D. 19 - Equality of the divine persons

Division of the first part of the text

Having considered the divine persons in reference to their distinction through eternal relations, here the Master begins to consider them as regards their equality. Now, this part is divided into two: in the first, he manifests the equality of the persons; in the second, he presents a certain doubt that arises from certain expressions that he had used in his own proof, at here arises a question which has its root in what has been said earlier. (Sent. I, 21.1(87).1.)

The first is divided into two: in the first he shows in what respect one should view the equality of the persons; in the second, he manifests the equality of the persons in that respect, at that none of the three persons surpasses another in eternity has been shown above. (Sent. I, 19.2(73).6.)

As regards the first, he does two things: in the first, he shows that the equality of the persons is seen in reference to eternity, magnitude, and power; in the second, he shows how these three stand to each other, that is, that they are the same as the divine essence according to reality, at and although these things are enumerated as if they were diverse things, yet in God they are one and the same thing. (Sent. I, 19.2(73).1.)

That none of the three persons surpasses another in eternity has been shown above. (Sent. I, 19.2(73).6.) Here he shows what he proposes, and it is divided into three parts: in the first, from things said before it remains that there is an equality of the persons as regards eternity; in the second, he shows an equality of the persons as regards magnitude, at and so now it remains to show that one does not surpass another in greatness and might; (Sent. I, 19.3(74).1. Note that we are here translating magnitudo and potestas/potentia as “magnitude” and “power,” respectively, although the Silano translation of the Sentences instead translates these words as “greatness” and “might.”) in the third, he does this as regards power, at now it remains to show how none of these persons excels another in might. (Sent. I, 20.1(84).1.)

And so now it remains to show that one does not surpass another in greatness and might. (Sent. I, 19.3(74).1.) Here he shows the equality of the persons in reference to magnitude. And first he shows the equality in magnitude; second, he draws a certain conclusion, at moreover, although God is called threefold, yet he is not to be called triple. (Sent. I, 19.12(83).1.)

The first is divided in three according to the three ways by which he proves the equal magnitude of the three persons: first, he shows it from their mutual inherence; second, from the removal of things that could make an inequality, at but let us now return to our main point; (Sent. I, 19.4(75).6.) third, from the account of divine simplicity and truth, at it is to be known that ‘there is such an equality in the Trinity.’ (Sent. I, 19.11(82).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 8, prologue.)

As regards the first he does two things: first, he manifests what he has put forward; second, he proposes his intention, at and it is to be understood that the Father is not greater than the Son; (Sent. I, 19.3(74).2.) third, he presents a sign of their equality, at and so it is that the Father is said to be in the Son, and the Son in the Father, and the Holy Spirit in both. (Sent. I, 19.4(75).1.)

Here two things are asked about:

first, the equality; (Q. 1.)

second, the things in which one sees the equality. (Qq. 2–3.)

Question 1

Divine equality

As regards the first, two things are asked:

first, whether there is equality within the divine;

second, whether the equality there is mutual.

Article 1

Whether there is equality in the divine

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.42.1.) It seems that there is no equality in the divine.

Obj. 1: For as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.15, 1021a13.) one in quantity makes the equal. But in God there is no quantity, as Augustine said above; (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 5, prologue; see above, d. 8, q. 4, a. 1, sed contra.) God is great without quantity. Therefore it seems that equality is not there.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, whatever is in the divine that is absolute signifies the divine substance. But in reference to the unity of substance one attends to identity, not equality. Therefore it seems that through the fact that it is proved that there is one essence of the three persons, their identity would be proved more than their equality.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, quality more than quantity relates to spiritual things. For certain species of quality, like knowledge, virtue, and the like, are found in spiritual substances, but no species of quantity is found, except perhaps number. But this equality of persons does not attend to that. Therefore, since in reference to quality there is more a likeness than an equality, it seems that this agreement in the essential attributes should be called a likeness more than an equality.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, every equality indicates a certain proportion and commensuration. But there is no commensuration or proportion among infinite things. Therefore, since the divine persons are infinite, there appears to be no equality in them.

On the contrary, it is said in the Creed of Athanasius: all three persons are coeternal with each other and coequal. (Athanasian Creed (PG 28:1593).)

I answer that, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.15, 1021a9‒14.) the one in substance constitutes the same; the one in quantity constitutes the equal; and the one in quality constitutes the like. Now, although in the divine there is no quality or quantity according to the common account of the genus, nonetheless certain species of quality are there as regards their constitutive differences. And similarly, certain species of quantity are there as regards what is proper to them, such as magnitude and duration; and therefore in their account, equality and likeness are said to be in the divine. However, just as things that are signified through the mode of quality, like wisdom and such, are not other according to reality than the divine essence, but only according to account, so too in the divine, likeness and identity differ according to account, and not according to reality; and the same is true for equality.

And this is why equality and likeness are found in the divine persons and in other things in diverse ways. For in other equal things the quantity is not the same in its essence, but only in measurement; and likewise, their quality is one only in species. For in them their quality is something other than their essence, which latter looks to their existence as its proper act, whereas quality and quantity are not said with respect to existence, but rather only indicate the “whatness” of a certain genus. Whence one can speak of one quantity where the existence is not one, but one cannot speak of one essence absolutely except where there is one existence; and this is where the essence is the same in number. And this is why, for the account of equality, a numerical unity is not required, whereas numerical unity is required for identity. However, in the divine persons the magnitude and wisdom are the same as the essence, so equality and likeness of persons is viewed in reference to numerically the same wisdom and magnitude.

Reply Obj. 1: Equality is caused by the one in quantity not only according to the common account of quantity, but also according to the account of a certain species of quantity. For it suffices for the account of equality that there be a unity of number, or even of time. And in this way, since in the divine there is the account of certain species of quantity, equality properly speaking can be there.

But because what is found in many belongs to them in reference to what is common to them, and not in reference to what is proper to each of them, therefore it can be said in a better way that equality follows the account of quantity in common, which latter consists in a certain divisibility. Whence the account of quantity is properly found in things that are divided in themselves. And in this way it does not belong to God. Also, equality is found in a certain way in things that are divided in reference to things that are extrinsic, just as a power is said to be divisible and to have the account of quantity from the account and division of its acts and objects. And such an account of quantity—that is, virtual quantity—does belong to God; and consequently, so does equality.

Reply Obj. 2: By reason of what was said above, (Above, d. 9, q. 1, a. 1.) it is clear that “identity” posits a numerical unity in the essence. And in created things, from the consideration of which we impose names—even the ones that are predicated of God—a unity of the essence is only in the same supposit. Therefore identity indicates no distinction in the supposit, but rather unity. Whence the Son cannot be called, speaking in the masculine, “the same” as the Father, but only “the same thing,” in the neuter, such that the unity would be referred to the essence. In fact, “equality” and “likeness”—which indicate the unity of quantity and quality but not according to the essence or existence, as far as their own signification goes—do not indicate numerical unity of quantity or quality; rather, it is enough that they are the same in species. However, this unity is in diverse supposits, and therefore “equality” and “likeness” indicate simultaneously distinction with the unity. And on account of this we say that the Son is like the Father and equal to the Father, yet not the same as him. And this is why the Master has more powerfully made determinations about equality than about identity, since in identity there is indicated only a unity of essence. Nor does identity belong to the divine persons in every manner whatsoever, that is, in the masculine gender; whereas, in equality both genders are indicated: both the unity of the essence signified through the mode of quantity, and the distinction of the persons.

Reply Obj. 3: Although in “likeness” both quality and quantity are similarly indicated—as is clear from Hilary’s words noted in Distinction 2 that a likeness is not to one’s very self (Above, d. 2, exposition of the text, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 7.)—still equality adds something over and above likeness, and includes it, when it is said of the divine persons. For since in the divine there is only the quantity of power, which is founded on quality, the unity of quality is placed in a unity of such quantity, and an excess of intensity is being denied, as is clear. For whatever things are equal in color are also like in color, but this cannot be converted.

Reply Obj. 4: Equality is a species of proportion, for equality is a proportion of certain things that have one quantity. Therefore I say of equality, as of certain other things, that it is predicated of God in reference to the account of its difference, which is to have one quantity, and not in reference to the account of its genus, which consists in the commensurability of quantity.

Whence I say that the divine magnitude is in no way measurable or measured, either by another or by itself. The first reason is that “measuring” indicates a termination, and the divine magnitude has no terminus, either from within or from without; and this is why it is called “infinite”—not through extension taken in a privative sense, but through a negation of termini. The second reason is that measurement is, through itself, not of one quantity, but of two, and no other magnitude can be equal to itself. Now, the Father and the Son do not have different magnitudes, but one and the same, according to which they are called “equal.” And thus nothing diverse from the divine magnitude is commensurate with it. The third reason is that every mover is traced back to a mover that is not moved, either by itself or by another; in this way every measurement is traced back to one first thing that is in no way measured, but rather is the measure of all things. And this is God, as the Commentator says. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 10, text. 17.)

Article 2

Whether the equality in the divine persons is mutual

To the second we proceed as follows. It appears that there is no mutual equality here.

Obj. 1: For Dionysius says (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 9, para. 6 (PG 3:914).) that in the cause and the caused we do not admit a conversion of likeness and equality. But, although in the divine persons there is no cause and caused, nonetheless a principle and what is from a principle are there. Therefore it seems that the Son, who is from the Father as from a principle, is like and equal to the Father, but the converse is not so.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, each thing is equal to that to which it is not less, and nothing is equal to that than which it is greater. But above Hilary says, the Son is not less than the Father, and nonetheless the Father is greater than the Son. (Above, d. 16, exposition of the text, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 9, ch. 54 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:325).) Therefore the Son is equal to the Father, but not vice versa.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, since nothing is equal to its very self, everything that is called “equal” presupposes something to which it is being called equal. But the Son according to the order of nature presupposes the Father, whereas the Father does not presuppose anything. Therefore it seems that the Son is equal to the Father, but not vice versa.

On the contrary, in the Creed it is said, the three persons coeternal with each other are coequal. (Athanasian Creed (PG 28:1593).) Therefore the equality there is mutual.

I answer that, because equality is founded on the unity of quantity, it is the same thing for something to be equal to something else as to have the latter’s quantity, and to be like it is to have the latter’s quality. Now, that is said to be something’s quality which it has properly and fully. But sometimes it happens that that quality is perfect in each of them, so it can be called the quality of each of them. And in such cases one can say that each is like the other.

However, sometimes a certain quality is properly and fully in one thing, and in the other there is only a certain imitation of it, according to some participation. And in this case that quality is not said to be the quality of each of them, but the quality of only the one that possesses it fully. And then that which does not have it fully is said to be “like” that which has it fully, and not vice versa, such as when we say the picture is like the man, and not the other way around; for one does not say that a man is like his image, properly speaking.

Furthermore, “becoming like”—over and above “being like”—posits a certain motion and approach to unity of quality; and becoming equal does the same thing as regards quantity. However, in the divine persons there is no motion; rather, in the place of motion a receiving is present there, insofar as one person is said to “receive” from another. Whence there can be no becoming like or becoming equal except according to the account of receiving. Therefore I say that, because magnitude or goodness is fully in each of the divine persons, each person can be called “equal” to and “like” the other. But because one person receives from another, but not vice versa, therefore the receiving person can be said to “become equal to” or “become like” that person from whom he receives, and not vice versa. Therefore we concede that between the Father and the Son there is mutual likeness or equality, since the Father is like the Son, and vice versa, but there is no mutual becoming equal, or becoming like, since the Son becomes equal and like to the Father, but not the other way around.

Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius is speaking about caused things that do not perfectly receive the likeness of their cause, and this is not the case with the divine persons, since the entire fullness of the Father is in the Son. And therefore the likeness and equality can there be called mutual. This is why Dionysius says (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 9, para. 6 (PG 3:914).) that in things of the same order, that is, equals, it is possible for things to be like each other, and to reciprocate the likeness of one to the other.

Reply Obj. 2: When the Father is said to be greater than the Son, no gradation of magnitude is being posited, but only an order of authority. Whence this does not remove mutual equality, but only mutual becoming equal.

Reply Obj. 3: Equality does not necessarily presuppose something else, but it does suppose something. Whence it is not necessary that what is said to be equal have any order, whether of priority or of a principle, to that to which it is said to be equal, or vice versa.

Question 2

Eternity

Next we ask about the things wherein this equality is viewed, and two things are asked in reference to this:

first, about eternity; (Q. 2.)

and second, about magnitude. (Q. 3.)

For we will ask about power below in Distinction 43. (In I Sent., d. 43, q. 1, a. 1.)

As regards eternity, besides the things that were asked about above in Distinction 8, (Above, d. 8, q. 2, esp. a. 2.) two things are asked:

first, what eternity is according to reality;

second, how the now of eternity relates to eternity.

Article 1

Whether eternity is the substance of God

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: above, d. 8, q. 2, a. 2; In IV Sent., d. 49, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 3; ST I.10.2; SCG I.15; On the Power of God, q. 3, a. 14, ad 10; a. 17, ad 23; Quodl. X, q. 2; Compendium theologiae, cc. 5, 8; Commentary on Dionysius’s On the Divine Names, ch. 10, lect. 3.) It appears that eternity is not the divine substance itself.

Obj. 1: For nothing is the cause of its very self. But God is the author of eternity, as Augustine says, (Augustine, Book of Eighty-Three Different Questions, q. 23 (PL 40:16).) and is even before eternity, as its cause, as is said in the Book of Causes. (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 2.) Therefore it seems that eternity is not God himself.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, each thing is measured by the first of its genus. But the first existence is the divine existence. Therefore every existence is measured through its measure. But the existence of temporal things is measured through time, and that of aeviternal things through aeviternity. Therefore it seems that, since of one thing there is only one measure, eternity is the same thing in reality as aeviternity and time.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, within all participations in the divine goodness there is a community in both the name and the account of a certain analogy between the perfection participated in by the creature, on the one hand, and the principle of the communication within God, on the other, just as the goodness of a created thing stands to uncreated goodness. But according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7, para. 1 (PG 3:866), and ch. 10, para. 2 (PG 3:938).) as God is called “wise” insofar as he fills others with wisdom, so too he is called “eternal” through the fact that he is the cause of aeviternity and time. Therefore it seems that aeviternity and time should be called “eternity.”

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a measure is proportioned to what is measured by it. But every existence, considered in itself, is indivisible; for it has nothing mixed with it, as Boethius says, (Boethius, Hebdomads, rule 3 (PL 64:1311).) and as long as the thing remains, its substantial existence does not change, even though its accidents do change. Therefore, since the existence of temporal things is measured by time, it seems that time is the indivisible and enduring measure, and thus it does not differ from eternity.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, anything in which one finds succession is measured by time. But the existence of aeviternal things, like angels and the celestial substances, is not measured by time. Therefore it seems that their existence has no succession, and thus it seems that it does not differ from eternity.

I answer that some have wanted to take the diversity between eternity, time, and aeviternity (Aquinas appears to use the nouns aevum and aeviternitas interchangeably (as distinct from his use of the adjective aeternum and the noun aeternitas). Thus we have rendered both as “aeviternity.” This term was introduced above, in d. 8, q. 2, a. 2.) as being that time has a beginning and end, aeviternity has a beginning but no end, and eternity has neither beginning nor end. But this does not attend to their essential diversity, since were it asserted that time never began, nor was going to end, time will still not be eternity, as Boethius says. (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 5, prose 6, para. 6 (CCSL 94; PL 63:858).) And even supposing the angels always existed, aeviternity would still be different than eternity.

Nonetheless, what truth this view has will be clear from the things that will be explained. Therefore one should note that the three aforesaid names signify some duration. Now, one attends to every duration insofar as something is in act, for a thing is said to endure as long as it is said to exist in act, and not while it exists in potency. But to exist in act occurs in two ways. One is insofar as that act is incomplete, and blended with potency, by reason of which it can progress further into act—and such an act is motion, for motion is the act of what exists in potency as such, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Physics 3.1, 201a9.) The other way it occurs is insofar as the act is not blended with potency, nor receptive of an addition of perfection—and such an act is a resting and enduring act. However, there are two ways to be in this latter act: either such that the very existence in act that the thing has is acquired from another—and in this way the thing having such existence is potential with respect to this act, which the perfected thing has received; or to exist in act belongs to the thing from its very self, such that it belongs to the account of its own “whatness”—and such existence is the divine existence, wherein there is no potentiality with respect to this act.

Therefore in this way act is of three sorts. There is a certain act that is not underpinned by any potency, and this is the divine existence and its activity—and eternity corresponds to this, in place of a measure. There is another act under which stands a certain potency, but the acquired act in that potency is nonetheless complete—and aeviternity corresponds to this. Moreover, there is another act that is underpinned by potency, and the potency is blended with it for an act complete according to succession, the potency receiving the addition of perfection—and time corresponds to this. Therefore, since to each thing corresponds its own proper measure, the essential difference of its very measure must be taken according to the condition of the act being measured.

Now, in the act that is motion one finds the succession of the prior and the posterior. And these two—that is, the prior and the posterior—insofar as they are numbered by the soul, have the account of a measure through the mode of a number, which is time. This is why the Philosopher says that time is the number of motion according to the prior and the posterior. (Aristotle, Physics 4.11, 219a1.) It is also the numbered number, and not the number simply speaking. For just as we say that two dogs is a numbered number, and two is a number simply speaking, so too the number of the prior and the posterior in motion is the numbered number that is time. (See Aristotle, Physics 4.12, 220b7.) From this it is clear that what belongs to time as though it were its material is founded upon the motion, that is, the prior and the posterior in the motion, whereas what is formal is completed in the activity of the soul numbering it; this is why the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Physics 4.14, 223a21‒29.) that if there were no soul, there would be no time. Therefore in this way two things belong to the account of this measure that is time: that many multiple things are taken there, at least two, whether two “nows” between which there is a time, or two times connected by one “now,” and that they are successive. Continuity even attaches to time from the account of the motion that it measures. Whence, if any motion were not continuous, not having an order to the continuous motion of the heavens, the time measuring that motion would not be continuous.

From this it is clear that only what is enclosed within time is measured by time, and according to its beginning and end. For the motion of the heavens, even if it be asserted always to have been, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Physics 8.1, 251a7‒252a6.) nonetheless each revolution or part of a revolution that is measured by time according to the prior and posterior taken within it has a beginning and end. And in this respect it is true that time has a beginning and end, since there is a measure only of what has a beginning and end. However, in that act that is a complete act one cannot understand a prior and posterior, nor even any multitude, and thus neither succession. Whence the measure that corresponds to these things is not through the mode of number, but more through the mode of unity.

Therefore just as the prior and posterior of time, insofar as they are understood to have been numbered, complete the account of time, so too the permanence of the act, insofar as it is understood in the account of the one that has the account of a measure, completes the account of the aeviternal and aeviternity. But because the existence of aeviternal things is acquired from another, therefore aeviternity measures an existence that has a beginning, or principle, whereas eternity, which measures the existence that is not acquired from another, does not. And in this respect the aforesaid difference can be upheld, although “beginning” is not being taken in the same way: (Note that principium can mean either “beginning” or “principle,” whereas this ambiguity is not present in English; we have here rendered both translations together to convey Aquinas’s thought.) for eternity looks to the existence that has no efficient beginning, or principle, whereas aeviternity looks to an existence that has such a beginning, and time looks to an act that has a beginning and end of duration insofar as it is measured by time.

Reply Obj. 1: As is clear from things said in the body of the article, aeviternity is nothing other than a certain participated eternity. Whence ancient authors are not found to have been very concerned about the difference between aeviternity and eternity, and this is why Dionysius uses the one for the other. Hence, if the cause and author is taken properly, God is said to be “the author of eternity” not as the author of that by which he himself is eternal, but of the participated eternity that is aeviternity. This is like how we say that he is the cause of every goodness—not of his own goodness, but of the goodness that flows forth from him into created things as from their principle.

It could also be said, although not as correctly, that “cause” is being taken commonly for everything that is prior even according to reason. For the divine essence, according to its concept, is prior to its existence, and existence is prior to eternity, just as the mobile is prior to motion and motion prior to time; and therefore God himself will be said to be the “cause of his own eternity” according to the mode of understanding, even though he is his own eternity according to reality.

Reply Obj. 2: In all things wherein one finds a diverse account of measurement there must be diverse proper measures; for bread and wine are not measured in the same way. Whence, since a diverse account of measurement is in the diverse acts, there must correspond to them diverse proper measures. Yet one of them can be ordered to the other, just as it can to the first and exceeding measure. This is why, just as the divine existence is the measure of every act, so too eternity is the measure of every duration—an exceeding measure and not an equal one. But besides this, one must have other proper measures, on account of the diverse modes of measurement.

Reply Obj. 3: The divine goodness is participated in by diverse things according to diverse modes. Now, two sorts of name of participated perfection are imposed: either according to the common account of that perfection—and then the name is common to the communicating principle itself and all the participants according to analogy, for example, goodness, being, and things of this sort; or according to the proper mode by which it is received or it exists in something created—insofar as it is clear that knowledge in all knowers is participated from God, and this name “sense” is imposed for signifying knowledge according to a determinate mode of having it, and on account of this it is not common to all knowers. Likewise “eternity” names duration according to that mode by which it is in its own principle, so the other participated durations are not called “eternities.”

Reply Obj. 4: Through itself time is the measure of the primary motion, so the existence of temporal things is not measured by time except insofar as it is subject to variation due to the motion of the heavens. Whence the Commentator says (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 4.) that we sense time insofar as we perceive ourselves to exist in a variable existence due to the motion of the heavens. And this is why all things ordered to the motion of the heavens as to their cause, of which primarily the measure is time, are measured by time; and whoever senses any variability that follows from the motion of the heavens senses time, even if he might not see the very motion of the heavens.

Reply Obj. 5: Although the act measured by aeviternity is not a simultaneous whole without succession, nonetheless this existence is from another, and this is how aeviternity is distinguished from eternity, as was said before. (Above, d. 8, q. 2, a. 2.)

Article 2

Whether the now of eternity is eternity itself

To the second we proceed as follows. (ST I.10.2.) It seems that the now of eternity is not eternity itself.

Obj. 1: For the nows of eternity, time, and aeviternity seem to be one now, as is signified when one says, “when the motion exists, the angel also exists, and God exists.” But eternity is not time, as was said in the previous article. Therefore the now of eternity, which is the same as the now of time, is not the same thing as eternity.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every now is indivisible. But eternity is divisible, which is seen from the text that is brought in: your years, into the generation and the generation; (See Sent. I, 19.2(73).4, quoting Psalm 102:24; RSV renders this psalm as thou whose years endure throughout all generations.) and it is speaking about the duration of eternity. Therefore it seems that the now of eternity is not eternity.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the standing now constitutes eternity, as Boethius says; (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 4, poem 6 (PL 63:859).) and thus the now is the cause of eternity. But the same thing cannot be the cause of its very self. Therefore eternity and the now of eternity are not the same thing.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, as the now of time stands to time, so stands the now of eternity to eternity. But the now of time is not time, just as neither is a point a line. Therefore the now of eternity is not eternity.

On the contrary, eternity is God himself. But in the divine essence there is no real diversity. Therefore the now of eternity and eternity do not differ here.

I answer that, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Physics 4.11, 219b1; 4.12, 221a1.) time is the measure of motion itself, and the now of time is the measure of the mobile itself that is being borne along. Whence, just as the mobile is the same in substance within the entire motion, yet it is varied according to its existence, as we say that Socrates in the forum is other than his very self in the house, so too the now is the same in substance within the entire succession of time, though varied only according to its existence—that is, according to the account of the prior and the posterior that it receives. But just as motion is the act of the mobile itself insofar as it is mobile, (Aristotle, Physics 3.2, 202a7.) so too existence is the act of what exists insofar as it is a being. Whence by whatever measure any reality’s existence is measured, to the existing reality itself corresponds the now of its very duration, as its measure. This is why through the now of aeviternity is measured the existing thing itself whose measure is aeviternity, and through the now of eternity is measured that being whose existence eternity measures. Whence just as every act stands to that of which it is the act, so too every duration stands to its own now.

Now, that act that is measured by time differs from that of which it is the act both according to reality—since the mobile is not the motion—and according to the account of succession—since the mobile does not have its substance from the number of successive things, but that of things that endure.

Whence in the same way, time differs from the now of time in two ways: according to reality, since the now is not time, and according to the account of succession, since time is successive, and the now of time is not.

However, the act measured by aeviternity, that is, the very existence of the aeviternal thing, does really differ from that of which it is act, but not according to the account of succession, since both are without succession. And this is how one should also understand the difference between aeviternity and its now. However, the existence that is measured by eternity is really the same thing as that of which it is the act, and they differ only in account. And therefore eternity and the now of eternity are not different in reality, but in account only—that is, insofar as eternity itself looks to the divine existence itself, and the now of eternity looks to the “whatness” of the reality itself, and this it not really something other than its own existence, but only in its account.

Reply Obj. 1: The now of eternity, that of time, and that of aeviternity are not the same; and when one says, “when a motion is, so too is an angel, and God,” the now can be signified in three ways, as either that of eternity, or that of aeviternity, or that of time. For if the now of time is being signified, then the motion will be said to be in it as in its proper measure, whereas the angel and God are in it not according to the account of measurement, but more according to a certain concomitance—insofar as eternity and aeviternity are simultaneous with time, and they do not fall short of it. However, if the now of eternity is being signified, then God is said to be in it as in his proper and adequate measure, but the angel and the mobile are in it as in an exceeding measure. Moreover, if the now of aeviternity is being signified, it will correspond to the angel as an adequate measure of it, to God according to concomitance, and to the mobile as an exceeding measure.

Reply Obj. 2: Eternity is indivisible, and the fact that sometimes it is signified as plural can occur in two ways: either insofar as it is participated in by diverse things, especially in the blessed—as is said in Daniel 12:3: those who are wise shall shine like the brightness of the firmament; and those who turn many to righteousness, like the stars into the enduring eternities (RSV ends with forever and ever and does not capture the plural of the Vulgate.)—or by reason of an inferior measure to which division belongs through itself, that is by reason of time. Whence the meaning of “years” of eternity is eternity insofar as it is possible for many years to be contained under it as in an exceeding measure.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as existence, according to the account of understanding, follows on the principles of the very being as on its cause, so too does the measure of the being stand to the measure of existing according to the account of a cause. Whence the now of eternity appears, according to its account, to be the cause of eternity. But this does not show a diversity in reality, but only one in account, just as neither is there a diversity between the divine existence itself and the divine being.

Reply Obj. 4: The account of time and the now of time is not like the account of eternity and the now of eternity, and the reason for this has been stated.

Question 3

Magnitude

Next we ask about his magnitude, and two things are asked about this:

first, whether magnitude belongs to God, and what it is; and

second, about the sign of the divine persons’ equality in magnitude insofar as they are said to exist in each other.

Article 1

Whether magnitude belongs to God

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that magnitude (Note that the Latin magnitudo may be translated narrowly as “magnitude” or more generally and abstractly as “greatness.” Hence the adjective magnus is translated as “great.”) does not befit God.

Obj. 1: For magnitude is a certain condition of matter. But no material condition is said of God unless it is said metaphorically. Therefore it seems that magnitude does not belong to God except metaphorically.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the great and the small are divided as opposites. But according to the Philosopher, everything small is also great, just as every few is also many, as he says in Metaphysics 10. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.6, 1056b3‒15.) Therefore it seems that everything great is small. But God is not small. Therefore he is not great.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, magnitude is a continuous quantity. But there can be no continuity in God, since he is simple and indivisible. Therefore neither is there magnitude.

Obj. 4: You might say that in God there is a quantity of power, according to which he is called “great.”

On the contrary, according to his power God is called “powerful.” But here power is being divided against magnitude. Therefore this expression is not understood as being about a magnitude of power.

On the contrary, we have what is said in the Psalms: great is our Lord, and great in power (Ps 147 [146]:5). (RSV: abundant in power.)

I answer that in God there can be no quantity except one of power, and when equality is attended to according to any species of quantity, there will only be an equality according to power. Now, according to the Philosopher, a power (Note that virtus here might also be translated more narrowly as “virtue”; indeed, this narrower sense seems more appropriate at some points.) is the limit of the potential in a thing. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.2, 1139b13; On the Heavens 1.11, 281a5‒15.) Whence he also says in Physics 7 that a power is a certain perfection, (Aristotle, Physics 7.3, 246b27.) so each thing is perfected when it attains its proper power. Therefore in all those ways in which it is possible to reach a limit, one can consider the power of that reality.

But this can happen in three ways.

First, it happens in activities wherein it is possible to find a gradation of perfection. This is why that is said to have the power for acting which attains the complete activity, insofar as it says in Ethics 2 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1106a15‒16.) that power (Or “virtue.”) is what makes the one who has it good and renders his work good.

Second, it can happen even in reference to a thing’s very existence, according to which the Philosopher also says (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.12, 283a7.) that a certain thing has the power to always exist.

And furthermore, it can happen in reference to the fullness of perfection relative to the being itself, insofar as it reaches the limit of its own nature. Whence, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Physics 7.3, 246a14‒15.) we speak of the “power” or “virtue” of the circle when it attains its definition in a complete way.

Therefore, if the divine power be considered according to perfection as regards his work, this will be the power of his active potency. But if the perfection be considered with respect to the divine existence itself, his power will be its eternity. However, if it be considered with regard to the completion of the perfection of the divine nature itself, this will be its magnitude. (Or “greatness.”) This is clear from the fact that he proves this equality in magnitude from the whole fullness of the Father’s nature being in the Son. According to this manner too Augustine says (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 6, ch. 8 (PL 42:929).) that, in things that are not great in bulk, to be greater and to be better are the same thing; according to this we even say that any man is great who is perfect in knowledge and virtue. And just as he founds all his active potencies on his omnipotence in power, and it acts in them, so too through the power of his eternity he establishes and makes stable every duration, and through the power of his magnitude he fulfills and contains all things.

Reply Obj. 1: Magnitude, according to the account of its genus, which is quantity, is a condition of matter. And it is not predicated of God in reference to this, but according to the account of its difference, which consists in the account of completion, insofar as we say something small becomes great when it attains its complete quantity.

Reply Obj. 2: Continuous quantity is divisible into infinity, but it does not increase into infinity. And therefore, by reason of its infinite division, everything small can have a lesser relative in respect to which it is called great, but still not in everything great is there something greater relative to which it can be called less. This is clear in the size of the heavens. Nonetheless, if the great and the small are not being spoken of relatively, but in an absolute way, the way a quantity determined to a certain species is considered, then although everything less is also greater than something else, still not everything less is small, nor everything greater also great, as the Philosopher says. (See Aristotle, On the Heavens 3.1, 299a30‒b4.) Nonetheless, note that just as God is called great, so too is he called small, as Dionysius says; (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 9, para. 3 (PG 3:911).) and he is taking “small” for subtle, insofar as he penetrates all things, even the deepest thoughts. And in this respect it is said (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.5, 271b12.) that principles are small in quantity, and great in power.

Reply Obj. 3: Continuity follows on dimensive magnitude, but not magnitude of power, and this alone should be understood in God.

Reply Obj. 4: The solution is already clear from things said in the body of the article, for “power” is said not only in reference to the work, according to which “potency” is being taken here, but also in other ways, as was said above.

Article 2

Whether the Father is in the Son, and vice versa

To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that the Father is not in the Son, nor vice versa.

Obj. 1: For the Philosopher assigns (Aristotle, Physics 4.3, 210a15‒24.) eight ways of being “in” something, none of which can be adapted such that the Father would be said to be in the Son, or vice versa. For neither is this as a whole is in its parts, nor vice versa; nor as a genus is in its species, nor vice versa; nor as in a place; nor as form is in matter; nor as something is in its mover the way the kingdom is in the king; nor as a thing is in its best end, as can easily be shown. Therefore the Father is not in the Son.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, of the things wherein one is with the other as distinct from it, the one is not in the other. But the Son is with the Father, as John 1:1 says, and the Word was with God. Therefore it seems that the Father is not in the Son, nor vice versa.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, in the divine there is no relation but that of origin. But this preposition “in” indicates a certain orientation. Therefore in the divine it can indicate only a relation of origin. But the Son does not have the same relation to the Father that the Father has to the Son. Therefore either each is not in the other, or not in the same way.

On the contrary, wherever there is the Father’s essence there is the Father. But the Father’s entire essence is in the Son, and vice versa. Therefore the Father is in the Son, and vice versa.

Furthermore, in one member of a pair of relatives one understands the other. But the Father and the Son are relatives. Therefore it seems that the Father is in the Son, and vice versa.

I answer that in the divine persons one can consider two things: the essence, which is one and the same, and the relations by which they are distinguished. And in reference to both the Father is said to be in the Son, and vice versa, according to the significations of diverse things. For according to the three doctors who are brought into the text, that is, Augustine, Hilary, and Ambrose, (Sent. I, 19.4(75).1‒6; in fact, the Augustine attributions are from Fulgentius of Ruspe, On the Faith, to Peter the Deacon, ch. 1, n. 4 (PL 40:753); and the Ambrose attributions are from Ambrosiaster’s commentary on 1 Corinthians 13:12.) this is said on account of the unity of the divine essence, since the Father’s essence is in the Son, and the Father is not absent from his own nature, so where his nature is, he himself is; this was made clear also from Hilary’s words above in Distinction 5. (Sent. I, 5.1(15).11, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 37 (PL 10:155).) But according to Damascene (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 6 (PG 94:1002).) this should be understood according to the account of relation, insofar as, with a pair of relatives, the one is understood in the other.

Reply Obj. 1: Taking this strictly, not all the ways in which something is in something else are contained in those eight, except through a certain tracing-back based on likeness. For example, to be in time is traced back to the way in which something is said to be in place, since both are as a thing measured is in its measure. And so too through a certain likeness this mode can be traced back to some one of them. For if this is taken in reference to the unity of the divine essence, then the Father is said to be in the Son on account of the fact that the Father’s essence is in the Son. Whence it is traced back to that mode to which it would be traced back if the essence were said to be in the Son. But this is the way in which a common nature is in any supposit, and that is traced back to the way in which a genus is in its species—even though there is no genus or species in the divine, as will become clear below. (In I Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 3.) However, if it is taken in reference to relation, then it will be traced back to the way in which something is in something else as in its moving and efficient principle. For although the Father is not an efficient principle of the Son, still he does originate him. Whence the Son is in the Father as what is originated is in its originator, and conversely, the Father is in the Son as the originator is in what it originates. But the Son being in the Father is said even more properly in the divine, even on the side of relation, than this is said in the human. For the Son, from the relation itself, is a subsisting person, for his relation is his personhood, which happens in no other realities.

Reply Obj. 2: One person is said to be “with” another by reason of their distinction, but one is said to be “in” another either in reference to its essence or in reference to the concept of the relations. For the one is understood in the other, even though one relative is distinct from the other.

Reply Obj. 3: If one says the Father is in the Son on account of the unity of the essence, the Father is in the Son in the same way that the Son is in the Father. And in this sense, the preposition “in” will not bring in any real relation, but only a relation of reason—the sort that there is between the essence and the person, according to which the essence is said to be in the person. However, if this is taken on the side of relation, then this is a different way, as was said in the response to the first objection, according to the diverse orientations the Father has to the Son and the Son has to the Father.

Exposition of the first part of the text

Your years, into the generation and generation. (Sent. I, 19.2(73).4, quoting Psalm 102:24. See the note on q. 2, a. 2, obj. 2, above.) By God’s “years” is understood eternity, but not on account of its multitude, since it is one and simple; rather, this is insofar as it can embrace in its power a great multitude of inferior measure, which multitude is divisible. This is like how we also say that “time was before the world,” not indeed before in reality, but according to our imagination, insofar as we imagine time, which began with the world, as capable of having been made longer on the side of what came before, all of which addition is contained under eternity.

We confess the whole nature of the Godhead to be perfectly in each of the hypostases (Sent. I, 19.3(74).2, quoting John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 6 (PG 94:1093).)—that is, the entire and perfect nature; and one should take this in the same way in what follows it.

Nor will human comparison provide any adequate example for divine things. (Sent. I, 19.4(75).2, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 3, ch. 1 (PL 10:76).) It is true that it does not (Given the logic of the paragraph, a “not” must be implied here, though it is not found in Mandonnet.) sufficiently demonstrate divine things, since in every likeness there is found a greater unlikeness, as was shown above.

But it is possible for God to be that which is unintelligible to man. (Sent. I, 19.4(75).2, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 3, ch. 1 (PL 10:76).) For because the divine nature and power, which is infinite, exceeds our understanding, there is nothing that we can understand that God could not do. Rather, there are many things that we cannot understand that he can do, and they can be, and are, in him. For in him there cannot be anything that is not, nor is there anything that can not be in him, for then he would be changeable, if something could be added to or subtracted from him.

The knowledge of divine truth brings about that which is thought to be impossible to happen by the nature of things. (Sent. I, 19.4(75).2, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 3, ch. 1 (PL 10:76).) This is as if to say that the divine truth, from which Sacred Scripture has been handed down to us, is enough for our belief, it serving as an argument or means of proof, even if an argument taken from the natures of things might seem to disagree with it.

For the Father to be in the Son and the Son in the Father—construe this as meaning the Father is in the Son, and the Son is in the Father—the fullness of divinity is perfect in each. (Sent. I, 19.4(75).2, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 3, ch. 4 (PL 10:77).) That is, from the fact that the full divinity is in each, it follows that the Father is in the Son, and vice versa. This he proves consequently when he says, because the plenitude of divinity is in the Son: whatever is in the Father, this also is in the Son. (Sent. I, 19.4(75).2, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 3, ch. 23 (PL 10:92).) His argument is as follows: the fullness of the divinity in each shows that whatever is in the one is in the other, since if something were lacking to that one that the other possesses, neither would be perfect. For the one giving the Godhead would give part of his substance, and thus each, that is, the Father giving and the Son receiving, would have only part of the Godhead. And thus it is clear that unless all that one has the other also receives, the fullness of the divinity cannot be in each. But for the whole that is in the Father to be in the Son, it follows that the Father is in the Son; for wherever the Father’s entire nature is, there the Father is. Therefore if the fullness of the Godhead is in each, it follows that the Father is in the Son, and vice versa. Likewise also one should construe his saying that because the plenitude of divinity is in the Son: whatever is in the Father, this also is in the Son; that is, this follows on the fullness of the Godhead.

For the nativity neither allows God born of God to be the same, since nothing is born of its very self, nor to be something else, (Sent. I, 19.4(75).2, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 1, ch. 17 (PL 10:37).) since nothing is born from something living unless in this way he receive a nature that is the same at least in species, such that the name “sonship” would follow. Whence, since the divine nature cannot be multiplied in things numerically diverse, insofar as it is immaterial, it remains that he receives numerically the same nature. And thus, he is not something else, but someone else.

The Father is in the Son and the Son in the Father, . . . not by a double joining of harmonious kinds, the way different things alike in genus are joined together, like a horse and a donkey, such that a new species is begotten, nor by the nature of a larger substance ingrafted on another, as when a branch of one tree is grafted onto another, but by the united likeness of nature, that is, the agreement in numerically one nature. (Sent. I, 19.4(75).3, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 39 (PL 10:232).) For if the agreement were only in a nature one in species, it would be called a likeness, but not united.

They are in each other by the birth of a living nature, that is, the nature of the Son, who is a living nature, from a living nature, the Father, who is a living nature*: while the reality does not change, while birth causes no degeneration of the nature of God*, as occurs when, on account of the indisposition of matter, the complete species of the agent is not received in the patient, but rather degenerates into another genus. (Sent. I, 19.4(75).3, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 39 (PL 10:232).)

Division of the second part of the text

But let us now return to our main point. (Sent. I, 19.4(75).7.) Here he shows in a second way the divine persons’ equality in magnitude, by removing the things that can cause an inequality. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he shows the truth; in the second, he resolves something that seems contrary, at but some things which Catholic commentators on Sacred Scripture have handed down in their writings seem to contradict these statements. (Sent. I, 19.9(80).3.)

The first is divided in two: in the first, he shows that the divine persons do not agree in essence as in a whole; in the second, he shows that they do not agree in the essence as in a part, at it is also to be noted that the divine essence is not the material cause of the persons. (Sent. I, 19.8(79).1.)

The first is divided in two: in the first, he shows that the divine persons do not agree in one essence as parts in an integral whole; in the second, he shows that they do not agree in the essence as parts in a universal whole, at here it is to be added. (Sent. I, 19.7(78).1.)

The first he shows in two ways from the words of Augustine. The first is as follows: wherever there is an integral whole, there must be parts that are diverse in their essence. But in the divine persons there is not diversity of essence or nature. Therefore they are not parts of the one nature as though making it an integral whole. The second he gives at also, in the same place; (Sent. I, 19.5‒6(76‒77).3.) here he shows the same thing, through a likeness. For just as many attributes, like goodness, wisdom, and such, are found in one person, that is, the Father, so too many persons are found in the divine nature. But the Father is not said to be composed from the many attributes as from parts, since he is simple. Therefore, for a like reason, because the divine nature is simple, it will not be composed from the persons as from its parts.

Here it is to be added. (Sent. I, 19.7(78).1.) Here he shows that the persons do not agree in the essence as in a universal whole, and he proves this in two ways. The first is as follows: every genus is predicated in the plural of multiple species taken at once, or of the multiple individuals contained under these species; for example, man and ass are animals, and two men are two animals. But the essence is not predicated in the plural of the three persons; for we do not say that the three persons are three essences, but one essence. Therefore the three persons do not agree in one essence as do species in a genus. With the same argument he proves that neither are they as individuals in a species, at but if they say that a species is not signified by the term of ‘person,’ but something singular . . . the same reasoning will similarly defeat them too. (Sent. I, 19.7(78).3, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 6.) The second is at also in another way, Augustine proves the same point; (Sent. I, 19.7(78).4.) here he proves the same thing as follows: no one existing thing has species under itself, like a genus does; nor does it have individuals under itself, like a species does. But the essence is one in number. Therefore neither does it stand to the persons as a genus stands to its species, nor as a species stands to its individuals.

It is also to be noted that the divine essence is not the material cause of the three persons. (Sent. I, 19.8(79).1.) Here he shows that the three persons do not agree in the essence as in a part. And he does this in two ways: first, he shows that they do not agree in it as in a material part; second, that they do not agree in it as in a formal property, at to these, it must also be added that . . . we do not say that the three persons are one essence . . . ‘as we say that the nature of any three human beings of the same sex . . . or that they are of one nature.’ (Sent. I, 19.9(80).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 6 (PL 42:943).)

The first he proves as follows. In all things that are made from one matter, like rings from gold, there is more of the matter in the many than in just one. But there is not more of the divine essence in the three persons than there is in only one of them. Therefore it does not stand as matter to the divine person. In the same way, he shows that they do not agree in the essence as in a formal property, as when we say that men of the same bodily constitution are of one nature. For in such things, two are something greater than one, and this is not the case with the divine persons.

But some things which Catholic commentators on Sacred Scripture have handed down in their writings seem to contradict these statements. (Sent. I, 19.9(80).3.) Here he resolves the opposition. And he does two things: first, he presents the opposition based on the words of Damascene, who seems to say that the essence is as a species, and the persons are as particulars; second, he lays out the solution, at as for the words said here, although on the surface they appear to state something alien to the faith, yet they are capable of a right understanding. (Sent. I, 19.9(80).5.)

And in reference to this latter, he does two things: first, he explains how one should understand that the essence is as a species predicated of the persons as of its parts. For this is said according to a certain likeness, and not according to proper usage. Second, he shows how one should understand the fact that Damascene says the persons differ in number. For by their relations they are distinct such that one is not the other, and not by the divine essence such that it is in one and not in the other, at as for John’s other statement, that ‘the hypostases differ in number, not in nature,’ insofar as he says that they ‘do not differ in nature,’ he speaks most truly. (Sent. I, 19.10(81).1, quoting John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 6 (PG 94:1002).)

And so, . . . it is to be known that ‘there is such an equality in the Trinity.’ (Sent. I, 19.11(82).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 8, prologue (PL 42:947).) Here he proves in a third way the equality of the magnitude of the persons, based on the account of truth, as follows. Wherever there is the same truth and magnitude, there is not, in reality, a greater magnitude and truth. Therefore where there is not a greater truth, neither is there a greater magnitude. But the existence of the three persons is not more true than that of only one of them. Therefore the magnitude of the three persons is not greater than that of only one.

Moreover, although God is called threefold, yet he is not called triple. (Sent. I, 19.12(83).1.) Here he concludes, from the things said, that although God is called “threefold,” he should still not be called “triple.” For triplicity is found in things where the three exceed the one in magnitude. But the three persons do not exceed one person in magnitude. Therefore one should not speak of a triplicity of the three persons relative to one of them.

Here one asks about two matters, according to the two arguments that are present in this reading.

Question 4

The whole in the divine

As regards the first proof, two things are asked:

first, whether in the divine there is an integral whole;

second, whether here there is a universal whole.

Article 1

Whether an integral whole is in the divine

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that there is an integral whole in the divine.

Obj. 1: For wherever there is any quantity, the account of an integral whole is present, since every quantity is divisible into parts. But in God there is a quantity of power. Therefore an integral whole is there.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as a continuous quantity is integrated from its parts, so too is a number. But in the divine, there is a number of the persons, namely, three, of which a part is one and another is two. Therefore it seems that an integral whole is there.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, whatever is something of another thing, and is not that thing, is an integral part of that thing. But the Father is something of the Trinity, and is not the Trinity. Therefore he is an integral part of the Trinity.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, realities of a nature are never constituted from their nature alone; and this is especially so where there are several realities of a nature in the one nature. But in the one divine nature there are several realities of that nature—that is, the person. Therefore for the constitution of a person something else must belong to the divine nature besides that person, so something integrated from many will be here.

On the contrary, every integral whole is composed of its parts. But in God there is no composition, but rather the highest simplicity, as was held above. (Above, d. 8, q. 4, a. 1.) Therefore in the divine there is no integral whole.

I answer that the account of an integral whole consists in composition. However, the account of an integral part has imperfection joined to it, to which the divine simplicity and perfection is repugnant. Whence there cannot be any integral whole or part here.

Reply Obj. 1: A quantity of power is not viewed intrinsically according to a division of power. Rather, its division is viewed more relative to exterior things, whether according to the number of its objects, or according to the intensity of its act, or according to its modes of acting. Whence it is clear that the account of an integral whole and part is not in quantity of power, since integral parts are internal to their whole.

Reply Obj. 2: In the divine, the unit or its double is not part of the three, except according to the way reason takes it. The reason for this is that number is in divine realities in a different way than it is in created realities, and so is unity. For because the one is what is indivisible in itself and divided from others, whereas everything created is by its own essence distinct from others, a created thing’s very essence, as undivided in itself and distinct from others, is its unity. And several unities constituting a number of created persons are several essences gathered according to enumeration, such that there is nothing in one that is numerically the same in another. Therefore in this way, in created realities number has the account both of distinction and of a certain aggregation of things distinct by their essences—and from this it has the account of an integral whole.

However, in the divine personal unity is the relative property itself that distinguishes one person from another, not something distinguishing the essence of that very person. Whence the three persons are not different by their essence, since the essence in the three persons is numerically one. And therefore there cannot be any aggregation there, but only distinction. And on account of this, number in the divine does not have the account of an integral whole, except perhaps insofar as the accounts of the personal properties are united in the intellect. But this will not be the integration of any real thing, but one in reason only.

Reply Obj. 3: “The Father is something of the Trinity” is false if it is being understood in a partitive sense. For then it would be signified that he has part of the Trinity’s essence, since “something,” because it is grammatically neuter, signifies the essence. But “the Father is someone of the Trinity” is true; this is because there are not as many persons as is the Trinity, for the Trinity, not the Father, is three persons. But from the fact that someone is of the Trinity it does not follow that he is a part of the Trinity, except according to account, as was said.

Reply Obj. 4: Nothing is added to the divine nature to constitute a reality of the nature, since in God that by which he exists and that which exists, or who exists, are the same thing. Now, the distinction of the persons is not due to the account of the nature, but due to the account of relative property. Indeed, this latter, insofar as it is compared with the essence, is different from it only in account, and not in reality; however, insofar as it is compared with the correlative to which it is opposed, it makes the real distinction of persons, as was said above. (Above, d. 9. q. 1, a. 1.)

Article 2

Whether a universal whole is in the divine

To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that in the divine there is a universal whole.

Obj. 1: For whatever is predicated substantially of something, but not convertibly, is predicated of it as a universal whole of its subjective part. But the divine essence, or God, is predicated of the Father in this way, for the Father is the divine essence, but it is not the case that whatever is the divine essence is the Father. Therefore a universal whole is present here.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the universal and the particular differ as the common and the proper. But the common and the proper are found in the divine, since the essence is common and a relation is proper to a person. Therefore the universal and particular are here.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, above it was said, based on the words of Hilary, that the Son of God*, in the habit of his assumed humility, exercised the power of his own genus*. (Sent. I, 5.1(15).9, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 9, ch. 51 (PL 10:322). The Silano translation omits the reference to genus, rendering the phrase as follows: the divine nature . . . exercised its proper power in the guise of the humility which had been assumed.) Now, “his own genus” names his divine nature. Therefore it seems that the essence is a genus and a universal, relative to the persons.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, knowledge is a species of cognition. But each is said of God—that is, that he cognizes and that he knows. Therefore it seems that the universal whole is in the divine.

On the contrary, wherever there is the universal and particular, the particulars are potentially in their universals, just as differences are in their genus. But in the divine there is nothing in potency. Therefore the universal and particular are not there.

Furthermore, every superior is an integral part as a constituent of the definition of the inferior; this is why Porphyry says (Porphyry, Isagoge, cc. 3, 8.) that the genus stands as in the likeness of matter, and the difference in the likeness of form, and the species in the likeness of the composite. But in the divine there is no integral whole and part. Therefore neither is there a universal whole and part corresponding to it.

I answer that the universal and particular cannot be in the divine. And four sorts of reason can be assigned for this. The first is because, according to Avicenna, (Avicenna, Logicae, pt. 2, ch. 2.) wherever there is genus and species, the “whatness” must be different from its existence, as was said before, (Above, d. 8, q. 1, a. 1.) and this is not compatible with the divine. The second is because a universal essence is not numerically the same in its inferiors, but is the same only according to its account, whereas the divine essence is numerically the same in the several persons. The third is because the universal requires a plurality in the things contained under it, either actually or potentially—in act as it is in a genus, which always has many species; in potency as it is in those species of which the form, in and of itself, is capable of being found in many, since every form is of itself communicable. But that it be found only in one is due to the matter owed to that species, all of which is united in one individual; this is clear in the case of the sun, which is constituted from all of its own matter. And such plurality is according to number, which number is simply speaking founded upon substantial distinction. However, the three persons are not numbered by such a number, as was said in the previous article, (Above, a. 1.) and therefore the essence does not have the account of a universal. The fourth is because the particular always stands to the universal based on an addition. However, in the divine, on account of its supreme simplicity, there is no capacity for addition, and therefore neither the universal nor the particular.

Reply Obj. 1: The mode of predicating is proportioned to the very realities about which the predication is made, since, according to Hilary, (Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 14 (PL 10:107).) a statement is subjected to the real. Whence, just as no reality among created things is found to be like the Trinity, due to the total unity of the essence in the three persons, but only in a certain respect, so too no mode of predicating used in created things is like this mode of predicating by which the essence, or God, is predicated of the three persons. Therefore I say, in reference to what is touched on in the objection, that it has a likeness with the mode of predicating of a universal whole, but it differs from it, according to the other things that were said above.

Reply Obj. 2: The common, in and of itself, does not determine a commonness of reality or one of the account, like a universal. And therefore the essence can be called “common,” but not “universal.”

Reply Obj. 3: Hilary is speaking according to a likeness with created things, insofar as, commonly speaking, we say the genus of men is one genus, insofar as there is a multitude of certain ones related to one principle. So too the very plurality of the persons is called a “divine genus” according to the order of emanation from one principle, who is the Father.

Reply Obj. 4: In created things, some are found that, both according to the account of a genus and according to the account of a species, signify something of perfection. Whence each is attributed to God according to its proper account, as is clear in cognition and knowledge. And although these things, in created things, are related as genus and species, nonetheless in the divine they are not so related. For the one adds nothing to the other according to reality, but only according to account.

Question 5

Truth

As regards the second proof, one asks about this in reference to truth. And three things are asked:

first, what truth is;

second, whether all things are true by one truth, which is the uncreated truth;

third, about the conditions of the truth—that is, its eternity and unchangeableness.

Article 1

Whether truth is the essence

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.16.1; I-II.3.7; SCG I.59‒60, and III.51; On Truth, q. 1, aa. 2, 3, 9; Commentary on Aristotle’s De interpretatione, lect. 3; Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 6, lect. 4; Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 3, lect. 11.) It appears that truth is the same as the essence of a thing.

Obj. 1: For Augustine says (Augustine, The Soliloquies, ch. 5 (PL 32:889).) that the true is what is, and others say that the true is the non-division of existence, and of what exists. Therefore each thing is called “true” insofar as it has existence. Now, existence is the act of essence. Therefore, since each thing is true formally by truth, it seems that truth and essence are altogether the same thing.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, for whatever things differ in reality or in account, one can be understood without the other; whence, according to Boethius, (Boethius, Hebdomads, solution (PL 64:1312).) God can be understood without understanding his goodness. But a thing’s essence cannot be understood without its truth. Therefore a thing’s essence and its truth do not differ in reality or in account.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, whatever differs from a being according to its account relates to it by adding something to it. But what relates by adding to a thing contracts and determines that thing, just as man relates to animal. Therefore, since true does not contract being, because true and being are convertible, it seems that truth differs from essence neither in reality nor in account.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, Anselm says (Anselm, On Truth, ch. 11 (PL 158:480).) that truth is a rectitude perceptible only to the mind. Now, it is certain that he is speaking metaphorically about rectitude, since rectitude, properly said, is an attribute of the continuous. But goodness and justice have it according to their proper account that they are a rectitude perceptible only to the mind. Therefore it seems that truth is the same as goodness and justice, in reality and in account.

On the contrary (5), it happens that one says something true both of a being and of a non-being. But non-beings do not have an essence. Therefore, since everything true is true by its truth, it seems that truth is not same thing as essence.

Furthermore (6), truth is perceptible only to the mind, as is clear from Anselm. (See obj. 4; Anselm, On Truth, ch. 11 (PL 158:480).) But what is perceptible only to the mind is not among sensible things, but only among intelligible things. But essence is in both. Therefore essence and truth are not the same thing.

Furthermore (7), truth and falsity are only in compositions, since each thing that is not composite is neither true nor false. But essence is one of the non-composite things. Therefore it is not the same thing as truth.

Furthermore (8), falsity is opposed to truth. But one can find falsity within beings, just as we speak of false gold. But non-being is not said of a being. Therefore the false is not the same as non-being. Therefore neither is truth the same as essence, since if a contrary is not predicated of its contrary as being the same thing as it, neither is an opposite predicated of its opposite.

I answer that, of the things that are signified by names, one finds three differences. For there are some that are outside the soul according to their whole complete existence; and things of this sort are complete beings, like a man and a stone. But there are some that have nothing outside the soul, like dreams and the imagining of a chimera. However, there are some that have a foundation in a real thing outside the soul, but the completion of their account, as regards that which is formal, is through the activity of the soul, as is clear in the universal. For humanity is something in reality, yet there it does not have the account of the universal, since there is not any humanity common to many outside the soul. Rather, insofar as it is received in the intellect, there is joined to it, through the activity of the intellect, an intention according to which it is called a “species.” And the like is so for time, which has a foundation in motion—that is, the prior and the posterior of the motion itself—but as regards what is formal in time—that is, the numbering—it is completed through the activity of the intellect numbering it.

Likewise, I say of the truth that it has a foundation in the real, but its account is completed through the activity of the intellect—namely, when reality is apprehended in the way in which it exists. This is why the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Metaphysics 6.4, 1027b20‒28.) that the true and the false are in the soul, whereas good and evil are in real things.

However, although in a real thing there is both its “whatness” and its own existence, truth is founded more on the reality’s existence than on its “whatness,” just as even the name “being” (ens) is imposed from existence (esse). And in the very activity of the intellect receiving a real thing’s existence, as it is through becoming like it in some way, the relation of becoming equal to it is completed, and in that consists the account of truth.

Whence I say that a real thing’s very existence is the cause of its truth insofar as it is in the cognition of the intellect; but nevertheless the account of truth is found within the intellect primarily, rather than within the reality. This is like how even the hot and cold and other causes of health are the cause of the health in an animal, and yet the animal is primarily called “healthy,” and the signs of health and the cause of health are called “healthy” according to an analogy with the “healthy” that is said of the animal. Whence I say that “true” is said primarily of the truth of the intellect, and of the statement insofar as it is a sign of that truth, whereas it is said of the real thing insofar as it is the cause of truth.

Whence, a real thing that is of itself naturally apt to cause a true apprehension, according to aspects that are apparent in it exteriorly, is called “true.” And likewise, a real thing that is naturally apt to cause a false apprehension, according to what is apparent about it exteriorly, is called “false”; for example, fool’s gold is called “false gold.” And this is why even a man is called “false” when he presents himself, by his words or deeds, as being other than he is; and one understands in the opposite way the truth that is the virtue consisting in words and deeds, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.7, 1127a20‒b9.)

However, both truths—that is, the truth of the intellect and the truth of the real thing—are traced back to God himself as to the first principle. For his own existence is the cause of every existence, and his understanding is the cause of all knowledge. And therefore he is the first truth, just as he is the first being, for each and every thing stands to truth the way it stands to existence, as is clear from the things said. And this is why the first cause of existing is the first cause of truth, and is true most of all, that is, God, as the Philosopher proves. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.1, 993b328‒31.)

Now, the truth of a statement is traced back to the first principles known through themselves, as to its first causes; and this is especially so in the principle that an affirmation and a denial are not true simultaneously, as Avicenna says. (Avicenna, Logicae, pt. 2, ch. 4.)

Therefore in this way it is clear how the diverse definitions of truth are given. For one definition of truth is given insofar as truth is completed in the manifestation of the intellect, as when Augustine says, truth is that by which is shown that which is; (Augustine, On True Religion, ch. 36 (PL 34:151).) and Hilary says, the true is existence made clear and manifest. (See Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 14 (PL 10:137); however, Mandonnet asserts that this is only found in Anselm, albeit indirectly.) Moreover, another definition of truth is given insofar as truth has its foundation in the real, as this one from Augustine: the true is that which is; (Augustine, The Soliloquies, ch. 5 (PL 32:889).) and another from a master: the true is the non-division of existence and of that which is; (The master who is the source of this definition is unknown; it is repeated in On Truth, q. 1, a. 1, without attribution. The Parma edition attributes the quote to Anselm, but Mandonnet notes that the quotation is not found in the place cited.) and another one from Avicenna: the truth of each thing is the property of its existence that is its stability. (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 8.) However, another definition is given according to the commensuration of that which is in the intellect with that which is in the reality, as when it is said that truth is the reality’s being equal to the intellect; and Augustine speaks this way: the true is what exists just as it seems to the knower, if he wants to know it and is able to do so. (Augustine, The Soliloquies, ch. 5 (PL 32:888).) However, another definition is given of truth insofar as it is appropriated to the Son, to whom knowledge is also appropriated; this is given by Augustine: truth is the supreme likeness of the principle, one that is without any unlikeness. (Augustine, On True Religion, ch. 36 (PL 34:151).) But another definition is given of truth that embraces all the ways of taking truth, that is: truth is the rectitude perceptible only to the mind. (Anselm, On Truth, ch. 11 (PL 158:480).) In “rectitude” the commensuration is touched on, and in saying “perceptible only to the mind” that which completes the account of the truth is touched upon. It is also clear from the things said that “truth” adds something over and above “essence,” according to account, namely, the order to the knowledge or demonstration of it.

Reply Obj. 1: “To be” is said in two ways: in one way, insofar as “being” signifies the essence of realities inasmuch as it is divided by the ten genera; in another way, insofar as “to be” signifies the composition that the soul makes, and this being the Philosopher calls the “true”; (Aristotle, Metaphysics 6.4, 1027b17‒26.) and so does Augustine, when he says the true is that which is, (Augustine, The Soliloquies, ch. 5 (PL 32:889).) as if to say, “the true is when one says of a thing that it is”; and one should understand in a similar way the saying that the true is non-division of existence and of that which is. And if in denials there is a truth that does not consist in composition, but rather in division, truth said negatively is still founded upon truth said affirmatively; a sign of this is that no denial is proved except through some affirmation. Or it can be said that such definitions are given of the true not according to its complete account but insofar as it is founded on reality.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as “goodness” indicates an account through which an essence is ordered to appetite, so too “truth” indicates the account through which the essence is ordered to intellect. Whence, just as no existence is desired if the account of the good is removed, so too no existence is understood if the account of the true is removed. Nonetheless the account of the true is other than the account of a being.

For in two ways is something said to be unintelligible without something else: either such that the one cannot be understood if the other is not asserted to be—and in this way one says that existence cannot be understood without the true, just as it also cannot be understood without the fact that it is intelligible existence; or such that whenever the one is understood, the other is understood—as whoever understands man, understands animal. And in this latter way “existence” can be understood without the true, but the converse is not the case, since the true is not in the account of a being, whereas a being is in the account of the true. For example, someone can understand a being, and yet not understand anything of the account of intelligibility, whereas one can never understand the intelligible, according to this account, unless a being is understood. Whence it is also clear that being is the first conception of the intellect.

Reply Obj. 3: “True” adds something over and above “being” just as both “good” and “one” do. Nonetheless, none of these add any difference that contracts being, but rather an account that follows upon every being. For example, “one” adds the account of non-division, and “good” the account of the end, and “true” the account of order to knowledge. And therefore these four—being, good, one, and true—are convertible.

Reply Obj. 4: “Rectitude” is said of goodness, justice, and truth metaphorically, according to diverse accounts. For one finds in something rectified a certain equal proportion of beginning, middle, and end. Whence insofar as someone engaged in distributing or sharing upholds the measure of the equality of justice, or the measure of a precept of law, there is said to be a rectitude of justice. But insofar as something does not deviate from the commensuration of its end, there is said to be a rectitude of goodness. Moreover, insofar as it does not deviate from the order of commensuration of the reality and the understanding, there is said to be a rectitude of truth.

Reply Sed Contra 5: According to Avicenna, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 2, ch. 1.) nothing can be stated about that which in no way is. For that of which anything is stated must at least be apprehended, and in this way it has a certain existence, at least in the apprehending intellect. And thus it is certain that some existence always corresponds to a truth; nor is it necessary that there always corresponds to it an existence in a real thing outside the soul, since the account of truth is completed in the account of the soul.

Reply Sed Contra 6: Although existence is in sensible realities, still sensation does not apprehend the account of existing, or the intention of a being—just as neither does it apprehend any substantial form, except incidentally, but apprehends only sensible accidents. So too, even though truth is in sensible things insofar as truth is said to be in real things, nonetheless the intention of truth is perceived by the intellect alone.

Reply Sed Contra 7: The activity of the intellect is of two sorts: one that some call the “imagination of the intellect,” which the Philosopher names “the understanding of indivisibles,” (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.6, 430a27.) which consists in the apprehension of what a simple thing is, and which by another name is called “formation”; the other that they call “belief,” which consists in the composition or division of a proposition. Therefore the first activity looks to what a reality is, and the second looks to its existence. And because the account of truth is founded on existence, and not on “whatness,” as was said in the body, therefore truth and falsity are properly speaking founded on the second activity, and on its sign, which is a statement, and not on the first, or its sign, which is a definition, except in a certain respect. This is just as even the existence of a “whatness” is a certain existence of an account, and according to that the existence is called “truth” in the first activity of the intellect. And thereby even a definition is called “true.”

But to this truth is not joined falsity through itself, since the intellect has a true judgment about its proper object, to which it tends naturally—which is the “whatness” of the real—just as sight is related to color. But falsity is mixed with it incidentally, that is, by reason of an affirmation or denial joined to it. This happens in two ways: either through the connecting of the definition with the thing defined—and thereby the definition is called “false” in relation to a thing, and not simply, the way that the definition of a circle is false when said of a triangle; or in the reference of the parts of the definition to each other, wherein an impossible affirmation is implied—for example, the definition of a void, which is a place in which there is no body. And this definition is false simply speaking, as is said in Metaphysics 5. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.29, 1024b17‒22, 1024b32.) But this can happen only in the “whatnesses” of composite things, since in the “whatnesses” of simple realities the intellect fails only if it understands absolutely nothing, as is said in Metaphysics 9. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.10, 1051b30‒32.)

However, falsity is mixed with the second activity even through itself—but not as regards the first affirmations that the intellect naturally knows, as are the axioms, but as regards consequent ones. For it is possible for the reason, by inducing, to err through an application of one thing to something else. Therefore it is clear from things said above that the true properly speaking, which is found only in complex things, does not impede the convertibility of the true and being. For every non-complex reality has its own existence that is not received by the intellect except through the mode of composition, and therefore by the very account that “true” adds over and above “being,” that is, the order to the intellect, there follows this difference: that the “true” belongs to complex things, and “being” is said of a non-complex reality outside the soul.

Reply Sed Contra 8: As has been said in the body, being is the first intention of the intellect. Whence nothing can be opposed to being through the mode of contrariety or privation, but only through the mode of negation. For just as it itself is not founded on anything, so neither is its opposite, since opposites are concerned with the same thing. But one, true, and good, according to their own proper intentions, are founded on the intention of being, and therefore they can have an opposition of contrariety or privation founded on being, just as they themselves are founded on being. Whence it is clear that true and false, and evil and good, do not stand to each other the way being and non-being do, unless one takes “non-being” in a particular way, as the removal of something under which stands a certain being. This is why, just as every privation of a particular being is founded on a good, so too the false is founded on something true, just as it is founded on some existence. Whence, just as that in which there is falsity or evil is some being, but is not a complete being, so too that which is evil or false is some incomplete good or truth.

Article 2

Whether all things are true by the uncreated truth

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.16.6; SCG III.47; On Truth, q. 1, a. 4; q. 21, a. 4, ad 5; q. 27, a. 1, ad 7; Quodl. X, q. 4, a. 1.) It seems that all things are true by the one truth that is uncreated truth.

Obj. 1: For, as was said in the solution of the previous article, “true” is said analogically of the things wherein there is truth, just as “health” is said of all healthy things. But the health from which the animal is denominated “healthy,” as its subject, the medicine “healthy,” as its cause, and the urine “healthy,” as its sign, is numerically one health. Therefore the truth by which all things are called “true” is one.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every rectitude is viewed through a certain measure. But truth is a certain rectitude. Therefore, since we see one time corresponding to all temporal things as their measure, it also seems that one truth corresponds to all truths, according to which they are called “true.”

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as goodness stands to goods, so does truth to truths. But all things are good by one goodness; this is why Augustine says, a man is good, a face is good, this and that are goods. Take away the this and the that, and you will see the good of every good. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 8, ch. 3 (PL 42:949).) Whence it seems that there is numerically one goodness in all things participating in it, according to which they are called “good.” Therefore it seems that, similarly, all things are called “true” by one truth, which is the uncreated truth.

Obj. 4: You might say that all things are called “true” by the uncreated truth as their exemplar.

On the contrary, the exemplar of each and every form is in God, which exemplar is the creative essence. Therefore, if this were enough so that all things could be called “true” by the uncreated truth, because they are based on it as their exemplar, it seems that likewise all things could be called “colored” because they are based on an exemplar color, which is in God in an exemplary way—which is incongruous.

On the contrary (5), it is true that evil things come to be. But no evil is from God. Therefore it seems that not all truths are true by the uncreated truth.

I answer that, as was said in the previous article, the account of truth consists in two things: in a reality’s existence, and in the apprehension of a cognitive power proportioned to the reality’s existence. However, although each of these, as was said above, (Above, d. 8, q. 1, a. 1.) is traced back to God as to the efficient and exemplar cause, nonetheless every real thing participates in its own created existence by which it formally exists, and each and every intellect participates in the light through which it rightly judges the real thing, which light is based on an exemplar, the uncreated Light. Also, the intellect has its own activity in itself due to which the account of truth is completed. Whence I say that, just as there is one divine Existence by which all things exist as derived from an exemplar efficient principle—even though there is a distinct existence in distinct real things, by which existence a real thing formally exists—so too there is also one truth, the divine truth, by which all truths are true as derived from an exemplar efficient principle. Nonetheless, in the created realities there are many truths, by which they are formally called “true.”

Reply Obj. 1: Something is said according to analogy in three ways. One is with respect to the intention alone, and not to existence. And this is when one intention is related to many things as prior and posterior, while it nevertheless has existence only in one. For example, the intention of health is referred to the animal, the urine, and the diet in diverse ways, according to priority and posteriority, and yet not according to a diverse existence; for the existence of health is only in the animal. A second is with respect to existence, and not intention. And this happens when many things are equivalent in the intention of something common, but that common thing does not have an existence of one account in all of them. For example, all bodies are equivalent in the intention of corporeity; this is why the logician, who considers only intentions, says that this name “body” is predicated of all bodies univocally. But the existence of this nature is not of the same account in corruptible and incorruptible bodies; whence as regards the metaphysician and natural scientist, who consider realities according to their own existence, neither this name “body” nor anything else is said univocally of corruptible and incorruptible things, as is clear in Metaphysics 10, both according to the Philosopher (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.10, 1058b26‒1059a10.) and the Commentator. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 10, text. 5.) The third is with respect to both the intention and the existence. And this is when it is equivalent neither in a common intention nor in existence; for example, “being” is said of both substance and accident. Of such things the common nature must have some existence in each of the things of which it is said, but it differs according to the account of greater or lesser perfection. And likewise I say that “truth,” “goodness,” and all such things are said of God and created things analogically. Whence according to their own existence all these things are in God, and in created things according to the account of greater and lesser perfection; from this it follows that, since they cannot exist according to one existence in each, they are distinct truths.

Reply Obj. 2: Since truth is a certain rectitude and commensuration, in the account of truth one must understand measure, and, as was said in the body of the article, there must be a commensuration of the real thing with the intellect, so that the account of truth might be completed. However, realities stand in diverse ways to diverse intellects, since the divine intellect is the reality’s cause; this is why the real is measured by the divine intellect, because each thing is measured through its own first principle. Whence Anselm says (Anselm, On Truth, ch. 7 (PL 159:475).) that a reality is said to be true when it fulfills that to which it was ordered in the divine intellect.

But realities stand to our intellect as a cause, that is, insofar as the intellect receives from the realities. This is why our knowledge does not measure realities, but is measured by them, as is said in Metaphysics 10. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.1, 1053a32.) For it is not so in reality because we see it is so; but rather, because it is so in reality, what we see is true.

Therefore in this way the divine intellect is as the first unmeasured measure, whereas reality is the second measure, a measured measure, and moreover, our intellect is measured, and is not a measure. Therefore I say that the first measure of truth is only one, but the second measure, that is, realities themselves, are many, so there are many truths. And if there were only one measure of truth, still it would not follow that there is only one truth; for truth is not the measure, but its commensuration or equalization, and with respect to one measure there can be diverse commensurations in diverse things. Whence this is not like time, since time is itself a measure.

Reply Obj. 3: Likewise, I say of goodness that there is one goodness by which, as by an efficient exemplar principle, all goods are good. But nevertheless the goodness by which each thing is formally good is diverse in diverse things. But because universal goodness is not found in any created thing, but a partial goodness, and goodness in a certain respect, this is why Augustine says that, if we remove all accounts of partialness from goodness itself, there will remain in the intellect the integral and full goodness that is the divine goodness. And this is seen in created goodness as an exemplar is seen in what is based on it.

Reply Obj. 4: The exemplar of realities is in God in two ways: either with regard to what is in his intellect—and in this way, the divine intellect with respect to its ideas is the exemplar of all things that are from him, just as an artisan’s intellect, through the form of the art, is for all the artwork—or with regard to what is in his nature, just as by the account of his own goodness, by which he is good, he is the exemplar of every goodness. And the same is true of truth. Whence it is clear that God is not the exemplar of color and truth in the same way, and therefore the objection does not follow.

Reply Sed Contra 5: Although evil is not good, nor is it from God, nonetheless to understand evil is good, and is from God. And therefore a truth that consists in the commensuration of the intellect to a privation existing outside the soul, is good, and from God. And this is why Ambrose says (Rather: Ambrosiaster, Commentaria in Epistolas B. Pauli, on 1 Corinthians 12:3 (PL 17:245; CSEL 81).) that everything true, regardless who says it, is from the Holy Spirit.

Article 3

Whether there are several eternal truths

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.10.3, ad 3; I.16.7‒8; SCG II.35; III.82, 84; On Truth, q. 1, aa. 5‒6; On the Power of God, q. 3, a. 17, ad 27.) It seems that several truths are eternal.

Obj. 1: For, as is clear from the things said, there are diverse truths of diverse propositions. But “the Father is God” and “the Son is God” are two propositions. Therefore they are also two truths. But each of them is true from eternity. Therefore several truths are eternal.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, God has foreknown from eternity all the things that were, are, and will be, and it is certain that they are many. But God has foreknown only what is true. Therefore several truths are from eternity.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Augustine proves (Augustine, De immortalitate animae, ch. 2 (PG 32:1022).) that the soul is immortal through the fact that it is the subject of truth, which is eternal. But it is certain that the truth that is in our intellect as in a subject is not the divine truth by its essence. Therefore it seems that many truths are eternal. However, he proves that truth is eternal as follows: everything that must be posited, even if it is taken away, is eternal; but if one denies truth exists, one posits that it exists; therefore truth is eternal. Proof of the middle premise: if truth does not exist, it is false that truth exists; but if an affirmation is false, its denial is true; therefore it will be true that truth does not exist. But a thing is true only by some truth. Therefore some truth exists.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, what cannot be understood not to exist is eternal; for whatever is able not to exist can be understood not to exist. But truth cannot be understood not to exist, since whatever is understood is understood through a judgment of its truth. Therefore it seems that the truth that is in the intellect is eternal and unchangeable.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the same thing seems to be the case for the truth of a statement. For if the truth of a statement changes or is destroyed, this will be either due to the destruction of the sign, or due to the destruction of the reality it signifies. But it is destroyed or changed in neither of these ways. Therefore the truth of a statement is unchangeable and eternal. Proof of the middle premise: even without there being a sign, the reality to be signified is correct; but truth is the rectitude, and the truth of a sign is the rectitude of its signification; therefore even if the statement, or any sign of the truth, does not exist, the sign’s truth will remain.

Likewise one proves that it does not change due to a change of the reality, since, as was said, (Above, a. 1, ad 2.) each thing has truth when it fulfills that to which it is ordered in the divine mind. But when Socrates ceases running, the statement “Socrates is running” still does what it is ordered to do in the divine mind, because it signifies Socrates running. Therefore it seems that even with the reality destroyed or changed, the sign’s truth does not change nor is destroyed.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, the same thing seems to be the case for the truth that is in the reality. For as Augustine says, (Augustine, The Soliloquies, ch. 15 (PL 32:898).) when a true thing perishes, the truth does not perish. But a reality’s truth cannot be destroyed or changed except through a change of the reality. Therefore it seems that in no way does it perish.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, every whole is greater than its part (Euclid, Elements, book 1, common notion 5.) is a truth that seems to be in no way changeable; and so it is for many similar things. Therefore it seems that there are many eternal truths.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Augustine, On the Nature of Good*, para. 39 (CSEL 25:874; PL 42:551).)* that true eternity and unchangeability is only in God. But God’s truth is only one, just as his essence is only one. Therefore it seems that only one truth is eternal and unchangeable.

I answer that there is only one eternal truth, that is, the divine truth. For since the account of truth is completed in an activity of the intellect and has as its foundation the very existence of a real thing, a judgment about truth follows a judgment about the thing’s existence and the understanding. Whence, just as only one existence is eternal, that is, the divine, so too only one truth. Likewise, as regards the changeability of truth, the same thing should be said as about the changeability of existing; for above it was said, in a previous article, (Above, d. 8, q. 3, aa. 1, 2.) that only the divine existence is simply unchangeable, so the simply unchangeable truth is only one, the divine truth.

Now, the existence of certain other real things is said to be changeable by a change of variability, for example, in contingent things; and even the truth of these things is changeable and also contingent. Yet the existence of some things is changeable only according to an ability to return to nothing, if it were to be left to itself; and the truth of these things is similarly changeable through that ability to return to nothing, were it left to itself. Whence it is clear that no truth in created things is a necessary truth. Likewise, even if you were to speak about truth insofar as its account is completed in the account of intellect, it is clear that no intellect is eternal and invariable from its own nature, other than the divine intellect. From this it is clear that only the one truth that is in God, and which is God, is eternal and unchangeable.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as of the three persons there is one essence by which each has existence, even though there are many properties by which they are distinguished, (all of which nevertheless do not differ from the essence according to reality), so too there is one truth of the three persons, on the side of the reality itself, concerning which a statement is made. But that there are several true statements is because of our intellect. Whence the truth that is in the statements themselves, by which formally they are true, or which is in our intellect, is not eternal, just as neither the propositions nor our intellect is eternal.

Reply Obj. 2: The ideal accounts of things that are in God from eternity are not in reality other than the divine intellect and essence itself. Whence, just as the truth of the divine essence is one in reality, so too is the truth of all of those accounts; and it is not multiplied except as regards its reference to the diverse realities. Whence it is not proved from this that there are many truths from eternity, but only that there is one truth of things that are many according to account.

Reply Obj. 3: If there were no soul, nor a created intellect, truth, insofar as it consists in an activity of the soul, would not exist. Nevertheless it could still remain insofar as it has its foundation in reality. Also, the intention of truth understood in God would remain. Whence, because the soul is not eternal, nor is any created intellect, before these things existed, there was no created truth.

And if one objects: truth does not exist, so it is false that truth exists in reference to the time in which there was no created truth—then I say that it does not follow that when truth does not exist, neither does falsity exist. However, the fact that there is no truth or falsity is not due to a defect of truth or falsity as regards their intentions, but is due to a defect of the things wherein truth has its existence. For just as we say about universals that they are incorruptible and eternal because they are corrupted only incidentally, namely, in reference to the existence that they have in something else that can not-exist, so it is even with truth and falsity. Considered according to their own intentions, corruption does not occur to them through themselves, but only in reference to the existence that they have in something else. Augustine’s proof follows based on this, since every power that apprehends the account of some intention must be a power not bound to a body, nor dependent on a body; for apprehensive powers that are impressed on bodily organs, as is clear in the senses, do not apprehend the intention of the account, such as the account of man or of color, but apprehend things of this sort insofar as they are particulars. However, a power that does not depend on the body is incorruptible. And it is proved that the intellectual soul is immortal from the fact that it apprehends truth; for the sense powers, although they are true in their apprehensions, still do not apprehend the account of their truth, whereas the intellect does.

Reply Obj. 4: It happens in two ways that something is incapable of being understood not to exist: either on the side of the very thing understood, or on the side of the understanding. It happens on the side of the thing understood just as that, which has existence from its own account, is God, whose existence is his own “whatness,” through which he is understood. It happens on the side of the one understanding insofar as a thing cannot be understood without an act of understanding; whence were there no act of understanding, nothing could be understood, so the act of understanding not existing could not itself be understood.

In both ways the truth cannot be understood not to exist. For the true has existence within its own account insofar as it is founded on a reality, and it has the act of the intellect in its own account insofar as it is completed in the soul.

Yet it does not follow from this that it is eternal, except under this condition: if understanding were to be from eternity. For although it could not be understood that truth does not exist, such that the intention of truth is apprehended and it is not apprehended to exist, nonetheless it is possible that neither that intellect exists nor that existence in which truth is founded exists, as at a certain time was the case. But only that truth founded on eternal existence and the eternal intellect is eternal.

Reply Obj. 5: In both ways the truth of a statement can change. For if there were no statement, there would be no truth of the statement. But to what is objected—that the thing to be signified would still be correct—we say that this is true. But still, that rectitude is nothing other than the real thing’s ability to be signified, and this does not assert the actual truth of a sign, but only potential truth. Likewise, when a real thing changes, so does the truth of the statement. Whence, following the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Categories 5, 4a10‒20.) the same proposition can sometimes be true and sometimes false.

And to the further objection—that it fulfills that to which it was ordered in the divine mind—one should say that a statement can be considered in two ways. The first is as a reality—and in this way the truth of a reality is in it, as it is in every reality, when it fulfills that to which it was ordered in the divine mind; and such truth does remain in it even when the reality changes. The other is as the sign of such a reality—and in this way its truth is through its becoming equal to that reality. However, when the reality has changed, the equalization of the sign to what it signifies is taken away, without any change in the sign itself. That this can happen is manifest in relations. Whence the truth of the statement does not remain.

Reply Obj. 6: When a true reality perishes, the truth relative to that existence that it has in that reality perishes. But still the intention of truth according to the existence it has in the other reality, or according to the existence it has in the soul, can remain. But if all of this is removed, truth will remain only in God. Nor does that defect happen to the truth through itself, but rather incidentally, as was said; (Above, ad 3.) for according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Categories 5, 2b5.) if first substances are destroyed, it is impossible that any of the other categories remain, even though universals are through themselves incorruptible.

Reply Obj. 7: Likewise, the truth of necessary propositions can fail incidentally as regards the existence that it has in the soul, or in the realities, if those realities were to fail. For then these truths would remain only in God, in whom they are one and the same truth.

Exposition of the second part of the text

If, then, in the one person of the Father you find what seem to be many things, and do not find parts because it is one simple power, how much more are the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit one God because of their undivided divinity? (Augustine here is addressing one who denies that there is a Trinity of Persons. Sent*. I, 19.5‒6(76‒77).3, quoting Augustine, Against Maximinus, bk. 2, ch. 10, para. 2 (PL 42:764).)* It seems that he is arguing by affirming the major premise, for it seems that simplicity is found more in one person than in two taken together. I answer that this is the logical topic (While locus is literally translated as “place,” in this context Aquinas seems to be referring to the kind of dialectical argument logicians often called a locus, perhaps translatable as a “common place”; note that Aristotle has a work devoted entirely to such dialectical arguments, the Topics (a transliteration of the Greek word topoi, “places”). One logical topic was designated as a minore, which seems to be what Aquinas is referring to here; see Boethius, Concerning Different Topics, bk. 3, 7.23 (PL 64:1203–4).) moving from the lesser; for in the one person of the Father, Augustine takes things that are diverse in account, like wisdom, power, and such, whereas in the two persons of the Father and the Son, he takes what is one according to account, that is, the divine nature, which also cannot be multiplied according to number.

Just as if three statues were made from the same gold. (Sent. I, 19.8(79).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 6 (PL 42:943).) This seems to be false, since matter is not predicated of the composite, because it is its part. And one should say that this is true in natural things, the matter of which is not their entire substance. But this is not true in artificial things, which are ordered in the genus of substance through their matter, as the Commentator says, and not through their own form, (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, text. 8.) for artificial forms are accidents.

Substance signifies a common and collective species of ‘persons’ who are similar in species. (Sent. I, 19.9(80).3, quoting John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 4 (PG 94:998).) That is, the substance that is said to be common in the divine stands according to the mode of species, which brings together multiple individuals. For in this way the three persons are united in their essence, and not in such a way that there is a species in the divine essence, as the Master explains. (See Sent. I, 19.9(80).6.)

For some things are said to differ in number when they differ in such a way that this thing is not that one. (Sent. I, 19.10(81).2.) The reason for this distinction is that diversity in number in things that are numbered simply speaking is due to the division of the essence. This is why one individual is not the other, nor is something that is in the one numerically the same as what is in the other. But the number in the divine persons follows on the distinction of the relations, which do distinguish the supposits but do not divide the essence. And therefore the Father is not the Son, but what is in the Father is also in the Son.

Moreover, although God is called threefold, yet he is not to be called triple. (Sent. I, 19.12(83).1.) The reason for this is that triple is a certain proportion contained under multiplicity, which is a species of inequality. And therefore where there is triplicity, there must be inequality.