is joined to its act, includes paternity in itself, and in this respect it does not belong to the Son. But on the side by which it is rooted in the essence, it does not include paternity, and so it does belong to the Son, insofar as “of generating” is a gerund of the impersonal verb. Thereby “the power of generating is in the Son” means that the divine essence, through which the generation occurs due to the Father, is in him.

Reply Obj. 2: The power of generating is in the Father only insofar as it has the account of a principle included in itself through the mode of paternity. But in another mode it can be in the Son, as was said.

Reply Sed Contra 3: From the foregoing the solution to this one is also clear.

Reply Sed Contra 4: The divine will and knowledge do not have the account of a principle with respect to the generation of the Son, who proceeds through the mode of the nature, but only with respect to created things, which are brought forth from God as works of his art. But the divine power also has the account of a principle as regards the divine generation, and therefore it can be drawn to the personal, such that it is proper to a certain person, more than can the divine knowledge and will.

Article 2

Whether the Son can generate another son; whether the Father can generate another son

Quaestiuncula 1

To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that the Son can generate another son.

Obj. 1: For anything is capable of activity according to its unimpeded power. But the power of generating is in some way in the Son, as was said in the previous article. Therefore, since the power of God cannot be impeded, it seems that the Son can generate another son.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Son is an image of the Father that represents him perfectly, according to a perfect likeness. But the Father can generate. Therefore it seems that the Son can as well; otherwise he would not be perfectly like him.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every activity of a common nature, if it is in one of the supposits, is also in another; for example, understanding and reasoning are activities of the human nature in Socrates and Plato. But generation is an activity of the divine nature in the Father. Therefore it is also in the Son. Therefore it seems that the Son can generate a son.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, to be able to generate is something belonging to the Father’s dignity; otherwise it would not be a personal property. But there is no dignity in the Father that is not in the Son, since they are wholly equal in dignity. Therefore the Son can generate.

On the contrary, according to Anselm, (Anselm of Canterbury, Cur Deus homo, bk. 1, ch. 20 (PL 158:392).) the smallest incongruity is impossible for God. But if the Son were to generate a son, an incongruity would follow in God. For that son would generate another, and so on to infinity. Therefore it seems that the Son does not generate.

Furthermore, if the Son were to generate, there would not be the highest union and equal nearness there. For the Son of God would stand closer to his son of God than to the Father. And this does not seem fitting in the divine.

Quaestiuncula 2

Furthermore, it is asked whether the Father can generate another son. And it seems that he could. For his power is in no way diminished by generation. Therefore for the same reason for which he can generate one Son, he can also generate several.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that some have said that the Son can generate another son, but such power will never be brought to act, because of its unfittingness, as Augustine says in the text. (Sent. I, 7.1(19).2, citing Augustine, Against Maximinus, bk. 2, ch. 12 (CCSL 87A; PL 42:766).) But this amounts to nothing, because in perpetual things, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Physics 3.4, 203b230.) being and being able-to-be do not differ—and much less do they differ in the divine. Whence, whatever is not in God cannot be there; otherwise God would be changeable. Whence one should say simply speaking that the Son cannot generate a son.

And the reason for this is that that son would in no way be distinct from the other. For, because divine persons are not distinguished according to the division of matter since they are not material, no distinction remains there other than one through relations of origin. Now, it is impossible that one relation of origin, like filiation, be multiplied in number, since this would be a material multiplication. Whence in God there can only be one filiation, and by one filiation only one son is constituted, so in the divine there cannot be several sons, nor several fathers. And this pertains to the Son’s perfection, since in the divine there is nothing pertaining to filiation outside his very self, whereby he is the perfect Son.

Reply Obj. 1: In the Son there is no power to generate except insofar as it is rooted in the divine essence, and not on the side wherein it is joined to the act of generating. And therefore it does not follow that the act is there.

Reply Obj. 2: Wherever there is likeness there must be some distinction; for, according to Boethius, (Boethius, In Porphyrii Isagogen commentorum editio secunda, bk. 3, ch. 9 (CSEL 48:228; PL 64:99).) likeness is the same quality of different realities; otherwise there would be not likeness but identity. Whence between the Son and the Father a perfect likeness is preserved, for, even with their distinction remaining, they share together all the attributes. Now, if the Son were to generate, no distinction between the Father and the Son would remain, since the only distinction there is through relations of origin, and there can be only one paternity there, as was said in the body of the article.

Reply Obj. 3: To generate is not the act of the divine nature except insofar as the divine nature is the paternity itself. And under such an account, the divine nature is not in the Son.

Reply Obj. 4: “Dignity” is among things said absolutely, so the dignity of the Father and the Son is numerically the same, just as the essence is the same. Whence, just as the paternity in the Father is the divine essence, and that same essence in the Son is not the paternity, but the filiation, so too numerically the same dignity that in the Father is paternity, is in the Son filiation.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

The solution to the last question asked is also clear from what has been said. For it is impossible that in the divine there be several sons. This is not due to a defect in the Father’s power, but due to the distinction of supposits of the divine nature, which would be taken away, as was said in body of the article.

Exposition of the text

For the divine generation would be without measure, if the Son who had been generated had generated a grandson to the Father. (Sent. I, 7.1(19).2, quoting Augustine, Against Maximinus, bk. 2, ch. 12 (CCSL 87A; PL 42:766).) For it seems not unfitting if the begotten one were always to beget another; indeed, it seems like the greatest good, since every generation whatsoever would be an infinite good. And to this it can be said that there are three ways it is unfitting: first, because if this were to go to infinity, since everything infinite is imperfect, the divine generation would never be perfect, and this argument is taken from the text; second, because there could be no distinction between the many begotten ones, as was said in the preceding article; and third, because although communication belongs to the nobility and simplicity of a nature, still an infinite communication occurs only from a defect of a nature. For because a nature cannot be preserved in eternal existence in a single individual, it intends through an infinite succession of individuals to preserve its perpetuity, at least insofar as they are the same in species. And this in no way befits God.

‘For it is not that he could not do so, but that it was not fitting that he should do so,’ may be understood as follows: that is, it was not because of his powerlessness that the Son did not generate, but because it was not fitting for him to do so. (Sent. I, 7.1(19).5, quoting Augustine, Against Maximinus, bk. 2, ch. 12 (CCSL 87A; PL 42:766).) This exposition seems rather tortured, and cannot be taken from Augustine’s words. But one should say to this that the Master takes this exposition from the fact that the word “not” can be taken merely negatively, and that is how the objection went. Or it can be taken as a privative, so that “he could not” is, as it were, an indefinite term; and thereby when he says, for it is not that he could not, lack of power is being denied.

But again it seems that it is due to the Son’s lack of power that he would not generate. For Augustine argues this way: if the Father was not able to generate a coeternal and coequal Son, he was lacking in power. Therefore it seems that, similarly, if the Son was not so able, he would be lacking in power.

To this, one should say that to generate a son is among things that pertain to the account of a father, and so nothing could be lacking of the perfection of generation, lest it redound to a lack of power in the Father. But to generate does not pertain to the account of a son—indeed this is more the opposite of filiation—and therefore the Son is not thereby shown to be lacking in power, just as a man is not said to be lacking in power unless he cannot do things that pertain to him.