D. 1 - The procession of created things

Division of the first part of the text

This book is divided into two parts:

in the first, he considers created things in general;

in the second, he considers specific creatures insofar as this pertains to the consideration of a theologian, at Distinction 2: concerning the angelic nature, these things are to be considered first. (Peter Lombard (ca. 1096–1160 AD), Sentences, bk. 2, d. 1, ch. 7, para. 1 (Sent. II, 1.7.1).)

The first is divided into two parts:

in the first, he considers created things with respect to their procession from their principle;

in the second, he considers them with respect to their ordering to their last end, at and so let us believe ‘that the cause of created things . . . is nothing but the goodness of the Creator.’ (Sent. II, 1.3.5, quoting Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Love, ch. 9 (CCSL 46; PL 40:231).)

The first is divided into three parts:

in the first, he cites an authority that, having showed the truth concerning everything, rules out error;

second, he pursues the errors that are attested by authorities, at for Plato held that there were three first principles [or beginnings]; (Sent. II, 1.1.2.)

third, he concludes with the truth, at ‘the Holy Spirit, to purge the errors of these men and others like them and teach the discipline of truth, signifies that God created the world at the beginning of the ages, and that he existed eternally before all ages.’ (Sent. II, 1.3.5, quoting Bede the Venerable (ca. 672–735 AD), Libri quatuor in principium Genesis (Hexaemeron), bk. 1, at 1:1 (CCSL 118A; PL 91:13).)

Concerning the first, he does two things:

first, he touches on the error of Plato;

second, on the error of Aristotle, at but Aristotle asserted two principles. (Sent. II, 1.3.4.)

Concerning the first, he does two things:

first, he shows how the error of Plato is refuted by the authority of Scripture, both as regards the multitude of principles and as regards the denial of creation;

second, he allays a certain doubt that might arise from what was said, at and yet it is to be known that these verbs, namely, to make, to create, to do, and suchlike, cannot be said of God for the same reason as they are said of creatures. (Sent. II, 1.3.1.)

Question 1

Creation

To expound on this part, here six questions are asked:

first, whether there is only one first principle;

second, whether things have proceeded from this principle by creation;

third, whether from this principle alone things have proceeded by creation, or whether they have also proceeded from secondary principles;

fourth, whether, if not by creation, there is any other way in which one thing can be the cause of another;

fifth, whether things have been created from eternity;

sixth, supposing that they have not been, how it can be said that God in the beginning created heaven and earth.

Article 1

Whether there is more than one first principle

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: Aquinas, Summa theologiae (ST) I.44.1.) It seems that there is more than one first principle.

Obj. 1: For according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.3, 286a27.) if there is one of two contraries in nature, there will be the other. But the greatest evil is contrary to the greatest good, as evil is to good. Therefore, since there is a greatest good, which is the first principle of all goods, it seems that there is also a single greatest evil that is the first principle of all evils. And so there will be two first principles.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything that comes to be is either itself a first principle or is from another principle, as is said in the Physics 3. (See the discussion in Physics 3.3, on how motion is from the mover as from a principle. The observation here can be pieced together from Physics 1.2, 184b23–185a4; 1.4, 187a12–20; 1.5, 188a28–31; 2.3, 195a4–14.) But there does come to be evil in the world. Therefore, if it is not itself a first principle, since if this were granted, we would have the case in question, it must be from another principle. But it cannot be from good, since good is destructive of evil and not its cause, just as hot is not the cause of cold. For the same reason, if the evil from which it comes is not a first principle, there will be another evil principle of this evil; but we cannot proceed to infinity in principles or causes, as is proved in the Metaphysics 2. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.2, 994a1–b30.) Therefore, it seems that it is necessary to arrive at a first evil that is the principle of every evil. And so we have the case in question.

Obj. 3: You might say that evil does not have a principle but occurs apart from the intention of some active principle.

On the contrary, everything that occurs apart from the intention of an agent is by chance and found in fewer cases. But evil is found in more cases, as is said in the Topics 2. (See Aristotle, Topics 2.11, 115a35–b10, where the statement is not found verbatim. See also 2.6, 112a11–12, and Nicomachean Ethics 3.4, 1113a32; 9.8, 1168b18–23.) Therefore, it seems that evil is intended and has an essential principle.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, things that are from one principle have a conformity to one another. For what proceeds from a principle resembles the principle. But great contrariety and diversity are found among things. Therefore, we must trace them back to contrary principles.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, matter and agent are never identical, as is said in the Physics 2. (Aristotle, Physics 2.7, 198a22–26.) Nor are agent and form identical numerically. But things have formal, material, and active principles. And in each category of cause we must arrive at one first cause, as is proved in the Metaphysics 2. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.2, 994a1–b31.) Therefore, we must posit more first principles. (That is, there must at least be a first material principle, a first formal principle, and a first active principle.)

On the contrary, unity precedes all multitude, since plurality is born of unity. Therefore, if we posit more than one principle, there must be a single principle prior to them. But there is not anything prior to the first. Therefore, it is impossible to posit more than one first principle.

Furthermore, things that agree in something and differ in something else must be composite. But if we posit more than one first principle, they must agree in something by which they have the account of a principle; and, since they are more than one, they must differ in something. Therefore, they must be composite. But nothing composite is first. Therefore, it is impossible for there to be more than one first principle.

Furthermore, if there were more than one first principle, they would either be similar or contrary. If they were similar, either one would be sufficient by itself and so the other would be superfluous, or both of them would be insufficient by themselves but when joined would be sufficient to serve as a principle of things. And in this case they would not be first principles, both because they would lack what joins them together, which would be prior to them, and because they would act through something else added to their essence, namely, through the joining itself. And no such thing can be a first principle. However, if they are contrary, every contrary destroys and impedes its contrary. Therefore, if they were of equal power, one would impede the other to such a degree that no effect would follow. On the other hand, if one were more powerful, it would altogether destroy the other. Therefore, it is impossible for there to be more than one first principle.

I answer that “first” can be said in two ways, namely, first simply and first in some genus or order.

If taken in the second way, then just as there is more than one genus of cause, so there is more than one first principle, just as the first material principle is prime matter, the first formal principle is being, and so forth. And by descending from any of them to the different genera of things, different first principles are also found among the different things with respect to the same genus of cause. For example, in fluids the first matter is water, and in dry things it is earth. And in animals, it is either seed or the menses.

But it is impossible for what is a first principle simply to be anything except one. This is clear in three ways. The first way is from the very order of the universe, whose parts are found to be ordered to one another, like the parts of an animal in its entirety that perform a service for one another. But such a coordination of several things does not exist unless they tend toward a single thing. Therefore, there must be a single greatest and ultimate good that is desired by all things. And this is the first principle.

Second, it is clear from the very nature of things. For the nature of being is found in all things, more noble in some of them and less so in others, but still such that the natures of these things are not themselves the being that they have. Otherwise, being would pertain to the idea of every “whatness,” which is false, since the “whatness” of any given thing can be understood even without knowing whether the thing exists. Therefore, they must have being from something else, and we must arrive at something whose nature is itself its own being. Otherwise, we would proceed to infinity. And this is what gives being to all things and cannot be but one, since the nature of being has one account in all things analogously. For the unity of a caused thing requires unity in the essential cause. And this is Avicenna’s approach. (See Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā, ca. 980‒1037 AD), Commentary on the Metaphysics, tract. 8.)

The third way is from the immateriality of God himself. For the cause moving the heavens must be a power that is not in matter, as is proved in the Physics 8. (Aristotle, Physics 8.10, 266a10–267a20.) But in things that are without matter, there cannot be differentiation, except insofar as the nature of one thing is more complete and actually existent than the nature of another. Therefore, what reaches the perfection of completion and purity of act must be one only, from which proceeds every thing that is mixed with potency, since act precedes potency, and completion precedes incompletion, as is proved in the Metaphysics 9. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.8, 1049b3–1051a2.)

And yet, there have been three errors concerning this. For some, such as the first natural philosophers, posited only a material cause. Hence whoever of them posited more than one material principle said that there is more than one first principle simply.

But others, since they posited an agent cause along with a material cause, also said that there are two contrary first agents. Empedocles said they were friendship and strife. (Aristotle touches on the opinions of Empedocles in many of his physical treatises; for an example of an extended discussion of love and strife, see Physics 8.1, 250b27–251a7 and 252a19–32. The pertinent texts of Empedocles may be found collected in G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven, and M. Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 280–321.) And the opinion of Pythagoras, who divided all beings into two orders and traced one order back to the good as a principle and the other to evil, agrees with this. (See Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.5, 986a22–b2.) From this arose the heresy of the Manichees, who posit two gods, one of the New Testament, who is the creator of what is good, invisible, and incorporeal, and the other of the Old Testament, who is the creator of what is visible and corporeal. (See Augustine, On the Customs of the Church and the Manichees, bk. 1, ch. 10 (PL 32:1317).)

The third error was of those who posited an agent and matter, but also posited that the agent is not the principle of matter, even though there is only one agent. This is the opinion of Anaxagoras (On Anaxagoras, see Aristotle, Physics 8.1, 250b23–26, and Plato, Phaedo, 96b–100a.) and Plato, except that Plato added also a third principle, namely, forms separated from things, which he called “exemplars.” (See, above all, the dialogues Phaedo, Timaeus, and Parmenides.) And he said that none of these is the cause of another, but rather that the world and the things of which the world consists are caused by these three things.

Reply Obj. 1: The greatest evil is not contrary to the greatest good in reality, but only in speech, for two reasons. The first is because there cannot be a greatest evil. For there is nothing so evil that there is not some good in it, at least its existence. Thus, the Philosopher says that if there were something so perfectly evil that it came forth from the corruption of everything around it, then neither would it be able to sustain itself. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.5, 1126a11–12: evil destroys even itself, and becomes unbearable if complete.)

The second is because nothing can be opposed by privation or contrariety to that good that can in no way be taken away or lessened. Hence neither is this particular evil opposed to the greatest good directly, but rather to the particular good of which it is a privation. And I say that something is directly opposed to another when it is opposed to it precisely as such, just as the blackness of a hand is directly opposed to the whiteness of a hand, though indirectly it is opposed also to the whiteness of a wall: not inasmuch as it is the blackness of this thing or the whiteness of this thing, but inasmuch as it is whiteness and blackness simply. In this manner, any evil is opposed to any good, not with reference to the proper account of this or that (namely, desirability), but with reference to the common account of good and evil. And so, if evil is opposed to the greatest good, this will be indirectly, since it is not opposed to it inasmuch as it is such a good, but rather inasmuch as it is good.

Reply Obj. 2: Evil only has a cause incidentally, (Per accidens is traditionally translated as “accidentally” or “by accident,” and this is rarely confusing to those familiar with the technical meaning. However, because the meaning of “accident” and “accidentally” in ordinary English now signifies more narrowly an unfortunate chance occurrence, this translation will often opt for the more generic “incidentally.” However, the noun or adjective accidens, when used by itself in its technical sense to mean an incidental attribute, has usually been rendered as “accident,” since an accident is literally what “falls on top of” (ad, “on” + cado, “fall”) what exists substantially.) in two ways. The first way is insofar as an agent is said to be incidental with respect to that which occurs apart from the agent’s intention, since every agent acts for an end and intends a good that is its end, and no privation is intended but rather follows from the imposed form to which it is joined. For fire does not intend to deprive from matter the form of air but rather to introduce its own form, though by introducing its own form, it removes the form of air. Likewise, the sinner intends delight, which is the good of part of himself, namely, the concupiscible part, and does not intend the privation of grace.

The second way is insofar as an agent is said to be incidental when it removes a restriction. For what restricts a privation is a form or some other thing. Hence what removes that thing is said to cause a privation, as one who extinguishes a candle or takes it out of a house is said to cause darkness. Therefore, when it is said that everything that exists is either a principle or is from a principle, this must be understood of what is something in reality, but evil is a kind of privation and does not positively refer to any nature.

Reply Obj. 3: If we are speaking of natural evil, then evil can be considered either with respect to all of nature or with respect to some particular agent in nature. If it is with respect to the whole of nature, then in this case it is obvious that evil exists in fewer things by far, since it can exist only in generable and corruptible things, which taken all together are miniscule in comparison to the whole of heaven, in which nothing evil occurs.

But if it is considered with respect to some particular agent in nature, then it is obvious that its action always follows on what is due to its nature, unless it is impeded at some point, which is rare. And it is from such an impediment that something evil occurs in its nature, as is evident in the case of monstrous births.

But if we are speaking about the evil of fault, which is found in what is not determined to a single action, as are all things that act from the freedom of their will, then this either has several natures or only one nature. If it has one nature, as in the case of the angels, then it is clear that in the majority of them the right activity followed in accord with what is suitable to their nature, and sin was present in the minority of them.

But if it has several natures, as does man, who is composed of an intellectual and a sensitive nature, then it can be considered in two ways. It can be considered with reference to the whole nature of the species. And in this case, its action must for the most part proceed in accord with a nature whose action is more manifold and in reference to goods that are more manifest to us. And since the action of the sensitive nature concerns things delightful to the senses, which are more manifold than what is delightful to reason, which is also more hidden to us since we receive knowledge from the senses, the result is that more men follow these activities. And hence evil befalls man, but not precisely as man, since he is not a man as having senses but as having reason.

Or it can be considered as an individual of the species. And in this case it can happen that someone is determined by his will to pursue activities of reason through a habit of virtue, and then he acts well in more cases and is defective in fewer. But when he clings to another nature, he becomes as though something else, as is said in the Ethics 9. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 9.4, 1166a19–21.) Hence we must judge concerning him as about other animals, in which there is only a sensitive nature. For he will act in more cases for his good inasmuch as he is what he has become. And so, he is like a lion through cruelty, like a dog through wrath, or like a sow through lust, and so forth, as Boethius says. (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 4, prose 3 (CCSL 94; PL 63:800).)

Hence it is obvious that evil exists in fewer things, whether it is compared to the principle of all nature or to a particular agent.

Reply Obj. 4: Things have contrariety to one another with regard to proximate effects, but even contrary things agree in the last end with that to which they are ordered according to the harmony they form. This is clear in a mixed body, which is also composed even of contrary things. And from this it follows that proximate agents are contrary, even though the first agent is one, because a judgment about the agent and the end is the same, since these two causes coincide in the same thing.

Reply Obj. 5: Even though God is in no way matter, nevertheless matter’s very being, which it possesses as imperfect, just as it is called “a being” in potency, it has from God and is traced to him as to its principle. Likewise, too, form, which is part of a thing, is a likeness of the first agent, flowing from it. Hence all forms are traced back to the first agent as to their exemplary principle. And so, it is clear that there is one first principle simply, which is the first agent, exemplar, and last end.

Article 2

Whether anything can proceed from him by creation

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.45.2; SCG II.16; Disputed Questions on the Power of God, q. 3. a. 1; Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, bk. 8, lect. 2.) It seems that nothing can proceed into being from God by creation.

Obj. 1: For everything that is made previously had the potential to be made. It means the same thing to say that it did not have the potential to be made and to say that it was necessary for it not to be made, and thus it would not have been made. But whatever has the potential to be made or to be moved has this potential by way of passive potency, which, since it is not a being existing by itself, must be in another being that is in potency. But nothing is a being in potency to something unless it is also something in act. Therefore, everything that is made is made from another being that actually preexists. But no such thing is created, since to create is to make something from nothing, as is said in the text. (Sent. II, 1.2.1.) Therefore, nothing can be created by God.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in every change, there is some terminus from which the change proceeds essentially, since every change is between two termini. But that from which something comes to be essentially must remain in what is made either completely, if it is made from it as from matter, just as when a knife is made from iron; or it must remain with respect to some part, namely, with respect to the matter, if the whole is said to be made from the whole, as when flesh is made from food. For blackness is only said to come from whiteness incidentally, that is, it comes after whiteness, as also day is said to come about from night.

Therefore, if a being is said to be made from non-being, it is necessary that non-being, or some part of it—though it does not have a part—remain in the being and that it be at the same time a being and non-being, which is impossible. Therefore, everything that is made is made from another being. Therefore, it seems that it is impossible for anything to be created by God.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, nothing enduring simultaneously is being made and has been made; for while it is being made it does not exist, and once it has been made it does exist. But it cannot exist and not exist at the same time. Therefore, if any enduring thing is made by God, its being-made must come before its being. But making, since it is an accident, cannot exist without a subject. Therefore, everything that is made must be made from something else in which its making exists as in a subject. But no such thing is created. Therefore, nothing can be made through its creation.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, if there is such a thing as creation, since it is not a substance, it must be an accident. But every accident is in some subject. But it cannot be in the thing that is created as in a subject, since this is its terminus. For in this case, the created thing would be prior to its creation inasmuch as it is its subject and is posterior to it inasmuch as it is its terminus. Therefore, it must be in some matter from which the created thing is made, and this is contrary to the account of creation. Therefore, there is no such thing as creation.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, if there is such a thing as creation, it is either the Creator or the created. But it is not the Creator, since then it would be from eternity, and thus created things would be from eternity. Therefore, it is created. But everything created is created by some act of creation, and so there is a creation of creation to infinity, which is impossible, as is clear from the Physics 5, (Aristotle, Physics 5.2, 225b13–16.) in which it is shown that there is not an action of action to infinity. Therefore, it is impossible for there to be creation.

On the contrary, it is said: in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth (Gen 1:1).

Furthermore, every agent acts insofar as it is in act. But what is partly in act and partly in potency produces a thing in keeping with part of itself, namely, by introducing a form into matter. Therefore, since the first being, namely, God, is act without admixture of potency, it seems that he can produce an entire thing with regard to its whole substance. But this is to create. Therefore, it seems that God can create.

I answer that there is creation, as not only faith holds but as reason also demonstrates. For it is obvious that everything that is imperfect in some genus arises from that in which the nature of its genus is found primarily and perfectly, as is clear in the case of the heat in things heated by fire. But since any thing and whatever is in a thing in some way participates in being and is mixed with imperfection, every thing, with respect to the totality of what is in it, must arise from the first and perfect being. Hence it is necessary that from the first principle all things proceed by creation.

But it should be known that two things pertain to the account of creation. The first is that it presupposes nothing in the thing that is said to be created. Hence it differs in this respect from other changes, since generation presupposes matter, which is not generated but is transmuted and brought into the complete act of a form by means of generation. And in other changes, a subject is presupposed that is a complete being. Hence the causality of one causing the generation or alteration does not extend to everything that is found within the thing, but rather to the form that is brought from potency into act. But the causality of a Creator extends to everything that is within a thing. Thus, creation is said to be “from nothing,” since there is nothing that preexists creation as if it were uncreated.

The second is that in a thing that is said to be created, non-being is prior to being, not by a priority of time or duration, as if it first was not and afterwards was, but by a priority of nature such that the created thing, if left to itself, would come to non-being, since it has being only from the influence of a higher cause. For in each thing, what is naturally in it that it does not have from another is prior to what it does have from another. And due to this, creation differs from eternal generation. For it cannot be said that the Son of God, if left to himself, would not have being, since he receives from the Father the same being that is the Father’s, which is absolute being and not dependent on anything else.

And in keeping with these two points, creation is said to be “from nothing” in two ways.

On the one hand, the denial negates the order of creation implied by the preposition “from” relative to something preexisting, such that creation is said to be “from nothing” because it is not from something preexisting. And this is the first way.

On the other hand, with the nature asserted, the order of creation relative to nothing preexisting can remain, such that creation is said to be “from nothing” because a created reality naturally has non-existence before it has existence. And if these two things suffice for the account of creation, then creation can be demonstrated, and the philosophers posited creation in this way. But if we take a third thing as necessary for the account of creation—namely, that the created thing first has non-being prior to being by duration, too, such that it is said to be from nothing because it comes after nothing in time—then in this case creation cannot be demonstrated and is not conceded by philosophers but is, rather, laid down by faith.

Reply Obj. 1: According to Avicenna, (Avicenna, Sufficientia, bk. 1, ch. 10, and Metaphysics, tract. 6, ch. 1. Sufficientia is the Latin title for the section on physics or natural science in Avicenna’s Book of Healing or al-Shifa’; Avicenna’s Metaphysics (al-Ilāhiyyāt) is itself a section of the same larger work.) there are two kinds of agent: a natural one, which acts through motion, and a divine one, which gives being, as has been said. (In I Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 1.) Likewise, too, we must understand “what has been acted upon” or “what has been made” in two ways. One way is through the motion of a natural agent, and for every such being-made, not only active but also passive potency must precede in time, since motion is the act of what exists in potency. However, the other way is what has been made inasmuch as it has received being from a divine agent without motion. And if what has been made is of finite age, (Aquinas sometimes uses the word novus (“new”) in opposition to aeternus (“eternal”). Hence he also speaks about the novitas (“newness”) of the world.) then active potency and not passive potency must precede its being, and such a thing made is said to have the potential to be made based on the active potency. But if it is not of finite age, then active potency does not precede it in duration, but in nature.

Reply Obj. 2: Creation is not a making that is change, properly speaking; rather, it is a reception of being. Hence it is not necessary that it have an essential order except with respect to the one who gives being. And so it is not from non-being except inasmuch as it is after non-being, just as night is from day.

Reply Obj. 3: No enduring reality can at the same time be made and have been made, if “being made” is taken properly. But there are certain things that signify what has been made in the manner of being made, such as, for example, when motion is said to be terminated. For at the same time it is being terminated and has been terminated.

Likewise, too, it can be that something is at the same time being illuminated and has been illuminated, due to the fact that illumination is a terminus of a motion, as the Commentator says on the Physics 6. (Averroes (Ibn Rushd, 1126‒1198 AD), Commentary on the Physics, bk. 6, comm. 32, 55.) And likewise, too, substantial form is at the same time being received and has been received. And likewise, something is at the same time being created and has been created.

If it is objected that being-made, understood properly, is before every having-been-made, then I say that this is true in all things that are made through motion, as generation follows on the motion of alteration and illumination follows on local motion. However, it is not the case in creation, as has been said. (Above: ad 1.)

Reply Obj. 4: “Creation” can be taken in an active and in a passive sense. If it is taken in an active sense, then since creation signifies a divine activity, which is his essence with a certain relation, then in this case creation is the divine substance. But if “creation” is taken in a passive sense, then it is a certain accident in a thing created, and in this case it signifies a thing, not one that is in the category of passion, properly speaking, but rather one that is in the genus of relation, and it is a certain relationship of something that has being from another as a result of the divine activity. And in this way, it is not unfitting that creation be in the very created thing brought forth by creation, as in a subject, just as filiation is in Peter inasmuch as he receives human nature from his father, nor is this filiation prior to Peter himself, but rather, it follows on action and motion, which are prior. But the relationship of creation does not follow motion but the divine action alone, which is prior to the created thing.

Reply Obj. 5: As was said before, (Aquinas, Commentary on the Sentences, bk. 1 (In I Sent.), d. 30, q. 1, a. 3.) when a thing created is referred to its Creator, the relation is founded in the created thing really and in God only according to account. Hence the relation implied by the word “creation” does not entail anything uncreated but only something created. Nevertheless, it is not necessary for this relation to be created by another creation, since that which is essentially a relation is not referred to another by the medium of another relation, as was also said, (In I Sent., d. 26, q. 2, a. 1.) except according to reason. And it is not impossible for relations of this sort, which are merely according to account, to be multiplied to infinity.

Article 3

Whether to create belongs to others besides God

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In IV Sent., d. 5, q. 1, a. 3, resp.; ST I.45.5; 65.3; 90.3; SCG II.20–21; On Truth, q. 5, a. 9; On the Power of God, q. 3, a. 4; Quodlibetal Questions III, q. 3, a. 1; Compendium theologiae, ch. 70.) It seems that to create also belongs to others besides God.

Obj. 1: For everything that is not brought into being by generation, if it is newly made, is created. But the rational soul does not come into being by generation. Therefore, by whomever it is made, it is created. But the rational soul comes into being by the power of the intelligences. Hence Plato portrays God as saying to secondary gods: take back to yourselves the capital you have lent, speaking of the rational soul. (Plato, Timaeus, 41d.) And likewise, in the Book of Causes, (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 3.) it is said that the soul was created by the mediation of an intelligence. Therefore, it seems that angels or intelligences can create.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, he who is supremely liberal communicates to what is created whatever dignity it is capable of. But the power of creating is communicable to what is created, as the Master says below. (See Sent. IV, 5.3(35).2–4.) Therefore, it seems that the power of creating has been communicated to what is created.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the more something offers resistance to an agent, the more difficult it is for it to be made something by that agent. But what is contrary is more resistant than non-being simply. Therefore, it is more difficult for something to be made from what is contrary than from non-being. But a natural agent can make a contrary from a contrary. Therefore, it seems that it can also make something from non-being simply, and so it can create.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, insofar as things proceed from God, they are also ordered to him. But according to Dionysius in several passages, (See Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 4, para. 4 (PG 3:182); ch. 7, n. 3 (PG 3:210); ch. 8, n. 1 (PG 3:239); Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, ch. 5, n. 4 (PG 3:503).) it is a law of divinity that last things are never led to their end except through intermediate things. Therefore, it seems also that the last among beings are not created immediately by God but by intermediate causes.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the first cause never acts on what is caused by a secondary cause, except insofar as it acts in the acting secondary cause itself. But God, who is the first cause of all things, is the Creator of any thing one considers. Therefore, any secondary cause through which God by his working creates should also be called a “creator.” And so, to create does not belong to God alone.

On the contrary, Damascene anathematizes all who say that angels can create anything. (John Damascene (ca. 675–749 AD), On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 3 (PG 94:874).) But the ability to create seems to be more plausible for angels than anything else. Therefore, it seems that to create belongs to God alone.

Furthermore, being and simple non-being are infinitely distant from each other. But to move over an infinite distance belongs to an infinite power, such as God alone possesses. Therefore, it belongs to God alone to create.

I answer that, concerning this, there are three opinions. Some philosophers (These would include Plato in the Timaeus, Avicenna in his Metaphysics, tract. 9, ch. 4, and the author of the Book of Causes (adapting and summarizing Proclus), props. 3, 9, 16.) posited that from the first cause there comes, without any intermediary, one first caused thing, and then from that first caused thing there come other things, and so forth. Hence they posited that one intelligence is caused by means of another, the soul by means of an intelligence, and bodily nature by means of spiritual nature. This is condemned as a heresy, since this opinion attributes to the created thing the honor that is due to God, and thus it is close to leading to idolatry. Hence others said that creation befits nothing created and is not even communicable, just as to have infinite power, which is necessary for the work of creation, is not communicable. Others said that creation has not been communicated to anything created, but that it nevertheless could have been communicated, as the Master asserts. (See Sent. IV. 5.3(35).2–4.)

Both of these latter opinions seem to me to be true in a sense. (Mandonnet notes that even though Aquinas is teaching here a doctrine he will later repudiate (see ST I.45.5: it is impossible that the act of creating belong to any creature, either by its own power, or instrumentally, as a minister), he nevertheless puts forward this opinion cautiously.) For since it pertains to the account of creation that something not preexist it, at least according to the order of nature, this can be understood from the perspective of the one who creates or from the perspective of what is created. If it is understood from the perspective of the one who creates, it can then be said that creation means an action that is not founded on the action of any preceding cause. And in this sense, creation is an action of the first cause alone, since every action of a secondary cause is founded upon the action of the first cause. Hence just as it cannot be communicated to anything created that it should be the first cause, so also it cannot be communicated to it that it should be a creator.

However, if it is understood from the perspective of what is created, then creation is of that regarding which nothing in a thing preexists, and this is being. Hence it is said in the Book of Causes that the first of created things is being. (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 4.) And elsewhere in the same book (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 1.) it is said that being comes about by creation—with other perfections added by the imposition of forms—and in composites especially there is the being that belongs to their first part, namely, matter. And with creation understood from this perspective, it could have been communicated to something created that, through the power of the first cause working in it, some simple being or matter should be produced. And this is the way in which philosophers posited that intelligences do create, though this is heretical.

Reply Obj. 1: In this matter, the texts of the philosophers are not to be followed, since they were wrong about this. Now, all those texts could be explained as speaking of “creating souls” inasmuch as through the movement of the spheres, bodies are disposed for the reception of the soul. But this is not what they intended to say.

Reply Obj. 2: Whatever is communicable to a created thing with respect to what pertains to the perfection of its nature is communicated to it. But this is not true with regard to secondary perfections. For example, not every man, though capable of royal dignity, has been made a king by God. And so it is with the power of creating, according to those who say that creation can be communicated to what is created.

Reply Obj. 3: The resistance of a contrary does not make for a difficulty in acting except inasmuch as it separates potency from act. For the more intense one of two contraries is, the more remote is its potency from the other. Thus, it is a matter of greater power simply for something to be made from non-being than for something to be made from its contrary, since in non-being simply no potency remains.

Reply Obj. 4: Even though last things are led to their last end through intermediate things, the influence of the last end is never communicated to any of the intermediates in such a way that it would be the last thing desired. So, too, the influence of the first agent, which is creation, can never be communicated to any of the secondary principles.

Reply Obj. 5: A proximate agent, such as that which generates, only acts in the thing generated by drawing out form from the potency of matter. But the activity of the first cause consists in creating even the very matter. Thus, a natural proximate agent is only what generates the thing, but the first and divine agent is what creates it. And from this it is clear that just as the activity of an art is founded on the activity of nature, inasmuch as nature prepares the matter for art, so also the activity of nature is founded on creation, inasmuch as it provides the matter for nature.

Article 4

Whether anything other than God can effect anything

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.22.3; 103.6; 116.2; SCG III.76–77, 83, 94; Compendium theologiae, ch. 130.) It seems that nothing other than God can effect anything.

Obj. 1: For an agent that acts without something intermediate is more perfect than one that needs something intermediate in its action. But God is the most perfect agent. Therefore, it seems that he produces all things without the mediation of anything.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, among the other things created, angels are the more noble. But to cause things is not attributed to angels. For one angel is not the cause of another, nor again is an angel the cause of a bodily creature. Therefore, it seems that much less would other creatures be causes of things.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is the same in species is not produced by specifically different agents. But the first individuals of all species were immediately created by God, on the supposition that the world has not always existed. Therefore, it seems that nothing can produce anything like itself specifically.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, that which is not from any matter can only come to be by creation. But forms and accidents do not have matter as part of them or we would go to infinity. Therefore, they can only come to be by creation. Hence we can argue as follows: every efficient cause of a thing gives it a form, either substantial or incidental. But such things are only produced by creation. Therefore, nothing can be the efficient cause of a thing except the Creator, which is God alone, as has been said. (Above: a. 3, resp.)

Obj. 5: Furthermore, an efficient cause is never more lacking than the effect. But natural agents only act through active qualities, which are accidents. This is proved by the fact that it is not possible for something to be a substantial form in one thing and an incidental form in another. Hence heat, which is an accident of man, cannot be the substantial form of fire, and so for other causes. Therefore, no natural agent produces a substantial form. And so, the same follows as before.

On the contrary, according to Damascene, any given thing has its own proper activity. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 23 (PG 94:950).) But every thing that has a proper active activity is by its activity the cause of something else. Therefore, it seems that fire by heating is the cause of heat, and so forth.

Furthermore, if God immediately caused all things, one thing would not depend on another just as what is caused depends on its cause. And so, a thing would not arise from one thing more than from another. But we perceive sensibly that a given thing does not arise from just any random thing. Rather, a man is always generated from the seed of a man. Therefore, the seed of the father is the efficient cause of the son.

I answer that concerning this question there are three positions. One of these is that God immediately works all things such that nothing else is the cause of anything. And they even go so far as to say that it is not fire that heats but rather God, that the hand does not move but rather God causes its motion, and so forth. But this position is foolish, since it takes away the order of the universe, and the proper activity from realities, and demolishes the judgment of the senses.

The second position is that of some philosophers who, in order to maintain the proper activities of things, deny that God immediately creates everything. Rather, they say that he is immediately the cause of the first created thing and that this is the cause of the next, and so forth. But this opinion is erroneous, since according to the faith we do not assert that angels are creators but rather that God alone is the Creator of all things visible and invisible.

The third position is that God immediately works all things and that individual realities have their proper activities whereby they are the proximate causes of things—not, however, of all things but of some of them.

For, as has been said, (In I Sent., d. 37, q. 1, a. 1.) according to the faith it is not asserted that anything created brings another into existence by creation, either by its own power or by the power of another. Therefore, God alone is immediately the cause of all those things that come into existence by creation. But things of this sort cannot come into being through motion or generation. First, this is on account of the simplicity of their essence in which they subsist, since everything that is generated must be composed of matter and form. Hence neither angels nor rational souls can be generated but only created. But it is otherwise with other forms that, even if they are simple, nevertheless do not have absolute being, since they are not subsistent. Hence coming into being is not due to them, but rather to the composite that has such a form, which is what is said to be generated directly, as having being directly. However, the aforementioned forms are only said to be generated incidentally. And by the same reasoning, prime matter, which underlies generation, is, on account of its simplicity, not generated but created.

Second, this is on account of a separation from contrariety, as in the case of the heavenly bodies. For everything that is generated is generated from a contrary.

Third, this is on account of the necessity that what generates being is like in species to what is generated. For this reason the first hypostases were immediately created by God, such as the first man, the first lion, and so forth. For a man can only be generated by a man. But it is otherwise with those things for whose generation an agent like in species is not required; rather, heavenly power with active and passive qualities suffices, such as what is generated from putrefaction.

But a created thing can be the cause of other things that are produced through motion and generation. It can do this either such that it possesses causality over the whole species, just as the sun is a cause in the generation of a man or a lion, or such that it possesses causality with regard to only one individual of the species, just as a man generates a man and a fire generates a fire. Even so, God is also the cause of these, working more intimately in them than other moving causes, since he is what gives being to things, while other causes, as it were, determine that being. For no thing’s complete being takes its beginning from another creature, since the matter is from God alone. But being is more intimate to any given thing than those things through which its being is determined. Hence, too, it remains even when they are removed, as is said in the Book of Causes. (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 1.) Hence the activity of the Creator penetrates more deeply into the innermost core of a thing than the activity of secondary causes. Thus, the fact that something created is the cause of another thing created does not exclude that God immediately works in all things, inasmuch as his power is like a medium joining together the power of any secondary cause with its effect. For there could not be the power of a created thing over its effect except through the power of the Creator, from whom is all power, and the preservation of power, and its ordering to the effect. For, as is also said in the Book of Causes, (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 1.) the causality of a secondary cause is made firm through the causality of the first cause.

Reply Obj. 1: It is not out of neediness that God needs other causes to create, but rather out of the goodness of him who willed to confer even the dignity of causing on others.

Reply Obj. 2: If we posit, according to the opinion of some, that the angels serve God in the movements of the spheres, it is obvious that angels will be a cause of generation and corruption through the movement of the spheres. And this causality will redound to them all, even though not all would be devoted to this ministry. For, according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 3 (PG 3:163).) the higher angels illuminate the lower ones in regard to the ministries that are to be performed by them. But if we do not suppose this, then it can be said that from the fact that angels are more noble, it does not follow that they have the dignity of causing generation and corruption in things, but rather another much greater dignity that consists in the knowledge of God.

Reply Obj. 3: The same effect in its species cannot come from different immediate agents that have activities determined to determinate effects, as from an art and from nature. But God does not have an activity that is determined to some effect. Rather, by one single activity he can produce all the effects he wills. Hence even without the activity of nature God can produce the same effect specifically that nature produces.

Reply Obj. 4: Regarding the coming of things into being through generation, there have been three opinions. The first was of those who posited “hiddenness,” such as Anaxagoras, who posited that all things are in all things and that generation comes about by drawing things out. (See Aristotle, Physics 1.4, 187a27–b8.) And so, he did not posit true generation, where a new substantial form for matter is acquired. And every opinion of the ancients who did not posit true generation but rather that generation is through aggregation or separation, or through alteration alone, falls into this deficiency. This happened to them because they did not posit formal cause but either material cause alone, or an agent cause along with it.

Another opinion contrary to this was that of Plato, who posited that separate forms, which he called “ideas,” are what introduce the forms in matter. The opinion of Avicenna is in a way reducible to this, since he says that all forms are from an intelligence and that a natural agent is nothing but what prepares matter for the reception of a form. (See In primis et secundis substantiis et de fluxu entis, ch. 4; the work is generally agreed to have been mistakenly attributed to Avicenna.) This opinion comes from the fact that he believes each thing is generated from something like it, which frequently is not found in natural things, as in the case of what comes to be through putrefaction. His opinion also comes about because he posited that coming-to-be is essentially terminated in the form. And this cannot be, since coming-to-be is essentially terminated in that which has being, which is the terminus of the making; and this is only the composite, not form or matter. Hence form is only generated incidentally.

The third opinion is that of Aristotle, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.7–9; 12.2–3.) midway between these, namely, that all forms are in potency in prime matter, but not actually, as those who posited hidden forms said. He also said that a natural agent produces not the form but the composite by leading matter from potency into act, and that this natural agent in its action is, as it were, an instrument of God himself acting, who created even the matter and gave it potency to the form. Hence maintaining this opinion, it is not necessary for what generates to create a form or to make something from nothing, since it makes not the form but the composite.

Reply Obj. 5: Just as natural heat acts by the power of the soul as its instrument, as is said in On the Soul 2, (See Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 416a1–18.) on account of which it not only heats but also acts for the generation of animated flesh, so also an active quality acts in the power of a substantial form. Thus, through this action matter is not only brought to the act of incidental form but also to the act of substantial form.

Article 5

Whether the world is eternal

To the fifth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.46.1; SCG II.31ff.; On the Power of God, q. 3, a. 17; Quodl. III, q. 14, a. 2; Compendium theologiae, ch. 98; Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, bk. 8, lect. 2; Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens, bk. 2, lect. 6 and lect. 29; Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, bk. 12, lect. 5.) It seems that the world is eternal. In support of this, arguments can be taken from four sources: from the substance of the heavens, from time, from motion, and from agent or mover.

Obj. 1: The argument from the substance of the heavens is as follows. Everything that is ungenerated and incorruptible always has been and always will be. But prime matter is ungenerated and incorruptible, since everything that is generated is generated from a subject and what is corrupted is corrupted into a subject, whereas there is not a subject of prime matter. Therefore, prime matter always has been and always will be. But matter is never divested of form. Therefore, matter from eternity was perfected by its forms, by which species are constituted. Therefore, the universe has been from eternity, since these species are its parts. And this is the argument of Aristotle in the Physics 1. (Aristotle, Physics 1.9, 192a25–35.)

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what does not have a contrary is neither corruptible nor generable, since generation is from a contrary and corruption is into a contrary. But the heavens do not have a contrary, since nothing is contrary to its motion. Therefore, the heavens are neither generable nor corruptible. Therefore, it always has been and always will be. And this is the argument of the Philosopher in On the Heavens 1. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.3, 270a12–17.)

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the faith’s position, the substance of the world is said to be incorruptible. But everything incorruptible is ungenerated. Therefore, the world is ungenerated. Therefore, it always has existed. Proof of the middle premise: everything that is incorruptible has the power to be always. But that which has the power to be always is not found to be at one time a being and at another time non-being, since it would follow that it would at the same time be a being and non-being. For something is a being during the entire time to which its power of being is determined. Hence if it has the power to be at every time, then at every time it is. And so, if we posit that it ever is not, it follows that at the same time it both is and is not. Therefore, nothing incorruptible is at one time a being and at another time non-being. But every generable thing is of this sort. Therefore, and so forth. And this is the Philosopher’s argument in On the Heavens 1. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.12, 281b18–282a14.)

Obj. 4: Furthermore, everything that is anywhere, where before there was nothing, is in that which before was a vacuum, since a vacuum is that in which there can be a body even though nothing is there. But if the world was made from nothing, then where the world is now there was nothing before. Therefore, before the world there was a vacuum. But a vacuum is impossible, as is proved in the Physics 4 (Aristotle, Physics 4.6–9.) and as the many experiences of the senses demonstrate in the many natural dispositions that arise from the fact that nature does not allow a vacuum. Therefore, it is impossible for the world to have begun. And this is the argument of the Commentator on On the Heavens 1. (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Heavens, bk. 1, comm. 29.)

Obj. 5: The same can be argued from the perspective of time, in this way: everything that is always at its beginning and end, always has been and always will be, since it is something after the beginning and before the end. But time is always in that which is the beginning of time and its end. For there is no time except now, the definition of which is that it is the end of the past and the beginning of the future. Therefore, it seems that there has always been time and always will be. Thus, there have always been and always will be motion, the movable, and the whole world. And this is the Philosopher’s argument in the Physics 8. (Aristotle, Physics 8.1, 251b11–28.)

Obj. 6: Furthermore, everything that can never be represented as static but instead is always taken as fluid has something before itself from which it flows. But “now” cannot be represented as static, like a point, but instead always as fluid. For the whole account of time lies in flux and succession. Therefore, before any given “now,” we must posit another “now.” Therefore, it is impossible to imagine that time had a first “now.” Therefore, time has always been. And so it follows as before. And this is the argument of the Commentator on the same passage. (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 8, comm. 12.)

Obj. 7: Furthermore, the Creator of the world either preceded the world by nature alone or also by duration. If it is by nature alone, as a cause precedes its effect, then whenever the Creator was, the thing created was. Thus, the world is eternal. But if it is by duration, then, since “before” and “after” in duration cause the account of time, before the whole world there was time, and this is impossible, since time is an accident of motion and does not exist without motion. Therefore, it is impossible that the world has not always been. And this is the argument of Avicenna in his Metaphysics. (Avicenna, Metaphysics, tract. 9, ch. 1.)

Obj. 8: The same can be shown from the perspective of motion. For it is impossible that there be a new relation between things unless there has been a change regarding one of them, as is clear, for example, in equality. For things do not newly come to be equal unless one of the extremes was either augmented or diminished. But all motion implies a relation of the mover to the thing moved, which are opposed relationally. Therefore, it is impossible for a motion to be new unless some change either in the mover or in the thing moved precedes it, as, for example, if one is accommodated to the other or something else of this sort. Therefore, before each motion there is motion. And so, from eternity there is motion, the movable, and the world. And this is the Philosopher’s argument in the Physics 8. (Aristotle, Physics 8.1, 251a18–b10.)

Obj. 9: Furthermore, everything that is at one time in motion and at another time at rest is traced back to a continuous motion that always exists. For something that is always the same cannot be the cause of this succession, which results from the alternation of motion and rest, since something that is always the same always does the same thing. Therefore, the cause of this alternation must be a motion that, if it does not always exist, must have another preceding motion. And since we cannot go to infinity, it is necessary to arrive at some motion that always exists. And so, the same follows as before. And this is the argument of the Commentator on the Physics 8. (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 8, comm. 9.) The same can also be drawn from the words of the Philosopher. The Commentator, too, adduces the same argument in the Metaphysics 7 (See Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 7, comm. 23.) to show that if the world were made, it would have to be part of another world by whose motion a change in this world would come about, whether in the alternation of motion and rest or in the alternation of being and non-being.

Obj. 10: Furthermore, the generation of one thing is the corruption of another. But nothing is corrupted unless it was first generated. Therefore, before every generation there is generation, and before every corruption there is corruption. But this could not be if the world did not exist. Therefore, the world has always been. And this is the Philosopher’s argument in On Generation and Corruption 1. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.3, 318a23–29.)

Obj. 11: The same can be shown from the perspective of mover or agent. For every action or motion from an agent or mover that is not moved must always be. But the first agent or mover is altogether immovable. Therefore, his action and his motion must always be. The first premise is proved as follows. Everything that acts or moves after not acting or moving is brought from potency into act, since each thing acts according as it is in act. Hence if it acts after not acting, something in it must be in act that was first in potency. But everything that is brought from potency into act is moved. Therefore, everything that acts after not acting is moved. And this argument can be drawn from the words of the Philosopher in the Physics 8. (Aristotle, Physics, bk. 8, throughout, although especially at the beginning of the book.)

Obj. 12: God is an agent either by his will or through a necessity of nature. If it is through a necessity of nature, since such things are determined to one thing, then from him the same thing must always arise. Hence if the world was ever made by him, then the world would have to be eternal. However, if he acts by his will, then every will only begins to act newly if some motion comes about in the will either from some impediment that was formerly there but later ceases. Or, it is due to the fact that the will is stirred up now but not before by something that induces it to act but did not induce it before. Therefore, since the will of God immovably remains the same, it seems that it does not begin to act newly. And this argument is common to the Philosopher in the Physics 8, (Aristotle, Physics 8.1, 251a28–35, and 252a10–b7.) to Avicenna, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, tract. 9, ch. 1.) and to the Commentator. (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 8, comm. 8, 15.)

Obj. 13: Everyone who wills at one time to act and at another time not to act must imagine a time after a time, distinguishing the time in which he wills to act from the time in which he does not will to act. But to imagine a time after a time follows a change either of the imagination itself or at least of what is imagined, since the succession of time is caused by the succession of motion, as is clear from the Physics 4. (Aristotle, Physics 4.11, 219a30–b4.) Therefore, it is impossible for the will to begin a new motion not preceded by another motion. And this is the argument of the Commentator on the Physics 8. (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 8, comm. 8–15.)

Obj. 14: Every will to effect something produces its effect at once, unless something is lacking to what is willed that afterward comes to it. For example, if I now have the will of making a fire tomorrow when it will be cold, now the presence of cold is lacking to what is willed, but when it comes, I will make a fire at once, if I can, unless something else is lacking for this. But God had an eternal will to make the world. Otherwise, he would be changeable. Therefore, it is impossible that he has not made the world from eternity, unless through the fact that something had been lacking to the world that has later came to it. But it could not have come to it except through an action. Therefore, prior to something newly made, another action producing this change must precede. Thus, something of finite age never proceeds from an eternal will except by the mediation of an eternal motion. Therefore, the world must always have been. And this is the argument of the Commentator in the same place.

On the contrary (15), God is either the cause of the substance of the world or he is not, being rather the cause of its motion only. If he is the cause of its motion only, then its substance is not created. Therefore, it is a first principle; and thus, there will be several first principles and several uncreated things, which was disproved above. But if he is the cause of the substance of heaven, giving being to heaven, then since everything that receives being from something comes after it in duration, it seems that the world has not always been.

Furthermore (16), Every created thing was made from nothing. But everything that was made from nothing is a being after it was nothing, since it cannot at the same time be a being and non-being. Therefore, it is necessary that the heavens first was not and later was, and so also the whole world.

Furthermore (17), if the world has existed from eternity, then infinite days have preceded this day. But we cannot traverse infinities. Therefore, we never would have been able to arrive at this day, which is false. Therefore, and so on.

Furthermore (18), anything to which an addition can be made can have something greater than or more than it. But to the days that have preceded, an addition of days can be made. Therefore, past time can be greater than it is. But there is nothing greater than the infinite, nor can there be. Therefore, past time is not infinite.

Furthermore (19), if the world has existed from eternity, then generation has also existed from eternity, both that of men and that of animals. But all generation has a generator and a generated. The generator is the efficient cause of the generated. And so, we proceed to infinity in efficient causes, which is impossible, as is proved in the Metaphysics 2. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.2, 994a1–19.) Therefore, it is impossible that generation and the world have always existed.

Furthermore (20), if the world has always existed, then there have always been men. Therefore, infinite men have died before us. But when a man dies, his soul does not die but remains. Therefore, there is now an actual infinity of souls separated from their bodies. But it is impossible for the infinite to be actual, as is proved in the Physics 3. (Aristotle, Physics 3.5, 204a8–16.) Therefore, it is impossible that the world has always existed.

Furthermore (21), it is impossible for anything to be considered equal to God. But if the world has always existed, then it would be equal to God in duration. Therefore, this is impossible.

Furthermore (22), no finite power is the power for an infinite activity. But the power of the heavens is a finite power, since its magnitude is finite and it is impossible for there to be an infinite power from a finite magnitude. Therefore, it is impossible for its motion to have existed over an infinite time, and likewise it is impossible for its being to have endured for an infinite time, since the duration of a thing does not exceed the power that it has for being. And so, at one time it had a beginning.

Furthermore (23), no one doubts that God precedes the world by nature. But in God, nature and duration are the same. Therefore, God precedes the world by duration. Therefore, the world has not existed from eternity.

I answer that concerning this question there are three positions. The first position is that of the philosophers who said that not only is God from eternity but also other things, though in different ways. (Cf. Aristotle, Physics 8.1, 251b13–28; On the Heavens 1.10, 279b12–16; 3.2, 300b25–301a3; 301a11–20; Metaphysics 1.8, 989b1–24; 3.4, 1000a5–b32.) For certain philosophers before Aristotle posited that the world is generable and corruptible and that the whole universe is like a particular thing of a species, of which one individual is corrupted and another generated. And this was the opinion of Empedocles.

Others said that things were at rest for infinite time, and that through an intellect extracting and separating one thing from another they began to be moved. And this was the opinion of Anaxagoras.

Others said that from eternity things were moved with an unordered motion and then were reduced to an order either by chance, as Democritus posits that indivisible movable bodies were united to one another by chance, or by a creator, as Plato posits, recorded in On the Heavens 3. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 3.2, 300b17–19, referencing Plato, Timaeus 30a.)

Others said that things have existed from eternity in the order in which they are now. And this is the opinion of Aristotle and of all the philosophers who came after him. And this opinion is the more probable among the aforementioned. Nevertheless, all these opinions are false and heretical.

The second position is of those who say that the world began to be after it had not been and likewise everything that is other than God, and that God could not have made the world from eternity, not owing to any lack in his power, but rather because the world could not be made from eternity, since it is created. They also hold that the fact that the world had a beginning is not only held by faith, but also proved by demonstration.

The third position is of those who say that everything besides God began to be, but that God nevertheless could have produced things from eternity. Thus, it could not be demonstrated that the world had a beginning, and this rather has been held and believed by divine revelation. This position is supported by the authority of Gregory who says that some prophecy concerns the past, (Gregory the Great (ca. 540–604 AD), Homiliae in Hiezechihelem prophetam, bk. 1, homily 1 (CCSL 142; PL 76:786).) as, for example, when Moses prophesied saying: in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth (Gen 1:1).

And I agree with this position. For I do not believe a demonstrative argument to this effect can be made by us, just as we cannot do so with regard to the Trinity, even though it is impossible for the Trinity not to be. This shows the weakness of the arguments that are adduced as demonstrations to this effect, all of which have been set out and resolved by philosophers who maintain the eternity of the world. Thus, they are turned more into a mockery of the faith than a confirmation of it, if anyone intends to prove against the philosophers the finite age of the world by resting on such arguments.

Therefore, I say that there are no demonstrations of the question on either side, but rather probable or sophistic arguments on both sides. This is what the words of the Philosopher signify when he says that there are certain problems concerning which we do not have an argument, such as whether the world is eternal. (Aristotle, Topics 1.11, 104b16.) Hence he never intended to demonstrate this, which is clear from his manner of proceeding, since wherever he treats of this question, he always adds an appeal either from the majority opinion or from arguments being approved, which in no way pertains to one who is giving a demonstration.

However, the reason why it cannot be demonstrated is as follows. The nature of a thing varies depending on whether it is in complete being or is in its first coming to be, as proceeding from its cause. So, for example, the nature of man already born is different from his nature when still in his mother’s womb. Hence if someone wished from the conditions of a complete man after birth to argue concerning his conditions as incomplete in his mother’s womb, he would be deceived. Thus, Rabbi Moses tells of a certain boy who, after his mother died when he was a few months old, had been brought up on a deserted island. He reached the age of discretion and asked someone whether men were made and how. When they explained the process of human birth to him, the boy objected that it was impossible, asserting that man cannot live a single day unless he breathes and eats and expels waste and that therefore he could not live in the womb of his mother for nine months. (Moses Maimonides (1135‒1205 AD), Guide for the Perplexed, part 1, ch. 18.) They err in like manner who, from the manner in which things come to be in an already complete world, wish to show the necessity or the impossibility of the world’s having a beginning, since now what begins to be begins through motion. Hence they say that what moves it must precede it in duration and that it must precede it also by nature and that there must be contrarieties. And all these things are not necessary in the procession of the being of the universe from God.

Reply Obj. 1: Matter is ungenerated and incorruptible, but it does not therefore follow that it has always existed. For it began to be not through generation from something else but altogether from nothing. It could likewise cease to be if God so willed, since by his will being is communicated to matter and to the whole world.

Reply Obj. 2: Similarly, this argument proceeds by considering a beginning through generation and motion. Hence this is an argument against Empedocles and others who posited that the heavens were generated.

Reply Obj. 3: The potency for duration that is now in the heavens is not measured by a determinate time. Hence through this potency it could have existed for an infinite time before as well as after, if it had always possessed it. But it did not always possess this potency for duration. Rather, it was given to it by the divine will at its creation.

Reply Obj. 4: Before the creation of the world there was not a vacuum, just as there is not a vacuum after it. For a vacuum is not merely a negation but a privation. Hence for the position that there was a vacuum, one must posit a place or separated dimensions, as those who posited a vacuum said, but we can posit none of these things before the world. And if it be said that there was the potential, one should reply that this was only in the power of the agent, as has been said above.

Reply Obj. 5: This argument is circular, which is clear, according to the Philosopher, in the following way. On the basis of “before” and “after” in motion, there is “before” and “after” in time. Hence when it is said that every “now” is the end of “before” and the beginning of “after,” it is supposed that every moment of motion follows one motion and precedes another. Hence I say that this proposition cannot be proved except by supposing its conclusion. Thus, it is clear that it is not a demonstration.

Reply Obj. 6: “Now” is never understood as static but rather always as fluid—yet not as flowing from “before,” unless motion precedes it, but rather as flowing into the “after.” And again, not as flowing into “after” but as flowing from “before,” unless motion follows it. Hence if motion never followed or preceded, “now” would not be “now.” And this is clear in a particular motion, which is observed sensibly to begin, of which any given moment is fluid, and yet there is still something first and something last with reference to the terminus-from-which and the terminus-to-which.

Reply Obj. 7: God precedes the world not only by nature but also by duration, yet not by a duration of time, but rather by one of eternity, since before the world there was not time that existed in reality but only in the imagination. For now we imagine that on the “before” side God could have added many years to this finite time, and eternity would be present to all these years. And accordingly it is said that God could have made the world before he did make it and that he could have made it both greater and more than one.

Reply Obj. 8: Newness of relation comes about not from a change in the mover but from a change in the movable, understanding “change” in a broad sense to include creation, which is not a change in the proper sense, as has been said above. (Above: a. 2.) Hence the creation of the heavens precedes its motion at least by nature, but no change precedes creation, since it is from non-being simply.

However, if it were supposed that the heavens did exist before they began to be moved, the argument would still not follow, since it must be understood that there are two kinds of relation. One kind is an absolute relation, as in all things that are in relation to something with respect to being, such as paternity and filiation. Such a relation only arises as new through the acquisition of that in which the relation is founded. Hence if it is acquired through motion, then such a relation follows on a motion, as for example the likeness of one thing to another follows on an alteration in the quality upon which the relation is founded.

However, if the relation is acquired through creation, then it follows on creation, as, for example, the likeness of the created thing to God is founded on the goodness that is acquired through creation, through which the created thing becomes like God. But there are other kinds of relative names that imply both a relation and the foundation of the relation together. The newness of such relations requires the acquisition of the thing signified by the name, such as the acquisition of the habit that is science. And the case is similar with the relation that the name “motion” implies, which arises as new through the acquisition of a motion from the mover in the movable.

Reply Obj. 9: Of this alternation whereby the world did not exist and then later existed, the efficient cause is not a motion but rather a reality that is always the same, namely, the divine will, which resolved from eternity that the world should come into being after non-being. And if it be objected that the same thing always does the same thing, I say that this is true if “first agent” is taken in its proper account, whereby it determinately produces a certain effect. But just as a natural agent is determined by its proper form such that an action never follows unless it is in agreement with that form, so also a voluntary agent is determined to an action by the will’s intention. Hence if the will can be neither impeded nor moved, an effect does not follow except in accordance with what the will intended. And it is true that the divine will, inasmuch as it is always the same, always does that which it willed from eternity, since it is never caused. Even so, the divine will does not cause the things willed by it to exist always, since this is not what it wills. Hence if it were to do this, then, because it would be doing what it itself does not will, it would be like if heat were to make cold.

Reply Obj. 10: The first individual generable and corruptible things did not come into being through generation but through creation. Thus, it is not necessary for others to have preexisted from which they were created so as to lead to an infinite regress.

Reply Obj. 11: There are two kinds of agent. One kind acts by a necessity of nature. And it is determined to an action by what is in its nature. Hence it is impossible for it to begin to act unless it is brought from potency, whether essential or incidental, into act. The other kind of agent is voluntary, and here, too, a distinction should be made. One kind acts by an intermediate action that is not the essence of what is working. In such things, a new effect cannot follow without a new action, and the newness of the action produces a change in the agent as proceeding from inactivity to act, as is said in On the Soul 2. (Found diffusely in Aristotle, On the Soul 2.5.) But the other kind is without an intermediate action or instrument, and this is the kind of agent that God is. Hence his willing is his action, and just as his willing is eternal, so also is his action. And yet the effect does not follow except in keeping with the form of the will, which proposes to do something in this or that way. Thus, it does not go from potency to act. Rather, the effect that was in the potency of the agent becomes a being in act.

Reply Obj. 12: In all those things that act for an end outside the will, the will is regulated in accordance with that end. Hence in keeping with what impedes or helps it toward the end, it wills at one time to act and at another time not to act. But the will of God has not given being to the universe for another end existing outside his own will, just as he does not move the universe for another end, as philosophers concede, since what is more noble does not act for the sake of something baser than itself. Thus, from the fact that he does not always act, it does not follow that he has anything inciting or restraining him besides the determination of his own will, which proceeds from his wisdom exceeding all understanding.

Reply Obj. 13: The divine intellect understands all things at once. Thus, from the fact that it understands what is present at this or that time, there need not be any change in its understanding, granted that this cannot occur in our intellect. Thus, it is clear that the argument is sophistic. Likewise, we do not posit any motion on the part of the thing imagined, since God did not will to make the universe after a time, since there was no time before except as imagined, as was said before.

Reply Obj. 14: The divine will did not produce the universe from eternity because something was lacking in what was willed. For what can be understood as lacking to a thing willed, on account of which it is deferred, is its proportion to the end—for example, a man’s will defers taking medicine when the medicine is not proportionate to the health of the man. And so, I say that for the universe to have come to be from eternity lacked proportion to its end, which is the divine will. For God willed that it would have being after non-being, in duration just as in nature. And if it had existed from eternity, this would have been lacking to it. Hence it would not have been proportionate to the divine will, which is its end.

And because we find that philosophers have replies to the arguments made to the contrary, which I have said are not demonstrations, thus, even though their conclusion is true, we must also respond to them as the philosophers themselves respond, lest they encounter someone disputing against those who maintain the world’s eternity and he be unprepared.

Reply Sed Contra 15: As the Commentator says in On the Substance of the Celestial Sphere, (Averroes, On the Substance of the Celestial Sphere, ch. 2.) Aristotle never meant that God was the cause of the motion of the heavens alone, but also that he was the cause of its substance and the one who gives it being. For since it is of finite power, due to the fact that it is a body, it needs another agent of infinite power from which it could have both perpetuity of motion and perpetuity of being, just as it has motion and being. But it does not follow from this that God precedes the heavens by duration, since he does not give being through motion, but rather through an eternal influence, insofar as his knowledge is the cause of things. And from the fact that he knows and wills from eternity, it follows that things exist from eternity, just as from the fact that the sun exists from eternity, it follows that its rays exist from eternity.

Reply Sed Contra 16: Avicenna replies to this in his Metaphysics, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, tract. 6, cc. 1, 2; tract. 9, ch. 4.) for he says that all things have been created by God and that creation is from nothing or of that which has being after nothing. But this can be understood in two ways. It either designates the order of duration, and in this way, according to him, it is false. Or it designates the order of nature, and in this way, it is true. For according to its nature, what belongs to each thing from itself is prior to what belongs to it from another. But any thing besides God has being from another. Therefore, it is necessary that according to its nature it would be non-being if it did not have being from God, just as Gregory says as well that all things would fall into nothingness if the hand of his omnipotence did not uphold them. (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 16, ch. 37 (CCSL 143A; PL 75:1143): cuncta quippe ex nihilo facta sunt eorum quae essentia rursum ad nihilum tenderet, nisi eam auctor omnium regiminis manu retineret.) And so, non-being, which it naturally has from itself, is prior to being, which it has from another, even if not by duration. And in this way, it is conceded by philosophers that things have been created and made by God.

Reply Sed Contra 17: The actually infinite is impossible, but the infinite through succession is not impossible. Now, of the infinite considered in this way, any given selection is finite. But what crosses over can only be understood as crossing from one determinate to another determinate, and thus, whatever determinate time is selected, there is always a finite time from this time to that. And so we can arrive at the present time.

Or it may be said that past time is infinite on the side of “before” and finite on the side of “after,” whereas the converse is true for future time. However, for each time on the side on which it is finite, we can place a limit, either a beginning or an end. Hence from the fact that past time is infinite on the side of “before,” according to them, it follows that it does not have a beginning, but rather an end. Thus, it follows that if a man begins to count from this day, he will not be able to arrive at the first day by counting. And the converse follows for the future.

Reply Sed Contra 18: An addition is made to the infinite not with respect to its whole succession—in respect of which it is infinite only in the potency of someone thinking about it—but rather to an actual finite selection, and nothing prevents something from being more or greater than this. And it is clear that this argument is sophistic, since it also does away with the infinite in the addition of numbers, as if someone were to say the following: some species of numbers are greater than ten that are not greater than a hundred. Therefore, more species are greater than ten than a hundred. Thus, since there are infinite species greater than a hundred, there will be something greater than the infinite. Therefore, it is clear that difference, addition, and going from point to point only pertain to something actual, either really existing or actually selected by the intellect or imagination. Hence these arguments are sufficient to prove that there is not an actual infinite, but this is not necessary for the eternity of the world. And these solutions are taken from the words of the Philosopher. (See Aristotle, Physics 3.6, 206a9–207a20.)

Reply Sed Contra 19: It is impossible for infinite causes to precede the same effect through themselves, or essentially, but it is possible in an incidental way. As such, an effect whose account includes that it proceeds from an infinity of causes is impossible, but there may be incidentally related to the effect an infinity of those causes whose multiplication is not relevant to the effect. For example, for the being of a knife some moving causes are necessary in themselves, such as a smith and an instrument. And it is impossible for these to be infinite, since it would then follow that an infinite was actual all at once. But it is incidental that a knife, made by an old smith who has switched instruments many times over, follows a successive multitude. And nothing prevents there being infinite instruments that precede that knife, if the smith had existed from eternity. And the case is likewise in the generation of animals, since the father’s seed is the moving cause instrumentally relative to the power of the sun. And since instruments of this sort, which are secondary causes, are generated and corrupted, it does happen that they are infinite. And in this way, too, it happens that infinite days have also preceded this day, since, according to them, the substance of the sun is from eternity and any revolution of it finite. And the Commentator sets out this argument in the Physics 8. (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 8, comm. 15, 47.)

Reply Sed Contra 20: This objection is stronger than the others, but Algazel responds to it in his Metaphysics, where he divides being into finite and infinite. (Algazel (al-Ghazālī, 1058–1111 AD), The Incoherence of the Philosophers, problem 4.) He concedes that there is an actual infinity of souls; but this is an incidental infinity, since rational souls bereft of bodies do not have dependence on one another. But the Commentator responds that souls do not remain plural after [separation from] the body, but only one soul remains from them all, as will be clear below. Hence unless this position—which the Commentator posits in On the Soul 3—is first disproved, the argument against him is not conclusive. And Rabbi Moses also touches on this argument, showing that the aforementioned argument is not a demonstration. (See Moses Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, part 1, ch. 73.)

Reply Sed Contra 21: Even if the world had always existed, it would not be equal to God in duration, since divine duration, which is eternity, is entire at once, whereas the duration of the world, which is varied by the succession of time, is not. And Boethius sets this out in the Consolation of Philosophy 5. (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 5, prose 6 (CCSL 94; PL 63:858): aeternitas igitur est interminabilis vitae tota simul et perfecta possessio.)

Reply Sed Contra 22: In the heavens there is not a potency to being, but only to place, according to the Philosopher. Thus, it cannot be said that the potency to being is finite or infinite, but the potency to place is finite. Nor is it even necessary for the local motion, to which this potency corresponds, to be finite, since the motion is infinite in duration from the infinity of the power of the mover from which the motion flows into what is movable. And this is the Commentator’s argument in the Metaphysics 11. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 11, comm. 41.) Now, when he says that it does not have a potency to being, this should be understood as meaning a potency to acquiring being through motion; yet it does have power or potency with respect to being, as is said in On the Heavens 1, (This claim seems to be extrapolated from the text of Aristotle in bk. 1 rather than stated verbatim in it.) and this power is finite. But its infinite duration is acquired from a separate infinite agent, as the Commentator himself says, in On the Substance of the Celestial Sphere. (Averroes, On the Substance of the Celestial Sphere, ch. 3.)

Reply Sed Contra 23: God’s duration, which is his eternity, and his nature are one thing. Yet they are distinguished in account or mode of signifying. For “nature” signifies a certain causality, inasmuch as nature is called the principle of motion, while “duration” signifies a certain permanence. Thus, if the preeminence of the divine nature and duration with respect to a created thing is considered as each being a given thing, then the same preeminence is found. For just as the divine nature precedes what is created by dignity and causality, so also the divine duration precedes the creature in the same ways. But if God precedes the world after the manner of nature, as is signified when we say, “he naturally precedes the world,” then it is not necessary for him also to precede the world according to the manner of duration, as is signified when it is said that God precedes the world by duration, since “nature” and “duration” do not have the same mode of signifying.

And many other similar objections are resolved in a like manner, as has been said in Book I.

Article 6

Whether this is fittingly expounded: in the beginning, that is, “in the Son,” God created the heavens and the earth

To the sixth we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.46.3.) It seems that this is unfittingly expounded: in the beginning, that is, “in the Son,” God created the heavens and the earth.

Obj. 1: For the Father is the origin of the whole divinity, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 20 (CCSL 50; PL 42:908): totius divinitatis vel si melius dicitur deitatis principium Pater est.) Therefore, by “beginning” we should understand the Father, by appropriation.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as was said in Book I, (Sent. I, 36.4(162).1.) “from him” is said with reference to the Father and “in him” with reference to the Holy Spirit. Therefore, from the fact that it says in the beginning we should take it as referring to the Holy Spirit and not to the Son.

Obj. 3: Again, it seems unfitting to take this as the beginning of time. For time goes together with the motion of the firmament. But the firmament was made on the second day. Therefore, the beginning of time was after the creation of heaven and earth. Thus, they were not created at the beginning of time.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, time is one of the four first created things. But time was not created at the beginning of time, since time would then be indivisible, which is impossible. Therefore, neither were heaven and earth.

Obj. 5: Again, it seems unfitting to take in the beginning as meaning “before all things.” For, as is said in the Book of Causes (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 4.) the first of created things is being and there is not anything else created before it. But heaven and earth are not their own being. Therefore, before heaven and earth something else was created.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, Sirach 18:1 says: he who lives forever created all things together. Therefore, heaven and earth are not before all created things.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, heaven and angels were made at the same time, as will be said below. Therefore, heaven and earth were not made before all things.

I answer that, following the saints, three explanations are set out that exclude many errors. The first excludes the error of Manichaeus, who posited more than one principle, since things are said to have been made in one effective principle and not in several. The second excludes the error of the eternity of the world, by the fact that the world is held to have a beginning of duration. The third excludes the error of those who hold that visible things were created by God through the mediation of a spiritual creature, in that it establishes that heaven and earth were created first.

Reply Obj. 1: The account of effective principle is appropriated to the Father, but the account of exemplary principle after the manner of art is appropriated to the Son, who is the wisdom and art of the Father.

Reply Obj. 2: To be “in,” as in what contains and preserves, is appropriated to the Holy Spirit on account of the appropriation of goodness. But to be “in” according to the manner in which an artifact is in art, and a thing is in its likeness, is appropriated to the Son.

Reply Obj. 3: According to the opinion that posits that all things were created simultaneously in matter and form, things are said to be created at the beginning of the time that measures the motion of the first mobile, not as in what measures creation, but as in what goes together with creation, since the creation of things and the beginning of time were simultaneous. But according to another opinion, which holds that things were formed through the succession of time, this is not understood of a time that is a measure of that motion, but rather of a time that is the number of that alternation by which the being of the world followed its non-being. Or, according to others, time is taken for aeviternity, which was created simultaneously with heaven and earth.

Reply Obj. 4: Just as number is not counted by another number, neither is time measured by another time, nor is its coming-to-be, since its whole being is in coming-to-be. Hence it begins in the beginning of time, not as in what measures its being, but rather as in that from which its production begins, just as an animal begins from its heart, a house from its foundation, and lines from a point.

Reply Obj. 5: The Philosopher is speaking of the order of nature in the way that “animal” is said to be prior to “man,” and not of the order of duration. For the being of heaven and earth did not exist before time itself.

Reply Obj. 6: According to one opinion, all things are understood as being created simultaneously not in their species, but in formless matter. But, according to others, all things are said to have been created simultaneously even in their proper forms. But then some things are said to be created before others, not in duration, but by the order of nature, insofar as in the process of generation the incomplete comes before the complete. But there will be greater inquiry into these things below.

Reply Obj. 7: “Heaven” is also understood as referring to angelic nature, which is said to dwell in the heavens. And “earth” is understood as referring to the whole nature of generable and corruptible things.

Exposition of the first part of the text

For Plato held that there were three first principles [or beginnings]. (Sent. II, 1.1.2.) It should be known that Plato erred in this regard, since he posited exemplary forms subsisting in themselves outside the divine intellect and held that neither they nor matter have their being from God. (In the Platonic dialogues, the “location” of ideas or forms is rather unclear, though he does seem to say they exist through themselves. Some later Platonists saw the ideas as requiring a mind in which they inhered.)

But Aristotle asserted two principles. (Sent. II, 1.3.4.) He seems to describe his position imperfectly. For Aristotle posits three principles in the Physics 1: matter, form, and privation. (These three principles are the point of arrival of the great argumentative sweep of book 1 of the Physics: Aristotle argues that there cannot be only a single principle (cc. 1–3); that the principles must be finite (ch. 4); that they must include contraries (ch. 5); that there needs to be an additional principle besides the contraries (ch. 6); and finally he concludes with a more formal demonstration that the principles are form, the privation of form, and the underlying or matter (cc. 7–9).)

Moreover, he posits not only an efficient exemplary cause, which is understood as the active principle, but also a final cause. (See Aristotle, Physics 2.3, 194b27–32.)

Furthermore, according to him, form, agent, and end are identical, as he says in the Physics 2. (Rather, Aristotle says that they “often” coincide: Physics 2.7, 198a25.) Thus, he seems to have posited only two principles.

To this it should be said that Aristotle did not err in positing more than one principle, since he posited that the being of all things depends only on the first principle. Thus, it remains that there is one first principle. But he did err in his position on the eternity of the world.

In response to the first we must say that Aristotle does not posit privation as an essential principle, but as an incidental principle, and that not in the being of a thing, but only in its coming-to-be.

In response to the other we must say that, according to him, the first agent principle and the last end are identical, as is clear in the Metaphysics 12, where he holds that the first moving principle moves as desired by all things. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.7, 1072a19–b13.) But he does not argue that the form that is part of a thing is identical with the agent numerically, but rather in species or likeness. (See Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.4–5.) From this it follows that there is one first principle outside a thing, which is agent, exemplar, and end. And there are two principles that are parts of a thing, namely, form and matter, which are produced by that first principle.

Division of the second part of the text

Having determined the procession of things from the first principle, here he pursues their ordering to the last end. And this is divided into three parts:

in the first, he explains the last end of created things;

in the second, from the end he shows the diversity of created things: but no one can be a sharer in his blessedness . . . except through intelligence. And so God made the rational creature; (Sent. II, 1.4.1.)

in the third, he bases the order of his treatment on a distinction: from the foregoing, it appears that the rational creature is distinguished into the angelic and the human. (Sent. II, 1.6.6.)

The second part is divided into three parts:

in the first, he shows the ordering of spiritual nature to the end;

in the second, the ordering of bodily nature: and just as man was made for God . . . so the world was made for man; (Sent. II, 1.4.6.)

in the third, the ordering of the conjunction of both: it is also usual to ask, since the soul would appear to be of greater dignity if it had remained without a body, why it has been united to the body. (Sent. II, 1.6.1.)

Concerning the first, he does two things:

first, from the end he draws a conclusion about the establishment of spiritual nature;

second, he draws a conclusion about its ordering to the end, at and so, when it is asked why man or angel is created, it can be briefly answered: because of God’s goodness. (Sent. II, 1.4.3.)

And concerning this he does three things:

first, he assigns an end on the part of the agent;

second, on the part of the work: and if it is asked for what the rational creature is created, answer: to praise God; (Sent. II, 1.4.4.)

third, he joins both together, at and so, when it is asked why or for what the rational creature has been made, it may be answered most briefly: because of God’s goodness and for its own utility. (Sent. II, 1.4.5.)

Concerning this he does two things:

first, he shows the end of the bodily creature;

second, he rules out a certain doubt, at concerning man, it is also sometimes found in Scripture that he was made in reparation for the fall of the angels. (Sent. II, 1.5.1.)

Question 2

The order of creation to the ultimate end

Here five questions are asked:

first, whether it belongs to God to act for an end;

second, whether the end of all things is God’s goodness;

third, whether all things were made for man;

fourth, for what purpose was man constituted of soul and body;

fifth, whether his soul should have been united to such a body.

Article 1

Whether it befits God to act for an end

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.44.4.) It seems that it does not belong to God to act for an end.

Obj. 1: For an end is the terminus of a motion. Hence there is neither an end nor a good in things that lack motion, such as in mathematical things, as is said in the Metaphysics 3. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 3.2, 996a27–35.) But God does not produce things through motion, as has been said before. (Above: q. 1, a. 2.) Therefore, it does not befit him to act for an end.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the end is the perfection of the agent. Hence just as matter desires form, so also the agent desires the end. But it does not belong to God to be perfected by another, since he is the first mover and the highest perfection. Therefore, he does not act for an end.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, for each thing that acts for an end, it is better that its work exist than not exist, since it is through this work that it obtains the end, as is clear by induction from particular cases. But for God it is not better, but rather indifferent whether created things exist or not, since he does not stand in need of any goods of ours. Therefore, he does not act for an end.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, his action is the last end of things, since it is his substance. But the last end does not have another end. Therefore, it seems that his action is not for an end.

On the contrary, the work of every agent that does not act for some end is vain. But the works of God are not such. Hence it is said: or have you made all the children of men in vain? (Ps 89:47 [88:48]) Therefore, he acts for an end.

Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.2, 994b9–15.) every agent that acts through intelligence acts for an end. But God is such, since his knowledge is the cause of things. Therefore, and so on.

I answer that to act “for an end” can mean two things: either for the end of the work or for the end of the worker. The end of the work is that to which the work has been ordered by the agent, and this is called the “reason for the work.” But the end of the worker is that which the worker principally intends. Hence the end of the work can be in another. But the end of the worker is always in himself, as is clear in a builder who gathers stones to put them together. This composition, in which the form of a house consists, is the end of the work. But the benefit to the worker that comes from this is the end on the part of the agent. Now, since every divine work has been ordered to an end, it is obvious that on the part of the work God acts for an end. But because the end of the work is always traced back to the end of the worker, we must also consider the end of his action on the side of the worker, which is the good of him in himself.

Therefore, it should be known that one can act for an end in this way for two reasons: either because of a desire for the end or because of love for the end. For desire is for a thing that is not possessed, whereas love is for a thing that is possessed, as Augustine says. (Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalm 118, sermon 8, para. 4 (CCSL 40; PL 36:1521).) Thus, it befits each created thing to act because of a desire for the end, since any given created thing acquires from another the good that it does not have of itself. But it belongs to God to act because of love for the end, since nothing can be added to his goodness. For he perfectly loves his goodness, and from this he wills that his goodness be multiplied after the manner that is possible, namely, by likeness to himself, from which a benefit comes to the created thing inasmuch as it receives the likeness of the divine goodness. Thus, it says in the text (Sent. I, 1.3.5.) that God made created things because of his goodness, considering the end of the worker, and because of the benefit to the thing created, considering the end of the work. And because of this Augustine also says that inasmuch as God is good, we exist. (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 32 (CCSL 32; PL 34:32).) And Dionysius says that divine love did not allow him to be without fruit. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4 (PG 3:694).)

Reply Obj. 1: According to Avicenna, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, tract. 6, ch. 1.) just as there are two kinds of agent, one that acts through motion as a natural agent does, and one that acts without motion by giving being, so also there are two kinds of good. One kind is acquired through motion, and this only exists among natural things, while the other kind is acquired without motion in receiving the influence of an agent without motion, and such a good also exists among immovable things.

Reply Obj. 2: That which acts out of desire for the end has an end outside itself by which it is perfected. But this does not pertain to God, who acts because of love for the end, since he himself is for himself the end possessed and loved by himself. Thus, we say that the divine will is not perfect in virtue of another, but in itself, since this will itself is goodness.

Reply Obj. 3: Everything that acts out of a desire for the end is ordered by its action to the attainment of what is desired. Hence it necessarily makes a difference to him whether his work exists or not. But it does not make a difference to him who acts out of love for the end, since he does not act to acquire any good.

Reply Obj. 4: God’s action is his essence. And we are not asking about its end from this perspective, but from the perspective of that by which an effect of a created thing is denoted.

Article 2

Whether created things exist for the sake of God’s goodness

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.44.4.) It seems that created things do not exist for the sake of God’s goodness.

Obj. 1: For, as it says in On the Heavens 1, nothing is naturally moved for the sake of what it cannot obtain. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.4, 271a30–34; 1.7, 274b14–18.) But no thing can obtain the divine goodness, since it is not received as any created thing’s perfection or form. Therefore, things have not been naturally ordered to it.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as it says in On the Heavens 2, every thing exists for the sake of its activity, and a sempiternal or incorporeal thing exists for the sake of the sempiternality of its being. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 2.3, 286a9–12.) But a thing’s existence and activity are not outside of it. Therefore it seems that they do not exist for the sake of the goodness of God, which is separate from things and not intermingled with them.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every thing is produced by an agent as near to the end as possible. But the better and more lasting something is, the more it approaches the divine goodness. Therefore, God made each and every thing as good as he was able to make it and from eternity, if he was able to make it so. But, since these conclusions are false, it seems that God’s goodness is not the end of created things.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the divine goodness is his beatitude. But only the intellectual creature is capable of his beatitude, as is said in the text. (Sent. I, 1.4.1.) Therefore, the divine goodness is not the end of everything created.

On the contrary, that on account of which a thing is made is its end. But as is said in Proverbs 16:4, the Lord has made all things for himself. Therefore, it seems that he himself is the end of all things.

Furthermore, the good has the account of an end, as is said in the Metaphysics 3. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 3.2, 996a24.) Therefore, the greatest good has in God also the account of the last end. But the divine goodness is the greatest goodness. Therefore, it is the last end of things.

I answer that end and agent are proportionate to each other, as are matter and form. Hence a difference in the end corresponds to a difference in the agent. Now, there are two kinds of agent. One kind is proportionate to what receives its effect. Hence it introduces into the effect a form of the same species or account, as in all univocal agents, such as when fire generates fire and the house that is in the soul of the craftsman causes the house that is in the matter. But the other kind of agent is not proportionate to what receives its effect. Hence the effect does not obtain the species of the agent, but rather some likeness to it, as much as it can, as happens with all equivocal agents, as when the sun is said to heat things.

So also there are two kinds of end. One kind is proportionate to what is directed to the end. And such an end is acquired as a perfection in what is directed to the end, such as when health is achieved by the activity of medicine. But there is also a kind of end that exceeds disproportionately that which is directed to the end. And this is not acquired as a perfection inhering in what is directed to the end; rather, what is acquired is a likeness to it. The divine goodness, which infinitely exceeds created things, is such an end. Thus, it is not in itself acquired by the thing created so as to be its form; rather, the created thing acquires a likeness to it that consists in the participation of some goodness. And thus, every appetite of nature or will tends toward becoming like the divine goodness and would tend to it itself if it had the potential to be possessed as an essential perfection, which is the form of a thing.

But even so, the divine goodness itself can be acquired by the rational creature as a perfection that is the object of its activity inasmuch as the rational creature has the potential to see and love God. Thus, in a singular way God is the end toward which the rational creature tends, above and beyond the common manner in which everything created tends to it, namely, inasmuch as everything created desires a good that is a certain likeness to the divine goodness. And from this it is clear that in every good the greatest good is desired.

Reply Obj. 1: Even though a thing does not acquire the divine goodness, still it does acquire a likeness to it. And on this basis it is called the end.

Reply Obj. 2: Activity is itself the ultimate perfection in which a thing exists, for habit and potency possess imperfection. Thus, it is the same for a thing to exist for the sake of its activity and for the sake of the divine goodness, which it approaches most of all when it is most of all in perfect act. Likewise, too, sempiternity of being is itself an assimilation to the divine goodness. And on account of this, philosophers call the perpetuity of species “divine being.”

Reply Obj. 3: The end is the cause of a thing only insofar as it is in the will of the agent. Thus, the divine goodness itself is the end of things in accordance with the manner and order by which it is willed by him. And thus, each thing most of all approaches its end when it imitates the divine will in keeping with what God has ordained concerning that thing.

Reply Obj. 4: Though the goodness of God is the end of things, things are related to it in various ways. For God himself possesses it perfectly in his own existence; hence he is supremely good. And he also possesses it in his own activity, whereby he perfectly knows and loves it; hence he is blessed, since beatitude is perfect activity, according to the Philosopher. (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.13, 1153b9; 9.9, 1170a27–b10; 9.10, 1171a17–20; 10.7, 1177a13–18.) But the intellectual creature does not attain to the goodness of God in its own existence, such that it itself would be the greatest good, but rather in its activity, by understanding and loving it. Hence the intellectual creature is a participant in beatitude and not only in the divine goodness. But the irrational creature approaches it in a certain assimilation, though it does not attain it either in activity or in existence. Hence the irrational creature is a participant in the goodness, but not in the beatitude.

Article 3

Whether all things were made for man

To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that not all things were made for man.

Obj. 1: For the end is intended by the agent. But human nature cannot be intended by God, since no one’s intention is directed toward what is baser than itself. Therefore, it seems that God did not make all things for man.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as the universal agent is only the first agent, so also the universal end seems to be only the last end. But man is not the last end of creation, but rather the divine goodness is, as was said. Therefore, man is not the end of all things created.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a wise craftsman would not make many large instruments for the sake of something small. But human nature is in a way one of the tiniest things in the universe. Therefore, it seems ridiculous for the whole universe to be made for the sake of man.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, whatever does not help toward that for which it was made is superfluous and void. But there are many things in the universe that are harmful to man, like serpents, thorns, and things of this sort. There are also many things that do not help him at all, such as certain fish that live in the depth of the sea. Therefore, since nothing is vain in the works of God, it seems that not everything was made for man.

On the contrary (5), it says in the Physics 2 that we are also in a certain way the end of all things. (Aristotle, Physics 2.2, 194a34–36: we use everything as if it were there for our sake (for we also are, in a sense, an end).)

Furthermore (6), the order of the universe is the end of the whole of creation. But in man there is a certain likeness to the order of the universe; hence he is also called a “microcosm,” since all natures come together, as it were, in man. Therefore, it seems that he is in a certain way the end of all things.

I answer that the end of any reality can be spoken of in two ways: either as that to which the thing naturally tends, or on the basis that the thing is said to be ordered to it as to an end, and this in order to obtain a benefit according to the intention and ordering of an agent. Now, man is said to be the end of created things in both ways. The first way is on the part of the work, whereas the second way is on the part of the agent.

Nevertheless, man and the divine goodness are said to be the end in different ways, since on the part of the agent the divine goodness is the end of things as the ultimate thing intended by the agent. But human nature is not intended by God as though moving his will, but rather as that for whose benefit his effect has been ordered. For he established two orders in the universe. The principal order is according as things are ordered to him, while the secondary is according as one assists another in arriving at likeness to God. Hence it says in the Metaphysics 12 (Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.10, 1075a11–1076a2.) that the parts of the universe are ordered to one another for the sake of their ordering to the last good. In this way, everything which benefits another is said to exist for its sake.

Now, this occurs in two ways. The first is such that that from which a benefit comes to something has a participation in the divine goodness only according to its ordering to that which it benefits; for example, as parts ordered to the whole, and accidents ordered to their subject, which do not have absolute existence, but only existence in another. And such things would neither exist nor come to exist if the other thing which they benefit did not exist. But there are some things that do have an absolute participation in the divine goodness, and from their participation a benefit arises for something else. Such things would exist even if that which they benefit did not exist. This is how it is said that angels and all created things were made by God for man. This is also how it is said that man was made to repair the ruin of the angels, since this benefit likewise followed as foreseen and ordered by God.

Similarly, on the part of the work, created things themselves tend to the divine goodness as to that to which they principally intend to be assimilated. But since something is assimilated to the best by virtue of the fact that it is made like something better than itself, every bodily creature, to the degree that it can, tends toward assimilation to the intellectual creature, which grasps the divine goodness in a higher way. Consequently, the form of man, too, namely, the rational soul, is said to be the last end intended by lower nature, as is said in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 415b15–22.)

Reply Obj. 1: Man is not said to be the end intended by the agent in this way, since this is the account of the last and principal end. Rather, he is said to be the last end as that to which the work of the agent is ordered in some way, as has been said. (Above: a. 2.)

Reply Obj. 2: Man is not the end of everything created as the last thing intended by everything created, but rather as that to whom benefit comes from everything created. And this happens because he has something in common with everything created, as Gregory says above. (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 16, ch. 37 (CCSL 143A; PL 75:1143–44).)

Reply Obj. 3: Every physical thing created, no matter how great in quantity it might be, is still lower than man by reason of his intellect. Hence it is not unfitting if every such created thing also tends toward assimilation to him inasmuch as by this it is assimilated to the greatest good. But angels are more noble than man according to the condition of their nature. Hence they do not exist for man in the aforementioned way, but rather only as creatures from whom benefit accrues to man; it is like if one were to say that a king is set up for the sake of some country fellow who derives the benefit of peace from the king’s laws.

Reply Obj. 4: Things of this sort were not harmful to man from the beginning. But later they became harmful to him through sin. Nevertheless, they are still a benefit to him, since he thereby becomes more humble and considers even in such lower things the glory and wisdom of God. And in this way, even things that are not of use to his work yield a benefit, since he has some knowledge of them either in general or in particular.

Reply Sed Contra 5–6: However, the text of the Philosopher in the Physics 2 that was adduced to the contrary refers to artificial things.

Article 4

Whether the rational soul should be united to a body

To the fourth we proceed as follows. It seems that the rational soul should not have been united to a body.

Obj. 1: For what is directed toward an end is determined according to the account of the end. But the rational soul exists for the sake of the divine beatitude and goodness. Therefore, because it is impeded by the body from participation in divine beatitude, since by bodily activities the soul is impeded from the contemplation of spiritual things, it seems that it should not have been united to a body.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, that which possesses subsisting being of itself is only united to another thing accidentally, (Or “incidentally.”) since what comes after complete being is an accident. But the soul is a kind of thing that subsists in its own being; otherwise, it could not remain after the body. Therefore, it is not unitable in such a way that from it and the body one thing essentially is made.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, things that stand at the greatest distance from each other are only united by the smallest bond. But soul and body stand at the greatest distance from each other, as is said in the text. (Sent. I, 1.6.4.) Therefore, since the bond of form to matter is after the manner of the greatest union, it seems that the soul is not unitable to the body as form to matter.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the powers of the soul flow from its essence. But what results from a principle cannot be more simple than the principle from which it flows. Therefore, since some powers of the soul, such as the intellect and will, are not the act of any body, it seems that neither is the essence of the rational soul.

On the contrary, it belongs to the divine goodness to fill out all the gradations of creatures in the universe. But some created things are purely bodily and some are purely intellectual. Therefore, for the completion of the universe, there must be a creature composed of a body and an intellectual nature.

Furthermore, the potential intellect, according to the Philosopher, is like a tablet on which nothing has been written. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429b30–430a2.) But it cannot be perfected by something being written on it except through species received by the senses. Therefore, it must be united to a sensible organic body.

I answer that the final cause of the joining of soul and body is sufficiently assigned in the text by the Master. (Sent. I, 1.6.1–6.) For the end can be taken either on the part of the agent or on the part of the work. On the part of the agent, namely, God, the end is his goodness, insofar as it falls under his will to diffuse his goodness among things. And this is the first reason that the Master assigns. But on the part of the work, the intended end is to reach assimilation to the divine beatitude. But this is true with respect to its being, inasmuch as the union of soul and body is itself a certain likeness to the divine beatitude by which the spirit is joined to God. And this is the second reason that he assigns. It is also true with respect to its activity—namely, inasmuch as the soul, through the activities that it carries out in the body, approaches divine beatitude by meriting. And this is the third reason.

Reply Obj. 1: If the soul were not able to be united to the body, then it would be of another nature. Hence in accordance with the nature that it does have, it cannot better approach the divine goodness than through being united to the body.

Reply Obj. 2: Whatever comes to a subsisting thing such that from its coming a new being is constituted, such a thing must come incidentally, since there can be only one essential being of one thing. Hence another being coming to it beyond that will be incidental. But the body coming to the soul is drawn into a sharing in the being by which the soul can subsist, though other forms cannot subsist in that being as the soul can.

Reply Obj. 3: As Gregory of Nyssa relates, (Gregory of Nyssa, On the Making of Man, ch. 3 (PG 44:215).) because of this objection Plato posited that the soul is in the body just as what moves is in what is movable, like a sailor in a ship, and not as form in matter. Hence he said that man is not something of soul and body, but rather that man is a soul using a body. And for this reason, too, others sought for certain intermediaries between the soul and body, such as a bodily spirit, a vegetative and sensible soul, and light, by the mediation of which the rational soul would be united to the body. These are all absurd according to philosophy and were disproved by the Philosopher in the Metaphysics 8. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 8.6, 1045a7–b23.) Thus, we say that the essence of the rational soul is immediately united to the body as form is to matter and as a shape is to wax, as is said in On the Soul 2. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.1, 412a27–b9.) Therefore, it should be known that agreement can be considered in two ways: either according to the particular qualities of nature, and in this way, soul and body stand far apart; or according to the proportion of potency to act, and in this way, soul and body greatly agree. And this is the agreement required for something to be united to another immediately as a form. Otherwise, an accident would not be united to a subject and no form would be united to matter, since accident and subject are even in different genera, and matter is potency whereas form is act.

Reply Obj. 4: Among forms there is a certain ranking of nobility. The more noble a form is, the more it predominates over matter. Hence the form of earth is more material than the form of air or fire. But among all forms the rational soul is the most noble. Hence it predominates over matter most of all. Now, everything that is united to another as prevailing and having dominion over it has an effect not only with reference to the joining of itself to the other, but also through itself absolutely, inasmuch as it does not depend on that to which it is united. This is clear, for example, in the fire of a candle, whose light is cast farther than the rising of its smoke and its heating. Hence certain powers can arise from the soul that are acts of the body, while others are from bodily organs in an absolute sense. For even though the essence of the soul is united to the body as its form, nevertheless it is not like a material form, which does not possess being absolutely in which it can subsist.

Article 5

Whether the human soul should be united to such a body

To the fifth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.76.5; Disputed Questions on Evil, q. 5, a. 5; Disputed Questions on the Soul, a. 8.) It seems that the soul should not be united to such a body.

Obj. 1: For since form is proportionate to matter, the most noble body is due to the most noble form. But a heavenly body is the noblest of the bodies. Therefore, it seems that the soul, which is the most noble of forms, should be united to a body of this nature.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a simple body is more proportionate to a simple form than a composite body. But the soul is the simplest of forms. Therefore, it should not be united to a composite body, but rather to a simple one.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, an organic body is less uniform than a homogeneous body. But the soul is the simplest mover. Therefore, the body to which it is united as what is movable should be homogeneous and not organic.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the more subtle a body is, the more it approaches the nobility of form and container. But fire is the subtlest body. Hence it says in On Generation and Corruption 2 that it partakes more of species. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 2.8, 335a17–18: fire alone—or more than all the rest—is akin to the form because it tends by nature to be borne toward the limit.) Therefore, it seems that what should be in the ensouled body is fire, at least predominantly; but the ensouled body’s heavy motion shows the contrary to be true. For each thing is moved by the motion of what predominates in it, as is said in On the Heavens 1. (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.2, 268b27–269a3.)

On the contrary, it is said: and the Lord God formed man of the slime of the earth (Gen 2:7). And we even perceive this sensibly.

I answer that it was necessary for such a form, namely, the rational soul, to be united to a body suitably put together. Avicenna assigns the reason for this, saying that the order of perfectible things must be in accordance with the order of perfections. (Avicenna, De intelligentiis, ch. 10, pt. 2. De intelligentiis is thought to be not actually written by Avicenna and has been attributed to Dominic Gundisalvi (Gundissalinus), though it clearly contains Avicennian influence. See Étienne Gilson, “Avicenne en Occident au Moyen Age,” Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age 36 (1969), 89–121.) But among all perfections that which moves the heavens is the most noble, and among all other perfections the rational soul is likened to it most of all. Thus, the body must be most like heaven. But it pertains to the nobility of a heavenly body that it does not have a contrary. Hence the more a body is separated from contrariety, the more like the heavens it becomes. But this cannot be achieved in generable and corruptible things in such a way that they are freed altogether from contraries, such as hot and cold, but through the fact that they arrive at a mean, since a mean is neither of the extremes in act. Thus, the body that arrives at the greatest uniformity of composition is most like heaven, and such a body should be the human body. And, moreover, there is what is said in On the Soul 2, that man has better touch than other animals. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.9, 421a20–26.) And the better the touch, the better the intellect, since the subtlety of touch follows uniformity of constitution. For the instrument of touch has to be in potency with respect to its sensible objects as a medium and not through privation, just as the pupil is in potency with respect to white and black, as is said in the same book. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.11, 424a7–10.)

Reply Obj. 1: A heavenly body is more noble than a human body, and its perfection is more noble than the human soul. But, as the Commentator says in On the Substance of the Celestial Sphere 1, (Averroes, On the Substance of the Celestial Sphere, bk. 1, ch. 2.) a heavenly body is neither generable nor corruptible like the human body. Thus, it does not stand in need of a perfection completing it by making it sensitive and vegetative, but rather one that moves it locally. And whatever that power is, whether God or an angel, it is higher in nature than the human soul, which is the mover of the human body, and the corporeality of the heavens is higher than the corporeality of the human body.

Reply Obj. 2: Simple bodies are most removed from likeness to the heavens inasmuch as it is in their nature to have a contrary with intensity, and thus, the rational soul should not have been united to such a body.

Reply Obj. 3: The rational soul, even though it is simple in essence, is nevertheless complex in its powers and activities. Thus, its body must have many organs fit for different activities. And for this reason nature gave man hands, with which he can carry out very many activities. And for this reason, too, the less noble a soul is, the less differentiation in organs it requires, as is clear for example in plants and ringed animals.

Reply Obj. 4: The more the elements partake of species and active qualities, the more they partake of the power of acting. Hence there could not be a balance unless there were more of the material element in quantity or matter. Thus, the human body must have more from the earth in quantity, though not in quality, since what is hot dominates in a living body. Hence it says in On the Soul that nothing is sensitive without heat and that the heat of fire is the instrument of the soul. (See Aristotle, On the Soul 3.1, 425a6 (for the former point); 2.4, 416a10–14; 416b27–29 (for the latter point).) And since heaviness and lightness, which are the principles of local motion, follow on the quantity of matter, the human body exhibits a heavy motion.

Exposition of the second part of the text

Love it by understanding it. (Sent. II, 1.4.1.) Here he posits four things, which stand in a certain order. For the intellect engenders love in accordance with the apprehension of the good. Love, in turn, unites to the beloved and in a certain way makes it to be its own by possessing it. And finally, from this joining together there follows delight, which perfects the account of enjoyment.

The rest is clear from what has been said.