D. 6 - The Principle of the Son’s generation

Division of the text

Here the Master inquires about the generation as regards its principle, and it is divided into two parts. In the first, he asks what is the principle of the generation: whether necessity or will or nature. In the second, he asks about the commonness of the principle of the generation, that is, whether the power of generating is common to the Father and the Son, in Distinction 7.

The first part is divided into three: for he first lays out the question and makes a determination about it; second, he removes a doubt, at but against this, an objection is made; (Sent. I, 6.1(18).3.) third, he explains the determination, at as for the above words, . . . it seems to me that they are to be taken in such a sense. (Sent. I, 6.1(18).4.)

As regards the first he does three things: first, he presents the question; second, he determines it, at neither by will, nor by necessity; (Sent. I, 6.1(17).1.) third, based on the determination he excludes an error, at for this reason, Augustine says, . . . ‘And the sophistry of Eunomius.’ (Sent. I, 6.1(17).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 15, ch. 20 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1087).) And here he first points out the error, and then excludes it, at but it is for this very reason that our nature is understood to be changeable; far be it from us to believe that the same is true of God. (Sent. I, 6.1(17).1.) And here he first disproves the erroneous position, and then he confirms the argument at it was truly an insightful answer that someone responded to a heretic who had most craftily asked him. (Sent. I, 6.1(17).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 15, ch. 20 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1087).)

Question 1

What is the principle of the Son’s generation

To understand this part, three things are asked:

first, whether the Father begot the Son by necessity;

second, whether he did it by will;

third, whether he did it by nature.

Article 1

Whether the Father begot the Son by necessity

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.41.2; SCG IV.11; On the Power of God, q. 2, a. 3; q. 10, a. 2, ad 4–5.) It seems that the Father begot the Son by necessity.

Obj. 1: For the necessary and the possible divide being. Therefore, if the Father did not beget the Son by necessity, he begot him contingently, or by possibility—which is impossible.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything eternal is necessary, but the Son’s generation from the Father is eternal. Therefore it is also necessary.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as God is good through himself, so he is a necessary being through himself; for everything that exists by participation is traced back to what exists through itself. But in what is good through itself there can be nothing but good. Therefore in what is necessary through itself there can be nothing but the necessary. Therefore, since there is generation in God, it will be necessary.

On the contrary, every necessity is by reason of something coercive of it, whether interiorly or exteriorly. But nothing can be stronger than God. Therefore necessity cannot be here.

Furthermore, Augustine divides necessity into coercion and prohibition. (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 5, ch. 10 (CCSL 48; PL 41:152).) But neither of these fits God. Therefore and so on.

I answer that, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.5, 1015a20‒b15.) the necessary is spoken about in many ways. For there is the absolutely necessary and the necessary based on a condition, and the latter is of two sorts: on the condition of an end, or on the condition of an agent. The necessary on the condition of an agent is what is necessary by violence; for one who runs only with resistance needs to run only on the condition that someone is coercing him. The necessary on the condition of the end is that without which one cannot attain some end, or not easily. Now, the end is of two sorts: either for the sake of being, and in this way food and nourishment are said to be necessary, since without them a man cannot exist; or an end pertaining to well-being, and in this way a boat is necessary for going beyond the sea, since without it one cannot exercise his action.

However, what is necessary absolutely is what is necessary through what is in its essence, whether this is its own essence as in simple things or, as in composites, the principle is the matter, as when we say it is necessary that a man die, or the form, as when we say it is necessary that a man be rational. Now, the absolutely necessary is of two sorts. For one is what has its necessity and existence from another, as in all things that have a cause; the other is that whose necessity does not depend on another, but itself is the cause of the necessity in all necessary things, such as God.

Therefore one should say that the generation in the divine is not a conditioned necessity, whether conditioned on an end or on an agent; it is not due to the agent because God himself is the first principle; nor is it due to the end because he is also the ultimate end. Rather, it is necessary by an absolute necessity, as is the necessity of the first cause, which does not depend on another, but rather is itself the cause of necessity in all other things.

Reply Obj. 1–3, Sed Contra: The solution to each part is clear, since the first objections are based on absolute necessity, and the others on necessity of coercion, which is repugnant to absolute necessity. And the heretic argued based on that, and this is why it is denied in the text. (Sent. I, 6.1(18).1‒2.)

Article 2

Whether the Father begot the Son by will

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.41.2; SCG IV.11; On the Power of God, q. 2, a. 3; q. 10, a. 2, ad 4–5.) It appears that the Father begot the Son by will.

Obj. 1: For everything good is willed by God, just as everything true is known by him. But the generation of the Son is the best thing. Therefore it was willed by God, and so the Father begot the Son by will.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in human generation the principle inclining one to generate is the will. But human generation is drawn from the divine generation. Therefore also it will be similar in divine generation, and so it appears that the Father begot the Son by will.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Origen speaks of the Father, saying, the will’s seed made to go forth is the father of a word. (Pamphilius, Apologia pro Origene (PG 17:583).) But the will’s seed is born by the will of its generator. Therefore the Father begot the Son by will.

On the contrary, the will is the principle of production for things that come forth through art in human affairs. But the Son is not produced by the Father as a work of art, but is more like the art itself. Therefore it seems that the Father did not beget the Son by will, though he did bring forth created things by will.

Furthermore, Hilary says, if someone says the Son was made by the will of God, let him be anathema. (Hilary, Liber de synodis, can. 24 (PG 10:512).) Therefore and so on.

I answer that the will can be related to anything in two ways: either as a power to its object, or as a principle.

If it is related to anything as to its object, then everything willed by God can be said to be by his will. And in this way it can be said that the Father is God by his own will, for he wills to be God. And likewise it can be granted that the Father begot the Son by will.

However, if the will is related to anything as a principle, this can be in two ways: either that to which it is related as “principle” indicates the account of being a principle, or it indicates that it itself is derived from a principle. If it does this in the first way, then the will is related to the procession of the Holy Spirit, who proceeds as love, in which love the will brings forth all things derived from the principle, that is, created things. And in this way so too does the intellect in God stand to the generation of the Son, who proceeds as a word and art. But if it does so in the second way, then what is derived from the principle of the will proceeds from the will according to the condition of the will. Now, the will in and of itself is free, so things derived from the principle of the will are only things that can either be or not be. And it is certain that the divine will is related to the creation of things in this way, but not to the generation of the Son.

And this is why some distinguish the will into three. That is, there is the approaching will, which newly approaches a work or action: and such is not present in God according to any of the three stated modes of the will, since his every action is from an eternal will. Further, there is the concomitant will, which is spoken of in relation to the object alone: and this will is present in God in reference to the generation of the Son. And further, there is the antecedent will, and this indicates the relation of the principle to what is derived from it: and this is in God as regards created things.

Reply Obj. 1: That argument proceeds according to the relation of the will with respect to its object only.

Reply Obj. 2: Human generation is not eternal, so it can have an antecedent will, which is not possible in the divine as regards the generation of the Son.

Reply Obj. 3: Origen calls the “seed of the will” that on whom the good pleasure of the Father rests; and this is the Son, as the Father himself has said in Matthew 3:17: this is my beloved Son, with whom I am well pleased.

Reply Sed Contra: The other arguments are based on an antecedent will, that is, the will in the relation of a principle to what is derived from it.

Article 3

Whether the Father begot the Son naturally

To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that the Father did not beget the Son naturally.

Obj. 1: For Hilary says, not led by natural necessity did the Father beget the Son. (Hilary, Liber de synodis, can. 25 (PL 10:512).) Therefore it seems it was not a natural generation.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in God the will and the nature are the same thing. But the Father did not beget the Son by his will. Therefore neither did he beget the Son by his nature.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as was held earlier, (Above, d. 3, q. 1, a. 3.) through the accounts of created things, the philosophers have been able to come to the knowledge of the divine nature. But when a nature is known, the nature’s activity is known. Therefore if the Father begot the Son naturally, they were able to come to the knowledge of the eternal generation. But we have shown the contrary of this. (Above, d. 3, q. 1, a. 4.)

On the contrary, Hilary says, the will of God brought forth substance to all created things, but he gave it to the Son by nature. (Hilary, Liber de synodis, can. 58 (PL 10:520).) Therefore it seems that the Father begot the Son by nature.

Furthermore, Damascene says, the generation is the existing work of the divine nature. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 8 (PG 94:814).) Therefore and so on.

I answer that the divine essence, as has been said, (Above, d. 4, a. 4.) is the principle of all divine acts, even though “essence” under the account of essence does not signify the principle of the act that is activity, but that act that is existence. But since within the essence one can consider diverse attributes, which are really one in it though distinct in account, the act is referred to the essence according to this or that attribute insofar as the condition of the act goes forth. For example, understanding is from the divine essence insofar as it itself is intellect, and things willed, which can either be or not be, are produced by the essence insofar as it itself is will. And because it is of the account of generation that something begotten is brought forth as a likeness of the generator, and the principle of this bringing forth pertains to the nature, which is procreating like from like, therefore one says that the Father begot the Son by nature.

Reply Obj. 1: Hilary calls something a “natural necessity” when something is done by a power of the nature that is contrary to the will, such as our being hungry and thirsty. Whence the will suffers, as it were, a certain violence from the nature. And such necessity is not in God.

Reply Obj. 2: Although his nature and will are the same in reality, still they differ in account, as was said. And therefore the divine essence in the account of nature is the principle of someone whose principle is not the very same thing insofar as it has the account of will.

Reply Obj. 3: One can know what a nature is in two ways. One can know it by perfectly comprehending it, and in this way the philosophers did not know the divine nature, since then they would have known all of the divine actions, and whatever things are within the divine nature itself. Or one can know a nature through its effects, and in this way the philosophers did know him. For a created thing does not perfectly represent the divine nature insofar as it is the principle of an eternal and consubstantial generation. Therefore the philosophers did not know the divine generation that is its activity.

Exposition of the text

His will cannot precede his wisdom. (Sent. I, 6.1(18).1, quoting Pseudo-Augustine, Dialogue of 65 Questions, q. 7 (PL 40:736).) He says this because wisdom is appropriated to the Son. On the contrary: the will is the mover of the other powers, for we understand because we will; so the will seems to precede the knowledge of wisdom. To this one should say that some knowledge must precede the will. For the act of the will is of two sorts. The first is imperfect—that is, desiring—and this act precedes perfect knowledge of things that are acquired in knowledge. For through the desire to know something, one is moved to contemplate something about which one acquires knowledge by contemplation; but nevertheless an indeterminate knowledge precedes this act of the will, whereby the thing is known universally, and through that imperfect knowledge the appetite stretches forth to its perfection. For were it entirely unknown, it would not be sought. There is also another act of the will, a perfect one, whereby the will rests and is pleased in the thing that is already possessed. And this will of knowing follows the perfect knowledge.

Whether God had generated the Son willingly or unwillingly. (Sent. I, 6.1(18).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 15, ch. 20 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1087).) It seems that it is necessary to grant one of these, since the division occurs by affirmation and negation. To this one should say that unwilling and willing are not opposed as contradictories, whereas willing and not willing are. For “I am unwilling” and “I do not will” are different, for when one says, “I do not will it,” the act is being denied, and therefore it is opposed as a negation is opposed to an affirmation; but in the words “I am unwilling,” there both remains an affirmed act of the will in its entire grammatical declination and the negation is also carried to the thing willed. (The negation is of what is willed rather than of the act of willing.) Whence the meaning of “I am unwilling that something be so” is “I am willing that that not be so.” Likewise one should grant neither alternative in the proposition. Rather, one should grant that he did not beget the Son willingly if “willing” indicates an approaching or antecedent will; but if it indicates a concomitant will, one should grant that he begot him “willingly.”