D. 18 - The Holy Spirit as gift

Division of the text

Having considered the temporal procession of the Holy Spirit, here he considers the name that belongs to him according to the account whereby he temporally proceeds: that is, “gift.”

Therefore this is divided into two parts: in the first, he considers “gift” insofar as it is said of the Holy Spirit through its comparison to other gifts; in the second, he considers this name “gift” said of the Holy Spirit through its comparison to the name “given,” which is also said of him, at moreover, it is to be considered with diligence, since the Holy Spirit is called gift and given, whether each of the names is fitting for him for the same reason. (Sent. I, 18.2(67).1. We have here modified the Silano translation of the Sentences, which translates datum as “grant”; here and below, we have rendered it as “given,” in order to maintain the connection between the active verb dare and its passive participle datum. If datum were taken as a noun, “grant” would be more defensible as a translation, but Aquinas is clear (in a. 2, resp.) that he intends the participle.)

And this latter part is divided into two. In the first, he inquires whether the Holy Spirit is called “gift” and “given” by the same account, and he presents objections on either side. In the second, he determines the question, at to which we say that the Holy Spirit is called gift and given. (Sent. I, 18.2(67).3.)

And this latter is divided into two: in the first, he shows the difference between “gift” and “given,” insofar as they are said of the Holy Spirit, with reference to what is in the gift itself; in the second, with reference to the one whose gift it is, at and according to his being eternally a gift, he is referred to Father and Son. (Sent. I, 18.4(69).2.)

Now, in a gift two things are considered: the relation or property according to which it is called a “gift,” and the procession from which, according to the account of understanding, this account arises. Therefore first he assigns a difference on the side of the relation, and second on the side of the procession, at and it is to be noted that, just as the Son by being born took not only being Son, but also that he be entirely . . . so also the Holy Spirit, by proceeding from Father and Son, took not only being Holy Spirit or gift, but also that he be entirely. (Sent. I, 18.3(68).1.)

The first is divided in two: first, he shows that the Holy Spirit is called “gift” in the same relation or notion by which he is called “Holy Spirit”; second, he raises a question and determines it, at but it is asked to whom he is capable of being given. (Sent. I, 18.2(67).7.)*

And it is noted, etc. (Sent. I, 18.3(68).1.) Here he assigns a difference on the side of the procession, and it is divided into three: in the first, he manifests the difference, since the Holy Spirit by the procession by which he is a gift has the divine essence, but he does not have it insofar as he has been given; in the second, he raises the question and solves it, at here arises a question; (Sent. I, 18.3(68).2.) in the third, he draws a certain conclusion, at from the aforesaid, it is clear that the Holy Spirit is eternally gift, and temporally given, (Sent. I, 18.4(69).1.) because the name “gift” belongs to the Holy Spirit through his eternal procession, and the name “given” according to his temporal procession.

And according to his being eternally a gift, he is referred to Father and Son. (Sent. I, 18.4(69).2.) Here he shows a difference with respect to whose gift it is, and this is divided into two parts: in the first, he assigns the difference; in the second, he raises two questions, the first at here it is asked whether the Son also, since he has been given to us, is called or can be called ‘ours,’ (Sent. I, 18.5(70).1.) which he resolves; the second, at after these matters, it is asked whether the Holy Spirit may be referred to himself, (Sent. I, 18.6(71).1.) of which there is a different solution.

Question 1

The Holy Spirit as gift

About this part five things are asked:

first, whether “gift” is essential or personal;

second, whether it is a name proper to the Holy Spirit;

third, whether all gifts are given through this gift;

fourth, whether the Holy Spirit is also called “God” by the procession by which he is called “gift”;

fifth, whether he can be called our gift.

Article 1

Whether the name “gift” is essential or personal

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.38.1.) It seems that “gift” is an essential name.

Obj. 1: For every name connoting an effect in what is created signifies the divine essence, as is commonly said. But this name “gift” connotes an effect in the creature, for the Holy Spirit is called the “gift” insofar as he is givable to the creature in some effect. Therefore it is essential.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, no personal name belongs to the essence, because the essence is neither generated nor the begetter. But the divine essence is said to be granted to the Son by the Father: he granted him the name that is above every name (Phil 2:9); (RSV reads bestowed on instead of granted.) this is also taken from the words of Hilary, given above. (Sent. I, 16.2(59).4, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 9, ch. 54 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:324–25).) Therefore “gift” is an essential name.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it belongs to the Holy Spirit to be a gift insofar as he proceeds as love. But in God “love” is also said essentially, as is gathered from the words of Augustine above. (Sent. I, 10.1(34).3‒4, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 15, ch. 17.) Therefore so it seems for “gift.”

Obj. 4: Furthermore, whatever is had from someone else is said to have been given or granted. But even without understanding the distinction of persons, we are yet able to have God as our fruition, and we do not have this from ourselves. Therefore he would have been given to us. But whatever is understood in the divine, prescinding from the understanding of the distinction of persons, is essential. Therefore “gift” is essential.

On the contrary, whatever belongs to a person according to the account of origin is not essential but notional. But the Holy Spirit is called “gift” insofar as he proceeds from eternity, as is said in the text. (Sent. I, 18.2(67).3.) Therefore it is not essential but personal.

I answer that, just as was said above, (Above, d. 15, q. 3, a. 1.) “to give” or “to grant” something is spoken of in two ways: in one way, what is had by the giver through the mode of dominion, as a possession; in another way, what is had as intrinsic to the giver, just as someone has his very self, or his own matter, or quality. But although in the divine persons there is no dominion of one over another, nevertheless the authority belonging to a principle is there. Therefore one should say that “giving” can imply an authority with respect to what is given, and so “gift” or “given” is notional. It is also capable of not implying authority, but only the fact that what is given is had freely, and in this way the essence itself is said to be given or granted. And according to this, “gift” or “given” is not personal but essential. Nevertheless it always implies the distinction of the one giving from him to whom it is given, although not from that which is given.

Reply Obj. 1: A name can connote an effect in what is created in two ways: either according to the account of a principle only—and since the activity of the whole Trinity is the same, such a name must be common to the whole Trinity and pertain to the essence; or such that, along with the account of a principle, with respect to what is created, it also indicates something else. In this case, although according to its reference to the created it should give an understanding of the essence as a consequence, as a cause is understood in its effect, still in reference to the other thing that it signifies it can pertain to a person. This is like how assuming flesh indicates both the activity common to the three persons, and the activity’s terminus in whom the assumption is completed, which is proper to the person of the Son; and thereby it belongs to him only. Similarly I say that “gift,” beyond the reference it indicates to one to whom it can be given, indicates a reference to the one by whom it is given as by a principle with authority. And considered from this aspect, it is notional.

Reply Obj. 2: If “to give” implies authority in the giver over the given, in this sense the essence is not said to be given, but in another sense, as was said in the body of the article.

Reply Obj. 3: The response to the third is clear, since the essential love, although it has the account of the first gift in which other gifts are given, nevertheless in respect to it authority cannot be denoted; and therefore, for the aforesaid reason, love cannot be said to be granted insofar as authority is implied in the one granting over what is given.

Reply Obj. 4: The response to the fourth is similar, since without understanding a distinction of persons, no gift remains in whose account is implied authority.

Article 2

Whether the name “gift” is proper to the Holy Spirit

We proceed to the second as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.38.2.) It seems that “gift” is not proper to the Holy Spirit.

Obj. 1: For the temporal procession or sending of the Holy Spirit is called the granting of him. But the Son is sent just as the Holy Spirit is, and has an aptitude for sending from his eternal procession just as the Holy Spirit does, as is evident from what was said above. (Above, d. 15, q. 4, a. 2.) Therefore the Son can be called “gift” just as the Holy Spirit.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, since the persons are distinguished through the eternal processions, a name proper to a person can be designated in the act of procession, just as the Son is designated in generation insofar as he is a son. But the name “gift” is not designated in the eternal procession, since according to it the Father is not said to give a gift, as he is said to generate a son. Therefore it seems that it is not proper to the Holy Spirit.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the things proper to the persons indicate only relation, since in absolute things the divine persons are not distinguished. But “gift” indicates not merely a relation, but rather something other that is given. Therefore it seems that it is not a name proper to the Holy Spirit.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the Holy Spirit has only one notion, which is his procession. But the Holy Spirit becomes known in different ways as a gift and proceeding. Therefore it seems that the notion by which he is called a gift is not proper to the Holy Spirit, and so neither is the name “gift.”

On the contrary is what Augustine says in On the Trinity, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 6, ch. 2; bk. 15, ch. 18.) that just as in the Trinity only the Son is called “Word,” so only the Holy Spirit is called “gift.” But what belongs to only a certain person is proper to him. Therefore the name “gift” is proper to the Holy Spirit.

I answer that “gift” and “given” are different, as is said in the text; (Sent. I, 18.2(67).3.) and the difference of these can be looked at in reference to three things. Namely, it can be looked at with respect to consignification: for “given” consignifies time, because it is a participle; but “gift” does not, since it is a noun. This is why “gift” better fits divine things, which are without time, than does “given”; whence a gift can be eternal, but the given cannot. Again, it can be looked at with respect to signification, since “to grant” adds something over and above “to give,” for a grant or gift, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Topics 4.4, 125a19.) is a giving without return—not what is incapable of reciprocation, but what does not seek reciprocation. Whence “gift” implies liberality in the giver. Again, it can be looked at with respect to the mode of signifying, since “gift” implies an aptitude for giving, but “given” implies an actual giving. But aptitude for giving can be looked at in two ways: either on the side of the very thing given, as passive, just as “heatable” implies an aptitude to being made hot; or on the side of the one giving, as active, and such an aptitude is according to the account wherein something is given freely.

But the reason for every free bestowal is love. For what is given on account of desire, or on account of fear, is not given as a free giving. Rather, such a giving is more called a “seeking” or “exchange.” Therefore, since the Holy Spirit is love, from the account of his procession he has in himself both that he would be given and that he should be the reason for the giving. This is why he is a gift through his very self, and primarily, while other things given are gifts only insofar as they participate in something of love, such that they are given because of the love that is given. Therefore, if the three aforesaid accounts of a gift are combined, and also adjoining to the gift the authority of the one giving, it is evident that in the Trinity “gift” belongs to the Holy Spirit according to his eternal procession, insofar as he proceeds as love, which is the reason for free giving. Whence, just as “love” is proper to him, so is “gift.”

Reply Obj. 1: “Gift” does not signify actual sending, but the reason for free bestowal or giving, which, even though within the divine persons the sending is the same as the gift in reality, nevertheless they differ in their account. Whence, even though the Son is given or sent, still the reason for the free giving is love, which is the Holy Spirit, and that account does not pertain to the Son. Whence he cannot properly be called “gift,” even if he can be called “given.”

Reply Obj. 2: As was said above, (Above, d. 13, q. 1, a. 3.) the procession of the Son is also named according to its own proper mode—namely, with the name of his generation. And therefore from his own proper procession can be drawn his own property, namely, to be a Son. But the procession of the Holy Spirit does not have a name according to the proper mode of his own procession. Whence from the personal act in which he is signified as proceeding, the name cannot be drawn to something proper pertaining to the mode of his procession, according to which he is called “love” or “gift.”

Reply Obj. 3: This name “gift” or “given,” beyond the relation due to which it is called a gift or given, gives the understanding of some reality that is given—although perhaps not as a part of the name’s signification, because the subject is not included in the signification of a name signifying an accident concretely, as the Commentator says, although Avicenna thinks the contrary. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 5, text. 14; Avicenna, Liber de anima, pt. 1, ch. 2.) But for the account of a gift or given, it is of no matter whether that thing given is in this or in that genus. And insofar as “gift” is restricted by the aforesaid conditions, the reality given must signify the relation; for a gift as the reason for giving is love, nor can love be given such that one has authority over it unless it is a personal love, which is toward something.

Reply Obj. 4: Just as it is the case in the essential names that the one common essence is goodness, wisdom, and all other attributes according to diverse accounts, so too in the personal ones. For what is in reality one property or notion differs according to diverse accounts of signifying in the names. For example, the property of the Word is signified in a different way when he is called “Son” and when he is called “Word.” So also the property of the Holy Spirit can be signified according to diverse accounts by diverse names; and it can be that according to the account of understanding one of these accounts follows upon another, just as even in the essential attributes will presupposes intellect. Whence the account of gift follows the account of love in a similar way.

Article 3

Whether all gifts are given through the gift that is the Holy Spirit

To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that not all gifts are given through the gift that is the Holy Spirit.

Obj. 1: For just as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Physics 5.2, 225b15.) there is no alteration of an alteration; otherwise it would go on into infinity. Therefore, if a gift is given through a gift, it will go on to infinity—and one should not posit this. Therefore it seems that gifts are not given through another gift.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as is gathered above from the words of Hilary, (Sent. I, 18.3(68).3, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 37.) the divine essence itself is given by the Father to the Son. Therefore, if everything given is given through the Holy Spirit, then the essence is given to the Son through the Holy Spirit—and this is unfitting, since the Holy Spirit would then be a principle of the Son. Therefore it seems that not all gifts are given through this gift.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Son is also given to us, according to Isaiah 9:6. (For to us a child is born, to us a son is given (Isa 9:6).) But the Holy Spirit does not have any account of a principle with respect to the Son. Therefore it seems that not everything given is given through this gift.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, nothing is given through any gift unless that gift is given. But many things are given to us by God wherein the Holy Spirit is not given, such as our natural faculties and graces given gratuitously. Therefore it seems that not all gifts are given through this gift.

On the contrary, the text says otherwise. (Sent. I, 18.1(66).1.) Further, what is first in any genus is the cause of all the things that are in that genus, as is drawn from the words of the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.1, 993b30.) But the Holy Spirit has the account of the first gift, insofar as he himself is the love of the Father and the Son. Therefore it seems that through this gift all things are given.

I answer that something is said to be given in many ways: sometimes from the very property of its nature, according to which we say that fire gives heat and sun brilliance, and the will is not the principle of such a giving; and sometimes something is given from the will as the principle of the giving. And this latter happens in two ways: for sometimes through the giving one intends some benefit for the giver himself, either to remove an evil—as when something is given out of fear—and such a giving is called an “exchange”; or to acquire some good, and such a giving is properly called a “seeking” or “selling”; but sometimes no benefit for the giver is intended, and this giving is called “free,” or “liberal,” and is properly called “granting.”

But it is certain that the giving wherein the giver’s benefit is intended never belongs to God; this is why he is called “liberal” in a singular way, since in all other givers some benefit to the giver is intended, whether a temporal or spiritual good. Whence, as Avicenna says, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 5, ch. 4.) no giving is purely liberal other than the giving of God and his activity. But the reason for liberal giving is a love that, according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 1 (PG 3:694).) moves superior things to provide for things that have less. And since the Holy Spirit is love, therefore he himself is the reason for all the things given of which the principle is the divine will, as are all things given to created things.

Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher intends to say that alteration does not end in an alteration, essentially speaking; nevertheless, he does not intend to say that one alteration cannot be a cause of another; and so also one gift can be the cause of another. And this does not go to infinity, since one will come to a first gift that is given through itself, and not through another gift of the Holy Spirit.

Reply Obj. 2: That giving by which the Father gives the essence to the Son is a giving from the property of the nature. Whence to that giving the nature, not the will, is related as principle, as was said above. (Above, d. 15, q. 3, a. 1.) And therefore such a giving is not through the Holy Spirit.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the Holy Spirit is not the principle of the Son, he is nevertheless the principle of the effect according to which the Son is said to be given or sent. And therefore even the Son himself is given through the gift which is the Holy Spirit, namely, through love. Whence it is said in John 3:16, God so loved the world that he gave his only Son.

Reply Obj. 4: Although all gifts, both natural and gratuitous, are given to us by God through the love who is the first gift, yet not in all gifts is given the love itself, but only in the gift that is the likeness of that love—namely, in the gift of charity. For when it is said that other gifts are given through the gift of love who is the Holy Spirit, the preposition “through” does not indicate a cause on the side of the receiver, so that the sense would be “through the fact that he receives the gift of love, he also receives the other gifts”; rather, it indicates the orientation of a cause on the side of the giver, who, through the fact that he loves his creature, gives all gifts.

Article 4

Whether by the same procession the Holy Spirit is gift and God

To the fourth we proceed as follows. It seems that the Holy Spirit is not God and gift by the same procession.

Obj. 1: For the account of the common and the proper are not the same. But “gift” is proper to the Holy Spirit, whereas “God” is common. Therefore the gift and God are not the same.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, whatever the Holy Spirit has through his procession follows the procession itself according to the account of understanding. But his Godhead does not follow his procession, since it does not proceed either through itself or incidentally, just as neither is it generated. Therefore it seems that the Holy Spirit does not have through his procession that he is God.

On the contrary, the Holy Spirit is God only insofar as he possesses the Godhead. But through the procession he receives the entire Godhead from the Father. Therefore he is God by the procession.

I answer that just as in the Son one may signify his property through the mode of relation, as when it is called “sonship,” and through the mode of going out or emanation, as when it is called “generation,” taken passively, or “birth”—so too would it be with the Holy Spirit, if names were so posited. But on account of our shortage of names, we use the same name to signify his emanation and property or relation: that is, the name “procession.”

Therefore I say that “procession” can signify either the emanation of the Holy Spirit or his relation, that is, his property.

If it signifies the relation or property, in this way the Holy Spirit by his property, formally speaking, is the Holy Spirit, and gift, and love, but not God, just as neither is the Son God by his sonship, formally speaking—rather, by sonship he is Son, and by Godhead God, and by wisdom wise.

But if it signifies the emanation, then it can be said that the Holy Spirit is God and gift by his procession, just as also the Son is the Son and God by his birth; but in diverse ways. For the Godhead stands to generation only as received through generation, but sonship, according to the account of its understanding, follows generation; and by a similar account it follows that the Son by being born receives divinity. And this is not only such that the gerund (“by being born”) implies a concomitance, as when it is said about someone, “by running he is a man”; rather, it indicates an order to what is received, such that the sense of “the Son, by being born, receives the Godhead,” is “through his birth he receives divinity.” And it is similar for the procession of the Holy Spirit. But these things were more fully said above. (Above, d. 10, q. 1, a. 1.)

Reply Obj. 1: Not in the same way formally according to account is the Holy Spirit God and gift, but through the same emanation he has each. For just as the Son has nothing except what he receives by being born, so also the Holy Spirit has nothing except what he receives by proceeding.

Reply Obj. 2: The divine essence does not receive a new being in the Holy Spirit through the procession, because the being of the three persons is one and the same. And therefore it proceeds neither through itself nor incidentally. And neither does it follow upon the procession; but the fact that the Holy Spirit has the Godhead belongs to him from his procession.

Article 5

Whether the Holy Spirit can be called “our gift”

To the fifth we proceed as follows. It seems that the Holy Spirit can be called “our gift.”

Obj. 1: For “gift” is said with reference to the created. But to those things that indicate reference to the created we can add “my” or “our,” for example, “our Creator.” Therefore it seems that the Holy Spirit can be called “our gift.”

Obj. 2: Furthermore, “holy” takes away nothing from the account of the one called “spirit.” But he is called “our spirit,” as in “the spirit of Elijah.” Therefore it seems that he can be called “our Holy Spirit.”

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as “Son” indicates the eternal relation from which it is imposed, so too “Father.” But he is called “our Father.” Therefore also he can be called “our Son.”

Obj. 4: Furthermore, whatever is given to us is ours. But the Son has been given to us. Therefore he is our Son.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, in God, the Godhead, God, the wisdom, the goodness, and all such things are the same thing. But he is called “our God.” Therefore God can also be called “our wisdom” or “our essence.”

On the contrary (6), it seems that he cannot be called “our God.” For in the pronoun “our” or “my” there is indicated some bearing or relation of the Creator to the created. But “God” is an absolute name and the name of a nature, as Ambrose says. (Ambrose, De fide libri V, bk. 2, ch. 1.) Therefore it seems that he cannot be called “our God.”

I answer that God cannot have any relation to us except in the mode of a principle. However, there are four causes, and he is not our material cause, but stands to us in the account of efficient, final, and exemplar form, although not in the account of an inhering form. Therefore one should consider that, in the divine names, all those names that indicate the account of a principle through the mode of efficient or final cause allow the addition of the aforesaid pronouns; (“Our” is technically a possessive adjective; however, in medieval grammar, both the personal pronoun proper (“we” and “us” in the nominative and accusative cases) and the adjective based on it (“our” in the genitive case) were sometimes both treated as pronouns; similarly, both the noun and the adjective were frequently just called “nouns” (Lat. nomen; lit. “name”).) for example, we say, “our Creator” and “our good.” However, those things that are said in the mode of an inhering form do not allow the addition of the aforesaid pronouns, and such are all divine names that are signified in the abstract, which are all signified through the mode of form; examples are as “essence,” “goodness,” and the like. Whence in such, an addition cannot be made. For I cannot say, “God is our essence” or “substance” or anything of this sort.

Nevertheless among such names a certain order should be considered. For some of these abstract names indicate the account of an efficient and exemplar principle, such as wisdom, goodness, and the like, when an addition of the aforesaid pronouns is made—for example, when we say, “God is our wisdom” in a causal sense, in the way in which he is called “our hope.” For through his own wisdom as exemplar a wisdom based on his wisdom is brought about in us, whereby we are wise formally. However, some of these abstract names do not indicate the account of a principle, except perhaps that of an exemplar; and to such it has not been customary to make the aforesaid addition, for it is not customary to say, “God is our essence” or “our substance.” Nonetheless, sometimes even to those names certain additions are made on account of the bearing of an exemplar principle; for example, Dionysius says (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 4, para. 1 (PG 3:178).) that the being of all things is the super-being of the Godhead. But expressions of this kind should more be expounded than extended.

Reply Obj. 1: “Gift” indicates a certain actual relation, that is, to the giver, and a certain relation only in aptitude, as far as what is in the account of its name, that is, to the one to whom it is given. And therefore it can always be called “the gift of the giver” but not “the gift of him to whom it is given,” except when it is actually given to him. And on account of this, we call him “ours” when he is given, but not “our gift.”

Reply Obj. 2: “Holy Spirit” is a certain circumlocution struck upon for expressing the person of the Holy Spirit. But insofar as he is a subsistent person, it does not indicate the relation of a principle, but rather, the relation of what is from a principle. And therefore he cannot be called “our Holy Spirit.” But “spirit” brings in the account of a principle insofar as inspiration is from spirit; and on account of this he can be called “our spirit.”

Reply Obj. 3: “Father” indicates the account of a principle, but “Son” does not, but rather that of one who is from a principle. And therefore he cannot be called “our Son” the way he is called “our Father,” although also he cannot be called “our Father” insofar as the name is imposed from the eternal paternity—for this is how he is the Father of the natural Son alone.

Reply Obj. 4: Although the Son has been given to us, nevertheless he has not been given to us as a son, but as a teacher or savior. And therefore he can be called “our Savior,” but not “our Son.” And if it is objected that he is a Son and he is ours, therefore he is our Son, it is evident that this is the fallacy of the accident.

Reply Obj. 5: Wisdom in the abstract signifies that by which someone is formally wise; and on account of this by reason of the aforesaid it cannot properly be said that he is our wisdom, except in the manner which was explained in the body of the article.

Reply Sed Contra 6: Although “God” signifies the divine essence as regards that for which the name is imposed, nevertheless it signifies the activity as regards that from which the name is imposed, as was said above from the words of Damascene. (Above, d. 2, exposition of the text; see John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 9 (PG 94:835).) And therefore he can be called “our God.” Nevertheless in diverse ways can he be called “the God of all” and “the God of the just”; for he is called the “God of all” on account of the relation of principle, namely, insofar as he is the Creator of all; but he is called the “God of the just” especially, according to the account of the end that they attain. And therefore he is also said to be possessed by them. For although other things are ordained to him as to an end, nevertheless only the just joined to him through grace and glory attain him. And therefore also of all men in common he is called either the end or something of this sort, but this is said absolutely about the just, since God is theirs, because they have him as their inheritance, and through a certain manner of possession.

Exposition of the text

But the relation itself it not apparent in this name. (Sent. I, 18.2(67).5, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 11.) This seems to be false, because just as one says, “the gift of giving,” so too one says, “the spirit of spiration.” But it should be said that in the name “spirit” the relation is not indicated except incidentally, from its mode of signifying, insofar as it is signified as the terminus of the action of spiration, whereas in the name “gift” the relation is indicated even as regards its signification. For gifting itself, whence the name “gift” is taken, pertains more to the genus of relation than that of action, since to give is nothing other than to make what is one’s own be another’s. Also, the name “spirit” is imposed for signifying a substance by reason of its property, that is, subtlety, as was said above. (Above, d. 10, q. 1, a. 4.) Whence also we call both air and the soul “spirit.” But the name “gift” is not imposed for signifying a substance, but something about a substance that follows upon the giving. That is why it is not traced back to the category of substance.

As Hilary says, . . . the Son ‘is not God by defection, or extension, or derivation from God.’ (Sent. I, 18.3(68).2, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 37; we have modified the Silano translation to read defection instead of partition, to better match the Latin and Aquinas’s interpretation below.) Here Hilary excludes from the divine persons three modes of emanation that are among the diversity of substances. One is when something is generated from a corrupted thing, for example, worms from rotting flesh, or air from water; and this he notes when he says, “through defection.” The second is when it is produced from a thing remaining joined to it, for example, a limb produced from a tree; and he touches on this when he says, “extension.” The third is when something is produced from a thing that remains but is separated from it, for example, a stream from a spring, or from a crag; and he touches on this when he says, “derivation” or “a cutting off.” And this is also how a man is from a man. But none of these fits the divine persons.

And by the power of this nature, not as of the one generating, but as a principle of generation through the mode of form, by means of a birth, that is, he is born subsisting, he exists in a nature which is one with itself, not only in species, as in other univocal generations, but in number. (Sent. I, 18.3(68).2, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 37.)

He says, whatever is born of God cannot have the same nature from which it has come forth. (Sent. I, 18.3(68).3, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 37.) This was expounded above. (Above, d. 5, exposition of the text.)

He is not that spirit of ours by which we exist. (Sent. I, 18.4(69).3, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 14.) Note that we also exist by the Holy Spirit not indeed formally, but effectively; but we exist formally by a created spirit, which is the soul. But by the Holy Spirit we are holy both effectively and formally, insofar as through charity, which is based on Love the exemplar, who is the Holy Spirit, we are formally sanctified; and through this the Holy Spirit is joined to us.

*I will take of your spirit (*Num 11:17). For this is not said because the grace of Moses was being diminished as regards the state of the habit, but as regards its use in caring for others, being deputed to others to aid him. It is also said that “of his own spirit” it is bestowed on them, not because the person of the Holy Spirit is divisible, or because the habit of grace can be divided and transferred from one subject to another, but because they received a lesser grace than Moses had, and for the sake of similar acts, and as though it were propagated from the grace of Moses, insofar as he besought such a grace for them by his prayers.

After these matters, it is asked whether the Holy Spirit may be referred to himself. (Sent. I, 18.6(71).1.) That question the Master resolves in Distinction 30. (Sent. I, 30.2(130).1.)